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This thesis analyses the British official attitudes and the gradual change of British 
policy towards Hungary and Hungarian revisionism in the period from the Anschluss in 
March 1938 to December 1941, when the British government declared war on Hungary. 
The primary focus of this thesis lies in the impact of Hungary`s territorial claims on 
British policy towards Hungary and Central Europe and upon the criteria Britain judged 
the territorial gains of Hungary between 1938 and 1941. This work is the result of the 
author`s research in British, American and Hungarian archives, along with his reflection 
on numerous documentary editions, diaries, memoirs and secondary sources. It aims to 
deepen our knowledge of Anglo-Hungarian relationship, British Central European 
policy and the British view of regional territorial disputes. At the same time, it is keen 
to dispel the myths and stereotypes of the British and Hungarian historiography, which 
have so far viewed Hungary as an unimportant factor in British Central European 
strategy.    iii	 ﾠ
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`The whole lot, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, Jugos, Romanians 
should be put in a bag and shaken up, and then handed over to 
a decent Briton to administer.`
1 
(Sir George Clerk, 1919) 
 
1. Introduction	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.  1. The aims and focus of the study: 
	 ﾠ
Sylvia Stevenson travelled through the border country of Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
in the troubled times of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-39. She noted her experiences 
in a travel journal. At the outset of her journey she was unable to comprehend the petty 
quarrel over a tiny strip of territory between two small nations, Hungarians and Slovaks. 
By the end of her journey, after arriving at Munkács [Mukachevo] she exclaimed in her 
journal with burning enthusiasm: `They [the Hungarians] were right, [frontier revision 
was] not a mere childish clinging to sentimentalism.`
2 The Spectator had given a 
sarcastic and hostile review of Stevenson`s account and accused her of glorifying the 
whole episode into a sort of crusade, being hopelessly susceptible to the romantic 
appeal of dashing Hussars, and being overwhelmed by anti-Czech Hungarian 
propaganda and the Nazi suggested estimate of the allegedly dismaying condition of the 
Magyar minorities in Czechoslovakia.
3 It is difficult to decide whether Stevenson or the 
reviewer was more influenced by propaganda and personal experiences. This example 
nevertheless vividly demonstrates that British perceptions about Hungary and 
Hungarian revisionism were formulated on limited background information, and were 
indeed very reliant on personal experiences and external data. This thesis argues that 
key British policy-makers were also quite susceptible to these influences, and made 
decisions about Hungary on limited background knowledge.  
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠQuoted	 ﾠby:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠOrzoff,	 ﾠBattle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCastle:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMyth	 ﾠof	 ﾠCzechoslovakia	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1914-ﾭ‐1948	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠ
York,	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ144.	 ﾠClerk	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠminister	 ﾠin	 ﾠCzechoslovakia.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠretired	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠ
service	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1937.	 ﾠSee:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠProthero,	 ﾠSearching	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠNew	 ﾠEurope:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDiplomatic	 ﾠCareer	 ﾠof	 ﾠSir	 ﾠ
George	 ﾠRussell	 ﾠClerk	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠS.	 ﾠStevenson,	 ﾠRide	 ﾠto	 ﾠBattle	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1939),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ45.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSpectator,	 ﾠ`Ride	 ﾠto	 ﾠBattle,	 ﾠby	 ﾠSylvia	 ﾠStevenson`,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ36.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
This study is concerned with the official British-Hungarian relationship and 
official British opinions about Hungary`s territorial gains between 1938 and 1941. It is 
particularly interested in how key British policy-makers perceived Hungary and its 
territorial ambitions, and aims to identify what factors and principles influenced their 
decisions and policy towards Hungary. The primary objective is to determine how the 
British officially saw the dramatic territorial transformation of Hungary between 1938 
and 1941. The First Vienna Award (2 November 1938), the Hungarian occupation of 
Ruthenia (March 1939), the Second Vienna Award (30 August 1940) and the Hungarian 
occupation of the northern parts of Yugoslavia (April 1941) (map 1.1) had increased the 
territory and population of Trianon Hungary by more than 50 percent. This extensive 
territorial adjustment made Hungary the dominant power of the Carpathian basin, and 
formidably increased its strength compared to its rivals in the region.  
The historiography so far has focused on the British reaction to these territorial 
changes, but neglected the dynamics of British opinion in the intervals between these 
four events and how British decisions were made.
4 Moreover, it has crucially 
overlooked the wider Central European perspective of the problem and the fact that the 
Hungarian territorial question had strong implications for British regional policy. This 
wider perspective provides a clearer picture of the position of Hungary in British policy 
and helps us in understanding the sudden shifts in British policy towards Budapest. 
Also, Britain`s relationship with Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia cannot be 
entirely understood without considering the British attitude towards the `Hungarian 
question`. Since the end of the First World War, Hungary persistently contested its 
frontiers with these countries. Upholding favourable relations with the West and 
cooperation with Germany for satisfying revisionist aims, Hungary`s foreign policy was 
an intricate web of seeming contradictions, which baffled outsiders, but made perfect 
sense to Hungarians. These inevitably had a crucial implication on Britain`s relationship 
with Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. An analysis from a wider Central 
European context has been provided by Gábor Bátonyi, who has focused on Britain`s 
relationship with Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia between 1919 and 1933.
5 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠA.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐1941,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2004);	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ
Romsics,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠkülpolitika	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠ„magyar	 ﾠkérdés”,	 ﾠ1914-ﾭ‐1946`	 ﾠin	 ﾠHelyünk	 ﾠés	 ﾠsorsunk	 ﾠa	 ﾠDuna-ﾭ‐medencében,	 ﾠ
ed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ34-ﾭ‐132.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠG.	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1918-ﾭ‐1933	 ﾠ(Oxford,	 ﾠ1999).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Miklós Lojkó has applied the same approach, but covering a shorter period of time, and 
demonstrated the challenges of British policy towards Poland and Hungary.
6 
Unfortunately there has been no comparable analysis for the period under consideration 
here.
7  
This study is not a rewriting of the Anglo-Hungarian relations, but a more 
focused analysis of the impact of the territorial question on British opinion and bilateral 
relations. As revisionism was the central theme of inter-war Hungarian foreign policy, it 
crucially affected all aspects of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship; hence reviewing 
British official opinions and the bilateral relations from this perspective offers a more 
reliable image than previous historical approaches. We are aiming to clarify questions, 
such as how British political, economic and strategic interests affected views on 
Hungary. Eventually, the analysis is directed to demonstrate the British long-term view 
of Hungary`s territorial changes, and to demonstrate whether policy-makers in 
Whitehall considered them sustainable and viable. It will be crucial to identify what 
were the British criteria in judging the territorial changes of Hungary and for redrawing 
Hungary`s frontiers after the war. We are seeking to address whether the concept of 
`self-determination`, the original aim of the Versailles peace settlement, was considered 
by Whitehall as a viable solution for reconstructing the region after the Second World 
War, or whether more forceful approaches, such as creating ethnographic frontiers by 
population transfers, redrawing frontiers on the basis of economic viability or historical 
precedence were contemplated as workable solutions.  
Fundamentally, the analysis is interested in official British opinion, but a 
different set of questions are posed to those normally found in conventional diplomatic 
narratives, which concentrate on Great Power diplomacy and exile politics. Diplomatic 
development provides the framework of British debate within and outside of official 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠM.	 ﾠLojkó,	 ﾠMeddling	 ﾠin	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠEurope:	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ`Lands	 ﾠBetween`,	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1925	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsynthesis	 ﾠof	 ﾠElisabeth	 ﾠBarker,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠvery	 ﾠuseful,	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠcollection	 ﾠof	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion:	 ﾠE.	 ﾠBarker,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐East	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1976).	 ﾠAndrás	 ﾠBán	 ﾠhas	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1930s	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhis	 ﾠpremature	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠleft	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠunfinished:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠ‘British	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠEast	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠ1937-ﾭ‐1947’	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ20th	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠPowers,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ1995),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ114-ﾭ‐132.	 ﾠGerard	 ﾠ
Van	 ﾠKessel	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBalkan,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
did	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠHungary:	 ﾠ	 ﾠG.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠVan	 ﾠKessel,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠReaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠExpansion	 ﾠto	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠ
East	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1936-ﾭ‐1939	 ﾠ(unpublished	 ﾠPhD	 ﾠthesis,	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠUniversity,	 ﾠ1972).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
circles, but the analysis takes a different tack by probing and examining the way in 
which advice, decision, intervention and thinking unfolded in London about Hungary. 
Essentially, it tries to understand the forces that had driven policy-makers.
8  
Through this perspective, the subsequent chapters are building up a new and 
more comprehensive interpretation of the dynamics of the Anglo-Hungarian 
relationship. By introducing a large set of unresearched British and Hungarian primary 
sources, and reinterpreting the old, this thesis seeks to dispel some long established 
myths surrounding the British view of Hungary between 1938 and 1941. The image of 
Hungary as a German satellite is very much overdrawn by historiography. This 
perspective suggested that Hungarian territorial demands and acquisitions were 
automatically condemned by London, because they were achieved with the help of 
Hitler and Mussolini, and that the opinion of British policy-makers was constantly anti-
Hungarian during the Second World War. It also indicated that due to Hungary`s 
officially pro-German foreign political orientation, London automatically supported 
Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia and the restoration of the Versailles status 
quo after the war. This research has proved that in spite of the fact that Hungary was 
condemned for following a pro-German policy, in the background policy-makers 
planned a fair treatment for Hungary after the war. However, the most significant 
argument put forward by this thesis is that Hungarian territorial demands overall did not 
affect British perceptions on Hungary, and that British opinions about the frontiers of 
Hungary were the subject of the international situation, and current British strategy.   
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8	 ﾠOne	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠaims	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠreview	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlist	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Foreign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠtables	 ﾠ1.1,	 ﾠ1.2,	 ﾠ1.3,	 ﾠ1.4,	 ﾠ1.5,	 ﾠ1.6,	 ﾠ1.7,	 ﾠ
1.8.	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.  2. Structure: 
	 ﾠ
The particular timeframe of 1938-41 has been chosen, because both starting and ending 
points mark defining junctures in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. In 1938 the 
Munich crisis drastically transformed British policy towards the Central European 
region, as it seemed that Britain had decided to withdraw from the region completely. 
This year also marked the first stage of the enlargement of Hungary. In the aftermath of 
the Munich Agreement, the First Vienna Award reincorporated into Hungary a wide 
strip of territory, which had been lost to Czechoslovakia in 1920. In April 1941 London 
severed diplomatic relations and in December declared war on Budapest. Within this 
timeframe our argument follows a chronological approach, as far as possible, but 
occasional overlaps will be necessary to enable the complete consideration of the long-
term British view on specific territorial changes.   
The text is divided into five chapters, each of which represents a significant 
stage either in the territorial aggrandisement of Hungary, or a shift in British 
perceptions toward it. Each chapter is exploring a series of themes and turning points 
through which the dynamics and complexity of the formulation of British opinion is 
disentangled, focusing particularly on the question of how British views changed.  
The Introduction, apart from presenting the sources and addressing 
historiographical and methodological questions, will also acquaint the reader with the 
British attitude towards Hungary before the late 1930s. It will explain some aspects of 
the Treaty of Trianon (1920), the peace treaty between the Allies and Hungary, and will 
briefly cover the Anglo-Hungarian relationship up to 1938. 
The first chapter is concerned with the Hungarian angle of the Munich crisis. It 
explores British reaction to the Hungarian territorial claims on Czechoslovakia and how 
London consequently judged the First Vienna Award. The aim is to demonstrate 
whether London drew a distinction between the German and the Hungarian claims on 
Prague, and to identify on what principles British policy-makers accepted the 
adjustment of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier. Besides, it demonstrates the British 
response to the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia in March 1939, which was the 
outgrowth of the German destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. London however viewed the 7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Hungarian takeover with forbearance. Bringing new evidence forward this chapter 
highlights that Hungary`s role in British strategy before the outbreak of the war was 
more significant than has been previously understood.   
  Chapter three begins by laying out the effect of the outbreak of the war on 
British Central European policy. The war changed British views on European territorial 
questions in various ways. Post-war planning started immediately, and perceptions 
about future frontiers were placed in the context of war strategy. The period of the 
`Phoney War` is one of the least known periods of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. 
Until now, historians have agreed that the outbreak of the war diminished British 
interest in the region and that Hungary was written off as a German satellite. We will 
prove that although Hungary and Romania were devalued militarily, London showed 
strategic interest towards these countries until Italy entered the war in June 1940.  
The fourth chapter offers the most significant turning point in the bilateral 
relationship and is contradictorily the least researched period. In April 1940 Budapest 
agreed to grant droit de passage (right of military passage) for German troops in the 
future if Berlin requested it. This radically transformed British views of Hungary, which 
was now considered to be in the German camp by its own choice. New evidence reveals 
that the `droit` had a devastating effect on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, and also 
gravely affected British opinions of Hungary`s territorial aspirations. 
The focus of the fifth chapter is the British reaction to the Axis arbitration of the 
Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute, the Second Vienna Award. It aims to decide 
why Romania was given priority by London in its dispute with Hungary, while both 
Budapest and Bucharest were condemned by Whitehall for following a pro-Axis policy.  
The beginning of 1941 brought a new positive approach towards Hungary in the 
Foreign Office. Our last chapter asks the reason for this sudden change of perspective, 
and identifies why London eventually decided to break off diplomatic relations with 
Hungary in April, and declared war in December. It also assesses how official British 
policy envisaged the post-war frontiers of Hungary.  8	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.3. Background: 
 
A number of problems, such as the Treaty of Trianon and British policy towards 
Hungary before 1938, have to be introduced prior to the presentation of sources.  
The Treaty of Trianon, the peace agreement between the Allies and Hungary 
after the First World War, regulated the status of Hungary and defined its frontiers.
9 It is 
not our aim to analyse or critique Trianon, but to sketch its territorial, demographic and 
minority implications and its impact on the Hungarian mind, Hungarian foreign policy 
and inter-war revisionism.
10 It will also be important to highlight British policy towards 
the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the dismantling of Hungary, as it will demonstrate 
British attitudes towards the questions of national independence and frontier change. It 
is similarly crucial to exhibit the British attitude towards Hungarian territorial claims	 ﾠ
during the 1920s and 1930s and how far Britain judged the Versailles status quo as 
viable in that period.   
Before its dismemberment in 1920 Hungary was a multi-ethnic state, with nearly 
half of the population non-Magyars (map 1.2, table 1.10). Trianon left Hungary with 32 
percent of its original territory (map 1.3), and 36 percent of its population.
11 The area 
allocated to the neighbouring states possessed the majority of the non-Magyar 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠantecedents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠM.	 ﾠOrmos,	 ﾠPaduától	 ﾠTrianonig,	 ﾠ1918-ﾭ‐1920	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ
1978).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhistoriography	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠis	 ﾠimmense,	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscope	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
comprehensive	 ﾠand	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠA	 ﾠtrianoni	 ﾠbékeszerződés	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ
2001).	 ﾠRomsics	 ﾠand	 ﾠStephen	 ﾠVárdy	 ﾠhave	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
historiography:	 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠClió	 ﾠbűvöletében.	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠtörténetírás	 ﾠa	 ﾠ19-ﾭ‐20.	 ﾠszázadban	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnemzetközi	 ﾠ
kitekintéssel	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ293-ﾭ‐315,	 ﾠ356-ﾭ‐376,	 ﾠ481-ﾭ‐490;	 ﾠS.	 ﾠVárdy,	 ﾠ`Trianon	 ﾠin	 ﾠInterwar	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
Historiography`	 ﾠin	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠWar	 ﾠand	 ﾠPeacemaking.	 ﾠA	 ﾠCase	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠB.	 ﾠKirály,	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPastor,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ
Sanders	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ1982),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ361-ﾭ‐89.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠupon	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠS.	 ﾠVárdy,	 ﾠ
`The	 ﾠImpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠupon	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠMind:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠNature	 ﾠof	 ﾠInterwar	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
Irredentism`,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠReview	 ﾠ37	 ﾠ(1983),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ21-ﾭ‐42.	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠAll	 ﾠdata	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠhere	 ﾠuses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1910	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠand	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠof	 ﾠ`Hungary	 ﾠproper`,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
excludes	 ﾠCroatia-ﾭ‐Slavonia,	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1102	 ﾠwas	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠunion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ1910	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
criticised	 ﾠby	 ﾠmany.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠby	 ﾠmother	 ﾠtongue	 ﾠand	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmay	 ﾠor	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠcorresponded	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual`s	 ﾠnational	 ﾠidentity,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
group	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠMagyars	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠdevelopment.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠethnically	 ﾠ
mixed	 ﾠregions	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbi-ﾭ‐	 ﾠor	 ﾠtrilingual.	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠK.	 ﾠPaul,	 ﾠPéter	 ﾠHanák	 ﾠand	 ﾠLászló	 ﾠKatus	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
stated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠis	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠaccurate,	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠby:	 ﾠP.	 ﾠR.	 ﾠBrass,	 ﾠEthnic	 ﾠGroups	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
State	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1985),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ132-ﾭ‐133,	 ﾠ156.	 ﾠOthers	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠMagyars	 ﾠwas	 ﾠexaggerated:	 ﾠ
V.	 ﾠBystricky´,	 ﾠ`Slovakia	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠConference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeclaration	 ﾠof	 ﾠindependence`	 ﾠin	 ﾠSlovakia	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
History,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠM.	 ﾠTeich	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(Cambridge,	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ157-ﾭ‐174	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ165);	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMurad,	 ﾠFranz	 ﾠJoseph	 ﾠI	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Austria	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠEmpire	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ1968),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
population, but about 3-3.5 million Magyars were also forced to live outside the newly 
defined frontiers. Predominantly Magyar settlements, consisting of about 2 million 
Magyars, were situated in a typically 50 km wide strip along the new borders, in foreign 
territory.
12 The initial aim of the Versailles peace settlement was to redraw the map of 
Central Europe and the Balkans on the principles of national self-determination. 
Peacemakers however believed that the strengthening of Czechoslovakia, Romania and 
Yugoslavia would bring stability to the region, therefore this criterion was neglected at 
the expense of Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. The new frontiers favoured the 
strategic interest of the newly created states with little or no regard to the historical, 
cultural, ethnic, geographic and economic characteristics of the region.
13 Hungarian 
propositions and complaints were disregarded, and the Hungarian delegation was 
excluded from the treaty negotiations. 
Before 1914, the Foreign Office knew very little about the national question of 
Austria-Hungary. In 1914, Britain did not declare war for the cause of national self-
determination, or for the purpose of changing the existing territorial structure of Central 
Europe, but to maintain the balance of power. Since the region was an area of secondary 
importance, the government gave very little thought to its post-war settlement. Aims 
were considered only in the most general terms, and British policy-makers would have 
been satisfied by a settlement which would be conducive to peace and stability.
14 
However, by the turn of 1917 and 1918 the Allies could not afford abstaining from 
turning the nationalities against Austria-Hungary.
15 When a separate peace with 
Austria-Hungary proved impossible, the Entente decided to give maximum support to 
the separatism of the nationalities.
16 Before and during the war, the national question of 
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12	 ﾠK.	 ﾠKocsis	 ﾠand	 ﾠE.	 ﾠKocsis-ﾭ‐Hódosi,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠMinorities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCarpathian	 ﾠBasin	 ﾠ(Toronto,	 ﾠ1995),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ13-ﾭ‐
28.	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠL.	 ﾠArday,	 ﾠTérkép	 ﾠcsata	 ﾠután,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠkülpolitikában	 ﾠ1918-ﾭ‐1919	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠMark	 ﾠCornwall	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠearly	 ﾠas	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1914,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
chauvinism	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠliability	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
viewing	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠas	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐viable,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdismemberment	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠCornwall,	 ﾠ`Great	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSplintering	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠ1914-ﾭ‐
1918`	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1848,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠL.	 ﾠPéter	 ﾠand	 ﾠM.	 ﾠRady	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ103-ﾭ‐
122.	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠterritories	 ﾠwere	 ﾠpromised	 ﾠto	 ﾠSerbia	 ﾠand	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1915.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsecret	 ﾠ
agreements,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintegral	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠCornwall,	 ﾠ`Great	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSplintering	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠHungary`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ110-ﾭ‐111.	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠK.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠCalder,	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNew	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ1914-ﾭ‐1918	 ﾠ(Cambridge,	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ214-ﾭ‐215,	 ﾠ
218;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠCornwall,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUndermining	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustria-ﾭ‐Hungary.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBattle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠHearts	 ﾠand	 ﾠMinds	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
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Hungary received much prominence in British public discourse. Scholars have argued 
that the anti-Hungarian tone of the writings of R. W. Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed 
had substantially coloured the viewpoint of the British public, and most crucially the 
Foreign Office.
17  
Before turning our attention to the British attitude towards Hungary after the 
Great War, and the question of frontier revision in the inter-war period, it is crucial to 
briefly sketch the aims and arguments of Hungarian revisionism after Trianon. In 
contemporary Britain, `revisionism` was interpreted as the reconsideration of the entire 
peace settlement, not only the reconsideration of its territorial conditions, as the 
problem was mostly viewed by Hungary.
18 English-language historiography has 
concentrated on German and Italian revisionism, and Hungarian and Bulgarian 
ambitions to reverse the status quo have received less attention from historians.
 19 This 
thesis is arguing that Hungarian territorial ambitions were one of the main reasons for 
the British failure to conjoin the countries of the region into a firm block against 
Germany in the late 1930s.
 20  
Since 1928, Hungary had openly challenged Trianon. The treaty was called into 
question from historic, ethnographic, economic, moral and legal perspectives. 
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(London,	 ﾠ2000),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ218-ﾭ‐221.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠAustria-ﾭ‐Hungary	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠF.R.	 ﾠBridge,	 ﾠ
Great	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠAustria-ﾭ‐Hungary	 ﾠ1906-ﾭ‐1914	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1972).	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠCornwall,	 ﾠ`Great	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSplintering	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠHungary`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ115;	 ﾠG.	 ﾠJeszenszky,	 ﾠAz	 ﾠelveszett	 ﾠ
presztizs:	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠmegítélésének	 ﾠmegváltozása	 ﾠNagy-ﾭ‐Britanniában	 ﾠ(1894-ﾭ‐1918)	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1994),	 ﾠ
pp.	 ﾠ12-ﾭ‐14.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠR.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠRacial	 ﾠProblems	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1908);	 ﾠIbem,	 ﾠ
Roumania	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1915);	 ﾠIbem,	 ﾠGerman,	 ﾠSlav,	 ﾠand	 ﾠMagyar:	 ﾠA	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrigins,	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1916);	 ﾠH.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSteed,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHabsburg	 ﾠMonarchy	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1913).	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠH.	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
C.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMaking	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠNew	 ﾠEurope:	 ﾠR.W.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLast	 ﾠYears	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustria-ﾭ‐
Hungary	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1981),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ41.	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrevisionism,	 ﾠseparatism,	 ﾠirredentism	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpansionism.	 ﾠ
`Revisionism`	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠaspirations	 ﾠto	 ﾠregain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
territories	 ﾠlost	 ﾠin	 ﾠTrianon.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠan	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐depth	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterminology;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠKallis,	 ﾠFascist	 ﾠIdeology.	 ﾠ
Territory	 ﾠand	 ﾠExpansionism	 ﾠin	 ﾠItaly	 ﾠand	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠ1922-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2000),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ111-ﾭ‐121.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
19	 ﾠC.	 ﾠFink,	 ﾠ`Revisionism`	 ﾠin	 ﾠA	 ﾠCompanion	 ﾠto	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1900-ﾭ‐1945,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠG.	 ﾠMartel	 ﾠ(Oxford,	 ﾠ2010)	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ326-ﾭ‐340.	 ﾠ
See	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ‘British	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
1930s’	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1848,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠL.	 ﾠPeter	 ﾠand	 ﾠM.	 ﾠRady	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ205-ﾭ‐
216.;	 ﾠKallis,	 ﾠFascist	 ﾠIdeology,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ104-ﾭ‐115.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplethora	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistoriography	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
revisionism	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠpassing	 ﾠreference.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠmention	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠstudies:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ
Taylor,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1961);	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ
Reconsidered,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠG.	 ﾠMartel	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1999);	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠTwo:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDebate	 ﾠContinues,	 ﾠ
ed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠR.	 ﾠBoyce	 ﾠand	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMaiolo	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2003);	 ﾠP.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠBell,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Europe	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2007);	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠAn	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠPerspective,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠF.	 ﾠ
McDonough	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ11	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Hungarian governments in the inter-war period contested the legality and validity of the 
treaty on the basis that the Hungarian delegation was not invited to the peace 
conference, hence the treaty constituted a diktat. Questioning the morality and sincerity 
of the entire Versailles settlement was directly connected to this. Budapest claimed that 
self-determination was only a bombastic catchphrase, which ignored 3-3.5 million 
Magyars, and was intentionally applied at the expense of the defeated. The demographic 
and minority consequences of Trianon were however only one side of the Hungarian 
grievances. Principally, Trianon was a territorial trauma for Hungarians. The notion of 
the `1000 year old kingdom of St. Stephen` was based on the unquestionable territorial 
integrity of Hungary.
21 The Foreign Office considered this state-concept as archaic, and 
its reiteration in the inter-war period by Hungary was viewed as a sign of instability.
22 
Most crucially, the territorial fixation and inward-looking nature of Hungarian national 
mythology, and the concept of the supremacy of state over national independence 
alienated British policy-makers, who interpreted integral Hungarian revisionism in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s as aiming to restore Magyar supremacy over other nations.
23 
This eventually became one of the key reasons for rejecting the reincorporation of 
territories inhabited by non-Magyars into Hungary.
 24  
Balázs Ablonczy has argued that Pál Teleki`s view-point on revivionism during 
his premiership (1939-41) was defined by these principles. Teleki regarded anything 
less than integral revision as a gallant concession to the nationalities and a compromise 
on the altar of European peace.
25 However, the Hungarian elite recognised that integral 
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21	 ﾠThe	 ﾠChristian	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠstate	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠby	 ﾠStephen	 ﾠ(Saint)	 ﾠI	 ﾠ(1001-ﾭ‐1038)	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1001.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ`State-ﾭ‐
concept	 ﾠof	 ﾠSaint	 ﾠStephen`	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠmixture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠrule	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCarpathian	 ﾠbasin,	 ﾠand	 ﾠChristianity.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmingled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠprotected	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠcivilization	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbarbaric	 ﾠhordes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEast.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠTeleki`s	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠconcept,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠfuture;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ
Teleki,	 ﾠ`Szent	 ﾠIstván	 ﾠbirodalma	 ﾠ1941-ﾭ‐ben`	 ﾠin	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠPál	 ﾠválogatott	 ﾠpolitikai	 ﾠírások	 ﾠés	 ﾠbeszédek,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠB.	 ﾠ
Ablonczy	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2000),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ496-ﾭ‐519;	 ﾠP.	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠszentistváni	 ﾠállameszme`	 ﾠ(speech	 ﾠmade	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Catholic	 ﾠDemonstration),	 ﾠBudapest,	 ﾠ19	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠ<http://www.regnumportal.hu/>	 ﾠ[accessed	 ﾠ24	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ
2013].	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠG.	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ205.	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠIntegral	 ﾠrevisionism	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠrestore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐Trianon	 ﾠfrontiers	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠover	 ﾠnation	 ﾠwas	 ﾠadvocated	 ﾠby	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠpoliticians	 ﾠand	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠP.	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠ`Szent	 ﾠIstván	 ﾠbirodalma	 ﾠ1941-ﾭ‐ben`;	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠSzekfű,	 ﾠHárom	 ﾠ
nemzedék	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1920),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ389-ﾭ‐390.	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠB.	 ﾠAblonczy,	 ﾠPál	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠLife	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠControversial	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠPolitician	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ2006)	 ﾠ,p.	 ﾠ93.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠ
also:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ(book	 ﾠreview)	 ﾠ`Ablonczy,	 ﾠBalázs.	 ﾠPál	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠ(1874–1941):	 ﾠThe	 ﾠLife	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠControversial	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠPolitician`	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustrian	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠYearbook,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠGary	 ﾠB.	 ﾠCohen	 ﾠet	 ﾠal,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ42	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ2011	 ﾠ
(Minneapolis,	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ248-ﾭ‐249.	 ﾠ12	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
revision could not be presented as an aim to the international community, as its scale 
would have alienated foreign governments. Consequently, Hungarian politicians were 
very circuspect in defining the extent of Hungary`s territorial claims during the inter-
war years.  
Gábor Bátonyi and Mark Cornwall have pointed out that British representatives 
in the region, particularly the British minister in Prague, Sir Joseph Addison, were 
revisionist voices. Bátonyi has stressed however that the viewpoints of these British 
ministers should not be confused with those of British policy-makers in London, who 
expressed more rigid opinions.
26 The memory of the Great War and the German-Austro-
Hungarian alliance crucially determined the mind-set of British policy-makers towards 
Hungary.
27 As we will see, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the German-
Hungarian military alliance and the notion of German-Hungarian `war guilt` in the First 
World War, and the German cultural tradition in Hungary largely determined Hungary`s 
place in British thought. While Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians and Yugoslavs were 
known for their struggle for independence, Hungary was only remembered for its 
negative role in the Great War. Adding to this, Cornwall has emphasized that the idea 
that Hungarian sympathy with England was fully reciprocated in London stuck fast 
among the Magyar political elite and the public.
28 Misreading British opinion in 
Budapest indeed became the main reason for misunderstanding between London and 
Budapest	 ﾠin the late 1930s and early 1940s.  
These, as we will see, crucially affected both the British view of Hungarian 
territorial claims, and the interpretation of British attitudes in Budapest. This study has 
not had space to detail the labyrinth of Hungarian territorial claims and revisionist 
propaganda in the 1920s and early 1930s.
29 Our aim here is briefly to describe how 
London judged the questions of revisionism and frontier revision in this period.  
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26	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ205-ﾭ‐206;	 ﾠ
Cornwall,	 ﾠ`Great	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSplintering	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠ1914-ﾭ‐1918`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ103.	 ﾠ
27	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠminister	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠ(1938-ﾭ‐41),	 ﾠalso	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmemoirs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠGerman-ﾭ‐Austro-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠalliance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠcorps	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
inter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwas	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠof	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠdiplomacy:	 ﾠ
Gy.	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiplomataemlékeim,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠvolt	 ﾠvatikáni	 ﾠés	 ﾠlondoni	 ﾠkövetének	 ﾠemlékirataiból	 ﾠ1911-ﾭ‐
1945,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠvols,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1994),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ423.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
28	 ﾠCornwall,	 ﾠ`Great	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSplintering	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠHungary`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ103.	 ﾠ
29	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaims	 ﾠand	 ﾠtools	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠZeidler,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠ
irredenta	 ﾠkultusz	 ﾠa	 ﾠkét	 ﾠvilágháború	 ﾠközött	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2002);	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠA	 ﾠrevíziós	 ﾠgondolat	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2009);	 ﾠ13	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The continuous `Justice for Hungary` press campaign of Lord Rothermere on the 
pages of the Daily Mail, and the petition of British MPs in 1933 for `justice to the 
Hungarian nation` negatively affected British official opinion about Hungarian 
territorial aspirations.
30 However, due to the Great Depression, British official opinion 
softened on the question of revision, because London recognised that the economic and 
territorial strains of the peace treaties obstructed the economic development of Central 
Europe, which eventually injured interstate relations and hampered stability.
31 In the 
mid-1930s British disapproval of Hungarian revisionism was mainly the consequence of 
Hungary asking for a territorial price to participate in initiatives like the Danubian 
Customs Union Plan (1932) and the Tardieu Plan (1932)	 ﾠwhich intended to solve 
regional problems.
32 Indeed, it was evident that London did not contemplate the 
complete reversal of the territorial structure, but only to remove the most urgent 
antagonisms. The Four Power Pact (1933), which meant to ensure the cooperation of 
Italy, France, Britain and Germany, initially called for the limited revision of Hungary`s 
frontiers, applying ethnographic criteria. The plan originated from Mussolini, but the 
British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, received it with passionate enthusiasm. 
When he commented in the House of Commons that `Every treaty is holy, but none are 
eternal[…]` it caused sensation in the world press, as it was the first occasion that a 
British Prime Minister officially and openly had espoused the principle of revision.
33 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
E.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠWeaver,	 ﾠRevision	 ﾠand	 ﾠIts	 ﾠModes:	 ﾠHungary's	 ﾠAttempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠOverturn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠ1931-ﾭ‐1938	 ﾠ
(unpublished	 ﾠD.Phil.	 ﾠthesis,	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠOxford,	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
30	 ﾠLord	 ﾠRothermere,	 ﾠMy	 ﾠCampaign	 ﾠfor	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1939);	 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`Hungary’s	 ﾠPlace	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSun.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠNewspaper	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠRepercussions`,	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1848,	 ﾠ
pp.	 ﾠ193-ﾭ‐204;	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ211.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
petition	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommons	 ﾠand	 ﾠLords,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠR.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠL.	 ﾠV.	 ﾠWilliams,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠParliament:	 ﾠspeeches,	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠand	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠthereto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠof	 ﾠLords	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Commons	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1919	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1930	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1933);	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠSir	 ﾠR.	 ﾠGower,	 ﾠTreaty-ﾭ‐revision	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
Frontiers	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1936);	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠMinorities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSuccessor	 ﾠStates	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1937).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
31	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ213-ﾭ‐214.	 ﾠ
32	 ﾠI.	 ﾠDiószegi,	 ﾠ`Gazdasági	 ﾠegyesítési	 ﾠtervek	 ﾠa	 ﾠDuna	 ﾠmedencében	 ﾠaz	 ﾠ1929-ﾭ‐33-ﾭ‐as	 ﾠgazdasági	 ﾠvilágválság	 ﾠ
időszakában`	 ﾠin	 ﾠIntegrációs	 ﾠtörekvések	 ﾠKözép	 ﾠ–és	 ﾠKelet-ﾭ‐Európában	 ﾠa	 ﾠ19.	 ﾠés	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠSzázadban,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ
Romsics	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1997),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ63-ﾭ‐115;	 ﾠS.	 ﾠBethlen,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠDanubian	 ﾠStates	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTardieu	 ﾠPlan`,	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠ
Science	 ﾠQuarterly	 ﾠ141	 ﾠ(1932),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ352-ﾭ‐362;	 ﾠF.	 ﾠG.	 ﾠStambrook,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠProposal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDanubian	 ﾠStates:	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCustoms	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠProject	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1932`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSlavonic	 ﾠand	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠReview	 ﾠ98	 ﾠ(1963),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ64-ﾭ‐88;	 ﾠ
Bátonyi,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ209.	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠHansard	 ﾠ(Commons),	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ276,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ511,	 ﾠRamsay	 ﾠMacDonald,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1933.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠK.	 ﾠMorgan,	 ﾠ
Ramsay	 ﾠMac	 ﾠDonald	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2006),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ79.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠwas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠFour	 ﾠPower	 ﾠPact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPolish	 ﾠCorridor	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiminished,	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadjacent	 ﾠ
territories	 ﾠpopulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠMagyars:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/16683,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ2608/2607/62;	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/16691,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ
5740/2607/62.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ14	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Eventually, out of suspicion of Hitler`s intentions, all references to frontier revision 
were omitted from the Four Power Pact.
34  
Sensing the softening of British views, Count István Bethlen went on a lecture 
tour to Britain in 1932-33 to influence British opinion. His main goal was to present the 
viability of broad frontier revision. He called for the creation of an independent 
Transylvania and the transferring of a wide strip of territory along Hungary`s frontiers.
35 
The Foreign Office, although considering Bethlen a moderate politician, refused to see 
him and gave a frosty reception to his lecture tour.
36 After Hitler`s accession to power 
Britain`s interest in adjusting the peace treaties through peaceful negotiations drastically 
diminished. There was also particular concern about the dictatorial methods of 
Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös (1932-36), which made London cautious 
towards the question of frontier revision.
37 With the appearance of a revisionist 
Germany, Hungary expected a rapid realization of its revisionist hopes. However, in 
order not to cause a landslide in the region, London categorically disapproved of any 
attempt to link Hungarian and German demands, and was convinced that the Hungarian 
problem was the less pressing issue, and therefore could be postponed. Eventually, the 
search for Hitler’s support for territorial aspirations, as we will demonstrate, 
undermined the Hungarian moral case in international forums of seeking justice for the 
Magyars living under alien rule. Bátonyi has argued that the aggressiveness of Germany 
discontinued British public support for creating justice in Central Europe, and 
consequently all the British public wanted was to avoid war.
38  
Following the remilitarization of the Rhineland, Ramsay MacDonald declared 
that he was pleased that the Versailles status quo was disappearing.
39 British Foreign 
Secretary, Anthony Eden, initiated discussions in Whitehall on the reconsideration of 
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the status quo of the Central European region. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, recommended the rewriting of the League of 
Nations Covenant and the territorial restructuring of the region. Cadogan`s 
recommendation however did not reflect sympathy towards revision, but rather an 
attempt to save whatever was left of the Versailles system.
40 Eden`s initiative also 
cannot be interpreted as the embracing of revision. It was no more than an inquiry. 
These kinds of investigations died away under the premiership of Neville Chamberlain, 
who, from 1937, took the initiative to appease Germany. With appeasement, British 
efforts for constructing an anti-German bloc in Central Europe ceased completely, and 
Chamberlain, as we will see, showed only limited interest towards the territorial 
questions of the region. British interest in Hungarian territorial claims only intensified 
in 1938 as a result of the Munich crisis.  
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1.  4. Sources: 
	 ﾠ
This thesis is analysing British and Hungarian official and private papers, which are 
scattered in numerous British and Hungarian archives. The primary sources used for this 
thesis and their usefulness will be briefly discussed here.  
The National Archives (TNA) in Kew was consulted extensively.	 ﾠMost of the material 
used was drawn from the Foreign Office general political correspondence (FO 371), 
which in itself reflects the intensely political nature of the study. Research aids, such as 
the Foreign Office Index for Correspondence proved to be very useful, particularly in 
cases when the Hungarian problem was intermingled with Czechoslovak, Romanian, or 
Yugoslav questions. Its indexing however is too general to be used as a sole guide of 
research reference. Our aim to examine the way in which advice, decision, intervention 
and thinking unfolded in Whitehall; and the goal to identify international and Hungarian 
developments affecting British views, made reviewing most of the Hungarian boxes 
between 1938 and 1941 inevitable. The material we have found most useful in filling 
the gaps in our knowledge about the Anglo-Hungarian relationship were the annual 
reports on Hungary, the reports of the British commercial and military attachés, and 
most crucially the diplomatic reports of the British minister in Budapest.
41 Owen 
O`Malley, compiled extensive, thorough and illuminating reports. Diplomatic reports, 
intelligence data and press articles were the main source of information of a foreign 
country. Therefore the fact that only a fraction of O`Malley`s diplomatic dispatches has 
been analysed by historians, shows the current limitations of our knowledge of the 
Anglo-Hungarian relationship.  
The most important evidence for understanding how decisions were made about 
Hungary are Foreign Office minutes. When a report arrived at the Foreign Office, after 
deciphering, it was seen by the junior officials of the relevant department, then, 
depending on its importance, it worked its way up the hierarchy.	 ﾠNegligible reports on 
Hungary were only minuted by junior clerks, but important ones, affecting British 
policy in the region reached the desk of the departmental head and the permanent 
undersecretary of state for foreign affairs within less than a week. In most cases, reports 
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 ﾠthe	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 ﾠof	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 ﾠBritish	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion,	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	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 ﾠsee:	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about territorial questions were seen and minuted by senior officials, which reflects their 
interest towards the future status quo of Central Europe. The importance of these 
Foreign Office minutes lies in their uniqueness in reflecting the perceptions and mind-
sets of policy-makers. Moreover, the minute sheets are echoing debates between 
officials or the various departments of the Foreign Office. As the papers, diaries and 
memoirs of key policy-makers, such as Lord Halifax, Anthony Eden, Frank Roberts, or 
Alexander Cadogan reveal little about their perceptions on Hungary; their minutes on 
Hungarian files provide useful clues for their approach and attitude.
42 Besides, in cases 
when a problem required the attention of other governmental agencies, their advice was 
also sought. Consequent exchanges of opinion were preserved on these minute sheets, 
which vividly demonstrate the process of advising, the prolonged method of evaluating 
information, the formulation of opinion, and most crucially the level of influence of 
ministries and individuals in the maze of the policy-making process. Apart from 
diplomatic reports and minutes, the most decisive evidence for the opinion of Whitehall 
are then the instructions sent to the British minister in Budapest.  
Understandably, the attention of Hungarian historians has centred around the 
final policy adopted by London towards Hungary, while the labyrinth of the British 
foreign policy-making process for the most part was overlooked on the possible 
assumption that that path was less important. However, a major problem with this 
approach is that it generalises the foreign policy of Britain, assuming that Whitehall 
followed the same principles in decision-making with all countries at all times.
 43 The 
essential questions have not been asked: In what ways can British foreign policy 
towards Hungary be distinguished from the relationship of Britain with the rest of the 
region; and did London follow specific principles in its policy towards Budapest? 
Deciding this question is one of the cornerstones for understanding the British approach 
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 ﾠLord	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠFullness	 ﾠof	 ﾠDays	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1957);	 ﾠA.	 ﾠEden,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEden	 ﾠMemoirs,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠReckoning	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠ1965);	 ﾠF.	 ﾠRoberts,	 ﾠDealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠDictators:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDestructions	 ﾠ&	 ﾠRevival	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1930-ﾭ‐70	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠ1991);	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDiaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠSir	 ﾠAlexander	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠD.	 ﾠDilks	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1971).	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
diaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠhis	 ﾠantipathy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion,	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠdiaries	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠno	 ﾠclues	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhis	 ﾠanimosity	 ﾠ
played	 ﾠany	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠOther	 ﾠkey	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐makers,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠOrme	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsenior	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Southern	 ﾠdepartment,	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠleave	 ﾠdiaries	 ﾠor	 ﾠmemoirs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠposterity,	 ﾠhence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠessential.	 ﾠKeith	 ﾠNeilson`s	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠconcentrates	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreveals	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠSargent`s	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠHungary:	 ﾠK.	 ﾠNeilson,	 ﾠ`Orme	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠAppeasement	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1933-ﾭ‐39`,	 ﾠTwentieth	 ﾠCentury	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠ85	 ﾠ(2010),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐28.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
study,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreviewed	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlater	 ﾠstage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIntroduction.	 ﾠ	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towards Hungary therefore cannot be ignored. Similarly, the British view of Hungary`s 
territorial ambitions was seen in this same limited context and it has not been analysed 
how far Hungary`s territorial ambitions and the question of treaty revision in Central 
Europe influenced British policy towards Hungary.   
The papers of the Cabinet (CAB) and the Prime Minister`s Office (PREM) were 
also consulted for this research. Despite the fact that they contain very little on 
Hungarian questions, they were most useful in identifying British regional priorities. 
We were aiming to pinpoint the memoranda which served as a basis for decision-
making on Hungary. Deciding the author of these memoranda is a well-known problem 
in the analysis of British foreign policy-making. Although in most cases documents 
were initialled by the Foreign Secretary, the text itself often originated from one of the 
senior officials of the Foreign Office, or the private secretaries of the Foreign Secretary. 
It has been most challenging to decide the original author, which indeed in some cases 
proved to be impossible. Similarly to Foreign Office minutes, the minutes of Cabinet 
meetings are valuable to learn the opinions of cabinet members about Hungary. Various 
other materials have been consulted to a more limited extent at the TNA: the papers of 
the War Office (WO), the Ministry of Information (MoI), the Political Intelligence 
Department (PID)
44, and the papers of Halifax, Cadogan and Sargent (FO 800).  
The Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL [Hungarian State Archives]) supplied a 
significant part of material for Hungarian aspects of this project. A considerable part of 
the inter-war diplomatic correspondence of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry was 
destroyed in the calamities of 1944-45. Anglo-Hungarian correspondence was 
particularly affected; most of the papers of 1940 and 1941 were lost. Some of the 
surviving materials are very fragmented or are in an extremely bad condition.
45 The 
papers of the Political Department (K 63), the so called `Reserved` (confidential) files 
(K 64), the papers of the Minority Department (K 28) and the documents of the Press 
and Cultural Relations Department (K 66) were consulted in Budapest. The fact that 
research aids, such as the Foreign Office Index for Correspondence were not available; 
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44	 ﾠThe	 ﾠPID	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠits	 ﾠmain	 ﾠ
function	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠsummaries,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1940	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠvery	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠpropaganda	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBalkans,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠ	 ﾠD.	 ﾠ
Garnett,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecret	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠPWE,	 ﾠ1939–46.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠWarfare	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2002),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ7-ﾭ‐59.	 ﾠ
45	 ﾠSome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestroyed	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsurvived	 ﾠin	 ﾠcopies,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmade	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Pál	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠMS-ﾭ‐Szentiványi.	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and that in most cases the files are arranged by countries and themes, or simply batched 
loosely together, made research in the MOL a time-consuming process. Due to these 
difficulties, and in an attempt to fill the gaps in the availability of archival materials,  it 
was important to inspect not solely the correspondence between Budapest and London, 
but also the reports about Britain`s relationship with Hungary`s neighbours. Although 
the Hungarian Foreign Ministry applied the same minuting method as the Foreign 
Office, the surviving Anglo-Hungarian files bear only a very limited number of 
minutes. This obviously made it very difficult to disentangle Hungary`s policy towards 
Britain and to reveal how British policy influenced Hungarian actions and tactics, and 
territorial claims in particular.  
However, the diaries  of György Barcza, Hungarian minister in London (1938-
41) bridge some of these large gaps. So far historians have only analysed Barcza`s 
memoirs.
46 This study is the first analysis of the diaries.
 47 The diaries are held at the 
Hoover Institution Archives (HIA) in the United States, where they are organised in 12 
large boxes. Barcza rigorously kept his diaries on a daily basis. Their value as historical 
evidence is incomparable to the memoirs which were written only in the 1950s. 
Moreover, the diaries are lengthier, and they reveal a great deal more of Barcza`s 
activities in London. They give unique insights into Barcza`s attempts to maintain the 
Anglo-Hungarian relationship, and shed fresh light on the Foreign Office attitude 
towards Hungary and also Hungarian policy towards Britain.	 ﾠThe diaries also illuminate 
how Barcza was often defiant both towards the Foreign Office and Budapest, and often 
undertook secret initiatives. The diaries were used to discover Barcza`s views on the 
Hungarian territorial problem, and how he represented the question at the Foreign 
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46	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiplomataemlékeim,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠvols.;	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ‘Barcza	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠvisszaadja	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“kölcsönt”	 ﾠBárdossy	 ﾠ
Lászlónak’	 ﾠin	 ﾠTanulmányok	 ﾠa	 ﾠ60	 ﾠéves	 ﾠRomsics	 ﾠIgnác	 ﾠTiszteletére,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz	 ﾠ(Eger,	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ246-ﾭ‐262;	 ﾠ
P.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ‘Barcza	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠkét	 ﾠarca	 ﾠ–	 ﾠemlékirata	 ﾠés	 ﾠjelentései	 ﾠtükrében`	 ﾠin	 ﾠPártok,	 ﾠpolitika,	 ﾠtörténelem.	 ﾠ
Tanulmányok	 ﾠVida	 ﾠIstván	 ﾠegyetemi	 ﾠtanár	 ﾠ70.	 ﾠszületésnapjára,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ305-ﾭ‐
319;	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ‘Emlékirat	 ﾠés	 ﾠtörténeti	 ﾠvalóság.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠemlékiratai	 ﾠfényében.	 ﾠLondoni	 ﾠévek	 ﾠI.’	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Nemzetek	 ﾠés	 ﾠbirodalmak.	 ﾠDiószegi	 ﾠIstván	 ﾠ80	 ﾠéves,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ547-ﾭ‐560;	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ
‘Emlékirat	 ﾠés	 ﾠtörténeti	 ﾠvalóság.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠemlékiratai	 ﾠfényében.	 ﾠLondoni	 ﾠévek	 ﾠII.’	 ﾠin	 ﾠEmlékköny	 ﾠL.	 ﾠ
Nagy	 ﾠZsuzsa	 ﾠ80.	 ﾠSzületésnapjára,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠZ.	 ﾠKovács	 ﾠand	 ﾠL.	 ﾠPüski	 ﾠ(Debrecen,	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ303-ﾭ‐313;	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ
‘Búcsú	 ﾠLondontól	 ﾠ–	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠkirályi	 ﾠkövet	 ﾠutolsó	 ﾠhetei	 ﾠAngliában’,	 ﾠKommentár	 ﾠ34	 ﾠ(2010),	 ﾠ
pp.	 ﾠ24-ﾭ‐36;	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ‘Emlékirat	 ﾠés	 ﾠtörténeti	 ﾠvalóság.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠemlékiratai	 ﾠfényében.	 ﾠLondoni	 ﾠévek	 ﾠIII.`	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠEurópa,	 ﾠnemzet,	 ﾠkülpolitika.	 ﾠTanulmányok	 ﾠÁdám	 ﾠMagda	 ﾠ85.	 ﾠszületésnapjára,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ
2010),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ197-ﾭ‐210.	 ﾠ
47	 ﾠA	 ﾠshort	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiaries	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠAndrás	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠtranslated	 ﾠand	 ﾠannotated	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
selection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiary	 ﾠentries:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠ`Naplórészletek,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐1944,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠGyörgy`,	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠ26	 ﾠ(1996),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ
37-ﾭ‐54.	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Office and attempted to influence British policy. There are also significant differences 
between the entries of his diaries on the one hand, and his memoirs and diplomatic 
dispatches to Budapest on the other, therefore special attention will be placed 
demonstrating these contrasts and disentangling the reasons behind them. 
In terms of private papers, the papers of the historian, Carlile Aylmer Macartney 
(PCAM) in the Bodleian Library of Oxford (BLOU) have been scrutinised by many 
scholars, mostly interested in the academic spat between Macartney and R. W. Seton-
Watson, Macartney`s views on Trianon, Hungarian revisionism, and Macartney`s views 
on the post-war shape of Central Europe.
48 Macartney`s papers still offer interesting 
opportunities for researching frontier questions in Central Europe in the inter-war years 
and the Second World War. His papers elucidate the early stages of British post-war 
planning (1940-41), an aspect much overshadowed by the analysis of the final form of 
British peace plans, which crystallised only by 1942-43. For a study which analyses the 
formulation of British foreign policy, the understanding of this initial stage is pivotal. 
The most interesting part of the Macartney papers is his academic and personal 
correspondence. Macartney knew some of the leading political figures personally, both 
in Britain and Hungary, and he was on friendly terms with members of the Hungarian 
elite.
49  Our ambition was to find evidence for contacts between Macartney and the 
Foreign Office in the 1930s and 1940s. Unfortunately we have found little evidence for 
regular contacts between Macartney and Whitehall in the Macartney papers. A limited 
part of this official correspondence is however available in the TNA.  
  The transcripts of Macartney`s Hungarian talks in the BBC Written Archives 
Centre (BBC-WAC) were also consulted. These broadcasts have been analysed by 
Ágnes Beretzky, but the role these broadcasts played in British propaganda towards 
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48	 ﾠAmbrus	 ﾠMiskolczy,	 ﾠLászló	 ﾠPéter	 ﾠand	 ﾠÁgnes	 ﾠBeretzky	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Seton-ﾭ‐Watson	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠ
minorities:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMiskolczy,	 ﾠ‘Barát,	 ﾠvagy	 ﾠellenség?	 ﾠR.W.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson	 ﾠés	 ﾠMacartney’,	 ﾠHolmi	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ(1994),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ
1502-ﾭ‐1512;	 ﾠL.	 ﾠPeter,	 ﾠ‘The	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠR.W.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson	 ﾠand	 ﾠC.A.	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
Hungary’	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1848	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2004),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ167-ﾭ‐192;	 ﾠÁ.	 ﾠBeretzky,	 ﾠScotus	 ﾠ
Viator	 ﾠés	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠElemér:	 ﾠMagyarország-ﾭ‐kép	 ﾠváltozó	 ﾠelőjelekkel	 ﾠ(1906-ﾭ‐1945)	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
49	 ﾠRobert	 ﾠEvans	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreviewed	 ﾠMacartney`s	 ﾠcorrespondence	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwriting	 ﾠof	 ﾠMacartney`s	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠHungary:	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteen.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠModern	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ1929-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠ
(Edinburgh,	 ﾠ1957);	 ﾠR.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠEvans,	 ﾠ‘The	 ﾠMaking	 ﾠof	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth:	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
Correspondents’	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1848	 ﾠ(London	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ259-ﾭ‐270.	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Hungary is still unclear.
50 The territorial aspect was a regular theme of these talks. 
Comparing these to the under-researched files of the PID on political propaganda 
towards Hungary offers an interesting insight into the British opinion and the Hungarian 
territorial question.  
The papers of R. W. Seton-Watson (SEW) in the School of Slavonic and Eastern 
European Studies Library (SSEES) in London were also consulted for this study. On 
numerous occasions in the late 1930s and 40s Seton-Watson attempted to convince 
Whitehall that returning to the Versailles status quo was the only sensible solution. 
Seton-Watson however was not as influential then, as earlier in the era of the First 
World War. His failure to affect policy helps in demonstrating the contrast between 
British policy after the First World War and British principles for peace-making in the 
1940s.  
In the middle of the 20
th century press reports were a crucial source of 
information both for the public and policy-makers. As will be demonstrated, Whitehall 
often had to rely on press information in formulating opinion about Hungarian 
questions. In terms of newspapers, this thesis examines the tone of the British quality 
press about the Hungarian territorial question and traces the influences on press editors. 
The Hungarian Legation in London rigorously collected British articles about Hungary, 
and made a monthly analysis of the image of Hungary in Britain. These reports admit 
that Budapest made relentless efforts to influence the tone of the British press. We are 
also investigating how far Whitehall attempted to influence the tone on Hungarian 
questions in the British press, which will demonstrate the aims of British policy, and the 
image of Hungary Whitehall aimed to project to the British public. We have already 
noted that non-experts had limited background information on the Hungarian question; 
therefore it will be important to determine the sources of distinctly pro and anti-
revisionist articles, as these showed the marks of external influences.   
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 ﾠÁ	 ﾠBeretzky,	 ﾠ`C.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney.	 ﾠA	 ﾠDevoted	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrustrated	 ﾠFriend	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(1939-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ
1945).	 ﾠService	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBBC`	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1848,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	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Peter,	 ﾠM.	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 ﾠ(London,	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1. 5. Historiographical survey: 
1. 5. 1. British historiography and the image of Hungary in Britain 
	 ﾠ
British historians in the 19
th and 20
th century rarely saw Hungary independently. As part 
of the Habsburg Monarchy, Hungary had been viewed within the German sphere of 
influence. After Versailles, most scholars accepted that the liberation of the supressed 
nationalities of Austria-Hungary, the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, and the 
creation of a New Europe based on the independence of national states served justice in 
the region. Trianon Hungary was viewed in this context.    
The 1848-49 Hungarian revolutions against Habsburg supremacy propelled 
British interest in Hungary, and until the Compromise the cause of Hungarian 
independence ensured British sympathy.
 51 After 1867 the situation largely changed. 
Hungary became recognised as a separate polity. The nationality question however was 
not viewed as a pressing political issue by the British, who viewed Hungary under firm 
Magyar control.
52 A popular Orientalist in Britain, Ármin Vámbéry, presented a 
romanticised view of Hungary in his synthesis of Hungarian history.
53 The centre of his 
argument was that Hungarian heroism guarded the West for centuries from the 
`barbarism of the East`. Until the early 20th century these works determined British 
perceptions on Hungary, which was sympathetic towards Magyar rule.  
At the beginning of the 20th century W. B. Forster Bovill emphasized the 
viability of the peaceful coexistence of Hungarians and other nationalities, while Gyula 
Andrássy and Elemér Hantos pointed to the constitutional paralells between Britain and 
Hungary.
54 Their studies however were overshadowed by the fierce critiques of dualism 
and Magyarization. R. W. Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed sharply criticised the 
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51	 ﾠThe	 ﾠAustro-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠCompromise	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1867	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdual	 ﾠmonarchy	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustria-ﾭ‐Hungary.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐
established	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKingdom	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠseparating	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustrian	 ﾠEmpire.	 ﾠ
52	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠArthur	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠPatterson	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupremacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠMagyars	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠhistoric	 ﾠ
rule	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCarpathian	 ﾠbasin	 ﾠover	 ﾠother	 ﾠnationalities:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠPatterson,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMagyars:	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠCountry	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Institutions,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠvols.	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1869).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
53	 ﾠÁ.	 ﾠVámbéry,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠAncient,	 ﾠMedieval	 ﾠand	 ﾠModern	 ﾠTimes	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1886).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
54	 ﾠW.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠForster	 ﾠBovill,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarians	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1908);	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠ(Gyula)	 ﾠAndrássy,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Development	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠConstitutional	 ﾠLiberty	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1908);	 ﾠE.	 ﾠHantos,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMagna	 ﾠCarta	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
English	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1904).	 ﾠ	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social anachronism and the ethnic intolerance of the Monarchy and Hungary.
55 
According to Robert Evans, these studies enjoyed huge popularity in Britain, and they 
substantially influenced Foreign Office opinion.
56 More importantly, these books 
largely determined the perception of policy-makers about Hungarian questions in the 
inter-war years. In contrast, Hungarian revisionist propaganda was hitting hopelessly 
outdated tones attempting to score points in London by reiterating the constitutional and 
social similarities between Britain and Hungary.
57 Trianon was viewed by London as a 
step in the national development of the nationalities of Hungary; therefore the 
Hungarian argument, which used historical precedences for explaining present claims, 
was essentially judged unjust by London. The studies of Seton-Watson in the 1930s on 
the history of Czechs, Slovaks, and Romanians were acclaimed in Britain, which 
attested that the nationalities of Hungary were claiming their own future in Europe.
58  
Between the wars, the question of Hungary was very much associated with the 
works of Seton-Watson and Macartney. In 1934 both historians expressed their views 
on the question of treaty revision. Seton-Watson opposed any radical adjustment, and 
argued that the ultimate aim was the reconciliation of the nations of the region by 
reducing the importance of frontiers and by perfecting the machinery of minority 
protection.
59 By contrast, in 1934 Macartney underscored the geographical coherence of 
pre-Trianon Hungary.
60 The conflict between the two historians dated from this time. 
By 1937 Macartney had polished his viewpoint. His analysis of the consequences of the 
treaty of Trianon was still the antithesis of Seton-Watson,
61 but Macartney left the idea 
of the integral restoration of Greater Hungary behind, and instead argued for frontier 
adjustment in order to strengthen regional stability. In the late 1930s the Foreign Office 
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55	 ﾠSee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠRacial	 ﾠProblems	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary;	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠGerman,	 ﾠSlav,	 ﾠand	 ﾠMagyar:	 ﾠA	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrigins,	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠWar;	 ﾠSteed,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHabsburg	 ﾠMonarchy.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠopinion;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠH.	 ﾠand	 ﾠC.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMaking	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠNew	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ41-ﾭ‐44.	 ﾠ
56	 ﾠR.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠEvans,	 ﾠ`Hungary’s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠhistoriography`	 ﾠin	 ﾠDas	 ﾠUngarnbild	 ﾠder	 ﾠdeutschen	 ﾠ
Historiographie,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠM.	 ﾠFata	 ﾠ(Stuttgart,	 ﾠ2004),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ110-ﾭ‐125	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ118).	 ﾠ
57	 ﾠZeidler,	 ﾠA	 ﾠrevíziós	 ﾠgondolat,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ94-ﾭ‐95.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
58	 ﾠEvans,	 ﾠ`Hungary’s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠhistoriography`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ120.	 ﾠSee:	 ﾠR.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠA	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Roumanians	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1934);	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠA	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCzechs	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠSlovaks	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1943).	 ﾠ
59	 ﾠR.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠRevision	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠFrontiers`,	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠ
Affairs	 ﾠ52	 ﾠ(1933),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ481-ﾭ‐503;	 ﾠR.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠRevisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠFrontiers	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠ1934),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ53-ﾭ‐59,	 ﾠ69-ﾭ‐70.	 ﾠ
60	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1934).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
61	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠHer	 ﾠSuccessors.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠConsequences	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1937	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠ1937).	 ﾠ24	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often used this work as a reference book for Hungarian questions, but after the outbreak 
of the war it became forgotten.  
In the 1920s, the consequences of the Versailles treaties for Central Europe 
sparked mixed emotions in Britain. The forerunner of critics was John Maynard 
Keynes, who argued that the European economy could not prosper without an effective 
and integrated economic system, which the peace treaties were unable to provide.
62 The 
new territorial order was also vehemently criticised.
63 Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, a British 
war correspondent, who, along with Hungarian right-wing officers, fought the 
Bolshevik regime of Béla Kun in 1919, sharply condemned the dismemberment of 
Hungary, as he believed that the successor states were too weak to protect themselves 
alone.
64 Sir Charles Cunningham, the former editor of the Daily Chronicle visited 
Hungary and Slovakia in 1930 and recommended frontier revision, but because his 
contacts were mostly Magyars, his account is heavily biased towards Hungary.
65 In the 
early 1930s a `Friends of Hungary` group was formed in the House of Commons. They 
were mostly back-benchers, and the membership constantly fluctuated. The most 
prominent member, Sir Robert Gower, a Labour MP, published two books on the 
conditions of the Magyar minorities and the territorial consequences of Trianon.
66 
Gower, along with other members of the group, was lavishly entertained in Hungary on 
several occasions; hence his account, just like those of Ashmead-Bartlett and 
Cunningham, is tendentiously pro-Hungarian. These books made no impact on the 
Foreign Office, and did not enjoy much publicity, unlike the enthralling narratives of 
British travellers to Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia: Cecil Street`s popular 
travelogue, East of Prague depicted a journey from Germany to Ruthenia. Street 
described the Czechs and Slovaks as clear-sighted heroes, but pictured the Germans and 
Hungarians as untrustworthy, and put their irredentist aims in a very negative 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
62	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠKeynes,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠConsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1919),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ129-ﾭ‐144.	 ﾠKeynes`	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠa	 ﾠbestseller	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠand	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠperception	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠunfairly	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
consequence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeace	 ﾠtreaties	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠKeynes`	 ﾠthesis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
63	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠhistorians	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVersailles	 ﾠpeace	 ﾠsettlement;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠCline,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠ
Historians	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠVersailles`,	 ﾠAlbion	 ﾠ20	 ﾠ(1988)	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ43–58.	 ﾠ
64	 ﾠA.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠBartlett,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTragedy	 ﾠof	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1923).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
65	 ﾠC.	 ﾠCunningham,	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1931).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
66	 ﾠGower,	 ﾠTreaty-ﾭ‐revision	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠFrontiers;	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠMinorities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSuccessor	 ﾠ
States.	 ﾠ25	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perspective.
67 Moreover, Street`s pamphlet, Slovakia: Past and Present dismissed 
Hungarian revisionism and similarly contrasted Slovaks and Hungarians by stressing 
that the Slovaks were less advanced only because of the 900 year long Magyar rule.
68 
According to Andrea Orzoff, these books on Czechoslovakia, and That Blue 
Danube, Roumanian Journey and particularly Black Lamb and Grey Falcon 
significantly reinforced British sympathies towards Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians and 
Yugoslavs in Britain in the 1930s and 40s.
69 Family ties between the Romanian and 
British royal families further strengthened these feelings. For instance, the memoirs of 
Marie, the Queen of Romania and cousin of Queen Victoria, enjoyed great popularity in 
Britain.
70 It is not difficult to perceive that books about Czechoslovakia, Romania and 
Yugoslavia were more popular than publications about the defeated Hungary. In the 
Great War these countries were fighting for their independence, they were viewed by 
the British public as allies and they were the pillars of the Versailles system in Central 
Europe. It is therefore more useful to determine why accounts of Hungary were received 
with suspicion both by the public and policy-makers.  
In her travel journals, Sylvia Stevenson noted that since the Great War the 
British public perceived Hungary as part of the German sphere by its own choice.  
Besides, she emphasized that it was a deeply held belief that Hungary was feudal, 
autharchic and repressed its nationalities; therefore Trianon was the righteous remedy.
71 
Regardless of the sympathies towards Czechs, Romanians and Yugoslavs, popular 
British culture continued thinking in stereotypes; the entire Central European and 
Balkan region was viewed as a mystic Orient, full of strange and uncivilised character.
72 
We aim to demonstrate to what extent these books and pamphlets affected the opinion 
of key officials in Whitehall. The question then arises as to whether popular perception 
towards the region was significantly different from the views of British policy-makers. 
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67	 ﾠC.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠStreet,	 ﾠEast	 ﾠof	 ﾠPrague	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1924).	 ﾠ	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68	 ﾠC.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠStreet,	 ﾠSlovakia:	 ﾠPast	 ﾠand	 ﾠPresent	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠn.d.).	 ﾠ
69	 ﾠOrzoff,	 ﾠBattle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCastle,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ148-ﾭ‐149;	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠEvans,	 ﾠThat	 ﾠBlue	 ﾠDanube	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1935);	 ﾠS.	 ﾠSitwell,	 ﾠ
Roumanian	 ﾠJourney	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1938);	 ﾠR.	 ﾠWest,	 ﾠBlack	 ﾠLamb	 ﾠand	 ﾠGrey	 ﾠFalcon	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1941).	 ﾠ
70	 ﾠT.	 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠ`Luring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish-ﾭ‐Speaking	 ﾠWorld:	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠDiverted`,	 ﾠSlavonic	 ﾠand	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Review	 ﾠ69	 ﾠ(1991),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ60-ﾭ‐80	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ62);	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠMarie,	 ﾠQueen	 ﾠof	 ﾠRomania,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠStory	 ﾠof	 ﾠMy	 ﾠLife	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ
1934).	 ﾠ	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71	 ﾠStevenson,	 ﾠRide	 ﾠto	 ﾠBattle,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ16-ﾭ‐17.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
72	 ﾠAgatha	 ﾠChristie`s	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSecret	 ﾠof	 ﾠChimneys	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimage	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠimaginary	 ﾠBalkan	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠ
`Herczegoslovakia`,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠinhabitants	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠuncivilised	 ﾠpeople:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠChristie,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSecret	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Chimneys	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1924).	 ﾠ	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András Bán has emphasized that compared to this, the publication of Hungarian 
literature in the English-language, such as Kosztolányi’s Nero, Imre Madách’s play The 
Tragedy of Man in 1933, or Frigyes Karinthy’s autobiographical Journey Around my 
Skull in 1939, were all flashes in the pan.
73  
Hitler`s accession to power disturbed British historians, who being concerned 
about its implications for British interests, became interested in the security and future 
of Central Europe.
74 Before the outbreak of the Second World War a number of British 
historians warned that the consequence of British passivity in Central Europe would 
encourage German penetration, which would negatively affect British imperial strategy. 
These predictions identified the Hungarian question as a destabilizing factor, but a 
solution to the problem was not offered.
75 During the war the most influential scholarly 
work of the Danube region appeared from the pen of A. J. P. Taylor. His study of the 
Habsburg Monarchy,	 ﾠsimilar to most of the anglophone histories of the era, largely 
ignored the Hungarian question, but his claim that the Monarchy had sunk to the status 
of a German vassal by 1918, reniforced British perception that its resuscitation would 
be a mistake.
 76 During the Second World War several scholars and publicists criticised 
British foreign policy during the 1930s. They mostly blamed the war on the missed 
opportunity confronting Germany in Central Europe. They however considered the 
territorial ambitions of  Hungary as only a secondary issue.
77    
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 ﾠA.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠ`Friends	 ﾠof	 ﾠEngland:	 ﾠCultural	 ﾠand	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠSympathies	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEve	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWar`,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
Quarterly	 ﾠ153	 ﾠ(1999),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ23-ﾭ‐35.	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74	 ﾠGerhard	 ﾠSchacher	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠfavoured	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠEntente	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDanubian	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠbook	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐German	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠbias:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠSchacher,	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1936).	 ﾠWilliam	 ﾠO`	 ﾠ
Molony	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnationality	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠarising	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeace	 ﾠand	 ﾠminority	 ﾠtreaties.	 ﾠInterestingly,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠethnocentric.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustria-ﾭ‐
Hungary	 ﾠpointing	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠand	 ﾠgains	 ﾠfor	 ﾠAustria,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
successor	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmethod	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutdated,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwars	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠethnocentric	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠwas	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠunder	 ﾠconsideration:	 ﾠW.	 ﾠO’.	 ﾠMolony,	 ﾠ
Nationality	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠTreaties	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1934).	 ﾠRobert	 ﾠMacHray	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
regional	 ﾠcooperation.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠhe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfavoured	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠEntente,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠregional	 ﾠ
antagonisms	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠits	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolicing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion:	 ﾠR.	 ﾠMacHray,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠStruggle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDanube	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠEntente,	 ﾠ1929-ﾭ‐1938	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1938).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
75	 ﾠE.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠCarr,	 ﾠBritain:	 ﾠA	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVersailles	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ
1939);	 ﾠR.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠto	 ﾠDanzig	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1939);	 ﾠE.	 ﾠWiskemann,	 ﾠPrelude	 ﾠto	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠ1939).	 ﾠ
76	 ﾠA.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠP.	 ﾠTaylor,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHabsburg	 ﾠMonarchy	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1941),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ268-ﾭ‐269.	 ﾠ
77	 ﾠE.	 ﾠWiskemann,	 ﾠUndeclared	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1939);	 ﾠIbem,	 ﾠPrelude	 ﾠto	 ﾠWar.	 ﾠCato,	 ﾠGuilty	 ﾠMen	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ
1941).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ
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After the war, the descent of the `Iron Curtain` on Europe overshadowed British 
scholarly interest in inter-war Hungary. Because interest mostly came from a small 
number of specialists, it is difficult to systematise British historiography about Hungary, 
or to identify clear trends. British historians intensely debated the reasons for 
appeasement, the role of continental commitment in British pre-war strategy, the pace of 
rearmament before the war, Anglo-German rivalry, and the disintegration of the British 
Empire. A history of inter-war Hungary, and beyond, appeared from Macartney in 
1957.
78Although some of its conclusions are now considered out-dated, and Macartney 
hit a distinctly pro-Hungarian tone, it is still indispensable, because some of the papers 
and testimonies of contemporaries were only available to Macartney. For a long time, 
Macartney`s monumental study was a solitary monograph on Hungary in the English 
language.
79  
Questions about Central Europe were mostly raised in these contexts, and the 
Anglo-Hungarian relationship, or British policy towards Central European territorial 
disputes did not form the subject of independent inquires.
80 Our aim is to demonstrate 
that post-war British historiography unduly neglected the Hungarian question, which 
had important implications for British Central European and Balkans policy. In the 
discourse over the reasons for appeasement, focus usually did not go beyond whether 
Chamberlain had offered Hitler a sphere of influence in Central Europe in order to gain 
time to rearm. R. A. C. Parker denied that Chamberlain offered Hitler a free hand in 
Central Europe, while Clement Leibovitz and Vít Smetana have argued that 
Chamberlain used Central Europe to bargain with Hitler over more important global 
issues, such as world trade, raw materials and the question of the return of German 
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78	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteen.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
79	 ﾠA	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠErvin	 ﾠPamlényi	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1973.	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
translation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠHungarian,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠmark	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Marxist	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠview-ﾭ‐point	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism;	 ﾠit	 ﾠcondemned	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
threatening	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠpeace.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠAnglo-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠ
extent:	 ﾠA	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠE.	 ﾠPamlényi	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ1973).	 ﾠ
80	 ﾠSee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠHoward,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠContinental	 ﾠCommitment:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDilemma	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠDefence	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEra	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWars	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1972);	 ﾠD.	 ﾠKaiser,	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Second	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠand	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1930-ﾭ‐1939	 ﾠ(Trenton,	 ﾠ1980);	 ﾠG.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠ
Peden,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠBurden	 ﾠof	 ﾠImperial	 ﾠDefense	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠContinental	 ﾠCommitment	 ﾠReconsidered`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHistorical	 ﾠ
Journal,	 ﾠ110	 ﾠ(1984),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ405-ﾭ‐423.;	 ﾠB.	 ﾠCorrelli,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPower	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1984);	 ﾠG.	 ﾠSchmidt,	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠPolitics	 ﾠand	 ﾠEconomics	 ﾠof	 ﾠAppeasement	 ﾠ(Leamington,	 ﾠ1986);	 ﾠA.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠPrazmowska,	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠPoland	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠFront,	 ﾠ1939	 ﾠ(Cambridge,	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠ28	 ﾠ
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colonies.
81 David Gillard`s recent study of appeasement and Central Europe has 
demonstrated the relative insignificance of the Danube region in British strategy, but his 
wide scope has failed to note that Central European territorial disputes, including the 
Hungarian question, presented significant complications for British regional policy.
82 
An analysis of British policy towards South East Europe and Hungary appeared from 
Elisabeth Barker. Barker`s analysis lacks the comparative approach, as she missed 
demonstrating how London`s relationship with one country affected policy towards 
another. This study argues that such a perspective is essential for understanding of 
British policy towards Hungary.
83  
After 1945 numerous diaries and memoirs were published by British policy-
makers. In most cases these are very tight-lipped about Central Europe, the Anglo-
Hungarian relationship and territorial and minority questions. Senior Foreign Office 
officials, such as Cadogan, Roberts and Vansittart, who were dealing with the 
Hungarian question on a regular basis, considered the `Hungarian problem` as an 
irritating by-product of the German question, and labelled Hungarian revisionism 
hopelessly unrealistic and ethnographically unjust.
84 Foreign Secretaries and other 
government ministers also thought about Central Europe as an essentially German issue, 
and only mentioned Hungary over aspects specific to the writer of the memoirs.
 85 Also, 
in the memoirs of other British politicians or diplomats Hungary is no more than a 
passing reference.
86 What is more surprising is that authors and politicians, who were 
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81	 ﾠR.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠParker,	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠand	 ﾠAppeasement:	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠComing	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠ
War	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1993),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ128-ﾭ‐169;	 ﾠC.	 ﾠLeibovitz,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠChamberlain-ﾭ‐Hitler	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1993);	 ﾠV.	 ﾠSmetana,	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShadow	 ﾠof	 ﾠMunich:	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠCzechoslovakia	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEndorsement	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Renunciation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠ(1938-ﾭ‐1942)	 ﾠ(Prague,	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ41-ﾭ‐43.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhistoriography	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
appeasement	 ﾠis	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠgreater.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠintention	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠ
tendencies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextremes	 ﾠof	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠin	 ﾠappeasement.	 ﾠA	 ﾠbrief,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠvery	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistoriography	 ﾠof	 ﾠappeasement	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby:	 ﾠD.	 ﾠHucker,	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠOpinion	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnd	 ﾠof	 ﾠAppeasement	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠ(Farnham,	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ7-ﾭ‐12.	 ﾠ
82	 ﾠD.	 ﾠGillard,	 ﾠAppeasement	 ﾠin	 ﾠCrisis,	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠto	 ﾠPrague,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938–March	 ﾠ1939	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2007).	 ﾠ
83	 ﾠBarker,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐East	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠ
84	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDiaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠSir	 ﾠAlexander	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠDilks;	 ﾠF.	 ﾠRoberts,	 ﾠDealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠDictators;	 ﾠVansittart,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Mist	 ﾠProcession	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1958).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitician,	 ﾠHarold	 ﾠNicolson	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠviews	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
diaries:	 ﾠH.	 ﾠNicolson,	 ﾠDiaries	 ﾠand	 ﾠletters	 ﾠ1930-ﾭ‐1939,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠN.	 ﾠNicolson	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1967).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrecollections	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠFrank	 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlater,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠtone	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
85	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠFullness	 ﾠof	 ﾠDays;	 ﾠEden,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEden	 ﾠMemoirs:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠReckoning;	 ﾠH.	 ﾠDalton,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠFateful	 ﾠYears:	 ﾠ
Memoires	 ﾠ1931-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1957).	 ﾠ
86	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample:	 ﾠB.	 ﾠLockhart,	 ﾠGuns	 ﾠor	 ﾠButter.	 ﾠWar	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠpeace	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠrevisited	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠ1938);	 ﾠSimon,	 ﾠViscount,	 ﾠRetrospect	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1952);	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDiaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠSir	 ﾠRobert	 ﾠBruce	 ﾠLockhart,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
vols.	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠK.	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1973,	 ﾠ1980);	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠColville,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠFringes	 ﾠof	 ﾠPower:	 ﾠDowning	 ﾠStreet	 ﾠDiaries	 ﾠ29	 ﾠ
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interested in Hungary hardly mentioned Hungary at all. Henry James Bruce, the head of 
the Hungarian section of the Ministry of Information, or Thomas Hohler, British 
minister in Hungary after the Great War, revealed nothing about their activities in the 
1920s, 30s and 40s to influence London towards a pro-Hungarian policy.
87 Owen 
O`Malley similarly dedicated only ten pages to his years in Budapest in his memoirs.
88 
The fact that Hungary occupied an insignificant place in personal recollections indicates 
that it was rarely the major concern of British policy-makers. However, the tone of the 
memoirs is a good indication of these key players` outlook.  
Since the 1980s and 1990s, the English-language historiography has become 
more forward on Hungary`s role in the international history of the era. Thomas 
Sakmyster studied Hungary`s balancing acts between the great powers in the 1930s.
89 
As we have noted, Gábor Bátonyi`s study of British policy towards Central Europe is an 
important analysis, as for the first time, it has provided a comprehensive and 
comparative analysis of British attitudes towards Czechoslovakia, Austria and 
Hungary.
90 In 2004, some of the most distinguished exponents of the history of Hungary 
gathered at a conference at the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies. 
Questions, such as British opinions about Hungarian revisionism in the 1930s, British 
propaganda towards Hungary during the war, and Churchill`s and Eden`s image of 
Hungary were discussed.
91 This study picks up the thread of Gábor Bátonyi`s analysis 
of Hungarian revisionism in 1938 and demonstrates that Hungarian territorial 
aspirations affected the Anglo-Hungarian relationship in later years	 ﾠjust as critically as 
in the inter-war period. Recently, Tibor Frank and Éva Haraszti-Taylor have enriched 
our understanding of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship by focusing not on political 
relations, but on cultural contacts and the image of Hungary in Britain.
92 The past 
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1939-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1985);	 ﾠN.	 ﾠChamberlain,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠStruggle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1939);	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDiplomatic	 ﾠ
Diaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠOliver	 ﾠHarvey	 ﾠ1937-ﾭ‐1940,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠHarvey	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1970).	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 ﾠJ.	 ﾠBruce,	 ﾠThirty	 ﾠDozen	 ﾠMoons	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1949);	 ﾠT.	 ﾠHohler,	 ﾠ
Diplomatic	 ﾠPetrel	 ﾠ(London,	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 ﾠ(London,	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 ﾠpolicy	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 ﾠproblem	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 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠMacartney.	 ﾠA	 ﾠDevoted	 ﾠand	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 ﾠFriend	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 ﾠ`,	 ﾠpp.	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Peter,	 ﾠ‘The	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 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson	 ﾠand	 ﾠC.A.	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠover	 ﾠHungary’,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ167-ﾭ‐
192;	 ﾠLojkó,	 ﾠ‘Churchill,	 ﾠEden	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary’	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelations,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ217-ﾭ‐236.	 ﾠ
92	 ﾠT.	 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠ`Luring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠspeaking	 ﾠWorld:	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠDiverted`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ60-ﾭ‐80;	 ﾠT.	 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠ`Editing	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠPolitics:	 ﾠJózsef	 ﾠBalogh	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠQuarterly`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠQuarterly	 ﾠ129	 ﾠ(1993),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ5-ﾭ‐13;	 ﾠT.	 ﾠ30	 ﾠ
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decade has seen a considerable expansion in the historiography too. This has adjusted 
the historiography by rethinking overdrawn perceptions, such as the image of Hungary 
as a German satellite, but they have not brought forward considerable achievements in 
the study of Anglo-Hungarian relationship.
93   
The concept that the Anglo-Hungarian relationship cannot be viewed in isolation 
is central to my research. For this reason, studies of British policy toward other Central 
European and Balkan countries were also used.
 94 Mention finally has to be made of 
general studies and document collections which have also influenced this work. E. H. 
Carr`s study of international relations in the inter-war years is still a valuable survey by 
an insightful witness. Carr criticized heavily the utopian theories of the peace-makers.
95 
Zara Steiner`s two monumental analyses of international relations between the wars 
were invaluable, most importantly, because similarly to Palmer and Macartney in their 
study of Central Europe in the inter-war period, she has tried to measure the impact of 
regional antagonism on the security of Europe.
96 Anita Prazmowska`s study of the 
Central European origins of the Second World War has also highlighted the devastating 
impact of territorial disputes on the security of the region, but the Hungarian part of her 
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Frank,	 ﾠ`Magyarország	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠpolitikai	 ﾠgondolkodásban	 ﾠ1919–1945`,	 ﾠLimes	 ﾠ38	 ﾠ(2008),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ45-ﾭ‐57;	 ﾠÉ.	 ﾠ
Haraszti-ﾭ‐Taylor,	 ﾠ`In	 ﾠMemoriam	 ﾠof	 ﾠGeorges	 ﾠBuday	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPWE`s	 ﾠClandestine	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠPetőfi	 ﾠRadio`	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Scribble,	 ﾠscribble,	 ﾠscribble	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠessays,	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠreviews	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠreflections	 ﾠon	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Hungary,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠÉ.	 ﾠHaraszti	 ﾠTaylor	 ﾠ(Nottingham,	 ﾠ2001),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ123-ﾭ‐130.	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 ﾠSee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠC.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠEby,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠat	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠCivilians	 ﾠand	 ﾠSoldiers	 ﾠin	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII	 ﾠ(State	 ﾠCollege,	 ﾠ1998);	 ﾠ
D.	 ﾠS.	 ﾠCornelius,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII,	 ﾠCaught	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCauldron	 ﾠ(Fordham,	 ﾠ2011);	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠ	 ﾠL.	 ﾠKontler,	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
History	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary:	 ﾠMillennium	 ﾠin	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2002);	 ﾠB.	 ﾠCarthledge,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠWill	 ﾠto	 ﾠSurvive:	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
History	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠMost	 ﾠimportantly:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠCienciala,	 ﾠPoland	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠPowers	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐1939:	 ﾠa	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interdependence	 ﾠof	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠand	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1968);	 ﾠM.	 ﾠCornwall,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠrise	 ﾠand	 ﾠfall	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
'special	 ﾠrelationship'?:	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠCzechoslovakia,	 ﾠ1930-ﾭ‐1948,	 ﾠin	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠDifference	 ﾠdid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWar	 ﾠMake?,	 ﾠ
ed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠB.	 ﾠBrivati	 ﾠand	 ﾠH.	 ﾠJones	 ﾠ(Leicester,	 ﾠ1993),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ130-ﾭ‐150;	 ﾠR.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠEvans,	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠEast-ﾭ‐
Central	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1908-ﾭ‐48.	 ﾠA	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠin	 ﾠPerceptions	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2002);	 ﾠEvans,	 ﾠ`Hungary’s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
historiography`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ110-ﾭ‐125;	 ﾠR.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠEvans,	 ﾠ'The	 ﾠSuccessor	 ﾠStates',	 ﾠin	 ﾠTwisted	 ﾠPaths:	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ1914-ﾭ‐1945,	 ﾠ
ed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠR.	 ﾠGerwarth	 ﾠ(Oxford,	 ﾠ2007),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ210–36;	 ﾠR.	 ﾠDenniston,	 ﾠChurchill's	 ﾠSecret	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠDiplomatic	 ﾠ
Decrypts,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠand	 ﾠTurkey	 ﾠ1942-ﾭ‐44	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2009);	 ﾠR.	 ﾠHaynes,	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
Germany,	 ﾠ1936-ﾭ‐40	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2000);	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠHoptner,	 ﾠYugoslavia	 ﾠin	 ﾠCrisis	 ﾠ1934-ﾭ‐1941	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ1962);	 ﾠD.	 ﾠB	 ﾠ
Lungu,	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠPowers,	 ﾠ1933-ﾭ‐1940	 ﾠ(Durham,	 ﾠ1989);	 ﾠV.	 ﾠSmetana,	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShadow	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Munich.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠE.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠCarr,	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠBetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWars,	 ﾠ1919–1939	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1947).	 ﾠCarr`s	 ﾠ
study	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcriticised	 ﾠby:	 ﾠC.	 ﾠJones,	 ﾠE.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠCarr	 ﾠand	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠRelations:	 ﾠA	 ﾠDuty	 ﾠto	 ﾠLie	 ﾠ(Cambridge,	 ﾠ1998).	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠother	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠrevisionism	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠLentin,	 ﾠ
Lloyd	 ﾠGeorge	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLost	 ﾠPeace:	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠVersailles	 ﾠto	 ﾠHitler,	 ﾠ1919–1940	 ﾠ(Basingstoke,	 ﾠ2001).	 ﾠ
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 ﾠZ.	 ﾠSteiner,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠLights	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFailed:	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1933	 ﾠ(Oxford,	 ﾠ2007);	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Triumph	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDark,	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠHistory,	 ﾠ1933-ﾭ‐1939	 ﾠ(Oxford,	 ﾠ2011);	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠand	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ
W.	 ﾠPalmer,	 ﾠIndependent	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1962).	 ﾠ	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analysis is very sketchy.
97 The most important British, German, Italian and Hungarian 
diplomatic documents have been published in annotated volumes in the course of the 
decades after the war. These have helped in identifying the foreign political priorities of 
countries.
98  
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 ﾠA.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠPrazmowska,	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2000).	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98	 ﾠDocuments	 ﾠon	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1939	 ﾠ(DBFP),	 ﾠser.	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠvols.	 ﾠ3-ﾭ‐5,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠE.	 ﾠL.	 ﾠWoodward	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠ1950;	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠ1951;	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ5:	 ﾠ1952);	 ﾠDocuments	 ﾠon	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ(DGFP),	 ﾠser.	 ﾠD,	 ﾠ
vols.	 ﾠ7-ﾭ‐12,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠP.	 ﾠR.	 ﾠSweet	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(Washington,	 ﾠ1954);	 ﾠI	 ﾠdocumenti	 ﾠdiplomatici	 ﾠitaliani	 ﾠ(DDI)	 ﾠ(Ottavo	 ﾠ
serie:	 ﾠ1935–1939)	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ8-ﾭ‐11,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠG.	 ﾠAndre	 ﾠ(Rome,	 ﾠ2007);	 ﾠDiplomáciai	 ﾠiratok	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠ
külpolitikájához	 ﾠ1936-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠ(DIMK),	 ﾠ5	 ﾠvols.,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠM.	 ﾠÁdám,	 ﾠL.	 ﾠKerekes	 ﾠand	 ﾠL.	 ﾠZsigmond,	 ﾠ(Budapest	 ﾠ
1965-ﾭ‐1982).	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1.5.2.  Hungarian historiography 
	 ﾠ
Hungarian historiography needs a separate analysis from the British, mainly because of 
the differences in focus. Here, we aim to demonstrate the effects of Trianon on 
Hungarian historiography and revisionism, as well as highlighting how historians in the 
different political eras of the 20
th century viewed the problem of Hungary`s frontiers. 
Hungarian historians were politically and ideologically influenced and controlled both 
during the Horthy era and the communist decades, and at the same time were 
significantly coloured	 ﾠby the social and economic turmoils	 ﾠof the century. 
  In the dualist era the nationality question was an important political and public 
topic of discussion in Hungary. Hungarian scholars viewed the problem through the 
prism of Magyar supremacy and the irrefutable territorial integrity of Hungary.
99 During 
the Great War, Gyula Szekfű also reinforced the notion of Magyar control over the 
nationalities.
100 The inter-war Hungarian elite,	 ﾠwho were raised, educated and lived 
most of their lives in the milieu of Magyar dominance, were strongly influenced by 
these notions, which consequently dominated their attitude towards the question of 
frontier revision.
101 These ideas were contested by Oszkár Jászi in 1918, who 
recommended the federalization of the Monarchy and Hungary.
 102    
  The military defeat and the territorial mutilations occurring after the Great War 
had a profound effect on all aspects of Hungarian life. It did not shatter the concept of 
Magyar superiority, but mixed it with frustration, anger and denial. Although Ignác 
Romsics has argued that the historiography of the Horthy era moved away from the 
earlier romanticisation of the past towards scientific methods, nevertheless it is crucial 
to point out that the traumas at the end of the Great War considerably distorted the 
interpretations of the immediate past.
103 We have to differentiate two dimensions in the 
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 ﾠIgnác	 ﾠAcsárdy`s	 ﾠverbose	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠEmpire	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtouchstone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠlimitations:	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ
Acsárdy,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠbirodalom	 ﾠtörténete,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠvols.	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1904).	 ﾠ	 ﾠLóránt	 ﾠTilkovszky	 ﾠgives	 ﾠa	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
useful	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠnationality	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ20
th	 ﾠcentury:	 ﾠL.	 ﾠTilkovszky,	 ﾠNemzetiségi	 ﾠ
politika	 ﾠMagyarországon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠszázadban	 ﾠ(Debrecen,	 ﾠ1998),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ3-ﾭ‐12.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
100	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠSzekfű,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠállam	 ﾠéletrajza	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 ﾠ1918).	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 ﾠEven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠarticulating	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠopinion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprime	 ﾠministers	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
1938	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1941,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠall	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupremacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyars	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCarpathian	 ﾠbasin.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
favoured	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠrestoration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐1920	 ﾠfrontiers.	 ﾠ	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102	 ﾠO.	 ﾠJászi,	 ﾠA	 ﾠMonarchia	 ﾠjövője.	 ﾠA	 ﾠdualizmus	 ﾠbukása	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠDunai	 ﾠEgyesült	 ﾠÁllamok	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1918).	 ﾠ
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 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠClió	 ﾠbűvöletében,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ310-ﾭ‐311.	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historiography of this era. Firstly, we are reviewing opinions about Trianon and frontier 
revision, which can be used to highlight the contrast between British and Hungarian 
perceptions over the territorial question. Then, materials intended to influence the 
English speaking world about Hungary will have to be briefly considered.  
  Studies appearing immediately after the Great War show that notions of Magyar 
supremacy were mingled with frustration. In 1920, Tibor Joó labelled the repressive 
Magyarisation as the primary reason for Trianon, but he declared that a return to ethnic 
tolerance could justify Magyar supremacy again.
104 Gyula Szekfű identified Trianon as 
the final stage of decline, which he believed to be the result of the uncontrolled influx of 
nationalities into Hungary.
105 His Három Nemzedék is not a historical study, but a 
conceptualization of the conservative and anti-liberal ideology of the Horthy era, which 
essentially blamed Trianon on others, namely the nationalities and the West. Others, 
such as Elemér Mályusz and Ferenc Eckhart, dared to confront these limitations. They 
emphasized that the heroisation of the past and the concept of state versus religion, 
culture and language, as nation-forming factors, were outdated.
106 The 1930s witnessed 
two projects, which both aimed at laying the foundations of a 20th century Hungarian 
historiography. The Magyar Történet of Hóman and Szekfű and the Egyetemes Történet 
both aspired to avoid mingling scholarly work with sentiments, and attempted to 
understand past centuries on their own terms.
107 Both projects nevertheless viewed 
Trianon as a national tragedy. It is apparent that the historians of inter-war Hungary 
pursued new methods, but the proximity of Trianon made objectivity difficult.
108 This 
emotionally-charged approach is in stark contrast with the pragmatic British attitude 
towards Trianon, which as we have stressed, essentially judged it as a progress in the 
struggle of non-Magyar nationalities.  
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 ﾠT.	 ﾠJoó,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠnemzeteszme	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1920).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
105	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠSzekfű,	 ﾠHárom	 ﾠNemzedék.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
106	 ﾠE.	 ﾠMályusz,	 ﾠA	 ﾠnépiség	 ﾠtörténete	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1931);	 ﾠF.	 ﾠEckhart,	 ﾠJog	 ﾠés	 ﾠalkotmánytörténet.	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠ
történetírás	 ﾠúj	 ﾠútjai	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠn.	 ﾠd.	 ﾠ[1929?]).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
107	 ﾠB.	 ﾠHóman	 ﾠ–	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠSzekfű,	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠTörténet,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠvols.	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1928);	 ﾠB.	 ﾠIványi-ﾭ‐Grünwald,	 ﾠEgyetemes	 ﾠ
történet,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠvols.	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1935).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwake	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠSzekfű	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcommissioned	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
write	 ﾠa	 ﾠshort	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠviews	 ﾠon	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠaudiance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSzekfű	 ﾠfinished	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanuscript	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungarian,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠtranslation	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠnever	 ﾠcompleted:	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠSzekfű,	 ﾠRövid	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠtörténet	 ﾠ1606-ﾭ‐1939	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2002).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠEndre	 ﾠBajcsy-ﾭ‐Zsilinszky	 ﾠa	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠpolitician	 ﾠquestioned	 ﾠwider	 ﾠrevisionist	 ﾠaims,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
advocated	 ﾠonly	 ﾠethnographic	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunited	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠstates	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
Germany:	 ﾠ	 ﾠK.	 ﾠVígh,	 ﾠBajcsy-ﾭ‐Zsilinszky	 ﾠEndre	 ﾠkülpolitikai	 ﾠnézeteinek	 ﾠalakulása	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1979),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ79-ﾭ‐109.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ34	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Hungarian revisionist propaganda abroad became active in the late 1920s.
109 With the 
approval and support of the Hungarian prime minister, István Bethlen (1921-31), a large 
amount of material appeared in the English language.
110 These works tried to aquaint 
the British and the American elite and public with the injustices of Trianon, but the 
Hungarian minister in London, Count László Széchenyi (1933-35) reported that both 
the British public and official policy disliked and discouraged these propaganda 
activities. The publication of the transcripts of Bethlen`s 1933 lectures in Britain aimed 
at explaining the necessity of frontier revision for European stability, and at the same 
time contested R. W. Seton-Watson`s thesis about the justness of Trianon.
111 The 
publication of Seton-Watson`s history of Romania, which had a distinctive anti-
Hungarian bias, provided the impetus for Bethlen to bring out a `Hungarian History` in 
the English and French language.
112 Tibor Frank has argued that Bethlen wished to 
provide a Hungarian national propaganda for the English-speaking world, to counter the 
distorting mirrors of the Little Entente.
113 Domonkos Kosáry, on the initiative of the 
later prime minister Pál Teleki, published parts of this project in 1941. Eventually, it 
proved to be the only publication of the `Hungarian History` serving propaganda 
purposes, but reaching a very limited number of readers in Britain.
114 Frank has 
interpreted the failure of the whole undertaking as a clear sign of the non-viability of a 
pro-Anglo-American political orientation. It is certainly telling that the Foreign Office 
did not react to the project at all.
115  
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 ﾠSee:	 ﾠI.	 ﾠBethlen,	 ﾠ`Beszéd	 ﾠDebrecenben	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠkülpolitikai	 ﾠhelyzetéről	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠhatárrevízió	 ﾠ
szükségességéről	 ﾠ(1928)`	 ﾠin	 ﾠBethlen	 ﾠIstván:	 ﾠVálogatott	 ﾠpolitikai	 ﾠírások	 ﾠés	 ﾠbeszédek,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics	 ﾠ
(Budapest,	 ﾠ2000),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ240-ﾭ‐251.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
110	 ﾠTo	 ﾠname	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠJustice	 ﾠfor	 ﾠHungary!,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠA.	 ﾠApponyi	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1928);	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠLukacs,	 ﾠ
Injustices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1928);	 ﾠHungaricus	 ﾠViator	 ﾠ[M.	 ﾠFenyő],	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠits	 ﾠConsequences	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1929).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠFerenc	 ﾠEckhart	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyar-ﾭ‐chauvinist	 ﾠ
slant:	 ﾠF.	 ﾠEckhart,	 ﾠA	 ﾠShort	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠPeople	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1931).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
111	 ﾠCount	 ﾠS.	 ﾠBethlen,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠand	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1934);	 ﾠR.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠ
Treaty	 ﾠRevisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠFrontiers	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1934).	 ﾠ
112	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠThe	 ﾠRoumanians.	 ﾠ
113	 ﾠT.	 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠ`Luring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish-ﾭ‐Speaking	 ﾠWorld:	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠDiverted`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ63-ﾭ‐64.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproject	 ﾠ
eventually	 ﾠfailed,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠantagonisms	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeditors.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠD.	 ﾠKosáry,	 ﾠA	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ1941).	 ﾠSee	 ﾠKosary`s	 ﾠlater	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠ
enterprise:	 ﾠD.	 ﾠKosáry,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠIdea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠComparative	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠEast	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStory	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠVenture`	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠHistorians	 ﾠas	 ﾠNation-ﾭ‐Builders.	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠand	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐East	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠD.	 ﾠDeletant	 ﾠand	 ﾠH.	 ﾠHanak,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(Basingstoke,	 ﾠ1988),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ124-ﾭ‐138.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠIn	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1930s	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠunscholarly	 ﾠworks	 ﾠalso	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠabout	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠSimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ`Hungarian	 ﾠHistory`,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠany	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠTersánszky`s	 ﾠbook	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠintended	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠyounger	 ﾠgeneration:	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠTersánszky,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(Budapest	 ﾠn.	 ﾠd.,	 ﾠ
[1938?]).	 ﾠOtto	 ﾠZarek`s	 ﾠunscholarly	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠlegation	 ﾠin	 ﾠ35	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
After the war, in the shadow of the Soviet Union, unbiased historical discussions 
were impossible. A Marxist historiographical viewpoint was dictated by the communist 
party, which labelled Trianon the direct result of the rigid, feudal and autarchic system 
of the Hungarian Kingdom, which repressed democratic and national developments.
116 
Revisionism and the foreign policy of Horthy`s Hungary were despised to the extent 
that Marxist historiography proclaimed a complete discontinuity with the past. One of 
the most significant weaknesses of Hungarian Marxist historiography was that it 
overstated Hungary`s revisionist successes as being due to German and Italian 
assistance, and steadfastly maintained that the British negative view was the direct 
consequence of this.
117 Although under ideological constraint, valuable works appeared 
in the so called `liberalised` communist era about the foreign policy of Hungary,
118 and 
the collapse of Austria-Hungary.
119 At the end of the 1970s, the `10 volumes` history of 
Hungary held Hungarian imperialism and the repression of modern political and social 
theories as responsible for Trianon.
120 In the 1970s and 80s valuable works appeared 
from Gyula Juhász on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship during the war	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungarian 
foreign policy, but the scope of these studies were limited.
 121 
From the 1990s, after the fall of communism, ideological restrictions 
disappeared. However, a number of sensitive issues remained which divided many. 
Junctures of the traumatic past, such as Trianon, Hungary`s role in the Second World 
War, frontier revision and Hungary`s role in the Holocaust, remained the fault lines 
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London	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠMinistry	 ﾠas	 ﾠpropaganda	 ﾠmaterial:	 ﾠO.	 ﾠZarek,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠ1939).	 ﾠ
116	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleading	 ﾠMarxist	 ﾠtheorist	 ﾠwas	 ﾠErzsébet	 ﾠAndics:	 ﾠE.	 ﾠAndics,	 ﾠNemzetiségi	 ﾠkérdés,	 ﾠ
nemzetiségi	 ﾠpolitika	 ﾠ(Budapest	 ﾠ1946);	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠFasizmus	 ﾠés	 ﾠreakció	 ﾠMagyarországon	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1946).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample:	 ﾠAndics,	 ﾠFasizmus	 ﾠés	 ﾠreakció	 ﾠMagyarországon,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ177-ﾭ‐179,	 ﾠ183-ﾭ‐185.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1956	 ﾠrevolution,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠlater	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1960s,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtight	 ﾠideological	 ﾠgrip	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
historiography	 ﾠhad	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠsoftened.	 ﾠCriticising	 ﾠTrianon,	 ﾠor	 ﾠraising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠ
remained	 ﾠtaboos,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠrejection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHorthy	 ﾠera	 ﾠquietened.	 ﾠSensitive	 ﾠissues	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
buried.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample:	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠA	 ﾠTeleki-ﾭ‐kormány	 ﾠkülpolitikája	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐41	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1964),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ177-ﾭ‐179,	 ﾠ
183-ﾭ‐185.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
119	 ﾠPéter	 ﾠHanák	 ﾠstill	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrigid	 ﾠand	 ﾠfeudal	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Trianon,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisregarded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠP.	 ﾠHanák,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠMonarchia	 ﾠalkonya`	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Magyarország	 ﾠtörténete	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠE.	 ﾠMolnár	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1964),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ270-ﾭ‐282.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
120	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠGalántai	 ﾠand	 ﾠP.	 ﾠHanák,	 ﾠ`Egy	 ﾠkorszak	 ﾠlezárása`	 ﾠin	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠtörténete	 ﾠtíz	 ﾠkötetben,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠvols.,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ
10,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠP.	 ﾠHanák	 ﾠet	 ﾠal,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ1231-ﾭ‐1233.	 ﾠ
121	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠBrit-ﾭ‐magyar	 ﾠtitkos	 ﾠtárgyalások	 ﾠ1943-ﾭ‐ban	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1978);	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠ
külpolitikája	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1988).	 ﾠ36	 ﾠ
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between different social, cultural and political segments of society.
122 Sensitive 
historical questions such as Trianon and frontier revision have also often been hijacked 
for political purposes, which hindered more objective historical analysis. After 1990, 
there has been an increasing interest in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. Historians 
have primarily been interested in the diplomatic and cultural spheres, but far too little 
attention has been paid to the formulation of British opinions about Hungary and its 
frontiers.  
The diplomatic and cultural aspect was thoroughly examined by András Bán, 
whose study has been the starting point for this research. Although Bán`s study is the 
most complete analysis of the relationship, it essentially views bilateral relations from 
the Hungarian perspective, and there is a certain degree of inaccuracy in his analysis of 
the British decision-making process over Hungarian questions. Our aim has been to 
remedy these shortcomings and to provide a deeper survey of the causes and effects of 
British decisions about the Hungarian territorial question.
123 Bán also published the 
documents of the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) on the post-war 
reconstruction of Central Europe.
124 Our last chapter provides a valuable background to 
these documents by introducing the initial phase of British post-war planning about 
Hungary and Central Europe	 ﾠin 1940-41, a period, which so far has not been analysed. 
Romsics has also investigated French, British, Italian, German and American official 
opinions about the Hungarian frontiers in the inter-war period. He accurately 
demonstrates British official reaction to the territorial gains of Hungary, but 
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 ﾠKrisztián	 ﾠUngváry	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHorthy	 ﾠera	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHolocaust:	 ﾠK.	 ﾠUngváry,	 ﾠA	 ﾠHorthy-ﾭ‐rendszer	 ﾠmérlege	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠDiszkrimináció,	 ﾠszociálpolitika	 ﾠés	 ﾠ
antiszemitizmus	 ﾠMagyarországon	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHorthy	 ﾠ
era	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠremove	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanachronistic	 ﾠCold	 ﾠWar	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠexaggerated	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠrole	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠsatellite	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
123	 ﾠA.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐1941.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
124	 ﾠA.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠPax	 ﾠBritannica,	 ﾠBrit	 ﾠkülügyi	 ﾠiratok	 ﾠa	 ﾠmásodik	 ﾠvilágháború	 ﾠutáni	 ﾠKelet-ﾭ‐Közép-ﾭ‐Európáról	 ﾠ1942-ﾭ‐
1943	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1996).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠResearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠPress	 ﾠService	 ﾠfunctioned	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠagency	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollect	 ﾠdata	 ﾠand	 ﾠwrite	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpress	 ﾠsummaries.	 ﾠUntil	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1940	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
collaborated	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠpropaganda	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠthereafter.	 ﾠDistinguished	 ﾠ
historians,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠArnold	 ﾠToynbee,	 ﾠR.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠElisabeth	 ﾠBarker	 ﾠand	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠworked	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
hope	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmistakes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠwar	 ﾠby	 ﾠscanning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠfor	 ﾠclues	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
better	 ﾠfuture.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFRPS,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠBaylis,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠWartime	 ﾠThinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠPost-ﾭ‐War	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠ
Group`	 ﾠReview	 ﾠof	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠ40	 ﾠ(1983),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ265-ﾭ‐281;	 ﾠ.R.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠKeyserlingk,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠRehabilitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠAustro-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠEmpire:	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPost-ﾭ‐War	 ﾠPlanning	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar`,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠ
Review	 ﾠ46	 ﾠ(1986),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ63-ﾭ‐74,	 ﾠ(pp.	 ﾠ65-ﾭ‐66);	 ﾠR.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠKeyserling,	 ﾠ`Arnold	 ﾠToynbee`s	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠResearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠPress	 ﾠ
Service,	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐43	 ﾠand	 ﾠIts	 ﾠPost-ﾭ‐War	 ﾠPlans	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐East	 ﾠEurope`,	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠContemporary	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠ88	 ﾠ
(1986),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ539-ﾭ‐558,	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ541).	 ﾠ37	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
concentrates less on the backgrounds and circumstances of decision-making.
125 Indeed, 
both Bán`s and Romsics` analysis suffer from confusing British official and non-official 
opinions on Hungary.
  
The subject of frontier revision has recently been the interest of many in 
Hungary. Pál Pritz has examined the role of revisionism in inter-war Hungarian foreign 
policy-making, Tibor Frank has studied the formulation and development of 
revisionism, while Miklós Zeidler has reviewed its tools and aims.
126 Also, there has 
been an increasing amount of literature about Macartney and Seton-Watson. Ágnes 
Beretzky has summarised their views and their attempts to influence British policy, but 
her analysis on the 1930s and 1940s is superficial.
127 András Bán and Miklós Lojkó 
have also summarised the views of Seton-Watson and Macartney on the future 
territorial structure of Central Europe respectively.
128 This thesis brings new evidence 
forward to clarify in what ways Seton-Watson and Macartney affected British policy-
making in the early years of the war.  
Others have investigated the Anglo-Hungarian relationship in different inter-war 
periods. Although these studies do not concentrate on the frontier question, they were 
very useful for mapping the general trend of Anglo-Hungarian relations after the First 
World War.
129 Finally, mention has to be made of general studies of Hungarian foreign 
policy, which have guided the Hungarian aspect of this research. Romsics` synthesis of 
20
th century Hungary and his edited volume on Hungarian foreign political thinking 
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 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠkülpolitika	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠ„magyar	 ﾠkérdés”,	 ﾠ1914-ﾭ‐1946`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ34-ﾭ‐132.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
126	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ‘Revíziós	 ﾠtörekvések	 ﾠa	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠkülpolitikában	 ﾠ1920-ﾭ‐1935’	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠTudomány	 ﾠ44	 ﾠ(1979),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ
272-ﾭ‐279;	 ﾠT.	 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠrevíziós	 ﾠpolitika	 ﾠalapvetése`,	 ﾠFilozófiai	 ﾠSzemle	 ﾠ34	 ﾠ(1980),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ931-ﾭ‐943;	 ﾠM.	 ﾠZeidler,	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
magyar	 ﾠirredenta	 ﾠkultusz;	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠA	 ﾠrevíziós	 ﾠgondolat.	 ﾠ
127	 ﾠÁ.	 ﾠBeretzky,	 ﾠScotus	 ﾠViator	 ﾠés	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠElemér.	 ﾠBeretzky	 ﾠalso	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠMacartney’s	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
broadcasts	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBBC:	 ﾠÁ.	 ﾠBeretzky,	 ﾠ’C.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney.	 ﾠA	 ﾠDevoted	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrustrated	 ﾠFriend	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(1939-ﾭ‐
1945),	 ﾠService	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBBC’,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ237-ﾭ‐246.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠA.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠ'R.W.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠin	 ﾠCzechoslovakia,	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1938'	 ﾠin	 ﾠScotland	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSlavs,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠM.	 ﾠCornwall	 ﾠand	 ﾠM.	 ﾠFrame	 ﾠ(Newtonville,	 ﾠ2001),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ127-ﾭ‐38;	 ﾠM.	 ﾠLojkó,	 ﾠ‘C.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ
Macartney	 ﾠand	 ﾠCentral-ﾭ‐Europe’,	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠReview	 ﾠof	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠ32	 ﾠ(1999),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ37-ﾭ‐57.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠL.	 ﾠArday,	 ﾠ`Magyarország	 ﾠés	 ﾠNagy-ﾭ‐Britannia	 ﾠdiplomáciai	 ﾠkapcsolatai`	 ﾠin	 ﾠAz	 ﾠEgyesült	 ﾠKirályság	 ﾠés	 ﾠ
Magyarország:	 ﾠNagy-ﾭ‐Britannia	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠMagyar-ﾭ‐Angol	 ﾠkapcsolatok	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠszázadban,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠL.	 ﾠArday	 ﾠ
(Budapest,	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ47-ﾭ‐148.;	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠTérkép	 ﾠcsata	 ﾠután.	 ﾠTibor	 ﾠFrank	 ﾠhas	 ﾠexplored	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhe	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠmore	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ1940s	 ﾠis	 ﾠincomplete:	 ﾠT.	 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠ`Magyarország	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠpolitikai	 ﾠgondolkodásban	 ﾠ1919–1945`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ45-ﾭ‐57.	 ﾠ
See	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠLojkó,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠ1918-ﾭ‐1919:	 ﾠA	 ﾠDocumentary	 ﾠSourcebook	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1995);	 ﾠ
Ibid,	 ﾠMeddling	 ﾠin	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠ	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have been utilised to a great extent.
130 Pritz`s analysis on Hungarian diplomacy and 
foreign political thinking was also used, as well as his analyses of György Barcza.
131 
Although the shadow of Trianon is a dormant issue in contemporary Hungarian society, 
with the possibility of explosive future implications, Hungarian historiography has 
moved away from heroic and sentimental notions, and committed itself to a less 
subjective, emotional approach.
132     
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 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠtörténete	 ﾠa	 ﾠXX.	 ﾠszázadban	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2005);	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠ
politikai	 ﾠgondolkodás	 ﾠ1920-ﾭ‐1953	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1998).	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠFülöp,	 ﾠP.	 ﾠSipos,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠ
külpolitikája	 ﾠa	 ﾠXX.	 ﾠszázadban	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1998);	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠJohancsik,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠkülpolitikája	 ﾠ1918-ﾭ‐1999	 ﾠ
(Budapest,	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ
131	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠdiplomácia	 ﾠa	 ﾠkét	 ﾠvilágháború	 ﾠközött	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1995);	 ﾠIbid,	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠkülpolitikai	 ﾠ
gondolkodás	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠszázadban	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2006);	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠAz	 ﾠobjettivitás	 ﾠmítosza?	 ﾠHazánk	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠnagyvilág.	 ﾠ
20.	 ﾠszázadi	 ﾠmetszetek,	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ
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 ﾠRomanticised,	 ﾠnationalistic	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠchauvinistic	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠinterpretations	 ﾠare	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠpopularity	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠare	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠhistoriography.	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1.  6. Methodology, the problem of British foreign policy-making and the differences 
between East and West: 
	 ﾠ
Historians have long been interested in a wide array of aspects of British foreign policy-
making, such as the functioning and organisation of the Foreign Office, the role of the 
British diplomatic service in decision-making, the decision-making process to go to war 
or the strategic priorities of British imperial policy.
 133 Studies on British foreign policy 
towards individual Central European countries have recently appeared, but policy 
towards Central Europe as a whole between 1938 and 1941 has not been examined.
 134 
Such an analysis however provides important benefits. London`s relationship with 
individual states in Central Europe cannot be understood in isolation, precisely because 
of the existence of interstate territorial disputes, which obviously affected British policy 
towards the protagonists.  Moreover, this approach clarifies the place of Central Europe 
in British war strategy, which so far has been a thinly researched subject.
135 It is 
increasingly difficult to avoid a comparative analysis of British foreign policy towards 
Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria particularly 
regarding the territorial disputes of these countries. It helps in answering questions such 
as whether Britain had a collective policy, based on principles, towards territorial 
questions, or whether individual problems were viewed on their own merits. It also 
gives a useful insight into the subject of the small state – large state relationship, a topic 
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 ﾠSee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠR.	 ﾠBullen,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ1782-ﾭ‐1982	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1984);	 ﾠV.	 ﾠCromwell,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠOffice`	 ﾠin	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes	 ﾠSurvey	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠMinistries	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠZ.	 ﾠSteiner	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠ1982),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ541-ﾭ‐573;	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠCharmley,	 ﾠ`Splendid	 ﾠIsolation	 ﾠto	 ﾠFinest	 ﾠHour:	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠGlobal	 ﾠPower,	 ﾠ
1900-ﾭ‐1950`	 ﾠin	 ﾠThe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠand	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ20th	 ﾠCentury,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠG.	 ﾠJohnson	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ
2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ130-ﾭ‐146;	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠConnel,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ'Office':	 ﾠA	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠmakers,	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1951	 ﾠ
(London,	 ﾠ1985);	 ﾠD.	 ﾠDilks,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwars`,	 ﾠin	 ﾠShadow	 ﾠand	 ﾠSubstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ1895-ﾭ‐1939,	 ﾠMemorial	 ﾠEssays	 ﾠHonoring	 ﾠC.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠLowe,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠB.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠMcKercher	 ﾠand	 ﾠD.	 ﾠ
J.	 ﾠMoss	 ﾠ(Edmonton,	 ﾠ1984),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ35-ﾭ‐54;	 ﾠC.	 ﾠHill,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠDecisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐June	 ﾠ
1941	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1991);	 ﾠB.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠMcKercher,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice:	 ﾠ1930-ﾭ‐1939.	 ﾠStrategy,	 ﾠPermanent	 ﾠInterests	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠNational	 ﾠSecurity`	 ﾠin	 ﾠThe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠand	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠG.	 ﾠJohnson	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ
87-ﾭ‐109;	 ﾠT.	 ﾠOtte,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMakers	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy:	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠPitt	 ﾠto	 ﾠThatcher	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2001);	 ﾠZ.	 ﾠSteiner,	 ﾠ
`The	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠOffice:	 ﾠResistance	 ﾠand	 ﾠAdaptation	 ﾠin	 ﾠChanging	 ﾠTimes`	 ﾠin	 ﾠThe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠ
Office	 ﾠand	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠG.	 ﾠJohnson	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ13-ﾭ‐30;	 ﾠG.	 ﾠWarner,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠImpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Second	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠupon	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy`	 ﾠin	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠDifference	 ﾠDid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWar	 ﾠMake?,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠB.	 ﾠBrivati	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠH.	 ﾠJones	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1995),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ99-ﾭ‐105.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠparticularly:	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 ﾠSword,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠReactions	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠSoviet	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠof	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 ﾠPoland	 ﾠin	 ﾠSeptember	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1939`,	 ﾠSlavonic	 ﾠand	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠReview	 ﾠ182	 ﾠ(1991),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ81-ﾭ‐101;	 ﾠV.	 ﾠSmetana,	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShadow	 ﾠof	 ﾠMunich;	 ﾠ
E.	 ﾠMcGilvray,	 ﾠA	 ﾠMilitary	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 ﾠExile:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠPolish	 ﾠGovernment	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 ﾠStudy	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 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2010).	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which has received surprisingly little attention from historians.
136 This thesis therefore 
places special attention not only on British opinion about the territorial changes of 
Hungary between 1938 and 1941, but compares it to British attitudes towards other 
states of the region.  
The other fundamental problem this thesis assesses is how British foreign policy 
was made towards Hungary. We aim to evaluate to what extent pressure and influence 
were applied on the Foreign Office on Hungarian questions, and what role these 
influences made in decision-making. David Dilks has argued that a `collective opinion` 
never existed in the Foreign Office, as decisions were the results of debates.
137 This 
argument is certainly true for critical questions, such the `German problem` which 
affected all aspects of British policy, and therefore triggered intense discussions. Our 
hypothesis however is that secondary issues, such as the Hungarian territorial problem 
did not generate considerable discussion and the Foreign Office often had a collective 
opinion on Hungary, which individuals rarely contested. The question of individual 
versus collective opinion is directly connected to the problem of debate versus diktat in 
the Foreign Office. It is important to evaluate the level of elbow room senior officials 
had in deciding policy towards Hungary, and to decide to what extent they carried out, 
or attempted to curb official policy towards Budapest.
138  
 This thesis is also aiming to contribute to other fields by considering under-
researched aspects of British Central European policy. There are a number of East-West 
contrasts which need attention here. For example, control over territory played a 
significantly more important role in Central Europe and the Balkans than in Britain, 
where the territory of the state was more enduring. Territorial disputes triggered 
markedly different collective emotions and political attitudes in these different 
geographical contexts. In Central Europe national territory was under constant threat 
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠbrilliantly	 ﾠby	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠVital:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠof	 ﾠstates:	 ﾠA	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1967);	 ﾠIbem,	 ﾠSurvival	 ﾠof	 ﾠSmall	 ﾠStates:	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠin	 ﾠSmall	 ﾠ
Power/Great	 ﾠPower	 ﾠConflict	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1971).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
137	 ﾠD.	 ﾠDilks,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwars`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ181-ﾭ‐202	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ195).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠAnthony	 ﾠBarker	 ﾠand	 ﾠGraham	 ﾠK.	 ﾠWilson	 ﾠhave	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisobedience	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Foreign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠera:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠBarker	 ﾠand	 ﾠG.	 ﾠK.	 ﾠWilson,	 ﾠ
`Whitehall's	 ﾠDisobedient	 ﾠServants?	 ﾠSenior	 ﾠOfficials'	 ﾠPotential	 ﾠResistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠMinisters	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
Government	 ﾠDepartments`,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠScience	 ﾠ110	 ﾠ(1997),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ223-ﾭ‐246.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠ
argues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠimportance,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwere	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Foreign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠreferring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCabinet.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠkeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
extent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠattempted	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess.	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and frontiers fluctuated frequently. Consequently territorial disputes triggered a more 
vehement and radical response than in Britain.  
The markedly different perceptions about the question of territory and frontiers 
in Britain and Hungary however are not the only example of the differences in the way 
of thinking. The British perception of the Hungarian problem cannot be analysed 
without understanding the fundamental psychological differences between East and 
West. László Cs. Szabó has noted that the English way of thinking differed considerably 
from the Hungarian. Szabó stressed that it was typical of Churchill and Halifax, but also 
of the English in general that they sought to adjust their ideas to circumstances and 
never vice versa.
139 As we have noted, the Trianon trauma largely affected Hungarian 
public and foreign political thought, and policy-making was fundamentally adjusted to 
this circumstance.  
  Moreover, Pál Pritz has also pointed out that there were significant differences 
in the Western and Eastern European perceptions of how far yielding to great power 
pressure and collaboration was considered acceptable, in order to preserve some sort of 
independence. Pritz noted that what seemed acceptable and sensible for Budapest was 
intolerable for the British. Regrettably, he did not bring this interesting theory to a 
conclusion.
140 David Vital has also emphasised the importance of this question, and has 
stressed that the problem is fundamentally underpinned by the characteristics of small 
and large state relations, and is not necessarily the typical feature of contrasts between 
Western and Eastern Europe.
141 This question nonetheless became the focal-point of the 
Anglo-Hungarian relationship in the era under consideration here.  
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 ﾠL.	 ﾠCs.	 ﾠSzabó,	 ﾠDoveri	 ﾠátkelés,	 ﾠNyugat-ﾭ‐európai	 ﾠhelyzetkép	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1937),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ32.	 ﾠ
140	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ`Magyar	 ﾠkülpolitika	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠcsatlósság	 ﾠls	 ﾠrevízió	 ﾠközött`	 ﾠin	 ﾠAz	 ﾠobjettivitás	 ﾠmítosza?	 ﾠHazánk	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
nagyvilág,	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠszázadi	 ﾠmetszetek,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ126.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠD.	 ﾠVital,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠof	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ10-ﾭ‐39.	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1.  7. Note on the Terminology: 
	 ﾠ
There has been considerable disagreement among historians about defining the name of 
the geographical area occupied by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania.
142 
The Foreign Office divided the region into a Central and a Southern department. From 
1940, Hungary was moved from the Southern department to the Central in the 
presumable effort to amalgamate the German and the Hungarian problem under one 
roof, which however did not necessarily mean that Hungary was automatically viewed 
as a German satellite.
143 As Whitehall appeared to look upon Hungary as a Central 
European country, we have decided to use `Central Europe` for describing the region 
occupied by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania.
144 Concerning other 
geographical names, such as the Carpathians, the English name will be utilised, if there 
is one available. However, we will be using the Hungarian names of cities, counties and 
regions, with their foreign name in brackets, if they belonged to a foreign country at 
some point in the period (e. g. Kassa [Košice]). Although the Hungarian language does 
not make a distinction between Hungarians and Magyars, this study, following the 
methodology of the English-language historiography, will refer to Hungarian speakers 
living outside of the frontiers of Hungary as Magyars to define them ethnically, and will 
call the population of Hungary Hungarians. 
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 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠand	 ﾠEast	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠare	 ﾠinterchangeably	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠmost	 ﾠhistorians.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtopic;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠNemzet,	 ﾠnemzetiség	 ﾠés	 ﾠállam	 ﾠKelet-ﾭ‐Közép-ﾭ‐	 ﾠés	 ﾠDélkelet	 ﾠ
Európában	 ﾠa	 ﾠ19.	 ﾠés	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠszázadban	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2004),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ17-ﾭ‐30.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠmost	 ﾠoccasions	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
viewed	 ﾠby	 ﾠhistorians	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBalkans.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthesis	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠappears	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠwith	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
country.	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 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
1940.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠsent	 ﾠto	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
war	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwas	 ﾠjudged	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠits	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠseemed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
serve	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 ﾠreasons.	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 ﾠCountries	 ﾠsouth	 ﾠof	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠBalkans	 ﾠor	 ﾠSouth	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`Not a soul is going to stir a finger to save Hungary.`
 1 
(Orme Sargent`s comment on Hungary`s position after the Anschluss) 
 
2. British official policy towards Hungarian revisionism and the Czechoslovak 
crisis, 1938-1939 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A 1938 anecdote tells the story about Chamberlain`s perceptions of Central Europe. A 
reporter asked the Prime Minister whether he believed that Prague was handling the 
minority situation in Czechoslovakia correctly. Chamberlain gave an affirmative answer 
and noted that his information came from a most authentic source. The reporter was 
persistent and asked who the source was, to which Chamberlain replied that it was Jan 
Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister in London. György Barcza, the Hungarian 
Minister, observed this anecdote with utter astonishment.
2 He felt that it described 
British policy toward Central Europe with chilling accuracy. Barcza argued that it 
proved, the Czechs had gained the trust of the British, which made Hungarian minority 
complaints and territorial demands in Slovakia seem absurd in British eyes because they 
contradicted Czech claims.
3 However, British official sources tell a different story. This 
chapter demonstrates that Czech opinion was not singled out in Whitehall, and 
Hungarian claims and complaints were also taken into consideration by British policy-
makers.  
On the other hand, British interest towards the territorial and minority disputes 
of Czechoslovakia worked in a very limited context. Ward Price noted in his memoires 
that `[...] the British race seldom shows concern for any foreign problem before it has 
reached a state of crisis.`
4 Truly, London became only attentive towards the 
Czechoslovak question when Germany`s strong interest threatened the outbreak of war. 
This suggests that British interest was underpinned by strategic considerations, namely 
to avoid war with Germany. It is our hypothesis that London viewed Hungarian 
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1	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22380,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ3469/719/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠAndrea	 ﾠOrzoff	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠIan	 ﾠMasaryk	 ﾠwas	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhis	 ﾠgood	 ﾠ
reputation	 ﾠwas	 ﾠan	 ﾠexception,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠdistrusted	 ﾠall	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEuropeans:	 ﾠOrzoff,	 ﾠ
Battle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCastle,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ10.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠW.	 ﾠPrice,	 ﾠYear	 ﾠof	 ﾠReckoning	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1939),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ206.	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territorial demands through this lens, and throughout the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-
39 the official opinion changed according to Britain`s strategic interests. 
Appeasement remains a vibrant field of scholarly interest, and it is one of the 
most thoroughly researched eras of the British-Central European relationship. The 
historiography of appeasement has been covered to some extent in the Introduction, 
therefore here we will only concentrate on introducing scholarly studies which put 
forward relevant arguments for the British view of the Hungarian angle of the 
Czechoslovak crisis. The studies of Bátonyi on British policy towards Central Europe 
and Hungarian revisionism provide the picture of British policy and perceptions towards 
the region and Hungary on the eve of the Sudeten crisis, and serve as a crucial starting-
point for this chapter.
5 Mark Cornwall has studied the British official opinion on 
Czechoslovakia and has proved that as a result of the anti-Czech reports of the British 
minister in Prague, senior decision-makers, such as Orme Sargent and Frank Roberts in 
the Foreign Office, were deeply sceptical about the good treatment of the Sudeten-
Germans.
6 As the British minister seldom reported about the Magyar question in 
Czechoslovakia, it will be crucial to examine how the British minister in Budapest 
reported the Magyar claims in Slovakia.   
Hungary`s role in the Munich crisis have been studied by a number of historians, 
but they mostly concentrated on Hungarian foreign-policy and the German-Hungarian 
relationship, and dedicated less attention to the Anglo-Hungarian relationship during the 
Czechoslovak crisis.
7 István Janek has recently studied the British view of the First 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope;	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ‘British	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
revisionism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s’,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ205-ﾭ‐216.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠand	 ﾠBalkan	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCzechoslovak	 ﾠcrisis:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠÁdám,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Versailles	 ﾠSystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2004);	 ﾠD.	 ﾠBakić,	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠEntente	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Security	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDanubian	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1936	 ﾠ(unpublished	 ﾠPhD	 ﾠthesis,	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠLeeds,	 ﾠ2010);	 ﾠM.	 ﾠ
Newman,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠMunich:	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠDanubian	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1933–1937`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHistorical	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠ
212	 ﾠ(1978),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ371-ﾭ‐386;	 ﾠSakmyster,	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠPowers.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSudeten	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠ
Cornwall,	 ﾠ'A	 ﾠLeap	 ﾠinto	 ﾠIce-ﾭ‐Cold	 ﾠWater':	 ﾠthe	 ﾠManoeuvres	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHeinlein	 ﾠMovement	 ﾠin	 ﾠCzechoslovakia,	 ﾠ
1933-ﾭ‐1938`	 ﾠin	 ﾠCzechoslovakia	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠNationalist	 ﾠand	 ﾠFascist	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠ1918-ﾭ‐1948,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠM.	 ﾠCornwall	 ﾠand	 ﾠR.	 ﾠ
J.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠEvans	 ﾠ(Oxford,	 ﾠ2007),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ123-ﾭ‐142;	 ﾠM.	 ﾠHauner,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠSudeten	 ﾠCrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1938:	 ﾠBeneš	 ﾠand	 ﾠMunich`	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠAn	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠPerspective,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠF.	 ﾠMcDonough	 ﾠ(London	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠ
pp.	 ﾠ360-ﾭ‐374.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠM.	 ﾠCornwall,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠrise	 ﾠand	 ﾠfall	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ'special	 ﾠrelationship'?`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ130-ﾭ‐150.	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠM.	 ﾠÁdám,	 ﾠ‘The	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVersailles	 ﾠsettlement	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope’	 ﾠin	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠ
crisis,	 ﾠ1938:	 ﾠprelude	 ﾠto	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠI.	 ﾠLukes	 ﾠand	 ﾠE.	 ﾠGoldstein	 ﾠ(Basingstoke,	 ﾠ1999)	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ82-ﾭ‐122;	 ﾠE.	 ﾠ
B.	 ﾠGastony,	 ﾠ`Hungarian	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠKálmán	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠHitler,	 ﾠand	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠAugust-ﾭ‐September,	 ﾠ
1938`,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠReview	 ﾠ53	 ﾠ(1986),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ3-ﾭ‐34;	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠ‘Hungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresent	 ﾠCrisis’,	 ﾠ
International	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠ28	 ﾠ(1938),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ749-ﾭ‐768;	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ‘A	 ﾠkieli	 ﾠtalálkozó’,	 ﾠSzázadok	 ﾠ236	 ﾠ(1974),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ646-ﾭ‐46	 ﾠ
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Vienna Award, but his analysis was based on limited research and he concentrated only 
on the official response.
8 The First Vienna Award was thoroughly studied by Gergely 
Sallai and Edward Császár, but they were more interested in German and Italian 
attitudes towards the Hungarian-Slovak dispute than the policy of London.
9 From the 
plethora of British historiography relating to appeasement, David Gillard and R. A. C. 
Parker showed more interest in the role of Central Europe in appeasement, hence their 
analysis is our guiding point when considering the position of the region from the 
perspective of the wider British strategy.
10  
In the history of the Czechoslovak crisis the Sudeten German question has been 
thought of as the key factor. Historians have not considered Magyar minority demands 
and Hungarian territorial claims in Czechoslovakia as a key issue between Germany and 
Britain. This perspective suggests that London was not interested in Hungary and was 
unconcerned about Hungarian territorial claims. However, this limited approach did not 
reveal that during the Sudeten crisis, in the background, London continuously weighed 
the potential threat from Hungary. By involving new evidence in the analysis, such as 
the documents of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, the overlooked recommendations of 
the Foreign Office on the Hungarian frontiers, György Barcza`s diaries; and by re-
examining and reinterpreting Cabinet documents on Hungary, this research has revealed 
that regardless of British suspicions towards Hungarian revisionism, London did not 
reject Hungarian territorial claims per se, but only discouraged them due to current 
strategic considerations.  
Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to challenge the consensus that Britain 
washed its hands of Central European commitments after Munich. It will prove that 
regardless of official disinterest towards the Hungarian question, Hungary and the 
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680;	 ﾠT.	 ﾠL.	 ﾠSakmyster,	 ﾠ‘Hungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠCrisis:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠRevisionist	 ﾠDilemma’,	 ﾠSlavic	 ﾠReview	 ﾠ58	 ﾠ(1973),	 ﾠ
pp.	 ﾠ725-ﾭ‐740;	 ﾠB.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠWinchester,	 ﾠ‘Hungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ"Third	 ﾠEurope"	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1938’,	 ﾠSlavic	 ﾠReview	 ﾠ58	 ﾠ(1973),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ
741-ﾭ‐756.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠSlovakia	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠaftermath	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠSlovak	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠ
Bystricky,	 ﾠ`Slovakia	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠConference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeclaration	 ﾠof	 ﾠindependence`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ157-ﾭ‐174.	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠI.	 ﾠJanek,	 ﾠ`Az	 ﾠelső	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés	 ﾠés	 ﾠNagy-ﾭ‐Britannia	 ﾠálláspontja`,	 ﾠÚj	 ﾠSzó,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ17-ﾭ‐18.	 ﾠJanek	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism	 ﾠin	 ﾠSlovakia	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠcrisis:	 ﾠI.	 ﾠJanek,	 ﾠ`Magyar	 ﾠtörekvések	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
Felvidék	 ﾠmegszerzésére	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐ban`,	 ﾠTörténelmi	 ﾠSzemle	 ﾠ105	 ﾠ(2010),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ37-ﾭ‐66.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠE.	 ﾠChászár,	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠin	 ﾠVienna:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠCzechoslovak-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠborder	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1938	 ﾠ(Bratislava,	 ﾠ1978);	 ﾠ
G.	 ﾠSallai,	 ﾠAz	 ﾠelső	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2002).	 ﾠSallai	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠ
minorities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Czechoslovak	 ﾠinterstate	 ﾠrelations:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠSallai,	 ﾠ“A	 ﾠhatár	 ﾠmegindul…”	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
csehszlovákiai	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠkisebbség	 ﾠés	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠkapcsolatai	 ﾠaz	 ﾠ1938–1939.	 ﾠévi	 ﾠállamhatár-ﾭ‐változások	 ﾠ
tükrében	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠGillard,	 ﾠAppeasement	 ﾠin	 ﾠCrisis;	 ﾠParker,	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠand	 ﾠAppeasement.	 ﾠ47	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region held strategic importance for London in late 1938 and early 1939 in the 
diplomatic battle against Germany. It is also important to disentangle on what basis 
Britain contemplated changes to the frontiers of Hungary. The Munich agreement dealt 
with the German-Czech dispute on an ethnographic basis. We are particularly interested 
to find out whether the application of the same criteria was acceptable for British 
policy-makers for solving the Hungarian territorial question, or whether due to strategic 
considerations London showed more flexiblity, and supported wider Hungarian 
demands.     
  Firstly, the consequences of the Anschluss on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship 
will be analysed, which will be followed by the examination of the implications of the 
Hitler-Chamberlain meetings on the British view of Hungarian territorial claims. Then 
we will concentrate on the Hungarian question at the Munich Conference and the 
British view of the First Vienna Award. Finally, we will analyse the British view of the 
Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia, and in what ways the British guarantees to Poland 
and Romania changed British perceptions of Hungary.    
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2.2 The impact of the Anschluss on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship  
 
The Anschluss had a profound effect on British Central European policy and the British 
view of Hungarian revisionism.
11 Chamberlain and Halifax reservedly accepted the 
Anschluss, because they considered that the risk of precipitating the hostility of 
Germany by condemning the German action should have been avoided.
12 Renouncing 
the option to confront Germany meant that London accepted having limited political 
influence in the region.
13 Bátonyi has stressed that in the years before the Anschluss, 
London had already disapproved Hungarian territorial claims, but the Anschluss seemed 
to mark the beginning of further deterioration of British opinion.
14 Orme Sargent, a 
senior official of the Southern department of the Foreign Office, was certain that after 
the Anschluss, Hungary would willingly join the German camp. He predicted that the 
pro-German policy of the Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi would lead to a 
far-right coup, and that consequently Hungary would join Germany as a semi-
independent state, submitting its army, economy and foreign policy to German tutelage. 
Moreover, the Foreign Office associated the recent German-Hungarian overtures with 
German-Austrian-Hungarian cooperation during the Great War.
15 Reflecting on 
Hungarian territorial ambitions, Sargent claimed that a rapproachment between Hungary 
and its neighbours (the Little Entente [map 2.1]) would now be impossible, as Budapest 
sold itself to Germany in order to realise its territorial aims against them.
 16 Alarming 
reports from the British Legation in Budapest also fuelled British suspicions of German-
Hungarian cooperation. After receiving reports of the immediate German occupation of 
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11	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnschluss,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠGehl,	 ﾠAustria,	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnschluss,	 ﾠ1931–1938	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1963).	 ﾠ
Gábor	 ﾠBátonyi	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistoriographical	 ﾠconsensus	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠwas	 ﾠindifferent	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
survival	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustria,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion	 ﾠhad	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠ
implications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBritain:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ‘Anglo-ﾭ‐Austrian	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwars’	 ﾠin	 ﾠVon	 ﾠSaint	 ﾠGermain	 ﾠ
zum	 ﾠBelvedere,	 ﾠÖsterreich	 ﾠund	 ﾠEuropa	 ﾠ1919–1955,	 ﾠAußenpolitische	 ﾠDokumente	 ﾠder	 ﾠRepublik	 ﾠÖsterreich	 ﾠ
1918–1938	 ﾠ(ADÖ)	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠIssue,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠK.	 ﾠKoch	 ﾠand	 ﾠA.	 ﾠSuppan	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Munich	 ﾠand	 ﾠVienna,	 ﾠ2007),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ115-ﾭ‐129.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ27/624,	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠConclusion,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian–British	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠ1938–1941,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ42-ﾭ‐43;	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠkülpolitikája	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐
1945,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ177-ﾭ‐179,	 ﾠ183-ﾭ‐185.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ214-ﾭ‐216.	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22373,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ3497/97/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNoble,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠby	 ﾠIngram	 ﾠand	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
April	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠby	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠand	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22380,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ3302/719/21,	 ﾠSargent`s	 ﾠ
report	 ﾠon	 ﾠconversations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠSzilárd	 ﾠMasirevics	 ﾠ(Hungarian	 ﾠminister),	 ﾠ17	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠR	 ﾠ3105/719/21,	 ﾠ
minutes	 ﾠby	 ﾠNoble	 ﾠand	 ﾠIngram,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22380,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ3302/719/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEarlier,	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠexerted	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠon	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠto	 ﾠput	 ﾠaside	 ﾠits	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠneighbours,	 ﾠand	 ﾠform	 ﾠa	 ﾠbloc	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠ
Entente	 ﾠto	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠcounter	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	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Hungary, Edward Ingram, the head of the Southern department, supported the 
recommendation of Geoffrey Knox, the British minister in Budapest, to suspend all 
future economic concessions to Hungary.
17 Moreover, Gascoigne, the first secretary in 
Budapest, also raised alarms by reporting the immediate conclusion of a German-
Hungarian military alliance.
18 Consequently, London became very distrustful towards 
Hungarian revisionist intentions, which were viewed as a German-Hungarian tool to 
turn the regional status quo upside-down. During the inter-war years Hungary`s 
persistent territorial claims on its neighbours were already viewed suspiciously by 
London; but now that Hungary seemed to commit itself on the side of Germany, the 
British attiude stiffened even further. As a result, the Foreign Office agreed that 
Hungarian territorial claims would be rejected, and any direct Hungarian intervention 
regarding Magyar minority questions should be bluntly rebuked, and Budapest would 
be warned that minority complaints had to be referred to the League of Nations in 
accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Trianon.
19 Regardless of Hungary`s 
deteriorating image in Whitehall, Pritz`s claims that after the Anschluss Hungary was 
written off in London, seem to be depthless and oversimplified.
20 As it will be shown, 
until Hungary allowed the entrance and passage of German troops, it remained an 
important factor in British Central European policy.  
British perceptions seemingly changed with the replacement of the pro-German 
Darányi with the pro-British Béla Imrédy. Imrédy`s financial expertise was respected by 
the financial circles of the City, and his appointment had a positive reception. To 
support his efforts, the News Department of the Foreign Office instructed the British 
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17	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22380,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ5416/626/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠIngram,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠKnox	 ﾠwas	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠminister	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Budapest	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ1936	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠdisliked	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠelite,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
greatly	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠreports	 ﾠabout	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism.	 ﾠEarlier,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠLeague	 ﾠof	 ﾠNations;	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommissionaire	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSaar-ﾭ‐plebiscite	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1935,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠhe	 ﾠadvocated	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpreservation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠVersailles	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠquo.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠretained	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐revisionist	 ﾠviews	 ﾠduring	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
years	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠGascoigne	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠvisit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchief	 ﾠof	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWehrmacht	 ﾠto	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠ
Hungary	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠdroit	 ﾠde	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠto	 ﾠGermany.	 ﾠGascoigne	 ﾠwarned	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman-ﾭ‐
Czechoslovak	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWehrmacht	 ﾠwould	 ﾠoutflank	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCzechoslovak	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠ
(map	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠ2):	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22380,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6743/719/21,	 ﾠGascoigne	 ﾠ(Budapest)	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
Consequently,	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠAgreement,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman-ﾭ‐
Hungarian	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠCzechoslovakia	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertainty:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠWO	 ﾠ190/606;	 ﾠWO	 ﾠ190/681;	 ﾠWO	 ﾠ
190/691;	 ﾠWO	 ﾠ691/694.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
19	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22377,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ5245/178/21,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠto	 ﾠKnox,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ‘Emlékirat	 ﾠés	 ﾠtörténeti	 ﾠvalóság.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠemlékiratai	 ﾠfényében.	 ﾠLondoni	 ﾠévek	 ﾠI.`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ547-ﾭ‐
560	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ549).	 ﾠ50	 ﾠ
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press to praise Imrédy`s anti-Nazi step.
21 Moreover, György Barcza, the Hungarian 
minister in London, also reported that the inevitable expansion of German-Hungarian 
trade was understood by the British, and London appreciated Hungarian efforts to 
maintain political independence.
22 By all appearances, British policy remained friendly 
towards Hungary.
23  
However, closer analysis of the sources reveal a more nuanced picture. 
Regardless of the amiable official tone, under the surface distrust prevailed towards 
Hungarian revisionism over the summer of 1938. András Bán argued that as a result of 
Imrédy`s anti-Nazi policy and the agreement between Hungary and the Little Entente at 
Bled, British opinion had taken a positive turn.
24 The British press though reacted very 
positively to the Bled agreement,
25 but Bán did not distinguish between the hurraying 
tone of the papers and the tone of discussions of the Southern department, which was 
markedly distrustful. Officials were very suspicious about Hungary`s role in the Bled 
agreemeent, and the fact that the treaty remained uninitialled with Czechoslovakia, 
triggered alarms in London about Hungary`s intentions.
26 Moreover, Bán disregarded 
Sargent`s opinion as not necessarily influential, and put more weight on the friendly 
official declarations of British policy, which, as we have pointed out, did not reflect the 
true British perception.
27 In this thesis we are aiming to contest the view-point that 
British foreign political thought can be sketched only by the analysis of official 
communications and diplomatic dispatches. As we will see, particularly in the case of 
Hungary, senior Foreign Office officials often made direct decisions on Hungarian 
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21	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22380,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6900/719/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNichols,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ11.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ96/pol.	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ24	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ84/pol.	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Kánya,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiplomataemlékeim,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ318.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠGascoigne	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠalliance,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhe	 ﾠremained	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
cordial	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠofficials.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠhe	 ﾠassured	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠfavourable	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠon	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠminority	 ﾠcomplaints:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ11.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠII.,	 ﾠ2744i/1938,	 ﾠApor	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Kánya,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian–British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ37-ﾭ‐38.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠsigned	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Little	 ﾠEntente	 ﾠin	 ﾠBled	 ﾠin	 ﾠlate	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1938	 ﾠannounced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠrenunciation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠforce	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
recognised	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠequal	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠarmaments.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBled	 ﾠAgreement,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠÁdám,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠEntente	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1976);	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠkülpolitikája,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ186-ﾭ‐187.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ66,	 ﾠ14/pol.	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbledi	 ﾠegyezmény	 ﾠvisszhangja	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠsajtóban`,	 ﾠMarosy	 ﾠ(London)	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ
26	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
26	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠwelcomed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBled	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠofficially,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsign	 ﾠof	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠ
MOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ74,	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠLondon,	 ﾠ6097/83.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠ
did	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsign	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠPrague,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠrevisionist	 ﾠaims:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22378,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ
7338/178/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNoble,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
27	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian–British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ43-ﾭ‐46.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ51	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questions without needing to consult the Foreign Secretary or the Cabinet, whose 
authority was felt only in Hungarian questions with primary implications. As a result, 
the opinion of senior Foreign Office officials should be weighed more heavily in 
analysing British policy towards Hungary.  
Hungarian territorial claims seemed radical from London, but Imrédy, and 
Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya, followed a cautious foreign policy and were careful 
not to alienate the opinion of the international community by expressing radical 
revisionist claims. Territorial claims were not declared officially. Since the end of 1937 
Budapest was aware of Hitler`s plan to destroy Czechoslovakia, and a major 
rearmament programme was initiated, to prepare for the realisation of revisionist 
dreams. On the other hand, the Hungarian political elite were keen to maintain good 
relations with London and Paris, and therefore refused to officially commit Hungary`s 
aims to those of Germany.
28 Concurrently with the Bled Agreement, Horthy, Imrédy 
and Kánya arrived in Germany for an official state-visit. They were received lavishly, 
and the Germans evidently tried to present the meeting to the world as the conclusion of 
a German-Hungarian alliance. The meetings provided very controversial results. Hitler 
offered Slovakia for Hungarian participation in a war against Czechoslovakia, but due 
to the weakness of their army, the Hungarians were very reluctant to commit to this 
plan. These meetings nevertheless clarified that due to the fear of losing German 
support for frontier revision, the Hungarian elite decided that under specific 
circumstances it would side with Germany in a German-Czechoslovak war.
29 It is 
crucial to note that London did not have reliable information on the German-Hungarian 
negotiations, and reacted positively to the apparent lack of an immediate agreement.
30 
The analysis of new sources have revealed that after the Anschluss, due to 
Hungary`s flirtations with Germany, Hungarian revisionism was viewed suspiciously by 
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28	 ﾠGastony,	 ﾠ`Hungarian	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠKálmán	 ﾠKánya`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ7-ﾭ‐8;	 ﾠSteiner,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTriumph	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDark,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ
371-ﾭ‐372.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
29	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠare	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠambiguous	 ﾠpicture.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Hungarians	 ﾠwere	 ﾠvery	 ﾠreluctant	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠwar	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠCzechoslovakia,	 ﾠand	 ﾠHorthy	 ﾠreminded	 ﾠ
Hitler	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠand	 ﾠnaval	 ﾠpower	 ﾠwould	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠprevail	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠconflict.	 ﾠJuhász	 ﾠand	 ﾠPritz	 ﾠ
agreed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfervent	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderpinning	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠagreeing	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠwar	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠCzechoslovakia,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠguaranteed	 ﾠYugoslav	 ﾠneutrality	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlocalised	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠCzechoslovakia:	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠ
külpolitikája,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ188;	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ‘A	 ﾠkieli	 ﾠtalálkozó’,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ646-ﾭ‐680.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
30	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ66,	 ﾠ113/pol.1938,	 ﾠMarosy	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ26	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ52	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London. While British official opinion towards Budapest remained amiable, the 
apparent hostility of the Foreign Office towards Hungarian territorial claims, and the 
widely held opinion in Whitehall that British political influence in Central Europe had 
diminished, projected a limited British interest towards the territorial shape of Hungary 
on the eve of the Munich crisis.    
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2.3 The implications of the Chamberlain-Hitler Berchtesgaden meeting on Hungary 
 
Historians paid very limited attention to how Britain perceived Hungarian territorial 
claims on the eve of the Czechoslovak crisis.
31 The Hitler-Chamberlain Berchtesgaden 
meeting brought the subject of Hungary into the international forefront. Consequently, 
Hungarian revisionism played an important role in British policy towards 
Czechoslovakia. New evidence suggests that Britain did not reject Hungarian territorial 
claims per se, and only discouraged satisfying Hungarian demands in Slovakia because 
the question was raised by Hitler, which therefore was viewed as a threat from 
Germany`s side.    
It is important to sketch Chamberlain`s and Halifax`s perceptions of Central 
European territorial and minority issues before the Czechoslovak crisis. During his 
infamous visit to Germany in 1937, Halifax vaguely assured Hitler of Britain`s 
flexibility towards the Central European status quo. Cabinet documents and 
Chamberlain`s intimate letters to his sisters prove that Chamberlain and Halifax were 
fundamentally disinterested about Central European territorial quarrels, and their 
attention stopped at the eastern frontiers of Germany.
32 Parker has added that the aim of 
preventing the opening up of new problems in Central Europe was the underlying 
reason of Chamberlain`s disinterest.
33 Cabinet minutes are supporting this theory. In 
August, the Cabinet decided that exactly for this reason, London would not raise the 
Magyar minority question in Czechoslovakia.
34 It is therefore no surprise that when 
Lord Runciman was sent to mediate between the Sudeten Germans and Prague, he was 
instructed by Chamberlain to concentrate only on the Sudeten-German problem.
35  
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31	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠexception	 ﾠis:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠÁdám,	 ﾠ‘The	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ82-ﾭ‐122.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
32	 ﾠChamberlain,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠletter	 ﾠto	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsister,	 ﾠIda,	 ﾠadmitted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠHitler,	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsatisfied	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustria	 ﾠand	 ﾠCzechoslovakia	 ﾠby	 ﾠpeaceful	 ﾠmeans:	 ﾠDBFP,	 ﾠser.2,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠ349.,	 ﾠN.	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠIda	 ﾠChamberlain,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠa	 ﾠsettlement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠafter	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustrian	 ﾠand	 ﾠCzech	 ﾠ
problem:	 ﾠZ.	 ﾠSteiner,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTriumph	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDark,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ339.	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠParker,	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠand	 ﾠAppeasement,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ141-ﾭ‐144.	 ﾠ
34	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/95,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ64	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ13	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
35	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠRunciman	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠno	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠminority	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠSlovakia.	 ﾠRunciman	 ﾠ
promised	 ﾠto	 ﾠvisit	 ﾠSlovakia,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠasked	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyars	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠany	 ﾠdemonstrations,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcase	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
declared	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠleave	 ﾠSlovakia	 ﾠimmediately.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvisit	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠnever	 ﾠmaterialised,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Runciman	 ﾠmet	 ﾠPéter	 ﾠEszterházy,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleader	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠParty	 ﾠin	 ﾠCzechoslovakia	 ﾠonly	 ﾠvery	 ﾠbriefly:	 ﾠ
MOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ11.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ201/pol.	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠVörnle	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRunciman-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ54	 ﾠ
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After the failure of the Runciman mission, Chamberlain decided to personally 
negotiate with Hitler to prevent the escalation of the Sudeten crisis into a European war. 
It is problematic to determine Chamberlain`s disposition towards the Magyar question 
at this stage, but the evidence suggests that he was certain that the Magyars were 
content in Czechoslovakia.
36 At their meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler demanded a 
plebiscite in the Sudetenland, and its consequent annexation to Germany if the 
plebiscite favoured it. Hitler`s demand for plebiscites for the Magyar and Polish 
minorities caught Chamberlain by surprise. Upon Chamberlain`s return from 
Berchtesgaden, the Cabinet eventually agreed to Hitler`s demands in the Sudetenland, 
but just like previously, decided that plebiscites in the Magyar areas would not be 
supported as it would set a precedent, and would lead to new complications in the 
region.
37 The Cabinet decision was followed by Anglo-French negotiations, which 
agreed to the transfer of the Sudetenland, but endorsing the British Cabinet decision 
also disapproved plebiscites in territories inhabited by Magyars and Polish in order to 
prevent the complete disintegration of Czechoslovakia.  
Rumours that a plebiscite in the Sudetenland would be approved, but a Magyar 
would not, had an intense effect on Hungarian policy. Anxious not to be left out of the 
settlement Budapest indignantly demanded `equal consideration` for the Magyars of 
Czechoslovakia.
38 Besides, Budapest also demanded a plebiscite in the predominantly 
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Eszterházy	 ﾠmeeting:	 ﾠK	 ﾠ64	 ﾠpol.	 ﾠ1938	 ﾠ7/4,	 ﾠ72/2396.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRunciman	 ﾠmission,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠP.	 ﾠVyšný,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Runciman	 ﾠmission	 ﾠto	 ﾠCzechoslovakia,	 ﾠ1938:	 ﾠprelude	 ﾠto	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠ(Basingstoke,	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
36	 ﾠSakmyster,	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠPowers	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDanubian	 ﾠCrisis,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ185-ﾭ‐186,	 ﾠ192-ﾭ‐193.	 ﾠChamberlain`s	 ﾠ
memoirs,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠletters	 ﾠto	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsister,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠand	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠfiles	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
Chamberlain`s	 ﾠperceptions.	 ﾠImmediately	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠhe	 ﾠtravelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠBerchtesgaden,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠSir	 ﾠRalf	 ﾠGlynn,	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠhad	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠvisited	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠsecret	 ﾠmessages	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
elite	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠa	 ﾠpeaceful	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ11.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠII.,	 ﾠ115/pol.	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠ
Marosy	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠOther	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpersonalities,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠSybil	 ﾠGlyn,	 ﾠLady	 ﾠSnowden	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Lady	 ﾠLondonderry	 ﾠalso	 ﾠvisited	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠquestions:	 ﾠOrszágos	 ﾠSzéchenyi	 ﾠKönyvtár	 ﾠ(OSZK),	 ﾠFond	 ﾠX,	 ﾠGéza	 ﾠ
Szüllő	 ﾠPapers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
37	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/95,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusions	 ﾠ39	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ16	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/95,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusions	 ﾠ41	 ﾠ
(38),	 ﾠ21	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBerchtesgaden	 ﾠmeetings,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠDGFP	 ﾠser.	 ﾠD.,	 ﾠ
vol.	 ﾠ2.,	 ﾠ896.	 ﾠParker	 ﾠis	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠopinion.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠstresses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcabinet	 ﾠministers	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠto	 ﾠpostpone	 ﾠ
plebiscites,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠan	 ﾠorderly	 ﾠfashion	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeventual	 ﾠdismemberment	 ﾠof	 ﾠCzechoslovakia:	 ﾠ
Parker,	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠand	 ﾠAppeasement,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ161-ﾭ‐162.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
38	 ﾠDIMK,	 ﾠII.,	 ﾠ314:	 ﾠKánya	 ﾠto	 ﾠVillani,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠIbid,	 ﾠ346:	 ﾠKánya	 ﾠto	 ﾠKnox,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠIbid,	 ﾠ
351:	 ﾠKánya	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHungarians	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠevoked	 ﾠVansittart`s	 ﾠslip	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
tongue,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠin	 ﾠAugust,	 ﾠpromised	 ﾠ`equal	 ﾠconsideration`	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyars	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠsituation,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcession	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSudetenland	 ﾠto	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtable	 ﾠyet.	 ﾠUntil	 ﾠ
mid-ﾭ‐August,	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠremained	 ﾠsilent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSudeten	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsources	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠ55	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Slovak and Ruthenian areas of Czechoslovakia, which belonged to Hungary before 
1920. It is crucial to note that this was the first time that Hungary officially presented 
territorial claims on Czechoslovakia in the 1930s.
39 The Foreign Office briskly rejected 
these demands and bluntly stated that without the Magyar districts Czechoslovakia 
would not be able to exist.
40 Halifax also side-tracked the problem, and assured Barcza 
that Hungary`s claims would be considered at the appropriate moment, but at present 
Britain was preoccupied by its attempts to avert war. He warned the Hungarians against 
extending the crisis, and referring to claims on Slovak and Ruthenian areas, Halifax 
called for moderation.
41 
Barcza was keen to support Hungary`s bid.
42 In order to circumvent the hostility 
of the Foreign Office, he sent a memorandum about the demands of Hungary directly to 
Chamberlain, via Andrian Dingli.
43 Barcza`s diaries crucially reveal the differences in 
the perceptions of Chamberlain and the Foreign Office towards Hungary, which so far 
were not apparent from official British documents. Compared to the abrupt disapproval 
of the Foreign Office, Chamberlain promised fair treatment for the Magyars and praised 
Hungary`s peaceful attitude.
44 Moreover, Chamberlain seemed to be pleased to establish 
a secret channel with Barcza; he complained to Barcza that Cadogan and Sargent were 
withholding information from him and were trying to lock him away from foreign 
diplomats.
45  
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
activated	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrevisionist	 ﾠrhetoric	 ﾠfor	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠpressure:	 ﾠDIMK,	 ﾠII,	 ﾠ361:	 ﾠSztójay	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ
1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
39	 ﾠHolly	 ﾠCase	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarians	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcase	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠforums	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠminority	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠa	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautumn	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
1938.	 ﾠCase	 ﾠhas	 ﾠunduly	 ﾠoveremphasised	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠTruly,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠhad	 ﾠsubmitted	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠ
complaint	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠMagyars,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠput	 ﾠ
forward	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠwas	 ﾠaiming	 ﾠfor	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠ
revision:	 ﾠH.	 ﾠCase,	 ﾠBetween	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTransylvanian	 ﾠQuestion	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠIdea	 ﾠduring	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ
II,	 ﾠ(Stanford,	 ﾠ2009),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ31.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
40	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0008;	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ74,	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠLondon,	 ﾠ5909/64.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
41	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21568,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ10591/2319/12,	 ﾠHalifax`s	 ﾠnote	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
minister,	 ﾠ21	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠII.,	 ﾠ370,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
42	 ﾠInterestingly,	 ﾠBarcza`s	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdiaries	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠmemoirs.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevisionist	 ﾠfervour	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmemoirs,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
enthusiastically	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠCzechoslovakia	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdiaries:	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiplomataemlékeim,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ
372;	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠto:	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ19	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0008.	 ﾠ
43	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ19	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0008.	 ﾠAndrian	 ﾠDingli	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠcounsellor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Italian	 ﾠEmbassy	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon,	 ﾠand	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠserved	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontact	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠand	 ﾠChamberlain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
44	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsent	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠworded	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠletter	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠpromised	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠ
Hungary’s	 ﾠcase	 ﾠcarefully	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmind:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ74,	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠLondon,	 ﾠ6097/83.	 ﾠ
45	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ19	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0008.	 ﾠ56	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In the Cabinet, Chamberlain and Halifax noted their openness towards the 
revision of Hungary`s frontiers, but when the Cabinet discussed a guarantee for 
Czechoslovakia on the 21 September, due to the possibility of German interference with 
the Magyar question, Hungarian and Polish territorial aspirations became one of the 
underlying reasons that the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia was not guaranteed.
  
Samuel Hoare`s comment, who was the Home Secretary in 1938, dramatically changed 
the tone of the meeting and proved the existence of deep seated prejudices about 
Hungary, which evidently influenced British perceptions on Hungarian revisionism to a 
great extent. Hoare noted that because of Hungary`s maltreatment of its nationalities in 
the past non-Magyars should not be transferred to Hungary if revision was approved. 
The Cabinet unanimously agreed with Hoare`s opinion.
46 The following days seemed to 
prove British suspicions, as a strongly worded Hungarian-Polish démarche was sent to 
London, demanding the transfer of Magyar and Polish minority territories, if the 
Sudetenland was ceded to Germany.
47 The démarche significantly damaged British 
opinion towards Hungary. The Foreign Office did not hesitate to send a harsly worded 
reply, which warned Hungary against taking military action against Czechoslovakia.  
The Sudeten problem had been the primary attention of Whitehall and now that 
Hitler connected the Magyar problem to it, the Magyar question also attained 
prominence in British thought. The opinion of the Foreign Office on Hungary was 
momentarily overshadowed, and due to its urgency, the Cabinet, and particularly 
Chamberlain, dealt directly with the Magyar question.
48 Barcza managed to build 
contacts with Chamberlain, who however remained very cautious towards Hungarian 
claims, mostly because of Hitler`s interference in the problem.      
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46	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/95,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusions,	 ﾠ40	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ19	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
47	 ﾠDIMK,	 ﾠII.,	 ﾠ371:	 ﾠKánya	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠSptember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ387:	 ﾠKánya	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
48	 ﾠG.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠPeden	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠera	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinner	 ﾠcircle	 ﾠof	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠ
(Chamberlain,	 ﾠHorace	 ﾠWilson,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsecretary	 ﾠof	 ﾠChamberlain,	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠSamuel	 ﾠHoare,	 ﾠand	 ﾠLord	 ﾠ
Simon)	 ﾠkept	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonopoly	 ﾠover	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠPeden,	 ﾠ`Sir	 ﾠHorace	 ﾠWilson	 ﾠand	 ﾠAppeasement`,	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠHistoric	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠ220	 ﾠ(2010),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ983-ﾭ‐1014.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠand	 ﾠmemoirs	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠon	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠquestions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ57	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.4 From Bad Godesberg to Munich 
 
At Bad Godesberg, Hitler shocked Chamberlain by demanding the immediate transfer 
of the Sudetenland, and the settlement of Hungarian and Polish territorial claims in 
Czechoslovakia.
49 Earlier, the Cabinet had decided that further demands would not be 
tolerated, so therefore Chamberlain returned to London. Consequently, Chamberlain 
found himself at odds with Halifax in the Cabinet. Chamberlain seemed ready to yield 
to Hitler`s demands, but Halifax disagreed, and openly challenged the Prime Minister. 
They also diverged on how to handle Hungarian territorial claims. Halifax 
recommended an arbitrary decision, as otherwise, he argued, the problem would lead to 
a new crisis.
50 Cabinet minutes suggest that Chamberlain was still aiming to cooperate 
with Hitler and in order to remove potential frictions with Germany he wanted to 
postpone dealing with the Hungarian problem. Halifax`s so called `rebellion` after Bad 
Godesberg intensified the debate in Whitehall on what policy to follow towards 
Germany and Czechoslovakia. As a result, discussions on the Hungarian question were 
pushed into the background.
51  
London did its outmost to argue Hungary out of escalating the crisis, and now 
the official view on Hungarian claims in Czechoslovakia until Munich was that there 
was no official view. Although Halifax recommended an arbitrary decision in the 
Cabinet, during a meeting with Barcza he warned that Hungary should not attempt an 
immediate settlement by direct military action. Halifax recommended peaceful 
negotiation, and as an alternative, the mediation of the League of Nations. It says much 
about the lack of Halifax`s understanding of the nature of Central European territorial 
disputes that at this stage he suggested the mediation of the League, which was viewed 
in Hungary to be incapable of solving minority disputes. Halifax was also greatly 
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49	 ﾠD.	 ﾠFaber,	 ﾠMunich,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ1938	 ﾠAppeasement	 ﾠCrisis	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ334-ﾭ‐337;	 ﾠSakmyster,	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Great	 ﾠPowers,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ203;	 ﾠR.	 ﾠSelf,	 ﾠNeville	 ﾠChamberlain,	 ﾠa	 ﾠbiography	 ﾠ(Aldershot,	 ﾠ2006),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ316-ﾭ‐320.	 ﾠ
50	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/95,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusions	 ﾠ42	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ24	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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51	 ﾠThe	 ﾠescalation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠafter	 ﾠBad	 ﾠGodesberg	 ﾠalso	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon.	 ﾠPrague	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠand	 ﾠmobilised	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwar.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠ
highlight	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠHitler	 ﾠ
offered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐annexation	 ﾠof	 ﾠSlovakia	 ﾠto	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠImrédy	 ﾠand	 ﾠKánya	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠa	 ﾠfait	 ﾠaccompli	 ﾠto	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠby	 ﾠattacking	 ﾠCzechoslovakia	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnegotiating	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Hitler	 ﾠin	 ﾠBad	 ﾠGodesberg:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠOrmos,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠa	 ﾠkét	 ﾠvilágháború	 ﾠkorában	 ﾠ(Budapest	 ﾠ2000),	 ﾠpp.195-ﾭ‐
196.	 ﾠ58	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
uninformed, and Barcza had to explain the basics of the Magyar problem to him.
52      
Halifax`s views on the necessity of frontier revision nevertheless seemed to alter 
the rigid standpoint of the Foreign Office. Sargent, who had previously condemned 
Hungary`s pro-German policy, and had disapproved of any territorial alterations in 
favour of Hungary, changed his viewpoint and expressed a very similar opinion to that 
of Halifax. He declared that London should eventually accept that the Magyars should 
receive similar treatment to the Sudeten-Germans, and territories would have to be 
ceded to Hungary.
53 
So far it has been pointed out that British policy-makers viewed Hungarian 
territorial aspirations in Czechoslovakia unsymphatetically. Essentially however, 
Whitehall did not reject revision, but in the midst of the Sudeten crisis, the problem fell 
victim to the geopolitical priorities of Britain, which in this case was to avoid 
disagreements with Germany. Decisions on Hungary were formulated on this basis, and 
the British delegation went to the Munich conference	 ﾠwith this mind-set.  
Even though the British showed complete indifference towards Hungary at 
Munich, Foreign Office memoranda provide evidence that the British arrived with clear 
views on Hungary`s frontiers. Philip Nichols and Sargent explained the opinion of the 
Southern department in a series of memoranda.
54 They recommended that Prague 
should be pressured to cede territories to Hungary. Sargent and Nichols argued that 
there was an ethnographic justification for frontier change, but due to Hungary`s past 
intolerance towards its own nationalities,	 ﾠthey noted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠonly the Csallóköz and 
Beregszász [Berehove] should be transfered (map 2.3), which had an 80 percent or 
higher Magyar population.
55 The memorandum used Macartney`s study of Trianon as a 
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52	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠreported	 ﾠhis	 ﾠimpression	 ﾠto	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠcontemplated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
comprehensive	 ﾠreconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaegis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLeague,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠleadership.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠappear	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdiaries,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠintentionally	 ﾠprojected	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
friendlier	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠactually	 ﾠwas,	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠ
Budapest	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠamiable	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠLondon:	 ﾠDIMK,	 ﾠII.,	 ﾠ391,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ24	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ
1938;	 ﾠIbid,	 ﾠ427a,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠto:	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ21,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠ
September	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcause	 ﾠto	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠargument	 ﾠlater.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
53	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21568,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ10782/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
note	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠused	 ﾠthe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ`similar`,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ`the	 ﾠsame`,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠstill	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
reservations	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠsatisfying	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠdemands.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
54	 ﾠThis	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠmemoranda	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠto	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreference	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
question.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
55	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/22380,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ8359/97/21,	 ﾠP.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠNichols	 ﾠand	 ﾠO.	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ`Hungarian	 ﾠMinority	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Czechoslovakia`,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ59	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
reference book.
56 More crucially, it mentioned that in formulating British opinion on the 
frontiers of Hungary, the opinion of former British representatives in Budapest were 
sought. Sir Thomas Hohler, Henry James Bruce and Sir William Goode all spoke in 
favour of Hungary.
57 Hohler, Bruce and Goode were all well-known pro-Hungarians in 
Whitehall, and their surprising influence on decision-making refutes suggestions that 
the Czech opinion was favoured in London. It proves that pro-Hungarian voices had 
weight in London, and that frontier revisions were not rejected. As we have seen, by the 
end of September policy-makers in London were already considering revision as an 
option, but the opinion of Hohler, Bruce and Goode seemed to tilt the balance. An 
alternative recommendation, based on the 1930 Czechoslovak census, advised the 
transfer of a number of towns and cities (map 2.4 and	 ﾠfigure 2.1). This alternative would 
have returned 425,000 Magyars to Hungary, who comprised 73 percent of the 
population of the territory under consideration.  
The importance of these documents is that they enable us to probe British views 
on Hungarian territorial claims in a period, when official opinion on the problem was 
silent for strategic reasons. They also prove that fundamentally Whitehall did not reject 
frontier revision, but was aiming to deal with the problem in an orderly manner. In order 
to promote stability, and to harmonise with the criteria applied to the Sudetenland, a 
new frontier, which closely followed the ethnographic dividing-line between 
nationalities was recommended.
58 However, the memory of 19th century 
`Magyarization` was evidently a deeply held argument against revision on a larger 
scale. These pieces of evidence also help us to understand the British opinion of the 
First Vienna Award, which settled the Hungarian-Czechoslovak territorial dispute a 
month later, and of which only ambiguous analysis has emerged so far.
59 The influence 
of Hohler, Bruce and Goode on British policy is arresting and it highlights that opinion 
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56	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠHer	 ﾠSuccessors.	 ﾠAttached	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠshort	 ﾠstudy,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
describes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠunsigned,	 ﾠits	 ﾠviews	 ﾠvery	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠ
resemble	 ﾠto	 ﾠMacartney`s	 ﾠviews,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠ	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠHer	 ﾠSuccessors,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ246-ﾭ‐250.	 ﾠ
57	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠHohler	 ﾠwas	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠminister	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1921	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1924,	 ﾠHenry	 ﾠJames	 ﾠBruce	 ﾠwas	 ﾠan	 ﾠadviser	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠNational	 ﾠBank	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s,	 ﾠand	 ﾠSir	 ﾠWilliam	 ﾠGoode	 ﾠwas	 ﾠan	 ﾠadviser	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1920s	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunofficial	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠadviser	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠLegation	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
1936.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
58	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCzechoslovak	 ﾠrefusal	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠceding	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠto	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠmade	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠon	 ﾠformulating	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21568,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ11042/2319/12,	 ﾠNewton	 ﾠ(Prague)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Halifax,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
59	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsection	 ﾠwill	 ﾠanalyse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠview	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠAward	 ﾠin	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdepth.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
discussed,	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠreluctant	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠan	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaward,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠdrew	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
frontier	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠrecommendation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ60	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
outside of Whitehall could potentially have carried significant weight.
60 
According to the Munich Agreement, districts with a 51 percent or higher 
German majority had to be evacuated by Czechoslovakia. London and Paris pledged to 
guarantee the new frontiers against unprovoked aggression, which Hitler and Mussolini 
also promised, after which the Magyar and Polish minority questions would be settled. 
At Munich, the Hungarian question was raised by Mussolini, but Hitler refused to 
include it in the immediate settlement. As a result of this German disapproval, 
Chamberlain also expressed his disinterest.
61 Mussolini prepared a minority draft, which 
provisioned equal treatment for the minorities of Czechoslovakia, which was rejected 
by all parties.  
Chamberlain, Daladier and Hitler however agreed to sign an appendix, which 
asked the Hungarian and Czechoslovak governments to seek a solution by direct 
negotiations, and stated that if an agreement could not be reached in three months, the 
case should be the subject of a new four-power conference. Hence, although indirectly, 
London officially recognised the existence of a Hungarian-Czechoslovak territorial and 
minority problem, which it had refused to do earlier. Under pressure from Berlin, 
London accepted the 51 percent rule in the Sudetenland, which it was able to refuse for 
the other minorities of Czechoslovakia, because Hitler did not insist on the immediate 
settlement of these questions. Therefore, Whitehall formulated an independent opinion 
on the Magyar problem, and consequently, an opinion less radical than he 51 percent 
rule emerged.  
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60	 ﾠEarlier,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠand	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersuade	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠof	 ﾠrevision.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠHohler,	 ﾠBruce	 ﾠand	 ﾠGoode	 ﾠhad	 ﾠconveyed	 ﾠmessages	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠcircles	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
behalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠprobable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠadvice	 ﾠ	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠopinion.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠto	 ﾠprove	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcase	 ﾠHohler,	 ﾠBruce	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Goode	 ﾠacted	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠacted	 ﾠsimultaneously	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
manoeuvres	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbackground.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
61	 ﾠBefore	 ﾠtravelling	 ﾠto	 ﾠMunich,	 ﾠIstván	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠdeputy	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠminister	 ﾠmet	 ﾠMussolini.	 ﾠCsáky	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠdemands,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠMussolini	 ﾠpromised	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ61	 ﾠ
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2.5 From Munich to Vienna 
 
As a signatory power of the Munich agreement, Britain officially had to support the 
Hungarian-Slovak negotiations, which commenced in Komárom shortly after Munich.
62 
Difficulties emerged from the outset, as Hungarian and Slovak concepts of an 
agreement were very different. The Slovaks offered the Csallóköz and territorial 
autonomy for the rest of the Magyars, while Hungary demanded the cession of 
territories with a 51 percent or higher Magyar population, and a plebiscite for the rest of 
Slovakia and Ruthenia.
63   
After Munich, the primary aim of London was to support the parties in reaching 
an ethnographically just and mutually acceptable solution.
64 Regardless of the official 
support, Cabinet documents prove that from the beginning of the negotiations, 
Whitehall tried its outmost to avoid being drawn into the dispute.
65 In order to ensure a 
favourable outcome, constant pressure was applied on Prague to reach an agreement 
with Budapest on an ethnographic basis.
66 Despite this, London openly declared its 
commitment to Munich, and to a new four-power arbitration, if negotiations proved to 
be unsuccessful.
 67  
Unaware of the influence of their opinion, Hohler, Goode and Macartney began 
petitioning the Foreign Office after Munich. Hohler argued that Hungary could be won 
over, because the Hungarian people were fond of Britain, but hated Germany.
68 
Similarly, Goode also recommended that active British support for frontier change 
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62	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ6	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠSlovakia	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠan	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠCzecho-ﾭ‐Slovakia.	 ﾠNote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠCzecholovakia.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠname	 ﾠof	 ﾠCzecho-ﾭ‐Slovakia	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSlovak	 ﾠautonomy.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠSlovakia,	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwere	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠby	 ﾠSlovaks	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
Czechs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
63	 ﾠSallai,	 ﾠAz	 ﾠelső	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ82-ﾭ‐84,	 ﾠ278-ﾭ‐279.	 ﾠ
64	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠas	 ﾠ`ethnographically	 ﾠjust`	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstage.	 ﾠJudging	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ80	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ51	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠagreement,	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠ
contemplated	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠanywhere	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfigures.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠcrucially	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
mutual	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠforce.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
65	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/95,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusions	 ﾠ47	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ30	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
66	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠII,	 ﾠ451a:	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ451b:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ452:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ503:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ699:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ
1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
67	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠII,	 ﾠ452:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ478:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ7	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ
371/21568,	 ﾠC11293/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠStrang,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠC12507/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠStrang,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
October	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠC13057/2319/12,	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠby	 ﾠStrang,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
68	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21570C11976/2319/12,	 ﾠHohler	 ﾠto	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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could turn Hungary against Germany.
69 Macartney argued that London could weaken 
the pro-German elements in Hungary by supporting reasonable Hungarian territorial 
claims.
70 Like previously, the views of Hohler, Goode and Macartney were taken 
seriously, and senior officials noted that if Hungary stood by her ethnic claims and did 
not couple claims with threats, then London would support frontier revision.
71   
  In mid-October the Foreign Office produced a number of memoranda on the 
Hungarian question. Their recommendations demonstrably aimed to correspond to the 
ethnographic principle, which was advocated by the Munich Agreement. A 
memorandum on the future of Slovakia acknowledged that a wide southern strip would 
eventually be ceded to Hungary because it was mainly inhabited by Magyars. 
Strikingly, the objective to follow the Munich-idea essentially overrode earlier British 
strategic concerns. Namely, the memorandum neglected the strategic importance of 
Czechoslovak authority over Ruthenia`s Magyar districts, which previsouly was the 
strategic cornerstone of the Little Entente. Czecho-Slovakia and Romania were 
connected through these Magyar districts, and the Romanian Army was supplied from 
the Czechoslovak Skoda arms concern through this territory (map 2.5).
72 The fact that 
strategic interests, which were previously considered important, were now disregarded 
in such an abrupt manner points towards a dramatic shift in British policy towards the 
region.   
Another memorandum on Ruthenia, Czecho-Slovakia`s easternmost province, 
recommended the transfer of the entire province to Hungary on economic and historical 
grounds. This document showed considerable confusion towards the future of Ruthenia. 
Contradicting the previous claim, it suggested that only compact blocks of Magyars 
should be ceded to Hungary due to Hungary`s impatient minority policy in the past.
73 
Both documents received limited attention in the Foreign Office which indicated 
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69	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21570,	 ﾠC12104/2319/12,	 ﾠGoode	 ﾠto	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21572	 ﾠ
C13087/2319/12,	 ﾠGoode	 ﾠto	 ﾠGladwyn	 ﾠJebb,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
70	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21571,	 ﾠC12627/2319/12,	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠQuestion`,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
71	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21570,	 ﾠC12104/2319/12,	 ﾠJebb	 ﾠto	 ﾠGoode,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21571,	 ﾠ
C12627/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠIngram,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ15	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
72	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21570,	 ﾠC12133/2319/12,	 ﾠMallett,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠFuture	 ﾠof	 ﾠSlovakia`,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBucharest	 ﾠ
asked	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠmediation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠensuring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwould	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuninterrupted	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
transport	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrailway-ﾭ‐line,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠceded	 ﾠto	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠNoble	 ﾠand	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠhad	 ﾠno	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠraising	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠforum:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21570,	 ﾠC13578/2319/12,	 ﾠ
minute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNoble	 ﾠand	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
73	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21571,	 ﾠC12378/2319/12,	 ﾠStevens,	 ﾠ`Ruthenia`,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1910	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930	 ﾠcensuses,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠRuthenia	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ17-ﾭ‐21	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠ63	 ﾠ
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momentary disinterest and suggest that the final decision had not been made on the 
future of Ruthenia. Cadogan, Sargent, Nichols and Stevens accepted that the Magyar 
districts would eventually be returned to Hungary, but they hesitated on deciding the 
future of the rest of the province (map 2.6). Analysing British opinion towards Ruthenia 
in mid-October provides the archetype of British policy towards Hungary, and more 
broadly towards the entire Central European region. Hesitating about the direction of 
policy towards Ruthenia, the Foreign Office endlessly debated alternatives without 
making a decision. However, a factor is missing from the equation; namely Germany. 
Halifax plainly noted to the Cabinet that London could not formulate a policy until 
Germany had made a decision on the future on Ruthenia, which Britain would 
discreetly adopt. Halifax added that in the meantime London had officially taken the 
line that it was not concerned in the matter.
74  
Diplomatic reports had been an important component of decision-making in the 
inter-war period, it is therefore curious that neither the opinion of Newton or of Knox 
influenced British decisions at this stage.	 ﾠTheir views were acknowledged, but as we 
have seen British tactics were largely directed by the attitude of Germany. Newton and 
Knox were sending very contrasting opinions from Prague and Budapest. Newton 
suggested that Hungarian demands had to be satisfied in Slovakia, because they were 
justified ethnographically, but Knox in Budapest disagreed, and wanted to limit frontier 
revision as far as possible.
75 Nonetheless, it has to be highlighted that while the opinion 
of Newton was trusted, there were signs that Knox`s evident hostility towards Hungary 
was considered counterproductive by policy-makers.
76  
  Negotiations between Budapest and Bratislava broke down on the 13 October, 
mainly due to the fundamental disagreement in the interpretation of the censuses of the 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
74	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/96,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusions	 ﾠ50	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ26	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes	 ﾠwent	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
official	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠacquisition	 ﾠof	 ﾠRuthenia:	 ﾠ`Poland	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
October	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠFrank	 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠremembered	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠannoyance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice:	 ﾠ
Roberts,	 ﾠDealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠDictators,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ29.	 ﾠ
75	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21570,	 ﾠC11899/2319/12,	 ﾠNewton	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21570,	 ﾠ
C12001/2319/12,	 ﾠNewton	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21570,	 ﾠC12081/2319/12,	 ﾠNewton	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Halifax,	 ﾠ8	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21570,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ11903/2319/12,	 ﾠKnox	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
76	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠKnox`s	 ﾠrecommendation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠ`to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠorganised	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGermans`,	 ﾠ
met	 ﾠwith	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠdispleasure	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSouthern	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfurious	 ﾠwith	 ﾠKnox,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobstacle	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnglo-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelationship:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ
371/21571,	 ﾠC12586/2319/12,	 ﾠKnox	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠMallet	 ﾠand	 ﾠNoble,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠ
October	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠInterestingly,	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠnotified	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarians	 ﾠthat	 ﾠKnox`s	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
Hungary	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠseriously:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ11.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠII.,	 ﾠ115/pol.	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠMarosy	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Kánya,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ64	 ﾠ
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disputed territories. The Hungarians contested the 1930 Czechoslovak census, which 
was favourable for Slovak claims, but the Slovaks contested the 1910 Austro-Hungarian 
census, which was more acceptable to the Hungarians. Viewpoints had arguably came 
closer, but authority over the larger cities, such as Pozsony [Bratislava], Nyitra [Nitra], 
Kassa [Košice], Ungvár [Uzhhorod] and Munkács [Mukachevo] divided the parties.
77 
Throughout the negotiations, the Hungarians relinquished very little of their original 
demands for territories with a 51 percent Magyar majority. Similarly to the British view, 
Budapest clung to the 51 percent rule in order to harmonise with the Munich idea.
78  
Whitehall desired a peaceful agreement, therefore, when negotiations broke 
down, Halifax instructed Newton to apply pressure on the Slovaks to assent to the 
ethnographic demands of Hungary.
79 To solve the deadlock, Mussolini and Ciano 
proposed a new four power conference, which was rejected by Hitler. Afterwards, due 
to firm German pressure, negotiations resumed. This German intervention had a crucial 
impact on British policy. It signalled that Hitler wished to solve the dispute alone, 
something the British readily accepted. Consequently, to avoid disagreements with 
Berlin, London gave up supporting four power arbitration.
80 Subsequently, the British 
hastened the conclusion of an agreement and strong pressure was applied on Prague to 
satisfy moderate Hungarian demands.
 81    
  At the end of October, the negotiation reached its second, and now final 
deadlock. Horthy and Kánya both insisted on  four-power arbitration as they believed 
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77	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠand	 ﾠSlovak	 ﾠcounter-ﾭ‐offers	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegotiations;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠSallai,	 ﾠ
Az	 ﾠelső	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ278-ﾭ‐279.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
78	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠafter	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarians	 ﾠgave	 ﾠup	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠof	 ﾠSlovakia,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠonly	 ﾠan	 ﾠethnographic	 ﾠfrontier,	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠopinion:	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ
Fifteenth,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ250.	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠsources	 ﾠand	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠhave	 ﾠproved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠ
Budapest	 ﾠwas	 ﾠresponsive	 ﾠto	 ﾠalleged	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠopinion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcrucially	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠidea	 ﾠ
dictated	 ﾠby	 ﾠBerlin.	 ﾠAlso,	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠshelved	 ﾠits	 ﾠmore	 ﾠradical	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠwas	 ﾠconvinced	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
long-ﾭ‐run	 ﾠSlovakia	 ﾠwould	 ﾠjoin	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠreasons:	 ﾠMOL	 ﾠK	 ﾠ27,	 ﾠ
Minisztertanácsi	 ﾠJegyzőkönyvek,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠI.	 ﾠJanek,	 ﾠ`Magyar	 ﾠtörekvések	 ﾠa	 ﾠFelvidék	 ﾠ
megszerzésére	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐ban`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ37-ﾭ‐66.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
79	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠII,	 ﾠ503:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠlater	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠapplied	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSlovaks	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠhis	 ﾠinfluence:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ11.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠI.,	 ﾠ159/pol.	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠ
December	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠthat	 ﾠduring	 ﾠOctober-ﾭ‐November	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ethnographic	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠidea.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
80	 ﾠNoble`s	 ﾠminute	 ﾠis	 ﾠtelling:	 ﾠ`Until	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdon`t	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan`t	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfour	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠconference`:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21571,	 ﾠC12666/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNoble,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
81	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠII,	 ﾠ548:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ	 ﾠDBFP	 ﾠser.	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ227:	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠto	 ﾠKrofta,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠ
October	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdiaries	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠevident	 ﾠannoyance	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠdemands:	 ﾠ`Barcza	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠmap	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠme	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbeastly	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠare	 ﾠclaiming.	 ﾠNot	 ﾠso	 ﾠbad	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠthought.`:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDiaries	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠSir	 ﾠAlexander	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ65	 ﾠ
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that it would provide permanence.
82 Officially, Prague and Budapest jointly applied for 
German-Italian arbitration, instead of a four-power conference, but historians so far 
have been unsure of how this scenario came about. New evidence suggests that the 
Germans persuaded Budapest to give up insisting on a four power arbitration.
83 Be that 
as it may, the British were satisfied to be left out of the arbitration and Ciano was 
informed that London welcomed a German-Italian decision in the Hungarian-Slovak 
dispute.
 84 
The Munich Agreement changed British policy towards Hungary in many ways. 
Compared to the viewpoint of historiography, London was not disinterested in Hungary 
after Munich. British policy towards Hungary after Munich essentially worked in two 
dimensions; firstly strong official support for finding a peaceful solution for the 
Hungarian-Slovak dispute, and active debates on the future of Hungary, Slovakia and 
Ruthenia in Whitehall, which suggested that London aimed to create stability in the 
region. In order to achieve this London supported the creation of ethnographic frontiers. 
The other dimension of the problem is the German factor, which restricted room for 
maneouver and decision. As the primary aim in Europe was to avoid conflict with 
Germany, supporting ethnicity depended upon this. However, quite conveniently for 
Britain, in October 1938, Germany momentarily also advocated the creation of 
ethnographic frontiers in the region. Therefore, the long standing British tradition of 
supporting justice and stability coincided with London`s strategic interest in the region. 
When Hitler rejected four-power arbitration, British policy shifted, but only in order to 
harmonise itself to German interests. As a result of this, the 80 percent rule, advocated 
before Munich was forgotten and London seemed to accept the adjustment of the 
Hungarian-Slovak frontier on the basis of a bare majority.   
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82	 ﾠMOL	 ﾠK	 ﾠ27,	 ﾠMinisztertanácsi	 ﾠJegyzőkönyvek,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠHorthy	 ﾠappealed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
personal	 ﾠletter	 ﾠto	 ﾠChamberlain:	 ﾠ	 ﾠHorthy	 ﾠMiklós	 ﾠtitkos	 ﾠiratai,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠM.	 ﾠSzinai	 ﾠand	 ﾠL.	 ﾠSzűcs,	 ﾠ(Budapest	 ﾠ
1962),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ179-ﾭ‐180.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠhis	 ﾠreply,	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠthe	 ﾠethnographic	 ﾠfrontiers	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
accordance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠarbitration:	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠII,	 ﾠ603:	 ﾠ
Chamberlain`s	 ﾠletter	 ﾠto	 ﾠHorthy,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
83	 ﾠGeorge	 ﾠOgilvie-ﾭ‐Forbes,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcounsellor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠembassy	 ﾠin	 ﾠBerlin	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠRibbentrop	 ﾠ
suggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarians	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpressured	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠup	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠidea	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠstyle	 ﾠarbitration:	 ﾠ
TNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21573,	 ﾠC13751/2319/12,	 ﾠOgilvie-ﾭ‐Forbes	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
84	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21572,	 ﾠC12924/2319/12,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠPerth	 ﾠ(Rome),	 ﾠ25	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠPalazzo	 ﾠChigi,	 ﾠ190:	 ﾠ
Attolicio	 ﾠ(Berlin)	 ﾠto	 ﾠCiano,	 ﾠ26	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	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2.6 The British reaction to the First Vienna Award 
 
Germany and Italy, seeking a non-violent way to end the territorial dispute between 
Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, decided to settle the question through an arbitrated 
decision, which became known as the First Vienna Award.
85 This decision claimed to 
apply the ethnographic criteria, and it ceded the southern strip of Slovakia and Ruthenia 
to Hungary (map 2.7). It transferred approximately 10,000 square kilometers of territory 
and 1 million inhabitants.
86 The arbiters based their decision on the 1910 Hungarian 
census, because they disputed the data of the more recent Czechoslovak census of 1930. 
According to the 1910 Hungarian census, 80 percent of the population was Magyar, 
while the 1930 Czechoslovak one claimed a 55 percent Magyar majority.   
Britain and France did not take part in the arbitration. In order to understand the 
British reaction to the award, firstly the British opinion on the population statistics of 
the territory have to be considered. We have pointed out that in formulating the `80 
percent rule`, British policy-makers used the 1930 Czechoslovak census because it was 
considered more representative than the 1910 Hungarian poll. The Foreign Office 
argued that the latter intentionally provided inaccurate information by manipulating the 
data collecting methods.
 87 However, when it became clear in London that a solution to 
the Hungarian-Slovak dispute would be dictated by Germany, the Foreign Office 
decided to accept the German decision to base the arbitration on the 1910 Hungarian 
census.
 88   
  London gave a very positive official reaction to the award. Chamberlain in the 
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85	 ﾠThe	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠAward	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠintense	 ﾠdisagreement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠand	 ﾠSlovak	 ﾠ
historians.	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠhistorians	 ﾠare	 ﾠeager	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaward	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠbalanced	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠand	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠethnicity.	 ﾠSlovak	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand	 ﾠview	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠ7	 ﾠyear	 ﾠlong	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠoccupation.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠboth	 ﾠsides,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠvast,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
followings	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠpoint:	 ﾠL.	 ﾠDeák,	 ﾠViedenská	 ﾠarbitráž	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ"Mníchov	 ﾠpre	 ﾠSlovensko"	 ﾠ(Bratislava	 ﾠ
1998);	 ﾠSallai,	 ﾠAz	 ﾠelső	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠpersonaly	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdisheartening	 ﾠ
nationalistic	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠconference	 ﾠin	 ﾠŠurany	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2011;	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠJuh	 ﾠSlovenska	 ﾠpo	 ﾠViedeňskej	 ﾠ
arbitráži	 ﾠ1938	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠMitáč	 ﾠ(Bratislava,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
86	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠanomalies.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠethnographic	 ﾠdividing	 ﾠ
line	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠHungarians	 ﾠand	 ﾠSlovaks,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠseparated	 ﾠeconomicly	 ﾠcoherent	 ﾠregions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcut	 ﾠ
numerous	 ﾠroads	 ﾠand	 ﾠrailways.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠSallai,	 ﾠAz	 ﾠelső	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ153-ﾭ‐173.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
87	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21571,	 ﾠC12848/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠMallet,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠLancelot	 ﾠ
Oliphant,	 ﾠ26	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ1910	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠdisregarded	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ`nationality`	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
citizens,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠit	 ﾠasked	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ`most	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠspoken	 ﾠlanguage`.	 ﾠBeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Hungary,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠspoken	 ﾠby	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnationality	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1910.	 ﾠAsking	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ`most	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠspoken	 ﾠlanguage`,	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠ`nationality`,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠcontroversial	 ﾠ
information.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
88	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21572,	 ﾠC12924/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠOliphant,	 ﾠ26	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	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House of Commons, and Halifax in the House of Lords both welcomed the award, but 
they did not recognise it de jure.
89 Cabinet documents also prove that Chamberlain and 
Halifax readily accepted the new frontiers, as they were in concert with the Munich 
Agreement. A. N. Noble and William Strang in the Foreign Office also praised the 
agreement on the same grounds.
90 Ignác Romsics has argued that Churchill similarly 
welcomed the decision. However, it seems that Churchill shared the distaste of most of 
the key British policy-makers towards Magyarisation in the 19
th century, and admitted 
that he was glad that Hungary did not receive large numbers of non-Magyars.
91   
The Southern department nonetheless voiced its doubt. Noble recognised that a 
rough decision was made, which did not satisfy either side.
 92 London however seemed 
to accept the 1910 census as the basis of the decision. In a lengthy document, in which 
Mallet summarised British policy towards the new frontier, he noted that it was 
ethnographically acceptable, all the more so, as large numbers of non-Magyars were not 
trasferred to Hungary. According to both the 1910 and 1930 censuses, the population of 
the Vienna Award territory had a Magyar majority, hence British recognition of its 
ethnographic character seems to be less important than the second part of Mallet`s 
argument. The British disapproval of ceding non-Magyars to Hungary became a 
recurring argument in Whitehall in the future against more extensive revison. This 
argument would have crucial implications for the British perceptions on Hungarian 
claims in Ruthenia, Transylvania and the northern parts of Yugoslavia later, because 
none of these territories had an outright Hungarian majority.  
The same document suggests that immediately after Munich, different strategic 
alternatives appeared. Mallet noted that when it became clear that in one way or another 
Germany would dominate Czecho-Slovakia, London recognised that checking German 
eastward penetration would be possible in Slovakia by supporting Slovak independence, 
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89	 ﾠHansard	 ﾠ(Commons),	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ353,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ122,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠHansard	 ﾠ(Lords),	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ110,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ1622,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
November	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠappendix	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Slovak	 ﾠ
negotiation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠoutcome,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠfour	 ﾠpower	 ﾠconference	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdispute.	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Slovak	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠfor	 ﾠGerman-ﾭ‐Italian	 ﾠarbitration	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
successful	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegotiation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠconsequently	 ﾠrelieved	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠpart	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
arbitration.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠgave	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠwere	 ﾠstill	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠidea.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
90	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/96,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusions	 ﾠ53	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ7	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21572,	 ﾠ
C13476/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNoble,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠStrang,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
91	 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠsorsfordulók	 ﾠ1920–1989	 ﾠ(Budapest	 ﾠ2012),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ62;	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠto:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ15.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ
1939-ﾭ‐2/7	 ﾠ,	 ﾠI.,	 ﾠ172/pol.	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠMarosy	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsaky,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠMiklós	 ﾠLojkó	 ﾠalso	 ﾠstressed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Churchill	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠAward	 ﾠin	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1938:	 ﾠLojkó,	 ﾠ‘Churchill,	 ﾠEden	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary’,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ217-ﾭ‐236.	 ﾠ
92	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21572,	 ﾠC13331/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNoble	 ﾠ3	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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or by dividing Slovakia between Hungary and Poland. The wording of Mallet`s notes is 
very vague, but it sheds a fresh light on British perceptions towards Central Europe and 
Hungary`s territorial claims. It proves that London was interested in the region, and out 
of strategic interests a complete reversal of British policy was considered. This 
alternative eventually fell victim to British weakness in the region; London relied on 
French and Romanian support to realise this strategy, but they disapproved this 
alternative. British policy therefore took a very different direction. Consequently, it was 
decided to discourage the creation of a common Hungarian-Polish frontier by the 
Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia because it would be a weak barrier against German 
expansion,
93 and it was hoped that British disinterest towards Ruthenia would direct 
German attention to the province and away from Western Europe.
94  
Consequently, the Hungarians were told that claims in Ruthenia could not be 
supported, as they were not justified ethnographically.
 95 Mallet`s note had however 
proved that British eyes were not closed to frontier revision on bases other than 
ethnographic ones, and the official British declaration of `no support` was only the 
result of strategic considerations. As a result, Britain was indifferent towards Hungary`s 
persistent attempts to acquire Ruthenia. The Vienna Award only transfered the southern 
part of Ruthenia to Hungary, which was inhabited by Magyars. Hungary however did 
not give up its aspirations for the entire region, something which Poland fully 
supported.
96 London was fully aware of these plans, but the Cabinet expressed complete 
disinterest and decided to accept any future German policy on Ruthenia.
97 A Hungarian 
occupation was planned for the end of November, but the strong German objection 
quickly upset the scheme.  
The reaction of the British press to the Vienna Award provides an intriguing 
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93	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21573,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ13549/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠMallet,	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
94	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21573,	 ﾠC13549/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠMallet,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSudeten	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠ
Hungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoland	 ﾠaspired	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠin	 ﾠRuthenia.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Warsaw	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcenturies	 ﾠlong	 ﾠ
friendship	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠnations	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclaim.	 ﾠ
95	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ11.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠI.,	 ﾠ4467/pol.	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ
371/22373,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ10213/97/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRalph	 ﾠMurray,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNichols,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ
1939;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRab	 ﾠButler,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
96	 ﾠSee:	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠKasparek,	 ﾠ‘Poland's	 ﾠ1938	 ﾠCovert	 ﾠOperations	 ﾠin	 ﾠRuthenia’,	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠQuarterly	 ﾠ34	 ﾠ(1989),	 ﾠ
pp.	 ﾠ365–373.	 ﾠ
97	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21573,	 ﾠC14295/2319/12,	 ﾠKnox	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/96,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠ
Conclusions	 ﾠ56	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ22	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ69	 ﾠ
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image of perplexity, lack of background knowledge, and the unmistakable evidence of 
external influence. Lajos Arday has suggested that in the 1930s, Hungary as a subject, 
appeared in the British press only through the influence of politicians or other 
influential personalities.
98 Indeed, there is strong evidence that background information 
were supplied, or entire articles were written by outsiders, who were keen to determine 
the tone of the press on Hungary. For example, Hungarian sources prove that the 
distinctively pro-Hungarian articles of Rothermere`s Daily Mail were suggested directly 
by the Hungarian Legation and Stephanie Hohenlohe, Rothermere`s Hungarian 
mistress.
99 The Daily Mail welcomed the Vienna Award, and described it a just decision 
which finally remedied the glaring errors of Trianon. Horthy`s entry into Komárom 
[Komárno] and Kassa [Košice] was lauded as the heroic culmination of Hungary`s 
decade-long revisionist struggle.
100 In contrast, Beaverbrook`s Daily Express evidently 
aimed to minimise the relevance of the award for Britain. With a mildly sarcastic tone it 
mocked the petty quarrel between Hungarians and Slovaks.
101 The Times and the Daily 
Telegraph hit a more impartial tone, but their choice of words suggested their faint 
disapproval.
102 There is evidence that the Foreign Office directly intervened to influence 
the press. In mid-October, Cadogan noted to Barcza that in accordance with British 
official policy, press editors were instructed to write about the Hungarian-Slovak 
territorial dispute only from the minority and ethnographic perspective, and were told to 
disregard economic, historical or other basis for frontier revision.
103 Accordingly, The 
Times and the Daily Telegraph declared that Britain supported only the ethnic 
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98	 ﾠL.	 ﾠArday,	 ﾠ`Magyarország	 ﾠés	 ﾠNagy-ﾭ‐Britannia	 ﾠdiplomáciai	 ﾠkapcsolatai`	 ﾠin	 ﾠAz	 ﾠEgyesült	 ﾠKirályság	 ﾠés	 ﾠ
Magyarország:	 ﾠNagy-ﾭ‐Britannia	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠMagyar-ﾭ‐Angol	 ﾠkapcsolatok	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠszázadban,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠL.	 ﾠArday	 ﾠ
(Budapest,	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ47-ﾭ‐148	 ﾠ(pp.	 ﾠ68-ﾭ‐72).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
99	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ10.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1937-ﾭ‐2/7,	 ﾠ92/pol.	 ﾠ1937,	 ﾠMasirevich	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ21	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1937;	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ64,	 ﾠ1936,	 ﾠII.,	 ﾠ
786/res.	 ﾠpol.,	 ﾠMasirevich	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ9	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1936.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmemoirs,	 ﾠRothermere	 ﾠopenly	 ﾠadmitted	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism:	 ﾠRothermere:	 ﾠMy	 ﾠCampaign	 ﾠfor	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠCollin	 ﾠBrooks,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclose	 ﾠ
associate	 ﾠof	 ﾠRothermere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmentions	 ﾠRothermere`s	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠcontacts:	 ﾠCollin	 ﾠBrooks,	 ﾠFleet	 ﾠStreet,	 ﾠ
Press	 ﾠBarons	 ﾠand	 ﾠPolitics:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠJournals	 ﾠof	 ﾠCollin	 ﾠBrooks,	 ﾠ1932-ﾭ‐1940,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠN.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠCrowson	 ﾠ(Cambridge,	 ﾠ
1998),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ164,	 ﾠ173,	 ﾠ220-ﾭ‐227.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠStephanie	 ﾠHohenlohe,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠSchad,	 ﾠHitler's	 ﾠSpy	 ﾠPrincess	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ
2004).	 ﾠ
100	 ﾠ`Horthy	 ﾠin	 ﾠSlovakia`,	 ﾠDaily	 ﾠMail,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ`Cheering	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRegent	 ﾠin	 ﾠKassa`,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ
1938.	 ﾠIntriguingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠAward	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠso	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠ`Rothermere	 ﾠline`,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
frontier	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlord	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1926.	 ﾠRothermere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpersonally	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠat	 ﾠHorthy`s	 ﾠentry	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
Kassa	 ﾠ[Košice].	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
101	 ﾠ`Czech	 ﾠcities	 ﾠceded`,	 ﾠDaily	 ﾠExpress,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
102	 ﾠ`Hungarian-ﾭ‐Slovak	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠresolved`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ`Ceded	 ﾠterritories`,	 ﾠDaily	 ﾠ
Telegraph,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
103	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠ159.,	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠ
Box	 ﾠ0008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ70	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
criteria.
104 On the other hand, the documents of the Press Department of the Hungarian 
Foreign Ministry establish that during September and October pro-Hungarian British 
personalities, such as Lord Newton, a member of the House of Lords, Sir Robert 
Gower, a Labour MP, and the historian Macartney were persuaded by the Hungarian 
Legation to submit pro-revisionist open letters to the press, in order to influence both 
the opinion of press editors and the British public.
105  
Influences from outside Fleet Street evidently had a strong impact on the tone of 
the press on Hungary, but their impact on the public remains highly questionable.
106 
This brief analysis of the reaction of the British press to the Vienna Award demonstrates 
how easy it was to manipulate the tone of papers on Central European territorial 
disputes, which were mostly unknown to both editors and the public.  
Opinion at the official level was also diverse, but for very different reasons. A 
memorandum, initialled by Halifax reflects hesitation and the contrast between desires 
and feasibility. On the one hand it recognised the recent political and economic changes 
of the region as inevitable and beneficial,
107 but on the other, it expressed the view that 
the containment of Germany was highly desirable in the region. The document pointed 
out that the primary British aim was to prevent Germany acquiring the raw materials of 
the region. The memorandum noted only generalities about Hungary. It declared British 
support for any moderate Hungarian government, but pointed to Hungary`s political and 
economic instablity and weakness in the geographical proximity of Germany. 
Nevertheless, it recommended the extension of Anglo-Hungarian trade.
108 An attached 
report, written by Leith-Ross, the chief economic advisor to the Cabinet, confirms that 
although there was political will to confront Germany in the region and to give more 
support to Hungary, it was impossible due to British military and economic weakness. 
Leith-Ross claimed that Hungary was already in the German economic orbit, and 
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104	 ﾠ`Hungary`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ19	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠ`Magyars	 ﾠin	 ﾠSlovakia`,	 ﾠDaily	 ﾠTelegraph,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
105	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ66,	 ﾠ(without	 ﾠnumber),	 ﾠL.	 ﾠSima,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Czech	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpress`,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
October	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠLord	 ﾠNewton,	 ﾠ`Grievances	 ﾠof	 ﾠMinorities`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ7	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠSir	 ﾠRobert	 ﾠGower,	 ﾠ
`Letters	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠagreement`,	 ﾠManchester	 ﾠGuardian,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠOctober;	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠQuestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Revision`,	 ﾠContemporary	 ﾠReview,	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
106	 ﾠNewspapers	 ﾠwere	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠeven	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice.	 ﾠTherefore	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyse,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠWhitehall	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsee,	 ﾠ
after	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes	 ﾠoften	 ﾠwent	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Hungary,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthen	 ﾠsparked	 ﾠintense	 ﾠdebates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠunclear	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikelihood,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
reorganisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠethnographic	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠnamely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnschluss,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠAward.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
108	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ24/280,	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ`Central	 ﾠand	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope`,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ71	 ﾠ
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accordingly the Ministry of Agriculture and the Board of Trade advised against 
extending Anglo-Hungarian trade.
109   
Paul Hehn and David Kaiser have also argued that regardless of the political 
will, there was a noticeable economic disinterest towards extending trade with Central 
Europe at the end of the year, mostly due to the lack of financial and industrial means to 
counter German positions.
110 Barcza`s impressions were similar; he reported British 
reluctance to purchase petroleum from Romania and wheat from Hungary.
111 Cadogan 
noted the same indifference in his diaries.
112  
From early 1939 the situation changed slightly. The Board of Trade became 
more interested in trading with the region, but a political decision was slow to follow.
113 
Kaiser has argued that golden opportunities were missed due to the lack of a clear and 
coordinated strategy.
114 The first sign of change in the political sphere was an extra £10 
million provision for commercial credits. On the priority list of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence the first country was Belgium, Yugoslavia 10th, Romania 11th and 
Bulgaria 12th, but Hungary was not on the list.
115 Newly granted commercial credits 
were the indicators of increasing British interest towards a country, but Hungary`s 
absence from the list confirms its low priority in British economic policy. On Halifax`s 
advice, Chamberlain finally agreed to buy 200, 000 tonnes of Romanian wheat out of 
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109	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ24/280,	 ﾠLeith-ﾭ‐Ross,	 ﾠ`Interim	 ﾠReport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInterdepartmental	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠon	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
South	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope`,	 ﾠ26	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar	 ﾠ
quite	 ﾠinterestingly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠhad	 ﾠno	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegotiation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBoard	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrade.	 ﾠ
110	 ﾠP.	 ﾠN.	 ﾠHehn,	 ﾠA	 ﾠLow	 ﾠand	 ﾠDishonest	 ﾠDecade,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠorigins	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII,	 ﾠ1930-ﾭ‐1941	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ2006),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ135-ﾭ‐139,	 ﾠ307-ﾭ‐309;	 ﾠKaiser,	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ290.	 ﾠA	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1932	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠEmpire	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠConference	 ﾠ(also	 ﾠknown	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOttawa	 ﾠ
Conference),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠa	 ﾠzone	 ﾠof	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠEmpire,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠtariffs	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠ`Imperial	 ﾠpreference`	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠ`home	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠ
empire	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠand	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠproducers	 ﾠlast`:	 ﾠR.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacKay,	 ﾠ`Imperial	 ﾠEconomics	 ﾠat	 ﾠOttawa`,	 ﾠ
Pacific	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠ25	 ﾠ(1932),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ873–885.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠin	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938	 ﾠa	 ﾠBritish-ﾭ‐American	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpact	 ﾠ
allowed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠits	 ﾠwheat	 ﾠsurplus,	 ﾠduty	 ﾠand	 ﾠtax	 ﾠfree,	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠdiminished	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠquantities	 ﾠof	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠDIMK.	 ﾠIII,	 ﾠ77:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ24	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
112	 ﾠ`We	 ﾠdon`t	 ﾠwant	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdamned	 ﾠstuff	 ﾠ(wheat).`:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDiaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠSir	 ﾠAlexander	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ
113	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠBT	 ﾠ11/1073,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠFraser,	 ﾠ7	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠOliver	 ﾠStanley,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠBoard	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1937-ﾭ‐40,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠextending	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠwith	 ﾠHungary:	 ﾠ
Barcza,	 ﾠDiplomataemlékeim,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ368.	 ﾠ
114	 ﾠKaiser,	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ91,	 ﾠ183,	 ﾠ284.	 ﾠ
115	 ﾠKaiser,	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ293.
 An	 ﾠarms-ﾭ‐export	 ﾠpriority	 ﾠlist	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcompiled,	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
Yugoslavia	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ7th,	 ﾠPoland	 ﾠ13th	 ﾠand	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠ14th,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠEgypt	 ﾠtopping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlist,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠname	 ﾠ
did	 ﾠnot	 ﾠappear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrecord	 ﾠeither:	 ﾠKaiser,	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ82-ﾭ‐86.	 ﾠ72	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
the 1.7 million tonnes of the total Romanian surplus.
116 He only agreed to buy a small 
amount, because he was concerned that a spike in Anglo-Romanian trade would 
provoke Germany. Hungary also offered its total surplus of 1 million tons of wheat to 
Britain in early 1939, but it was rejected.
117 This clarifies that in the first months of 
1939 Britain was in no position to challenge Germany`s trade and economic positions in 
the region. Kaiser however has argued that these purchases were only political 
assurances, so called `political purchases`, of British interest towards the region.
118 
Trade statistics show a four-fold overall increase of British agricultural imports from the 
region, but despite this, Central Europe and the Balkans still accounted for only 8 
percent of the total British agricultural imports in the first half of 1939. The position of 
Hungary, not surprisingly, looked even bleaker. Although British import nearly doubled 
from Hungary in a year, it still only accounted for 0.1 percent of the overall import.
119   
It is important to stress that Hungarian territorial aspirations in the region played 
no role in British economic policy towards Hungary. The underlying reason for 
Hungary`s unfavourable position in British trade was Germany`s dominant position in 
Hungary`s economy. Trade with Germany accounted for 50 percent of both Hungary`s 
imports and exports.
120 Henry Bruce attempted to exert influence on both the Board of 
Trade and the Foreign Office to consider the extension of Anglo-Hungarian trade, but 
his efforts were in vain.
121  
Often there is very little said about the foreign policy aims of the political 
opposition. Here it seems useful to highlight the perceptions of the British Labour Party 
towards Central Europe and frontier revision, particularly because it had a very strong 
emphasis on economic policy, and as a consequence of Munich it went through a radical 
transformation. Before Munich, Ralph Glynn, a Labour MP, was touring Central Europe 
in the name of pacifism. He noted to the Hungarians that frontier disputes were now the 
past and that Labour was contemplating a major reorganisation of the region along the 
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116	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB/24/279,	 ﾠC.	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ226	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ`Purchase	 ﾠof	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠwheat`,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
117	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ353.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
118	 ﾠKaiser,	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ290-ﾭ‐293.	 ﾠ
119	 ﾠKaiser,	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ320.	 ﾠ
120	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠthorough	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠAnglo-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdominating	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Hungary,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠRánki,	 ﾠGazdaság	 ﾠés	 ﾠkülpolitika,	 ﾠa	 ﾠnagyhatalmak	 ﾠharca	 ﾠa	 ﾠdélkelet-ﾭ‐európai	 ﾠgazdasági	 ﾠ
hegemóniáért,	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1939	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1981);	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠRánki,	 ﾠA	 ﾠHarmadik	 ﾠBirodalom	 ﾠárnyékában	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ
1988).	 ﾠ
121	 ﾠBruce	 ﾠassured	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠTeleki`s	 ﾠtrustworthiness:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ800/318,	 ﾠBruce	 ﾠto	 ﾠHudson	 ﾠ(on	 ﾠ
microfilm)	 ﾠ1	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ121-ﾭ‐122.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ73	 ﾠ
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lines of economic cooperation between the Danubian states.
122 Soon however, Hugh 
Dalton, the Labour foreign policy spokesman, moved the party away from pacifism to a 
policy of the armed deterrence of Germany. Dalton stressed that the Hungarian 
occupation of Ruthenia would provide strategic advantages for Britain in the effort to 
stop further German expansion. Dalton also proposed the open cooperation of Britain, 
France, the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Greece and Turkey, but his motion was 
ignored and he was unable to assert influence on British policy.
 123    
 British official reaction to the First Vienna Award was determined by the same 
strategic interest which defined British policy towards the Sudeten question and the 
Hungarian-Slovak negotiations, namely that decisions on Central European questions 
had to be adjusted to the interests of Germany. New evidence has demonstrated that 
although there was a political will to block Germany`s eastwards expansion, it was 
hampered by British military and economic inadequacies. The official British opinion 
on the Vienna Award would go through a significant transformation in the coming 
years, therefore we shall return to the subject at a later stage.   
   
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
122	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ12.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐2/7,	 ﾠI.,	 ﾠ131/pol.	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠMarosy	 ﾠto	 ﾠKánya,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLabour	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠunder-ﾭ‐researched	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠoverview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLabour	 ﾠParty	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠR.	 ﾠGordon,	 ﾠ
Conflict	 ﾠand	 ﾠConsensus	 ﾠin	 ﾠLabour`s	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠ1914-ﾭ‐1965	 ﾠ(Stanford,	 ﾠ1969),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ45-ﾭ‐83.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
123	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ15.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐2/7,	 ﾠI.,	 ﾠ172/pol.	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠMarosy	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠGillard,	 ﾠ
Appeasement	 ﾠin	 ﾠCrisis,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ67.	 ﾠ74	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.7 From Vienna to Ruthenia 
 
Between November 1938 and the final destruction of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939, 
British policy towards Central Europe and the Balkans went through a significant 
transformation. Policy-makers were divided on which course to follow, but the 
continuous development of British armed strength allowed more flexibility in decision-
making. As we have noted, due to strategic considerations London yielded to German 
interests at the Munich Conference and at the Vienna Award. London also acquiesced in 
the German economic domination of Central and South East Europe. However, when 
Germany aimed to completely squeeze Britain out of its economic positions, and 
increased its own political influence in the region, British policy changed.  
Increasing German penetration into the region deeply alarmed Whitehall and 
sharply divided policy-makers. Halifax gave up the Danube region strategically and was 
convinced that Germany would not be satisfied with an informal economic empire in 
the region. Therefore, he recommended accelerating British rearmament, in order to be 
in a better position to protect vital interests in the Mediterranean.
124 Laurence Collier, 
the head of the Northern department similarly predicted that Germany would soon 
completely dominate Central Europe. Cadogan also took a gloomier viewpoint, and 
projected that due to British military weakness, the whole region would be lost to 
Germany. Sargent agreed with Cadogan, and stressed that the Danubian countries had 
no strategic interest for Britain. Aston-Gwatkin, the head of the economic section of the 
Western department, was ready to accept German domination in the Danubian states, in 
return for the assurance of British positions in Greece and Turkey.
125 In contrast, Frank 
Roberts, a senior official of the Central department remained the sole idealist; he called 
for an active policy in the region and noted that Britain should not make deals at the 
expense of the possession of Central European nations.
126  
These differences however were quickly resolved. A Joint Planning Committee 
(JPC) report in January 1939 recommended that a British failure to intervene would 
have serious moral and political repercussions, which would seriously undermine 
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British reputation in the world, and would likely to deprive Britain of later support in its 
struggle against Germany and Japan.
127 This report was taken very seriously by the 
Foreign Policy Committee (FPC) and the Cabinet, but it has to be stressed that strategic 
implications were considered to be more decisive than the moral consequences.
128 
Reports of the immediate German invasion of Holland and the rumour of an aerial 
knockout blow against Britain further increased Whitehall`s concerns. According to 
Gillard, these were the key factors in making the decision that Germany had to be 
deterred.
129 The Chiefs of Staff recommended that the opinion of the Dominions were 
crucial in this context, but historians have recently proved that neither domestic and 
political pressures nor the opinion of the Dominions were considered crucial in the 
decision to deter Germany in Central Europe.
130 
In Budapest, the euphoria of the First Vienna Award left very few caring about 
the opinion of London. The revisionist hysteria, which was partly fuelled by the 
government, created a dangerous spiral of relentless public demand for further territorial 
gains. This left Hungary in an unstable internal and external condition; the failure to 
achieve further revision could have swept the Imrédy government away.
 131 Barcza also 
welcomed the Vienna Award, but was deeply alarmed by the blindness of the 
Hungarian government and public. His conversations with Imrédy and the new Foreign 
Minister István Csáky convinced him that Hungary was crumbling under immense 
German pressure. What he considered more alarming was that Imrédy and Csáky 
evidently were not concerned with British opinion, and they stressed to Barcza that 
improving the Anglo-Hungarian relationship was no longer a priority.
132 Macartney 
claimed that the reason for Imrédy`s sudden turn towards a pro-German policy was 
information received from the City, which declared that due to the implementation of 
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the First Anti-Jewish Law, it withdrew its support from Imrédy.
133 However, the 
disapproval of the City was not the most important factor in the formulation of British 
policy.
 The Foreign Office did not share these views, and until	 ﾠImrédy resigned in early 
1939 it supported him, as the alternative was an openly pro-German government. 
 
Barcza nevertheless did not feel disheartened and continued making relentless 
efforts to improve relations with London. He contacted Dingli, his link with 
Chamberlain.
134 Barcza stressed to Chamberlain that Knox, the British Minister in 
Budapest was a barrier to the development of good Anglo-Hungarian relations, as he 
was strongly prejudiced against Hungary.	 ﾠIn his reply Chamberlain conveyed his 
goodwill and assured Barcza that the replacement of Knox was already being 
contemplated. Barcza`s efforts were constantly supported by William Goode. Goode 
proved to be extremely influential in Whitehall; in February, he brought Barcza and Sir 
Joseph Ball, the propaganda chief of the Conservative Party and intimate advisor of 
Chamberlain, together. Ball also forwarded Chamberlain`s understanding towards 
Hungary and asked for trust in the growing power of Britain. For Barcza`s continued 
insistence, Ball promised that Knox would soon be replaced.
135 Barcza`s initiative 
seemed to advance Knox`s removal, as he was replaced with Owen O`Malley in less 
than two months.
136 It is crucial to stress the importance of this British diplomatic move. 
The replacement of Knox, whose aversion to Hungary was disliked by the Foreign 
Office, with O`Malley, who, as an influential figure in the Southern department was 
already well known for supporting an active British policy towards Central Europe, is a 
definite sign that London was interested in the development of Anglo-Hungarian 
relationship.     
This new wave of British interest towards Central Europe and Hungary was the 
result of the recent increase in British military strength. Historians have intensely 
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debated the burden of imperial defence and continental commitment, and also the 
conflict between rearmament and strict fiscal policy.
137 Regardless of the fact that 
Britain was indeed militarily overstretched, the speeding up of rearmament gave more 
elbowroom for foreign policy. This was clearly reflected in the British attitude towards 
Central Europe and Hungary. `Rab` Butler, the Under secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, and Cadogan, confidentially told Barcza in February that due to its increased 
strength, Britain would support the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia and the creation 
of the Hungarian-Polish common frontier, something London had discouraged earlier 
because of the German veto. Macartney argued that the Foreign Office recognised 
Hungary`s historic and economic claims for Ruthenia, but new evidence proves that	 ﾠ
there were only strategic reasons behind this shift in British policy.
138  
On the other hand, in early 1939 confidence in Hungary was severely shaken by 
the fact that Budapest acceded to the Anti-Comintern Pact, the agreement between 
Germany, Italy and Japan against the Communist International, but which was 
essentially viewed by London as a German alliance system. Both Bán and Macartney 
failed to recognise the impact of Hungary`s adhesion on British opinion.
139 Officially, 
Britain did not condemn Hungary`s adherence, but Cabinet documents clarify that the 
Hungarian action had a significant impact on British judgement of Hungary. Whitehall 
was convinced that politically and militarily Hungary was now dominated by 
Germany.
140 Most importantly, Hungary`s pro-German policy turned British strategy in 
the Balkans up-side-down, which also accounted for the deteriorating British view. 
Since the Munich crisis, London was aiming to facilitate a rapprochement between 
Bulgaria and Romania, to strengthen the cooperation of the Balkans against Germany. 
For this reason, Romania was pressured to return Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, which 
Bucharest acquired after the Great War. However, as a result of Hungary`s entry into 
the Anti-Comintern Pact, Halifax was convinced that this would now be impossible, 
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 ﾠon	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCabinet,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠjoined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnti-ﾭ‐Comintern	 ﾠPact	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1939`,	 ﾠn.	 ﾠd.	 ﾠ	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because it would immediately trigger Hungarian demands in Transylvania, something 
he was keen to avoid.
141  
By the end of 1938 it was decided in London that due to strategic reasons, 
further German expansion would have to be checked. As a result of the rearmament 
programme, policy-makers had more room for manoeuvre in the diplomatic sphere, and 
although senior officials judged that Central Europe would eventually fall under 
German supremacy, it was decided that deterring Germany in the region would be 
advantageous.  
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ27/627,	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ`Central	 ﾠand	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐Eastern	 ﾠEurope`,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/39,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ
712/126/7,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	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2.8 British reaction to the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia 
 
When Germany marched into Prague on the Ides of March, simultaneously with the 
German aggression, Hungary occupied Ruthenia. London condemned the German 
aggression, but the Hungarian action was received with passive acceptance. The 
Hungarian occupation could not be justified by ethnographic claims, therefore it will be 
crucial to disentangle why London reacted positively to it.  
As we have noted, Hungary`s accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact deeply 
affected British perceptions of Hungary. Bán and Macartney both emphasized that the 
appointment of Teleki as Prime Minister in early 1939 was positively received in 
Whitehall. Truly, Teleki`s appointment was attended by great expectations, because he 
was a well-known Anglophile, but Bán and Macartney were wrong in assuming that the 
replacement of the increasingly pro-German Imrédy instantly blew British suspicions 
away.
142 The cordial reception of the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia has to be 
viewed in this context, and should not be overstated.  
The Slovak declaration of independence from Prague in mid-March had 
important implications for both British and Hungarian foreign policy. London declared 
earlier that a Slovak or Ruthenian declaration of independence would nullify all British 
commitments to Czecho-Slovakia.
143 It also offered an exit strategy to declaring war on 
Germany or Hungary, in response to the German occupation of Bohemia-Moravia and 
the Hungarian takeover of Ruthenia. At the same time, Slovak independence awakened 
Hungarian hopes for further territorial gains. Barcza inquired of the Foreign Office 
about the British attitude, but Cadogan retracted any earlier assurances of British 
understanding and noted that Hungary had to agree with Germany on the fate of 
Ruthenia.
144 It is apparent that although Ruthenia was strategically important for 
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 ﾠCount	 ﾠPál	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPremier	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(1920-ﾭ‐21,	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐41)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠand	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠrespected	 ﾠ
geography	 ﾠscholar.	 ﾠLater,	 ﾠTeleki`s	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐Nazi	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠconvinced	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠtrustworthiness,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠchange	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinstant:	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ362,	 ﾠ372,	 ﾠ375.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠon	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/39,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ2539/166/21,	 ﾠGascoigne	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠ
FO	 ﾠ800/318,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠpapers,	 ﾠmicrofilm	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ121-ﾭ‐122;	 ﾠSEW	 ﾠ12/2/1,	 ﾠWeekly	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠSummary,	 ﾠ
31	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠSEW	 ﾠ12/2/2,	 ﾠWeekly	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠintelligence	 ﾠSummary,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ
143	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ24/280,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠGuarantee	 ﾠto	 ﾠCzechoslovakia`,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
144 MOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐33/a	 ﾠ414,	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠ11	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ333.	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Britain, by the time the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia seemed imminent London did 
not desire to confront Germany over its future.  
  Hungary occupied Ruthenia between 15 and 18 March. In the Commons 
Chamberlain acknowledged the Hungarian action and expressed his reluctance to take 
any further action in the matter.
145 The Cabinet and the Foreign Office were reserved, as 
they were mainly concerned with German aggression, and because very little 
information was available about the situation in Ruthenia.
146 The fact that opinion could 
not be formulated before reports from the Budapest legation arrived, points to the 
dependence of the Foreign Office on diplomatic reports. This was particularly true for 
Hungary, where, compared to larger countries like Germany, the British intelligence and 
diplomatic presence was more limited. Because Ruthenia had economic ties with 
Hungary, Knox recommended the acceptance of the occupation. However he pointed 
out that the way Hungary had acquired the province was unacceptable.
147 Ágnes 
Beretzky claimed that the Foreign Office instructed the press to refrain from criticising 
the Hungarian action, and indeed, the occupation was hardly commented upon and only 
the German aggression was criticised.
148   
London was more worried that tensions between Hungary and Romania, 
reawakened by the Hungarian take-over of Ruthenia, could plunge Europe into a war.
149 
After the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, due to deep seated mutual distrust, Hungary 
and Romania mobilised along their common frontier. The Hungarian-Romanian discord 
deeply concerned Whitehall, because it was believed that Germany would take 
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 ﾠHansard	 ﾠ(Commons),	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ345,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ632,	 ﾠChamberlain`s	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠMajor	 ﾠStautorn,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
146	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ15	 ﾠMarch,	 ﾠLeslie	 ﾠHore-ﾭ‐Belisha,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecretary	 ﾠof	 ﾠState	 ﾠfor	 ﾠWar	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠwas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwish	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠany	 ﾠfurther:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/98,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusions	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ(39),	 ﾠ15	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
Barcza`s	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠreaction,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ15.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐2/7,	 ﾠI.,	 ﾠ30/pol.	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Csáky,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
147	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/39,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ5188/71/21,	 ﾠKnox	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ7	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
148	 ﾠBeretzky	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdisclose	 ﾠher	 ﾠsource	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfound	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinstruction,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠ
Beretzky,	 ﾠScotus	 ﾠViator	 ﾠés	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠElemér,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ105.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ`Prague	 ﾠOccupied`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
February,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠrighteous	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠfor	 ﾠRuthenia:	 ﾠ`Hungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠRuthenia`,	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ21	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
149	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23061,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3665/3365/18,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠPerth	 ﾠ(Rome),	 ﾠ24	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠTrianon,	 ﾠ
Hungary	 ﾠpersistently	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠover	 ﾠTransylvania.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Hungary`s	 ﾠnorthern	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠalarmed	 ﾠBucharest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠ
officially	 ﾠstep	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠin	 ﾠRomania.	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advantage of the dispute to overrun both countries.
150 Although London applied 
pressure on both Hungary and Romania to demobilise, as a result of the recent evidence 
of Hungary`s pro-German policy, the Foreign Office held Budapest responsible for the 
mobilization.
151 Based on Romanian sources, Béni Balogh has suggested that there was 
a Polish-Romanian agreement to occupy the easternmost corner of Ruthenia before 
Hungarian troops could reach the area, because a railway line, which connected the two 
countries ran through this territory (map 2.8).
 152 Similar to its earlier attitude, the 
Foreign Office was indifferent about strengthening Romanian lines of communication 
and even refused to support the Romanian claims for a number of villages inhabited 
purely by Romanians (map 2.8), and advised Bucharest not to force its claims.
153  
Ruthenia clearly was not the main issue in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship 
after the disappearance of Czecho-Slovakia. During an interview with Barcza, 
immediately after the Hungarian occupation, Sargent was more interested in Hungary`s 
attitude towards future German aggression. He emphasised that Hungary would soon 
need to decide between an open alliance with Germany, willy-nilly collaboration, and 
resistance. Barcza gloomily reported to Budapest that Britain was not interested in 
Hungary at all, and British policy-makers only focused on these three alternatives in the 
judgement of Hungary.
154 These indeed became the main British criteria for assessing 
Hungary`s attitude until the end of the `Phoney War`. Hungary`s official 
communications, the tone of the Hungarian press, policy towards Romania and 
Germany, and most importantly Hungarian territorial claims were judged from these 
perspectives.
155  
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
150	 ﾠMI3	 ﾠreported	 ﾠlarge-ﾭ‐scale	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠand	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠmobilisation	 ﾠand	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠa	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Romanian	 ﾠ
war:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠWO	 ﾠ190/765,	 ﾠMI3	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠ19	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
151	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23108	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠ(unsigned)	 ﾠto	 ﾠBudapest,	 ﾠBucharest	 ﾠand	 ﾠWarsaw,	 ﾠ21	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠ
FO	 ﾠ371/23108,	 ﾠKnox	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Times	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconvinced	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwas	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠescalating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtensions:	 ﾠ`Hungarian	 ﾠtroop	 ﾠ
movements`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠ`Suspicions	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠ`Rumania	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCrisis`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠL.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠBalogh,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar-ﾭ‐román	 ﾠkapcsolatok	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐1940-ﾭ‐ben	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠmásodik	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés	 ﾠ(Csíkszereda,	 ﾠ
2002),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ57.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠWO	 ﾠ106/5387,	 ﾠKennard	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ19	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
153	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23061,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3665/3365/18,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠKnox	 ﾠand	 ﾠHoare,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
154	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ64	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠ10.,	 ﾠ19	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBox 0009.  
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 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeeting,	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠminuted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnear	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠwould	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠ
Hungary	 ﾠto	 ﾠattack	 ﾠRomania,	 ﾠand	 ﾠBerlin	 ﾠwould	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconflict:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23061,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ
3980/3356/18,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠInterestingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Sargent	 ﾠhad	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making.	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	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The comparison of the British attitude towards the Hungarian-Romanian discord 
and the Hungarian-Slovak so-called `mini-war` (map 2.9) offers intriguing insights into 
British priorities and the irrelevance of Hungary`s territorial adjustments for British 
regional strategy.
156 The Hungarian-Slovak `mini-war` in the second half of March, did 
not gather much attention from London, and German pressure on Hungary to stop the 
incursions was accepted by the Foreign Office without hesitation.
157 Interestingly, The 
Times, in comparison to its earlier understanding towards Hungary`s territorial claims in 
Slovakia, now openly blamed Hungary for the conflict and labelled Hungarian 
territorial aspirations as being too radical, because they went beyond the ethnographic 
criteria.
158 The Hungarian occupation of a narrow Eastern Slovakian strip in this conflict 
improved communication between Hungary and Poland, but as we have seen, the 
strengthening of Hungarian-Polish cooperation was now irrelevant for London. For the 
reason that Slovakia was now under direct German political, economic and military 
influence, which was not challenged by London, the Hungarian-Slovak war did not 
threaten any British interest. Romania, on the other hand, which Germany did not 
control yet, had a much greater economic potential and strategic significance. Even 
though defending Romania was considered highly problematic, it was a British priority 
to prevent Germany acquiring its petroleum and agricultural resources, hence the British 
interest in the Hungarian-Romanian dispute.  
Compared to official British policy and the opinion inside the Foreign Office, 
the scholarly world approached the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia and the question of 
Hungarian revisionism in early 1939 from very different perspectives.  The opinion of 
Macartney and Seton-Watson on the recent territorial changes of Hungary is important, 
as later during the war both attempted to exert influence on British post-war policy on 
Central Europe. In late 1938 Macartney recommended a general European settlement, 
which would involve the revision of both Hungary`s and Bulgaria`s frontiers. He 
accepted the Vienna frontier as ethnically just, although he pointed out its economic 
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attitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠoption,	 ﾠ`willy-ﾭ‐nilly	 ﾠcollaboration`.	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠmoment,	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠcooperating	 ﾠwith	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠverge	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠlosing	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠindependence.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠconvinced	 ﾠthat	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfavour,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ`willy-ﾭ‐nilly`	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠIn	 ﾠan	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccupy	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠSlovakia,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠarmy,	 ﾠupon	 ﾠcompleting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Ruthenia	 ﾠturned	 ﾠwestwards	 ﾠand	 ﾠattacked	 ﾠSlovakia.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
157	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23108,	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠKnox,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ`Slovak-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠdifferences`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ24	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠ`Slovak	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠaffrays`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ
March	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠ`Disputed	 ﾠSlovak	 ﾠfrontier`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	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anomalies. Macartney agreed to Ruthenia being adjoined to Hungary both on economic 
grounds and on the basis that the Ruthenians lacked a distinct national consciousness.
159 
He received strong criticism from Seton-Watson on the grounds that his suggestions 
went against the ethnic principle. Seton-Watson strongly criticised the Hungarian 
occupation of Ruthenia because it violated this principle. His main argument against 
Hungarian authority was that the region had achieved a special autonomous position 
under Czech rule.
 160     
Hungary`s adherence to the Anti-Comintern pact seriously shook British 
confidence in her, as she was now viewed as a German ally. Ruthenia was deemed 
irrelevant to British strategy once Germany controlled most of the former Czecho-
Slovakia. Due to this, and because London was interested in maintaining cordial 
relations with Budapest until it was fully committed to Germany, the Hungarian 
occupation of Ruthenia was acknowledged as a fait accompli. This however did not 
mean that Britain accepted the current status of Ruthenia as permanent and its future 
remained highly questionable. Whitehall was more concerned by the Hungarian-
Romanian dispute, as it had strong strategic and economic implications for Britain.  
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 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠ`Hungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresent	 ﾠCrisis`,	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠ57	 ﾠ(1938),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ762-ﾭ‐763.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠRuthenian	 ﾠnational	 ﾠidentity,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠP.	 ﾠR.	 ﾠMagocsi,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠShaping	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠNational	 ﾠIdentity:	 ﾠ
‘Subcarpathian	 ﾠRus',	 ﾠ1848-ﾭ‐1948	 ﾠ(Cambridge,	 ﾠ1978),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ234-ﾭ‐240.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
160	 ﾠR.W.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠProblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠSmall	 ﾠNations	 ﾠand	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠAnarchy`,	 ﾠMontagu	 ﾠBurton	 ﾠ
International	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠLecture,	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ13-ﾭ‐15,	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠby:	 ﾠBeretzky,	 ﾠScotus	 ﾠViator	 ﾠés	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠ
Elemér,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ105.	 ﾠ 84	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2.9 The Polish and Romanian guarantees and the Anglo-Hungarian relationship 
 
After the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, with an evident sense of urgency, Britain 
guaranteed the independence of Poland and Romania on 31 March and 13 April 
respectively. Historians have scrutinised the reasons for this unprecedented British 
decision, but a satisfactory conclusion has not been reached about its genesis.
161 
However, historians have not pointed out that the decision to provide guarantees, and 
also their application had important Hungarian angles which crucially affected British 
policy towards the region. This part provides new evidence, which suggests that 
although Hungarian territorial aspirations were discouraged, Hungary had a very 
important role in the British guarantees and in British policy to deter German expansion 
in Central Europe. The Romanian and Polish guarantees bring up various questions if 
they are considered in the context of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. It is important 
to analyse how the British attitude changed towards the region after these guarantees 
and how these influenced both the British and Hungarian attitudes towards Hungarian 
revisionism. It is also crucial to understand how far London considered the guarantees 
as binding, and how British policy-makers interpreted their application, particularly in 
the context of Hungarian-Polish friendship and the Hungarian-Romanian discord.  
  Crucially, the British guarantees were a political decision and attempted to 
diplomatically deter Germany from further expansion in the region.
162 The political 
diaries of Chamberlain contain a revealing entry on 2 April 1939, which gives an insight 
into his attitude about frontier change. In connection with the Polish guarantee, 
Chamberlain noted that Britain was not concerned with the boundaries of the Central 
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161	 ﾠLungu	 ﾠhas	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠTilea`s	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠon	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
German	 ﾠultimatum:	 ﾠLungu,	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠPowers,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ163-ﾭ‐73.	 ﾠCienciala	 ﾠstressed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
pressure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠto	 ﾠstop	 ﾠHitler	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions:	 ﾠCienciala,	 ﾠPoland,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ
225.	 ﾠNewman	 ﾠand	 ﾠGillard	 ﾠhad	 ﾠlooked	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠand	 ﾠexplained	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
guarantees	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠstop	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠproject	 ﾠstrength:	 ﾠS.	 ﾠ
Newman,	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠGuarantee	 ﾠto	 ﾠPoland:	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ
(Oxford,	 ﾠ1976);	 ﾠGillard,	 ﾠAppeasement	 ﾠin	 ﾠCrisis,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ126-ﾭ‐129.	 ﾠBruce	 ﾠStrang	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
underlying	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠsilence	 ﾠDominion	 ﾠand	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpassivity:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠStrang,	 ﾠ
`Once	 ﾠMore	 ﾠunto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBreach:	 ﾠBritain`s	 ﾠGuarantee	 ﾠto	 ﾠPoland,	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939`	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠContemporary	 ﾠ
History,	 ﾠ128	 ﾠ(1996),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ721-ﾭ‐751.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠPrazmowska,	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠPoland	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠFront,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ38-ﾭ‐
56.	 ﾠ
162 Chamberlain	 ﾠopenly	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPolish	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠonly	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠ
deterrence,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠcommitments,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠCienciala,	 ﾠPoland,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ224.	 ﾠBrian	 ﾠBond	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsharply	 ﾠcriticised	 ﾠ
decision-ﾭ‐makers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoverlooking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwarnings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChiefs	 ﾠof	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
guarantees:	 ﾠBond,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠMilitary	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ305-ﾭ‐307.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ85	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European states, but with their independence.
163 This seemingly questions our earlier 
argument that Chamberlain perceived the ethnographic reconstruction of Central Europe 
as the only `just` solution, but he had declared that view in a different international 
climate, when he still believed cooperation with Hitler was possible.  Therefore we 
agree with Parker`s argument that the Polish and Romanian guarantee served strategic 
purposes, to distance Poland from Berlin and to turn the Polish-Romanian anti-Soviet 
alliance into an anti-German cooperation.
164 At the same time, Britain guaranteed only 
independence, but not territorial integrity which arguably left the door open for 
negotiations with Germany.
165 London received numerous reports about the immediate 
threat to Romania, but firstly a guarantee was given to Poland.
166 The underlying reason 
for the Polish guarantee was to assure Warsaw of Anglo-French aid, and to persuade the 
Polish to come to Romania`s aid, in the event of a German aggression.    
The Hungarian context of the Polish guarantee has so far been ignored by 
historians. There is strong evidence that after the guarantee, as the result of the positive 
change in Hungarian foreign policy and the firm Polish declaration that Polish-
Hungarian friendship was pivotal for Warsaw,
 London was contemplating a radical 
change in its Central European policy.
167 In a private message through Thomas Moore, 
a Conservative MP, Horthy asked for a similar British guarantee for Hungary and 
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 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠOf	 ﾠBirmingham,	 ﾠPapers	 ﾠof	 ﾠNeville	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠ(NC),	 ﾠ18/1/1092,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
164	 ﾠParker,	 ﾠChamberlain	 ﾠand	 ﾠAppeasement,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ212-ﾭ‐219.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Romania	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠGreece)	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdawning	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBalkans.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠneglected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠcontext:	 ﾠ`New	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐Eastern	 ﾠEurope`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
165	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/97,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusions	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ(39),	 ﾠ8	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠP.	 ﾠTaylor	 ﾠand	 ﾠCienciala	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
argued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠguarantees	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠa	 ﾠshift	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
appeasement,	 ﾠas	 ﾠby	 ﾠguaranteeing	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindependence	 ﾠof	 ﾠPoland	 ﾠand	 ﾠRomania,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠadjustments	 ﾠand	 ﾠbargaining:	 ﾠTaylor,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ240-ﾭ‐241;	 ﾠ
Cienciala,	 ﾠPoland,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ200-ﾭ‐210.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
166	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠBucharest	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ25	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠdivisions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠstationed	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐
German	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠSlovakia	 ﾠand	 ﾠwere	 ﾠready	 ﾠto	 ﾠattack	 ﾠRomania:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23108,	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠthat	 ﾠTilea	 ﾠset	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalarms	 ﾠoff	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠultimatum	 ﾠto	 ﾠRomania.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠOlivier	 ﾠHarvey,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsecretary	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠHalifax:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDiplomatic	 ﾠDiaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠOliver	 ﾠHarvey	 ﾠ1937-ﾭ‐1940,	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpublicist,	 ﾠWickham	 ﾠSteed,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhad	 ﾠexcellent	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠin	 ﾠRomania,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠultimatum:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23061,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3749/3356/18,	 ﾠVansittart	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠGafencu,	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠminister,	 ﾠduring	 ﾠhis	 ﾠvisit	 ﾠto	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠin	 ﾠApril,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcolourfully	 ﾠ
described	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠdanger	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠRomania.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠGafencu	 ﾠtold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
London	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGermans	 ﾠaccidentally	 ﾠput	 ﾠup	 ﾠposters	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠin	 ﾠPrague,	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Bucharest,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoccupation.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhad	 ﾠan	 ﾠalarming	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon,	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV,	 ﾠ
111:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠGafencu,	 ﾠLast	 ﾠDays	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠA	 ﾠDiplomatic	 ﾠJourney	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
1939	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1948).	 ﾠ
167 Beck	 ﾠrefused	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠto	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreason:	 ﾠDIMK,	 ﾠIV,	 ﾠ103b:	 ﾠCsáky	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ86	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expressed that he would welcome an immediate British invitation for discussions.
168 
Consequently, the Cabinet was discussing the possibilities of bringing Hungary into the 
guarantee-system.  Although Halifax, Simon and Hore-Belisha were initially concerned 
about this possibility, later they decided that if Hungary was attacked first by Germany 
and Poland entered the war on Hungary`s side, then Britain could come immediately to 
their aid. Halifax voiced concerns about the means of actively assisting a Hungarian-
Polish resistance, and was convinced that such a resistance would not be long and 
successful. The view that under specific circumstances Hungary could have been 
attracted to regional cooperation changes our understanding of British foreign policy 
towards Hungary and Central Europe.
169 The consensus among historians has been that 
Hungary was never considered to be included in the British guarantees and was simply 
written off as a German satellite at this time. This new evidence changes this 
understanding and clarifies that London was interested in including Hungary in a British 
alliance system. Although Hungary followed a pro-German policy earlier, London was 
open to changes. In other respects, Hungarian territorial claims in Romania were 
excluded from this policy. Whitehall did not react to the Polish diplomatic initiative in 
April to persuade Hungary to sign a non-aggression pact with Romania in return for a 
narrow strip along the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.
170 The adjustments of the 
Hungarian-Romanian frontier would have alienated Bucharest, making a combined 
effort against Germany impossible. Moreover, Budapest was not interested in this 
proposition either.
 171  
The fundamental change in British attitude towards this scenario in the summer 
of 1939 illustrates that the main reason underpinning British opinion towards Hungarian 
revisionism was strategic. We shall return to the subject at a later stage, when in August 
1939, in order to keep Hungary out of the war, Britain reconsidered its opinion and 
secretly recommended that Bucharest should cede a narrow strip of territory to Hungary 
on the ethnographic basis. Whether Hungary was viewed differently at that time, or 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23062,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ4927/3356/18,	 ﾠLieutenant	 ﾠColonel	 ﾠSir	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠMoore	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
169	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB/23/98,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠ19	 ﾠ(39)	 ﾠ5	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ20	 ﾠ(39),	 ﾠ8	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠ
DIMK	 ﾠIV,	 ﾠ63:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠalso	 ﾠLungu,	 ﾠRomania,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ139.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
170	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV,	 ﾠ47:	 ﾠHory	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ31	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
171	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠcould	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠextent,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
found	 ﾠunacceptable,	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV	 ﾠ,	 ﾠ57:	 ﾠHory	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ87	 ﾠ
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London simply reconsidered its stand for strategic reasons to localise the imminent 
German-Polish war, will be the subject of our next chapter.  
Although the Polish guarantee had an important Hungarian angle, Hungarian 
revisionism did not affect its creation. However, Hungarian territorial demands played a 
critical role in creating the Romanian guarantee. Regardless of considering the inclusion 
of Hungary into a British guarantee-system, Hungarian-Romanian mobilization, and 
reports of German military preparation after the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia 
confirmed the Foreign Office in its suspicion that Hungary would do Germany`s 
bidding, and would attack Romania in the near future.
172     
New sources suggest that refusing to guarantee the integrity of Romania had a 
Hungarian angle. In response to an expected Romanian guarantee, Hungarian diplomacy 
became very active in London. György Buday, a well-known Hungarian artist, living in 
Britain since the 1920s, conveyed a secret message from Teleki to the Foreign Office. 
Teleki assured London that he would not allow the German military passage to 
Romania through Hungarian territory, but begged London not to guarantee Romania`s 
territorial integrity, because it would make Hungarian territorial aspirations in 
Transylvania impossible, which would eventually sweep away his government.
173 It is 
extremely interesting that a report on Teleki`s message was sent to Hoare in Bucharest 
along with the official communication of the British guarantee to Romania. This makes 
it highly probable that Teleki`s pleas played an important role in guaranteeing only the 
independence of Romania on 13 April, but not its territorial integrity. This indicates that 
London was interested in distancing Hungary from Germany, and for strategic 
advantages Whitehall was ready to reconsider its attitude toward the question of frontier 
revision.  
The Sargent-Barcza conversation, immediately before the Romanian guarantee, 
also proves that the attitude of Hungary was not irrelevant for Britain. Barcza declared 
his objections to the guarantee. In an exceptionally amiable manner Sargent assured him 
that Britain would only guarantee independence, not the integrity of Romania. Sargent 
also conveyed that Britain understood Hungary`s claims in Romania, but warned that 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ395/662,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3434/3356/18,	 ﾠKnox	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
173	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23061,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ4633/3356/18,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠMallet,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	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Hungarian revisionism was a good weapon in the hands of Germany.
174 `Revisionism as 
a German tool` became one of the uniform British responses to Hungarian territorial 
claims in Romania, until Bucharest renounced the British guarantee in the summer of 
1940.
175 Nonetheless, both Barcza and Budapest were shocked and puzzled. It was not 
understood how Hungary’s territorial claims in Transylvania were `understood` and 
Romania guaranteed at the same time.
176 It could not be interpreted why Britain 
guaranteed Romania, which – according to Hungary – was leading a dubious policy and 
which extensively cooperated with Germany economicly.
177 Until Romania renounced 
the guarantee, Hungary’s aim was to extract an official assurance from London that the 
guarantee was only for independence and not for territorial integrity; London refused to 
declare this officially.   
Macartney suggested that the Romanian guarantee had a distinct anti-Hungarian 
bias.
178 The text of the Romanian guarantee did not mention it directly,
179 but Foreign 
Office discussions clarify that Romania was assured of British support against threats 
other than Germany. Moscow did not recognise Romanian authority over Bessarabia, 
which was occupied by Romania during the Russian Civil war, but both London and 
Moscow worked towards regional cooperation against Germany, therefore the Soviet 
threat can be excluded.
180 Macartney argued that London would have treated a 
Hungarian attack against Romania as an indirect German attack, which would have 
activated the British guarantee. British official sources support Macartney`s claims. 
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174	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0009.	 ﾠ
175	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠSargent`s	 ﾠfriendly	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠ(here	 ﾠand	 ﾠlater	 ﾠalso),	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠSargent`s	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtone.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠ
argued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠeconomicly,	 ﾠBulgaria	 ﾠstrategically,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠhad	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠ
sold	 ﾠitself	 ﾠto	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠhence	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdeserve	 ﾠany	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠhelp:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23116,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ4000/4000/21,	 ﾠ
Sargent`s	 ﾠminute,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠBarcza`s	 ﾠdispatches	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconveyed	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠamicable	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠin	 ﾠreality.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmisjudge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice`s	 ﾠattitude,	 ﾠas	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
diaries	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrepeat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠarguments.	 ﾠJust	 ﾠas	 ﾠbefore,	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠhe	 ﾠintentionally	 ﾠprojected	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
amicable	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠto	 ﾠawaken	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠregularly	 ﾠ
reported	 ﾠto	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠproblems,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
looked	 ﾠfavourably	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreality:	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV:	 ﾠ111.,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ
1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
176	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠ39,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠ53,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
177	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ65.	 ﾠ
178	 ﾠPCAM,	 ﾠMSS.	 ﾠENG.c.	 ﾠ3302,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ23,	 ﾠDoc	 ﾠ13,	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠ`British	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Second	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar`	 ﾠ1977.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
179	 ﾠHansard,	 ﾠ(Commons),	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ346,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ654,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
180	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠboth	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠsuspicious	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother,	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐August	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSoviet	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠaggression,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠ
J.	 ﾠCarley,	 ﾠ1939:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠAlliance	 ﾠThat	 ﾠNever	 ﾠWas	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠComing	 ﾠof	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ89	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Halifax and Sargent both emphasised that a Hungarian attack, or a Hungarian invasion 
disguised as German aggression, would undoubtedly have activated the British 
guarantee.
181  
The way the Foreign Office handled the proposal of the influential Rothschild 
family to invite István Bethlen to London after the guarantee showcases British attitude 
towards Hungary. The Rothschild family in the spring of 1939 wanted to invite Bethlen 
for unofficial talks, in order to influence Hungarian policy towards Britain. Knox 
admitted that this was desirable, but pointed out that Hungary`s geographical position 
made British help impossible, and this move would probably attract unnecessary 
German attention, which could be embarrassing for London. The Foreign Office agreed 
with Knox`s disapproval and Sargent instructed the new British minister O`Malley, to 
do everything possible to flatter Budapest and make the Hungarians believe that London 
was supporting them, but not to encourage discussions with Bethlen.
182 The Foreign 
Office was also afraid that Bethlen might lecture about revision whilst in London, as he 
did in 1933.
183 Non-interference with Germany`s interests in the region seemed to be a 
stronger priority than influencing Hungary towards the policy of Britain, therefore 
territorial revision, even on the level of discussions did not fit into this approach.    
Hungary`s insistence on revision was viewed by London as an indirect German 
threat to Romania. Accordingly, the guarantee to Bucharest was not a direct British 
judgement on Hungarian territorial aims in Transylvania, but a countermove against 
German aggression, masked in Hungarian revisionism. Budapest was aware that as long 
as the British guarantee was in place, revision could not be achieved in Transylvania 
with the consent of London and Paris.  
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 ﾠDBFP	 ﾠser.	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠ460:	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠguarantee`,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
182	 ﾠSir	 ﾠOwen	 ﾠO'Malley	 ﾠwas	 ﾠborn	 ﾠEnglish,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhis	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠhad	 ﾠIrish	 ﾠorigins,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠlooked	 ﾠsympathetically	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠand	 ﾠminority	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠnations,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterview	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Macartney,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠadmitted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠexaggerated,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠlooked	 ﾠfavourably	 ﾠ
upon	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsee,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠoften	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠof	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠto	 ﾠLondon.	 ﾠSee:	 ﾠPCAM,	 ﾠMSS.	 ﾠENG.	 ﾠc.	 ﾠ
3311,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ32,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1952.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
183	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23116,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ4000/4000/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ90	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2.10 Hungary between territorial claims and neutrality before the outbreak of the war  
 
By guaranteeing Polish and Romanian independence, London officially demonstrated 
its strategic priorities in the region. Regardless of the fact that London indicated its 
flexibility on Romanian territorial integrity, the guarantees put British attitude towards 
Hungarian revisionism into a radically new context. Taking no notice of British 
hesitations about discussing Hungarian territorial demands in Romania, Budapest 
persistently lobbied for frontier revision in London. After the destruction of Czecho-
Slovakia, Teleki anticipated that Britain would remain diplomatically active towards 
Central Europe and the territorial and minority disputes in the region would be dealt 
with during a second Munich-style conference. For this reason, he wanted to keep 
Hungarian grievances prominent in London, which would prompt the Foreign Office to 
form much the same view as it had over the First Vienna Award.
184 Cadogan however 
explained to Barcza on 14 June that it was hard for London to recognise territorial 
claims in Romania, because of the guarantee and problem of ethnically mixed areas.
185  
In his diaries, Barcza complained bitterly about the lack of instructions from 
Budapest about this crucial question. Relying on his own judgement, he noted to 
Cadogan that a transfer of a wide strip of territory along the Hungarian-Romanian 
frontier would be desirable. He also noted that this was the first occasion when he was 
asked about Hungarian demands in Romania, and was the first time had specified 
Hungary`s territorial claims to London. The apparent lack of Hungarian interest to 
inform Barcza about the extent of Hungarian territorial demands supports the arguments 
of Balázs Ablonczy and Tibor Frank, who have both stressed that Teleki`s priority was 
revision and the British consent was only secondary in this context.
186 We know that 
over the summer of 1939 various schemes of territorial claims were compiled in 
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184	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV,	 ﾠ187:	 ﾠCsáky	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ
66.	 ﾠ
185	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠworked	 ﾠout	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠin	 ﾠRomania,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
declared	 ﾠas	 ﾠofficial.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐1939,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠso	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠcorridor-ﾭ‐plan	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠversion	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
map	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠ10).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠa	 ﾠ80-ﾭ‐100	 ﾠkm	 ﾠwide	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Romanian	 ﾠfrontier,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
connected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSzékely	 ﾠdistricts	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐Eastern	 ﾠcorner	 ﾠof	 ﾠTransylvania	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ50-ﾭ‐100	 ﾠkm	 ﾠ
corridor:	 ﾠA.	 ﾠCzettler,	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠPál	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠkülpolitika	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1997),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ69.	 ﾠ
186	 ﾠAblonczy,	 ﾠPál	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ93,	 ﾠ111,	 ﾠ175-ﾭ‐176;	 ﾠT.	 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠ`Treaty	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoublespeak:	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
neutrality,	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐41`	 ﾠin	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠNeutrals	 ﾠand	 ﾠNon-ﾭ‐Belligerents	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠN.	 ﾠ
Wylie	 ﾠ(Cambridge,	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ150-ﾭ‐173	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ163).	 ﾠ91	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Hungary under the direct leadership of Teleki.
187 Most of these claimed the larger part 
of Transylvania, which sharply differed from the claim presented by Barcza to 
Cadogan. Another possible explanation is that Teleki was aware of the British 
disapproval of wider Hungarian demands, and Barcza was intentionally left 
uninformed.
188 In any case, Barcza attempted to turn Britain against Romania by 
claiming that the British guarantee had given free rein to the Romanian oppression of 
Magyars in Transylvania. Cadogan was deeply sceptical and promised an answer for the 
Hungarian territorial demands upon receipt of a memorandum about the condition of the 
Magyars in Romania.
189 
As we have noted, in March 1939, London did not support the Polish initiative 
to persuade Romania to cede a strip of territory along the frontier to Hungary in return 
for rapprochement; this policy was revisited by June 1939.  It seems that having an 
interest in bringing the Hungarians and Romanians closer to each other, Whitehall was 
skilfully playing off one against the other. While on the one hand Cadogan showed 
lukewarm interest in revision to Barcza, the evidence suggests that Bucharest was 
questioned on the possibility of appeasing Hungary with frontier adjustment. It is 
known from Máriássy, the Hungarian minister to Turkey that Bucharest was outraged 
by the British insistence on satisfying Hungarian claims. Máriássy had the opportunity 
to look into a third party`s documents in Ankara. These documents mentioned a letter, 
supposedly written by Chamberlain to Calinescu, the Romanian prime minister in 1939, 
in which Bucharest was questioned on the possibilities of frontier adjustment.
190 Our 
research has been unable to confirm the existence of this letter, and the evidence points 
to a different scenario. Macartney pointed out that the initiative was supported by 
Halifax, which we have been able to confirm.
191 By June 1939, Halifax was ready to 
recognise the existence of a territorial dispute between Hungary and Romania. He 
continuously refuted the anti-Hungarian tones of the reports coming from Bucharest, 
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 ﾠA.	 ﾠRónai,	 ﾠTérképezett	 ﾠtörténelem	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1989),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ217-ﾭ‐237.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠTruly,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclarified	 ﾠintentionally	 ﾠon	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠforums.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadmitted,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠintegral	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠ(`Mindent	 ﾠVissza!`	 ﾠ[`Give	 ﾠEverything	 ﾠBack!`]	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
included	 ﾠ5-ﾭ‐6	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠminorities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggrandised	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
resentment,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠrather	 ﾠsymptomatic	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGermans	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhanded	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish:	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0009;	 ﾠ
DIMK	 ﾠIV,	 ﾠ205:	 ﾠVörnle	 ﾠto	 ﾠSztójay,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
190MOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ64	 ﾠ17főn/1939,	 ﾠ559,	 ﾠMáriássy	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ355.	 ﾠ92	 ﾠ
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and declared that he would not fall for the Romanian attempts to convince Britain that 
Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionism in Romania were the result of German 
encouragement. He stressed that Hungary`s and Bulgaria`s adhesion to the Axis could 
be prevented, and for this reason revisionism could not be rejected openly.
192 The 
existence of such an unexpected British initiative inevitably forces us to ask the reasons 
behind the sudden change in British policy. Béni Balogh`s analysis of Romanian cabinet 
minutes has revealed that London advised Bucharest to settle territorial disputes with 
Budapest in a friendly atmosphere during direct negotiations.
193 British sources are also 
very tight-lipped about this proposition. Most crucially we do not know the territorial 
extent of the British recommendation, and it can only be presumed that London 
recommended a limited revision. Bucharest however refused revision in any form, and 
declared that the strengthening of Hungary would only make the Axis stronger; this 
seemed to convince London to drop the proposal. As in March 1939, the primary reason 
for working for a Hungarian-Romanian accord was the aim to prevent a Hungarian-
Romanian war, which could have provided a convenient pretext for German 
intervention. 
Even so, the British policy fluctuated wildly towards Romania. By July 1939, 
the British policy of working for a rapprochement between Budapest and Bucharest had 
undergone a radical transformation, which significantly affected British policy towards 
Hungarian revisionism in Romania. Based on a Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) 
report the decision was made in June that a belligerent Romania would be more 
beneficial for the Allies than a neutral one. It was declared that the only benefit to keep 
Romania neutral was the assumption that it would keep Hungary neutral. The CID 
report reiterated that German aggression would come through the Hungarian Plains, 
which Hungary would not be able to resist. Hungary`s military weakness, its pro-
German policy and the failure of facilitating a Hungarian-Romanian agreement led to 
the decision in June 1939 to induce Romania to either adopt the status of `benevolent 
neutrality`, or enter the war on the side of the Allies, if it would break out.
194  
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/39,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ5490/140/37,	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel	 ﾠ(Bucharest)	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠR	 ﾠ5538/661/67,	 ﾠ
Halifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/40,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6029/10/37,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠ8	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠBalogh,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar-ﾭ‐román,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ68-ﾭ‐69.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/40,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ4700/133/37,	 ﾠ`Report	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠRomania`,	 ﾠn.	 ﾠd.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
time,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarians	 ﾠwere	 ﾠflattered	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠneutral	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwas	 ﾠBritain`s	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠinterest:	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV,	 ﾠ181:	 ﾠ93	 ﾠ
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The tone in the Foreign Office reflected a growing fear of the likely 
consequences of Hungarian revisionism. When the young R. W. Selby suggested that 
promises should be made to Hungary on frontier change to encourage Budapest towards 
an anti-German policy, Sargent excluded this possibility and minuted that promises 
should not be made to Budapest in order to influence Hungarian policy, and Britain 
could only hope for Hungary`s desire to stay independent.
195 O`Malley`s pro-Hungarian 
recommendations were also silenced. O`Malley suggested that the transfer of a 15 km 
wide territory along the Hungarian-Romanian frontier, or the promise of it, could direct 
Hungarian policy towards a pro-British course, but he was instructed that this was not 
the British policy.
196  
Earlier in June, Barcza promised a memorandum to Cadogan about the 
Romanian ill-treatment of Magyars since Britain guaranteed Romania. This 
memorandum was given to the Foreign Office in July and was duly passed on to 
Bucharest for comments. D. C. Watt stressed that the British had implied to Gafencu 
that even if Romania fought on the Allied side, it could not keep the same frontiers once 
the war ended. However, because D. C. Watt`s analysis relied on French-Romanian 
diplomatic correspondence it is likely that although London raised the issue in 
Bucharest, such threats were never made, and Gafencu was simply complaining about 
the British inquiry to the French.
197 Nevertheless, British and Hungarian sources prove 
that the Hungarian complaints about the Romanian treatment of Magyars were badly 
received in London, and based on Romanian information, they were labelled as German 
and Hungarian fabrications.
198 It is most intriguing that based on only Romanian 
assurances on the good condition of Magyars in Romania, without due reflection, 
Hungarian complaints were rejected in Whitehall.    
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Barcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ64	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠ562.,	 ﾠUtassy	 ﾠ(Hungarian	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠattaché	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon):	 ﾠ
Conversations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠBanfield	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠreferee	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWar	 ﾠOffice),	 ﾠ3	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠThis	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠLower	 ﾠ
rank	 ﾠclerks	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠSelby,	 ﾠOrchard	 ﾠand	 ﾠSpeaight	 ﾠurged	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfavourable	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠBudapest,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
Cadogan	 ﾠand	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠsenior	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠStrang	 ﾠand	 ﾠNichols,	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠa	 ﾠrigid	 ﾠview-ﾭ‐point	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwere	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠany	 ﾠfavours	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungary:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23116	 ﾠC	 ﾠ14406/4000/21,	 ﾠSelby`s	 ﾠ
memorandum	 ﾠand	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠby	 ﾠOrchard,	 ﾠSpeaight	 ﾠand	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
196	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24431	 ﾠAnnual	 ﾠreport	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠD.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠWatt,	 ﾠHow	 ﾠWar	 ﾠCame:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠImmediate	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐1939	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ
1989),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ303-ﾭ‐304.	 ﾠ
198	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ64	 ﾠ17főn/1939,	 ﾠ’Az	 ﾠangol	 ﾠgarancia	 ﾠhatása	 ﾠa	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠkisebbségek	 ﾠhelyzetére	 ﾠRomániában’,	 ﾠ24	 ﾠ
July	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠ417/39,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ5490/140/37,	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ94	 ﾠ
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The Sargent-Barcza meeting in July went in the same brusque manner. Sargent 
made it clear to Barcza that revision could not be promised, and he rejected to putting 
pressure on Bucharest in any form. Evidently showing deliberate indifference towards 
the problem Sargent incidentally asked: `What does Hungary actually want?`
199 Barcza 
still had no instructions on how to respond to these inquiries. He complained bitterly in 
his diaries about the inconsistent, unsystematic and harmful nature of Hungary`s 
revisionist policy. He found it appalling that he had no instruction to answer such 
questions, now that the British seemed to be interested in the problem.
200 Barcza 
insisted on the transfer of a strip along the frontier, which he had already communicated 
to Cadogan, but could not specify Hungarian aims in Transylvania proper, but promised 
to prepare a memorandum on this question.
201 Barcza only received instructions on 
Hungarian territorial claims in Transylvania a week before the outbreak of the war. 
Csáky informed him that if asked in the Foreign Office, he should insist on territories 
with a 50 percent Magyar population or higher.
202  
Sensing the growing British annoyance towards Hungarian demands Teleki sent 
a number of private messages and special envoys to London to assure London of 
Hungary`s peaceful attitude. Iván Rubido-Zichy, former Hungarian minister in London, 
was sent to London with Teleki`s promise that Hungary would not join any groupings 
and would protect its independence with arms.
203 Later, in July, Georgina Festetics - 
daughter of a very rich Hungarian landowner - arrived in London with Teleki`s 
memorandum. In this document Teleki explained Hungary`s difficult internal and 
external position and suggested that due to public pressure, if Germany offered 
Transylvania, it would be hard to say no.
204 In August, in another letter, Teleki 
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199	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV	 ﾠ250:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
200	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0009.	 ﾠ
201	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV	 ﾠ250:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠ83.,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ
202	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠchose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠclaim,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠcriteria	 ﾠat	 ﾠMunich.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠ
left	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠconfused,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠknown	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTransylvanian	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
solved	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠethnically	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠareas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovince:	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV	 ﾠ264:	 ﾠGhyczy	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠ
August	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ64	 ﾠ1939/2-ﾭ‐1,	 ﾠ705.,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
203	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfew	 ﾠoccasions	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠassured	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠarmed	 ﾠ
resistance.	 ﾠPossibly	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠto	 ﾠRomania,	 ﾠas	 ﾠarmed	 ﾠ
resistance	 ﾠwas	 ﾠknown	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpriority	 ﾠin	 ﾠformulating	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠstates:	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠ
Barcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0009.	 ﾠ
204	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠoccasion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
able	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist,	 ﾠif	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠin	 ﾠTransylvania	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGermans.	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠwished	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
extract	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠunderstanding,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠreception	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠLondon:	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ26,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠJuly,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0009.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ95	 ﾠ
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promised armed resistance once again, and pledged to protect Hungarian independence 
against anyone.
205  Barcza was disconcerted with these personal visits, and believed that 
Hungary was conducting misguided diplomacy, insisting on territorial revision in a 
difficult international situation.
206  
August of 1939 brought yet another radical change in the British attitude 
towards Hungary. The press hit an entirely new, positive tone. 
207 Seemingly, Sargent 
also completely reversed his views and declared that if Hungary was to be attacked, 
together with Poland, Britain would come to their aid. Sargent also suggested that in 
case Hungary was not attacked, but declared neutrality, its future would be secured by 
Britain.
208 Macartney and Bán have argued that the underlying reason for the dramatic 
shift in British policy were Teleki`s promises.
209 The evidence, set out in the next 
section, will refute these argument and will clarify that the British strategic interest to 
ensure Hungarian neutrality in the approaching German-Polish war underpinned the 
dramatic shift in the British tone.   
British policy towards Hungarian revisionism until the outbreak of the war was 
determined by strategic interest. Official attitude towards Hungary fluctuated 
correspondingly, and neither Hungarian territorial demands, nor Teleki`s promises 
about Hungary`s peaceful attitude affected it significantly. In the background the 
Foreign Office viewed the Hungarian arguments in the Hungarian-Romanian dispute 
with prejudice, and Romanian arguments were understood and mostly considered as 
just. On the eve of the war, the Foreign Office were thinking along the lines of the old 
Great War alliances, in which Hungary was viewed as Germany`s ally and pawn.  
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 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0009.	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 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	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 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1939,	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 ﾠ0009.	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 ﾠ`The	 ﾠPeace	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 ﾠMacartney,	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 ﾠp.	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2.11 Conclusion 
	 ﾠ
In one year, from the Anschluss, to the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia, the map of 
Central Europe went through a radical transformation. The Anschluss had a powerful 
impact on British policy towards Central Europe and Hungary. London recognised its 
deminishing influence in the region, and this inevitably resulted in limited interest 
towards Budapest. More crucially however, newly presented evidence suggests that 
Hungary`s openly pro-German policy after the Anschluss brought deep seated 
suspicions about Hungary in the Foreign Office to the surface, and consequently 
Hungarian territorial claims were viewed with strong antipathy. These therefore clarify 
that the cordial official tone towards Budapest did not reflect actual British perceptions, 
and the analysis of official opinion and British perceptions have to be separated.  
  The Hitler-Chamberlain meetings brought the Hungarian question to the centre 
of international attention. As Hitler connected the Sudeten question with the Magyar 
one, Chamberlain viewed Hungarian territorial demands with suspicion, but Barcza`s 
diaries have proved that Chamberlain was more open towards moderate Hungarian 
claims than has been previously understood. 
  The British Prime Minister deliberately avoided the issue of the Hungarian 
frontiers at Munich, but our findings have demonstrated that the British delegation 
arrived in Munich with very clear views on the question. The perception that Hungary 
treated its nationalities harshly in the dualist era largely determined British views on 
Hungarian revisionism at this time, which became the underlying reason why London 
would have recommended a very limited frontier revision. At Munich Hitler achieved 
what he wanted, and his lack of interest towards Hungary`s claims testifies that earlier 
in Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg he used the Magyar question only in order to 
apply pressure on Chamberlain. Before Munich, the British Prime Minister evidently 
refrained from any discussions about Hungary, and therefore Hitler`s disinterest came in 
handy.  
The British  lack of interest in Munich suggested that in the near future London 
would bow to the German policy on the Magyar question and would not voice its own 
opinion. Consequently, London closely followed the German policy towards the 
Hungarian-Slovak negotiations, and the First Vienna Award. Apart from conforming to 
German wishes in the Hungarian-Slovak dispute, the evidence presented here testifies 97	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that Britain`s ultimate aim was to create justice in the region, by drawing ethnographic 
frontiers between the quarreling nations. At this stage, London was unable to act on this 
notion, but as we will demonstrate, this criteria became the guiding principle of 
planning the post-war shape of the region during the war.   
London considered the First Vienna Award to be ethnographically just, therefore 
it was welcomed. However, Hungary`s adherence to the Anti-Comintern pact seriously 
undermined the image of Hungary in London, which was now viewed as Germany`s 
ally. Nevertheless, London was eager to maintain cordial relations with Budapest; 
therefore the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia was acknowledged as a fait accompli, 
which did not however mean that Britain accepted it as final.  
The ideal of creating justice soon became the victim of strategic interests. The 
Hungarian-Romanian discord after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia was viewed from 
the perspective of its strategic implications, namely Romania`s economic and geo-
strategic value. Hungary`s persistent claims in Romania, similar to in the Czechoslovak 
crisis, were viewed by London as a German interest and therefore it was discouraged. 
Nonetheless, new evidence suggests that even though Romania was guaranteed by 
Britain, at the insistence of Hungary the door was left open for future frontier change. 
Crucially, this became the underpinning reason for guaranteeing only the independence 
and not the territorial integrity of Romania.  
The consulted archival material refutes the consensus of historiography that 
Hungary was a German satellite after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. The analysis 
of overlooked official British sources sheds new light on Hungary`s position in the 
British policy to encircle Germany. Under specific circumstances, Britain considered 
guaranteeing and helping Hungary if war broke out. This is an intriguing new 
development in the study of British policy toward Central Europe and in our 
understanding of British opinion of Hungary. However, Hungarian territorial claims 
complicated the encirclement policy, because it created antagonism in the region, and 
therefore the British priority was to put these claims into abeyance. 98	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`When the horses start kicking each other,	 ﾠ
it is better for the donkeys to stand aside.`
1 
(King Boris of Bulgaria) 
 
3. Illusions and Disappointments: The Anglo-Hungarian relationship  
during the `Phoney War` 
 
3.1 Introduction 
	 ﾠ
Before the outbreak of the war Britain only showed passive interest towards Hungarian 
frontier revision. The First Vienna Award and the occupation of Ruthenia were quietly 
acknowledged, but London refused to officially recognise them, or to actively raise the 
question of further frontier revision. Our principal aim here is to decide how far the 
outbreak of hostilities shifted this approach, and from what criteria London reacted to 
territorial claims put forward by Hungary in the first six months of the Second World 
War. The Munich Agreement and the First Vienna Award both declared the aim of 
drawing ethnographically balanced frontiers. The most crucial task therefore is to 
examine whether this principle persisted in British thought after September 1939, and 
what role it had in the planning of the post-war frontiers of Hungary.  
In Britain, the outbreak of the war seemed to justify the critics of appeasement 
and the earlier submissive approach towards Germany was condemned by many.
2 E. H. 
Carr, the distinguished historian, in 1939 saw the war as the direct result of the failure 
of the inter-war international system, but he did not see Central European frontier 
revision as a key issue.
3 A large and growing body of literature has investigated the 
views of contemporary British scholars, such as R. W. Seton-Watson and Macartney on 
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1	 ﾠKing	 ﾠBoris	 ﾠof	 ﾠBulgaria	 ﾠcommenting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠ	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠby:	 ﾠV.	 ﾠDimitrov,	 ﾠ`Bulgarian	 ﾠ
Neutrality:	 ﾠDomestic	 ﾠand	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠPerspectives`	 ﾠin	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠNeutrals	 ﾠand	 ﾠNon-ﾭ‐Belligerents	 ﾠduring	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠN.	 ﾠWylie	 ﾠ(Cambridge,	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ192.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠSee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠCato,	 ﾠGuilty	 ﾠMen.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠscholarly	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠcriticism,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠR.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐
Watson,	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠto	 ﾠDanzig	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1939).	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠCarr,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTwenty	 ﾠYears'	 ﾠCrisis;	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠBritain:	 ﾠA	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy.	 ﾠA	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRoyal	 ﾠInstitute	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
International	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠ(RIIA)	 ﾠon	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNazi	 ﾠthreat,	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecord	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeographical,	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠfrictions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarea	 ﾠas	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
instability:	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐Eastern	 ﾠEurope:	 ﾠA	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠSurvey,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠA.	 ﾠToynbee	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ
1939).	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Hungarian revisionism, but these studies have paid less attention to clarifying their 
views towards the frontiers of Hungary after war broke out and how they attempted to 
influence British foreign policy.
4  
Historiography has also rarely commented on the British-Romanian aim in 
1939-40 to create a Balkan neutral bloc of Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. 
British views on the position of Hungary in this bloc help us to clarify British priorities 
in the region, and most crucially the role of Hungarian revisionism in British Central 
European policy. Historians have also disregarded the general diplomatic 
correspondence of the Foreign Office of late 1939 and early 1940 to great extent; 
although at this time the Foreign Office already expressed opinions about the post-war 
territorial extent of Hungary and Romania. The crucial questions of Hungary`s position 
in British Balkan strategy and how Hungary`s growing subservience towards Germany 
influenced British views on territorial questions can only be ascertained through 
analysing the Anglo-Hungarian and Anglo-Romanian diplomatic correspondence, since 
most of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry papers were destroyed during the war.  
A brief analysis of British and Hungarian foreign policy and strategy before and 
at the outbreak of the war is necessary here, in order to fully understand the mind-set of 
British and Hungarian policy-makers. The British cabinets of the 1930s were all aware 
that a simultaneous war on the European continent, in the Mediterranean and in the Far 
East was militarily impossible.
5 There were heated debates about rearmament and the 
defence of the Empire, which were all viewed through the prism of keeping financial 
stability. The destruction of Czecho-Slovakia and the declaration of war with Germany 
brought the alliance with France and the question of continental commitment to the 
forefront. The army in the months preceding the war had been subjected to a series of 
revolutionary changes; both the territorial and regular army divisions were raised and 
British contribution to the Allied cause had been substantially increased, although still 
remaining meagre, compared to the French strength on the continent. The Royal Air 
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 ﾠÁ.	 ﾠBeretzky,	 ﾠ‘A	 ﾠrevízió	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠkisebbség	 ﾠhelyzetének	 ﾠmegítélése	 ﾠR.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson	 ﾠműveiben’,	 ﾠ
Tiszavirág	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ(1999),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ12-ﾭ‐17;	 ﾠÁ.	 ﾠBeretzky,	 ﾠ‘R.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson	 ﾠés	 ﾠaz	 ﾠ"Új	 ﾠEurópa"	 ﾠ(1920-ﾭ‐45)’,	 ﾠValóság	 ﾠ
27	 ﾠ(2000),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ65-ﾭ‐78;	 ﾠÁ.	 ﾠBeretzky,	 ﾠ‘C.A.	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠnézetei	 ﾠa	 ﾠrevízióról	 ﾠés	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠkisebbség	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 ﾠ
(1929-ﾭ‐1941)’,	 ﾠPro	 ﾠMinoritate	 ﾠ32	 ﾠ(2004),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ34-ﾭ‐48.;	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMiskolczy,	 ﾠ‘Barát,	 ﾠvagy	 ﾠellenség?	 ﾠR.W.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐
Watson	 ﾠés	 ﾠMacartney’,	 ﾠHolmi	 ﾠ22	 ﾠ(1994),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ36-ﾭ‐54;	 ﾠL.	 ﾠPeter,	 ﾠ‘The	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠR.W.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐
Watson	 ﾠand	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠover	 ﾠHungary’,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ121-ﾭ‐145.	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠGrand	 ﾠStrategy,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠR.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠButler	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1957),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ6-ﾭ‐7,	 ﾠ11,	 ﾠ26;	 ﾠBond,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠMilitary	 ﾠ
Policy,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ188-ﾭ‐189.	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Force (RAF) was gradually gaining strength	 ﾠcompared to the size of the German Air 
Force (Luftwaffe). In Europe, the threats from the Italian navy was balanced by the 
French, hence the Royal Navy only had to keep the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) at 
bay. As regards to equipment there was however a very serious shortage of air defence 
guns and searchlights.
6 Through the fog of the English Channel, the latter appeared as 
the biggest threat in the light of the constant fear of a knock-out German bombing 
campaign against British cities.
7 Besides, the memory of the loss of a generation on the 
battlefields of the Somme was still very vivid.
 8 Due to these, Britain declared war with 
great reluctance. As regards to war aims, trying to learn from the mistakes of the past, in 
order to avoid the reoccurrence of the ill-fated secret treaties and territorial 
commitments of the Great War, at the outbreak of the war policy-makers declared that 
Britain would refuse making territorial promises while hostilities continued.
9 Also, 
during the Great War there had been little attempt to discuss a comprehensive peace 
settlement, and at Versailles hasty and unbalanced decisions were made on frontiers and 
minorities.
10 In 1939, post-war planning started soon after the outbreak of hostilities, 
with the aim to create a carefully thought-out new world order, based on the principles 
of ethnographic self-determination and `justice`.
11 British reluctance to officially declare 
policy on frontier questions therefore largely determined the official British reaction to 
Hungarian territorial claims, but as we will see, behind closed doors, passionate 
discussions on the future frontiers of Central Europe were well underway from as early 
as September 1939.  
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 ﾠButler,	 ﾠGrand	 ﾠStrategy,	 ﾠpp.	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 ﾠU.	 ﾠBialer,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠShadow	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBomber:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠFear	 ﾠof	 ﾠAir	 ﾠAttack	 ﾠand	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPolitics,	 ﾠ1932-ﾭ‐1939	 ﾠ(London,	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1980).	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8	 ﾠThe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ`the	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneration`	 ﾠusually	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBattle	 ﾠof	 ﾠSomme	 ﾠ(July-ﾭ‐November	 ﾠ1916),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠevokes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmense	 ﾠcasualties	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠHarris,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSomme:	 ﾠDeath	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1966).	 ﾠ	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9	 ﾠV.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠRothwell	 ﾠhas	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠwar	 ﾠaims,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
strategy:	 ﾠV.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠRothwell,	 ﾠWar	 ﾠAims	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠWar	 ﾠAims	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKey	 ﾠBelligerents,	 ﾠ
1939-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠ(Edinburgh,	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ64-ﾭ‐70.	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠDuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠsecret	 ﾠtreaties,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfar	 ﾠreaching	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠimplications,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsigned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
neutral	 ﾠpowers,	 ﾠto	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠjoin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEntente`s	 ﾠside.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
London	 ﾠ(1915)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠItaly,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠBucharest	 ﾠ(1916)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠRomania,	 ﾠpromised	 ﾠAustro-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠ
territories,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalready	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠceded	 ﾠto	 ﾠSerbia.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar	 ﾠthis	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠserious	 ﾠ
disputes	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEntente	 ﾠpowers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnotions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ`justice`	 ﾠand	 ﾠ`justice	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall`	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecurrent	 ﾠideas	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠearly	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠFRPS	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠto	 ﾠstart	 ﾠpeace	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠin	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠmemoranda	 ﾠcompiled	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacademics	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFRPS	 ﾠoften	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠ`World	 ﾠjustice`	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
war	 ﾠaim,	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠethnographic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠfree	 ﾠ
trade:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ800/321	 ﾠ(microfilm),	 ﾠfolios	 ﾠ339-ﾭ‐352.	 ﾠ	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The foreign political goals of Hungary were in direct contrast to British 
priorities. Budapest essentially wanted to overturn the Treaty of Trianon and foreign 
policy-making, especially from the mid-1930s became subordinated to frontier revision. 
Besides, the experience of military defeat, collapse and territorial dismemberment at the 
end of the Great War was a constant backdrop in the hearts and minds of most 
Hungarians. Therefore, during the Second World War Budapest was eager to preserve 
its strength for expected post-war territory-grabbing.
12 Concessions to Nazi Germany 
mostly became subordinated to this complex course. Essentially however, this policy 
was viewed by London as fundamentally dishonest, and as from September 1939 
resistance towards Germany became the barometer for judging the region in London. 
The most crucial collision-points in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship were about the 
concessions Budapest made to Berlin, and the different interpretations of what was 
considered acceptable. These apparent contrasts of British and Hungarian foreign 
political ideas made cooperation and mutual understanding on territorial questions very 
unpromising. This chapter will point out how these differences affected the question of 
frontier revision in late 1939.  
The analysis will essentially follow a chronological approach and the argument 
has been divided into five sections. The first deals with Hungary`s position in British 
strategy immediately before the outbreak of the war. The question asked here is how far 
Hungarian-Polish friendship or the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute affected 
British regional strategy. The second part will be looking at the same question in the 
context of the German-Polish war. Thirdly, we will be examining the impact of the 
Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland on British, Hungarian and Romanian foreign-
policies and whether the Soviet expansion was reflected in British judgements about the 
Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute. The fourth part will be looking at why Britain 
considered it impossible to attach Hungary to the Balkan neutral bloc in late 1939. This 
part will also discuss the mostly unresearched proposition of Bucharest for frontier 
revision in January 1940. New evidence will be brought forward to challenge our 
understanding of the British role in this scheme. The final part examines the visit of the 
British historian, Carlile Macartney, to Hungary in early 1940, and the role his visit had 
in British foreign policy. On Macartney`s advice, Teleki moderated Hungarian 
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 ﾠP.	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 ﾠ`Magyarország	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 ﾠalapelveiről`	 ﾠin	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠTörténelmi	 ﾠSzöveggyűjtemény	 ﾠ1914-ﾭ‐
1999,	 ﾠvol.	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territorial claims on Romania, which were put into official form in February 1940 in a 
lengthy memorandum. Disentangling British response to Teleki`s fresh claims will be 
crucial, as since the Munich crisis, this was the first official articulation of Hungarian 
territorial claims.  
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3.2 British views of the Hungarian-Romanian dispute in the last days of peace 
 
In recent years, the debate continued about the underlying reasons of the outbreak of the 
Second World War, but there has been little agreement. A large number of studies have 
looked beyond the standard approach of viewing the problem solely from the German 
perspectives and the aggressive nature of Nazism, and have taken a broader 
international approach.
13 However Central European territorial and minority disputes, 
and particularly the Magyar minority question and Hungarian revisionism received less 
prominence.
14 It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the impact of Hungarian 
and Bulgarian territorial claims on the stability of the region, which, this thesis argues, 
fuelled regional resentment and eventually allowed an easy German penetration.
15 It is 
similarly important to review and adjust the consensus of the historiography that Britain 
showed minimal interest towards the region and gradually withdrew from Central 
Europe during the `Phoney War`. The evidence set out here suggests that the effects of 
the Hungarian-Romanian and the Bulgarian-Romanian territorial disputes had a broader 
impact on British Balkan and Mediterranean strategy. The following will analyse the 
British view of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute on the eve of the war.  
As our previous chapter has concluded, Britain showed great concern about 
Hungarian-Romanian tensions after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia.	 ﾠHungarian 
mobilization and the aggravating tensions between Budapest and Bucharest in mid-
March was viewed as a result of German temptations to press territorial claims in 
Transylvania, and London anticipated that tensions would eventually lead to German-
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 ﾠAnita	 ﾠPrazmowska	 ﾠhad	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpioneering	 ﾠproject	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisplaying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠorigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠPrazmowska,	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar.	 ﾠA	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠedited	 ﾠvolume	 ﾠof	 ﾠFrank	 ﾠMcDonough,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠat	 ﾠall:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOrigins	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠAn	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠ
Perspective,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠF.	 ﾠMcDonough	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠAndrás	 ﾠBán	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠCzechoslovak	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠ
'R.W.	 ﾠSeton-ﾭ‐Watson	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠproblem`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ127-ﾭ‐38.	 ﾠA	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpen	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠTibor	 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhas	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar:	 ﾠ
Frank,	 ﾠ`Treaty	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠand	 ﾠdoublespeak`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ150-ﾭ‐173.	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠThe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠin	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
hard	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify.	 ﾠOfficially,	 ﾠno	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠwere	 ﾠput	 ﾠforward	 ﾠto	 ﾠBucharest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠrevisionist	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠ
intentionally	 ﾠremained	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠvague	 ﾠform.	 ﾠTowards	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠrevisionist	 ﾠpropaganda	 ﾠremained	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠto	 ﾠemphasizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviability	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpages	 ﾠof	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
Quarterly.	 ﾠBefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutbreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠterritories	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠpopulations,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠthis	 ﾠformula	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwithdrawn:	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ26	 ﾠ
August	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0009.	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Hungarian aggression against Romania.
16 Tensions between Budapest and Bucharest 
were renewed in the mounting Polish crisis of late August, which was received in 
London with the same alarm. By soothing the tension between Budapest and Bucharest, 
London was hoping to localise a German-Polish conflict.   
Discussions in the Foreign Office	 ﾠabout the Hungarian-Romanian problem 
immediately before the outbreak of the war capture the political, economic and military 
dilemmas of British policy and clarify how far Hungarian territorial claims influenced 
British regional policy. In August 1939, Halifax was inclined to officially recognise the 
existence of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute, to ensure that Hungary would 
not lobby for territorial revision in Berlin.
17 Although he did not attach immediate 
frontier revision to the recognition, Halifax`s proposition caused deep anxiety in 
Bucharest. A meeting of Halifax, Edward Ingram, the head of the Southern department 
and Philip Nichols, a senior official in the same department, discussed British policy on 
the Hungarian-Romanian problem. The meeting was hastily called, because Bucharest 
threatened to disrupt diplomatic relations with Britain, if London made positive 
comments about the Hungarian territorial claims in Transylvania.
18 The vehement 
Romanian refusal to consider frontier change and the fact that the guarantee was still in 
place tied British hands.
19 The assumption that Romania was ready to fight, while 
Hungary was judged more reluctant, strengthened the argument of supporting 
Bucharest`s point of view. Consequently, the meeting had taken Romanian anxieties 
seriously, and it was decided that Hungarian territorial claims would not be officially 
encouraged during the war without Romanian consent. The term `for the duration of the 
war` suggested a strategic British commitment, and not the definite rejection of frontier 
change, but the favouring of the Romanian viewpoint is arresting.   
Yet, a radically different declaration of this meeting captures British long-term 
strategic dilemmas. Beside the decision that Romanian anxieties had to be taken into 
account, for the first occasion by such high-profile figures, the desire to redraw the 
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 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ375.	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/40,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6440/661/67,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23843,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6427/140/37,	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
19	 ﾠGafencu	 ﾠcategorically	 ﾠstressed	 ﾠto	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠup	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠto	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwas	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question:	 ﾠ	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/40,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6434/170/37,	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23843,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ
6427/140/37,	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠGafencu	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠno	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠin	 ﾠTransylvania	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmemoirs,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠextensively	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠGermany`s	 ﾠside:	 ﾠ
Gefencu,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠLast	 ﾠDays	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠ	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Hungarian-Romanian frontier on the ethnographic basis was also declared. Nichols 
went so far as to recommend that this principle should be officially declared in the near 
future.
20 Officially, acknowledging the mistakes of Versailles generally appeared in the 
context of the German peace treaty, but openly critical tones of the Treaty of Trianon 
had rarely been articulated by senior officials. 
Very different opinions were expressed at a second meeting in late August, and 
radically different conclusions were reached. During the meeting of Ingram, Cadogan, 
and Vansittart, the chief diplomatic advisor, the revisionist tone melted away and they 
emphasized that stability in the region was only possible by retaining the Versailles 
status quo in some form. The meeting refused to recognize the existence of a territorial 
issue between Hungary and Romania, and the acceptance of the Hungarian-Romanian 
frontier was required from Hungary as a prerequisite for negotiations.
21 The conclusions 
of the second meeting were adopted as British official policy, and assurances were 
given to Romania that Britain would not raise the territorial issue, and would show 
ambivalence, if any other power raised it.
22  
The facts that the `for the duration of the war` formula was omitted at the second 
meeting, and Cadogan and Vansittart preferred the reconstruction of the Versailles 
status quo in Central Europe to the major territorial reorganisation of the region 
indicates that besides the strategic decision to support the economicly more important 
Romania, deeper seated aversions to frontier change were also recognisable in the 
perceptions of key policy-makers. However, care has to be taken not to overstate the 
declarations of this meeting. Although references to the Versailles order were 
articulated, these were too vague to define them as the definitive British criteria for 
post-war Central Europe.  
It is therefore more useful to use this evidence to demonstrate the contrast of 
opinions in the British foreign policy-making elite. Cadogan`s influence was not 
surprising, but Vansittart`s weight in decision-making, who, as a `chief diplomatic 
advisor` did not have direct influence on foreign political decisions at this time, seems 
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20	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23843,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6427/140/37,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNichols,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939.	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21	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23843,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6525/140/37,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939;	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 ﾠto	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23843,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6540/140/37,	 ﾠIngram	 ﾠto	 ﾠFlorescu	 ﾠ(Romanian	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠde	 ﾠaffairs,	 ﾠLondon),	 ﾠ16	 ﾠ
August	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most interesting. It also cannot be overlooked that Cadogan and Sargent were not 
present at the first meeting, where Halifax`s habit of over-simplifying Central European 
disputes provided the more `revisionist` tone. The final decision to support Romania 
against Hungarian territorial claims is a vivid example of British decision-making about 
Hungary. Decisions on relatively unimportant issues, such as this question, were made 
directly by the senior officials of the Foreign Office in the absence of the Foreign 
Secretary or without bringing the matter up at a cabinet meeting. Halifax, as we will see, 
although supported limited revision in the region, evidently did not insist on making it 
the official policy.   
Others also joined the discussion over the Hungarian-Romanian dispute. John 
“Jock” Colville, Chamberlain`s assistant private secretary, reaffirmed the Prime 
Minister`s earlier view that it was not in Britain`s interest to replace Germany, as the 
champion of revision in the region. According to Colville, Chamberlain believed that it 
would result in losing Romania, while nothing could be gained from Hungary, as 
Budapest was already following a pro-German policy.
23 During the Czech crisis 
Chamberlain had already expressed his concern that the Hungarian question might be 
exploited by Germany to destabilise the region.
24 David Gillard has also emphasized 
that after the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia the Prime Minister believed that the 
position of Hungary was very fragile and Hungarian revisionism would result in 
eventual German-Hungarian cooperation.
25 Colville`s tone in late August 1939 
suggested that Chamberlain`s opinion of Hungary had significantly changed since 
March. While during the 1938-39 Czechoslovak crisis Chamberlain believed that 
Hungary was buckling under German pressure, by August 1939 he was convinced that 
Hungary was decidedly in the German sphere of its own choice.  
The problem becomes more interesting if we juxtapose these British views with 
the positive communications made to Hungary earlier in August. Orme Sargent assured 
the Hungarian Minister in London that Britain was committed to a just settlement.
 26 In 
the previous chapter it has already been pointed out that such positive diplomatic 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23843,	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 ﾠ6497/140/37,	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 ﾠColville,	 ﾠ9-ﾭ‐10	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939.	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 ﾠDowning	 ﾠStreet	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 ﾠnot	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 ﾠor	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 ﾠperceptions	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠThe	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 ﾠof	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24	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB	 ﾠ23/95,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠConclusion	 ﾠ41	 ﾠ(38),	 ﾠ21	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠD.	 ﾠGillard,	 ﾠAppeasement	 ﾠin	 ﾠCrisis,	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 ﾠ138.	 ﾠ
26	 ﾠHIA,	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 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ26,	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communications should be considered reservedly. For the Hungarian ear, Sargent`s 
assurances meant the pro-Hungarian reconsideration of the frontier question after the 
war. But, putting Sargent`s promises in the context of the two crucial Foreign Office 
meetings and Chamberlain`s opinion, clarifies that Sargent was playing for the 
inclination of the Hungarians to interpret positive British references on frontiers as 
promises. These assurances simply served British strategic interests to encourage 
Hungary to resist Germany, at a time when war was approaching. The opinions 
expressed during the secret Foreign Office meetings undoubtedly carry more weight. 
Views expressed during internal meetings and discussions are the clearer indications for 
the perceptions of foreign policy-makers, as conclusions made at these meetings were 
not designed for public or diplomatic consumption.  
Compared to the views of Whitehall, Owen O`Malley made very different 
recommendations about the Hungarian-Romanian problem. He strongly suggested that 
the only way to increase the stability of the region, and to localise a German-Polish 
conflict, was frontier revision in favour of Hungary.
27 At any rate, his recommendations 
were completely ignored and the Foreign Office instructed O`Malley not to encourage 
Budapest.
28 O`Malley nevertheless was advised to maintain contacts with known 
Anglophiles, especially with Antal Ullein-Reviczky at the Press Department of the 
Foreign Ministry, but the Foreign Office bluntly declared that political propaganda was 
only conducted in Hungary over the summer to demonstrate to Greece and Turkey, 
whose opinion was more crucial for British strategy that Britain did not abandon the 
region completely.
29      
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23843,	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 ﾠO`Malley	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 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ14	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 ﾠto	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠHungarian	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The outbreak of the war raised tensions along the Hungarian-Romanian frontier. 
Out of mutual fear of each other, both armies mobilised. To contain the Hungarian-
Romanian tensions, London was aiming to facilitate a non-aggression pact between the 
arguing parties. Italian sources suggested that the proposition came from Bucharest, but 
the discussions of the Foreign Office in late August and Barcza`s diary clarify that the 
initiative was indeed British.
30 On the basis that the pact would be signed in the shadow 
of Romanian mobilisation, Budapest refused to consider it. This step had a very 
negative effect in the Foreign Office and the British press, and was interpreted as a clear 
sign of Hungary`s aggressive intentions.
31 Consequently, the opinion in the Foreign 
Office about Hungary further stiffened and the Hungarian occupation of Transylvania, 
simultaneously with German aggression into Poland, was anticipated. 
Thus, in evaluating London`s attitude towards Hungarian revisionism, it is clear 
that the British priority was to prevent Germany accessing Romanian raw materials and 
to keep the region out of the war. Our evidence has demonstrated that Hungarian 
territorial claims in Romania were judged as a threat to this policy. Immediately before 
the outbreak of the war the perception of the Foreign Office and Chamberlain shifted 
from viewing Hungary as a victim of German aggression, and revisionism was now 
directly connected to a possible German-Hungarian cooperation against Romania. 
Therefore, the decision was made to discourage frontier change and to support 
Romania.    
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3.3 British view of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute during the Polish 
campaign 
 
After Germany invaded Poland on the 1 September 1939, the British and French 
declared war on Germany on 3 September.
 32 The opinions of historians vary on the role 
of the Polish guarantee in the decision, but the Anglo-Polish relationship and the 
decision to honour the commitment to Poland have mostly been isolated from other 
regional issues by historians. A much neglected aspect of Anglo-Polish cooperation is 
the traditional friendship between Warsaw and Budapest, which had strong implications 
for the British aim to facilitate an Anglo-Polish-Romanian alliance over the spring and 
summer of 1939. As we have seen, the Polish guarantee in the spring had an important 
Hungarian angle, and contrary to the opinion of most historians, Britain considered 
helping Hungary. Therefore, it will be crucial to review whether Hungary retained its 
importance in this equation at the outbreak of the war, and how far the German-Polish 
war shifted British policy towards Hungary.  
During the spring of 1939 Britain had contemplated helping Hungary against 
German aggression, if Poland had declared war on Hungary`s side. But because 
Chamberlain and the Foreign Office considered Hungary in late August too pro-
German, any British references about helping Hungary were excluded from the Anglo-
Polish military alliance on 26 August.
33 More crucially, the Poles frustrated the British 
aim to facilitate Polish-Romanian cooperation in the framework of the Anglo-Polish 
alliance by stressing that Romanian aid, in case of a war with Germany, was not 
required as it would bring Hungary into the war. Warsaw, being friendly both towards 
Budapest and Bucharest refused to pick sides.
34  Following the failure of the Anglo-
Polish-Romanian alliance, the subject of whether Romania should be dragged into the 
war was widely debated in the Foreign Office.
35 The problem`s military implications 
were highlighted by a Chiefs of Staff Committee report, which recommended that due 
to the fact that the defence of Romania was impossible, British military intervention and 
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 ﾠFront,	 ﾠp.	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 ﾠ`Chiefs	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 ﾠStaff	 ﾠSubcommittee	 ﾠReport`,	 ﾠ2	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 ﾠ
Romania,	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 ﾠ181.	 ﾠ
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the plan to supply Poland through Romania had to be abandoned, because a German-
Hungarian countermove was anticipated. Hence, based on the assumption that a neutral 
Romania would not serve any pretexts for Hungarian or German-Hungarian aggression, 
and at the same time Hungary`s entry into the war and its accession to the Axis could be 
delayed, it was decided that Romania should be encouraged to stay neutral in the 
German-Polish war.
36   
  Romania declared neutrality on 5 September. Confidence in Hungary in the 
Foreign Office was rapidly decreasing, because Budapest instead of declaring neutrality, 
announced the status of `armed neutrality`. In the light of the Hungarian refusal to sign 
a non-aggression pact with Romania and the recent Hungarian mobilization close to the 
Romanian frontier, the Foreign Office was convinced that Hungary was conspiring with 
Germany in the dismemberment of Romania, and expected a Hungarian aggression in 
the immediate future.
37  
The British anticipation of German-Hungarian cooperation against Romania at 
the outbreak of the war brings up the inevitable question, whether the British guarantee 
to Romania was applicable against Hungary. We have noted that after the destruction of 
Czecho-Slovakia Halifax and Sargent declared that the British guarantee would have 
come into force in the event of a Hungarian aggression. New evidence suggests that this 
opinion was maintained over the autumn. After requesting instructions on how to handle 
Romanian inquires about the Soviet threat, the British ambassador in Paris, Eric Phipps 
was informed in October that Soviet aggression would not, but a German and/or 
Hungarian aggression would have enforced the British guarantee during the German-
Polish war.
38 Although the Foreign Office only specified British attitude for the time of 
the Polish campaign, this document finally clarifies some of the uncertainties as to 
whether a Hungarian action to regain Transylvania in September 1939 had activated the 
British guarantee. Even though the Hungarian attack never materialised, the British 
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 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ24	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 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠ`Report	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChief	 ﾠof	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠCommittee`,	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠsee	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 ﾠP.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠQuinlan,	 ﾠClash	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 ﾠRomania,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠand	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠPolicies	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 ﾠp.	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 ﾠto	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 ﾠa	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 ﾠ
37	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 ﾠLondon	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 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠ
October	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	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 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠPhipps,	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 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠHerman,	 ﾠParis	 ﾠEmbassy	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 ﾠSir	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 ﾠ
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judgement over this question crucially affects our understanding of the image of 
Hungary in London in the autumn of 1939. However, we cannot fail to notice that the 
information was given retrospectively to Phipps and only defined British policy for the 
duration of the Polish campaign.  
During the German-Polish war, reflecting on the expected German-Hungarian 
cooperation, Sargent and Cadogan were already secretly discussing the possibilities of 
the restorations of the Versailles status quo. Similarly to their reaction to the Hungarian-
Romanian dispute in August, they noted that returning to the Versailles order would 
provide stability, and declared that the liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks would 
eventually become one of the primary war aims of Britain. They contemplated the 
restoration of Czechoslovakia after the war, but made only very vague references on its 
territorial shape. Their tone suggested the possibility of a small rectification in 
`Northern Hungary`.
39 The comment on `Northern Hungary` illustrates that Sargent and 
Cadogan, who tended to rigidly disapprove frontier revision, considered to rethink the 
1920 Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier, but it is evident that the frontier change was 
planned to be very limited. It also has to be noted that instead of the `First Vienna 
Award`, the term `Northern Hungary` was used, which suggests that the viability of the 
award was now under discussion and curtailing Hungary`s acquisition was already 
planned.   
Although the Foreign Office now discussed the First Vienna Award and the 
question of frontier revision in general, declaring any official opinion was considered 
very untimely.
40 This had been reflected in the reaction to the publication of Lord 
Rothermere`s memoir, My Campaign for Hungary	 ﾠin mid-September. The book praised 
the First Vienna Award and the Hungarian acquisition of Ruthenia and called for the 
ethnic reconstruction of the region.
41 Objections were expressed by senior officials of 
the Foreign Office, not particularly because Rothermere called for the application of the 
ethnic principle, but mainly due to fears of the book`s effects on the public`s war effort. 
The Foreign Office was also concerned that Bucharest might interpret the 
recommendations of Rothermere as British official policy. Attempts were therefore 
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made to limit the distribution of the book, and Bucharest was hastily informed that the 
views of Rothermere had no relevance to official British policy, and London would 
adhere to its promise not to make references to the Hungarian-Romanian frontier 
without Bucharest`s consent.
42     
Ralf Walford Selby, a junior official in the central department, was the lone 
voice to abandon the central line of disapproving frontier revision after war broke out. 
He recommended the revision of the Hungarian-Slovak and the Hungarian-Romanian 
frontiers at the post-war settlement, but his propositions were killed in their early 
stage.
43 It seems that his young age was not the only factor in disapproving his opinions. 
His father, Sir Walford Selby, minister in Vienna in the 1930s, accused Vansittart and 
the Foreign Office of condoning the Anschluss and of giving Germany a green-light in 
the Danubian-region.
44 The young Ralf evidently inherited his father`s conviction that 
London should give more support to the Central European countries against Germany. 
Whether his pro-Hungarian views or the memory of the spat with his father made his 
propositions continuously overruled in the Foreign Office cannot be proved 
satisfactorily, but being the lone pro-Hungarian voice in the first months of the war, his 
views have to be considered for our analysis. Selby was also the only public servant 
who seemed to understand the reason of misapprehension between Budapest and 
London. He pointed out that British appraisals to reconstruct a free Hungary after the 
war were interpreted by Budapest as the appreciation of Hungarian territorial claims and 
the promise to recreate Hungary in a larger form after the war.
45 The senior diplomats in 
Whitehall however showed no interest in paying a price for Hungarian resistance and 
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 ﾠto	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠ
Teleki	 ﾠmade	 ﾠit	 ﾠclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐German	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠrevision:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23114,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ12979/350/21,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
September	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ16.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1940-ﾭ‐2/1.	 ﾠad	 ﾠ266/pol.,	 ﾠ2597/1940,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠ
Teleki	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠ11	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940.	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neutrality. Hungary was expected to show clear signs of resistance without the promise 
of reward.  
Barcza, recognising British resentment towards revisionism, recommended a 
pro-Western rhetoric	 ﾠto Budapest, and the shelving of the territorial questions for the 
duration of the war. But Csáky ignored this recommendation, and instructed Barcza that 
Hungary did not demand Romanian territories with a 50 percent or higher Magyar 
population any more and instead, to keep a free hand in the war Hungary did not want 
to specify the extent of its territorial claims. Arthur Henderson, a Labour MP, who was 
in regular contact with Barcza, admitted to the Hungarian minister that this new change 
in demands considerably confused British circles, mostly due to the inconsistency in 
Hungarian foreign policy. It was particularly suspicious in London that even though 
Hungary kept revisionism on the surface, was evidently reluctant to specify its claims.
 46  
Csáky`s attitude in early September gave no reason to the Foreign Office to 
consider a more flexible approach towards frontier change. After the outbreak of war 
Csáky led a nebulous revisionist policy mixed with violent outbursts against Britain and 
France. On the 14 September he publicly blamed the Versailles settlement and the 
Western powers for the war and declared the importance of further frontier revision.
47 In 
his diaries, Barcza had revealed the deep resentment he felt towards Csáky`s foreign 
policy in late 1939, as it ruined his laborious efforts to achieve understanding towards 
Hungary in London. He admitted that in order to avoid distressing the British, he 
intentionally failed to comply with some of the most absurd of Csáky`s instructions, 
such as asking the British to stop publishing pro-Czech articles in the press, and to delay 
the contraband control only towards Hungary.
48  
Besides, Barcza`s diaries reveal crucial aspects of the yet mostly unexplored 
Teleki-Csáky conflict, which were particularly apparent in Hungarian diplomacy 
towards London. Barcza`s diaries attest that Teleki strongly encouraged him to conduct 
diplomacy behind the back of Csáky, whom he regarded as too subservient towards 
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 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0009.	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 ﾠDIMK	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 ﾠ395:	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 ﾠHIA,	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Germany.
49 In personal letters, sent by special couriers, as telegrams and the diplomatic 
bag was the regular target of German agents, Barcza was encouraged to project the 
image of an able and strong Hungary, which was ready to defend its independence. The 
outbreak of the war made these secret communications even more difficult. 
Consequently, delicate issues were discussed through unofficial channels. One of these 
contacts was the Hungarian born Lady Listowel (Judit Márffy-Mantuano), who 
conveyed the message of a neutral and independent Hungary to Halifax and 
Chamberlain in mid-September.
 50  
Despite the efforts of Barcza and Teleki, Hungary`s vague assurances to stay 
neutral in the war had by all means failed their purpose. One of the underlying reasons 
was the openly pro-German attitude of the Hungarian press. Historians have stressed 
that London understood Hungary`s difficult position and turned a blind eye to the 
outrages of the Hungarian press against the Allies.
51 Yet, Foreign Office discussions 
attest very different opinions, and while the friendly official tone towards Hungary was 
kept, the pro-German attitude of Budapest was registered.
52  
The loss of confidence in Hungary is similarly recognisable in the perception of 
Halifax, and since September 1939 he also approached revision with more reluctance. In 
a memorandum summarizing British Balkans policy, he retracted his lenient views on 
frontier revision expressed before the war, and articulated an anti-revisionist opinion. 
The memorandum put Hungary in the German sphere of influence and judged 
Budapest`s temptation for revision as a constant threat to the region. Regardless of 
disapproving revisionism, this memorandum demonstrates a crucial new phenomenon 
in British policy towards Hungary. Despite a critical view of Hungarian territorial 
claims, it articulated very positive perceptions of Hungary`s will for neutrality and 
independence. Halifax expressed the British aim to bring a so called neutral bloc in 
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49	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠdefends	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠminister.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠCsáky	 ﾠ
conducted	 ﾠa	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐German	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠintegral	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠwith	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠas	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠas	 ﾠpossible.	 ﾠCsáky	 ﾠ
believed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠitself	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠanyone,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠGermany:	 ﾠ
Macartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ365.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
50	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV,	 ﾠ395:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠGhyczy,	 ﾠ15	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠLater,	 ﾠin	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBarcza`s	 ﾠrequest,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ$500	 ﾠ
annual	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠwas	 ﾠapproved	 ﾠfor	 ﾠLady	 ﾠListowel	 ﾠto	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠand	 ﾠwrite	 ﾠabout	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠAmerica:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ66,	 ﾠ293/res.,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
51	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ366,	 ﾠ375;	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠkülpolitikája,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ227.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23114,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ13491/350/21,	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1939.	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South Eastern Europe into being and he thought it possible to attach Hungary to it.
53 
Visibly, the perceptions on Hungarian territorial claims were separated from overall 
judgements about Hungary. This is a new phenomenon became the characteristic of 
British thought from the outbreak of the war. Historiography has failed to recognise this 
new current, and that is one of the reasons András Bán has labelled British foreign 
policy towards Hungary puzzled and inconsistent.
54     
By the time this memorandum was completed on the 12 September, Halifax was 
probably aware of Teleki`s secret pledge to keep Hungary neutral. In all likelihood he 
also knew that Budapest refused to grant droit de passage to Germany for the Kassa-
Velejte railway-line (map 3.1), which Pál Pritz, without due reflection has called the 
decision of the century.
55 Before the outbreak of the war Teleki had already notified 
Hitler that it was against Hungary`s moral conviction to participate in a conflict against 
Poland. Receiving the German request for a right of military passage on 6 September, 
Csáky informed Ciano that Hungary would refuse to assist German movement against 
Poland, but a similar request, to enter Romania would be granted.
56 Halifax`s 
memorandum reflected British appreciation of Hungarian resistance, and, as we noted, 
the inclusion of Hungary in the forming neutral bloc was expressed.
57 However, it 
further has to be emphasized that the question of frontier revision was disapproved in 
the Halifax memorandum, as it was believed to threaten the neutrality of the region.  
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53	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠCAB/66/1/25,	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ`Position	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBalkans`,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
54	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐1941,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ88-ﾭ‐96.	 ﾠ
55	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠ`Emlékirat	 ﾠés	 ﾠtörténelmi	 ﾠvalóság.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠemlékiratai	 ﾠfényében`	 ﾠin	 ﾠAz	 ﾠobjektivitás	 ﾠ
mítosza?	 ﾠHazánk	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠnagyvilág,	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠszázadi	 ﾠmetszetek,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ197-ﾭ‐210	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ
200).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrefusal	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠmixed	 ﾠfeelings	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice.	 ﾠCsáky`s	 ﾠpromise	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
railroad	 ﾠtunnels	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠblown	 ﾠup,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWehrmacht	 ﾠtried	 ﾠto	 ﾠforce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage,	 ﾠturned	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlies,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠrepulsed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23114,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ13491/350/21,	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠ
September	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠJuhász	 ﾠhas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠasked	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
free	 ﾠhand	 ﾠin	 ﾠTransylvania	 ﾠfor	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠrejected	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage:	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠkülpolitikája,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ223.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
concluded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠplan	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccupy	 ﾠTransylvania	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrenounced	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠprotested:	 ﾠ
Macartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ386.	 ﾠ	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56	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ366;	 ﾠG.	 ﾠCiano,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ1937-ﾭ‐1943.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠComplete,	 ﾠUnabridged	 ﾠDiaries	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠCount	 ﾠGaleazzo	 ﾠCiano,	 ﾠItalian	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠfor	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠAffairs,	 ﾠ1936-ﾭ‐1943,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠR.	 ﾠMiller	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ
2002),	 ﾠ6	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠstress	 ﾠCsáky`s	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠto	 ﾠCiano	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠresist	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠRomania.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmaterialised	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠautumn	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠdemonstrates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠBucharest.	 ﾠA	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠ
request	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfinally	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠby	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsee,	 ﾠhad	 ﾠdevastating	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnglo-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠrelationship.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠ
passage	 ﾠsee	 ﾠour	 ﾠnext	 ﾠchapter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
57	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23114,	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  Although territorial claims on Romania were in the forefront of Hungarian 
foreign policy in September 1939, there is evidence for a very different current. A yet 
unknown Hungarian initiative at the outbreak of the war proves that certain segments of 
the Hungarian elite attempted to confront the current crisis, and sensing the stiff British 
and Romanian attitude, wanted to soften the rigid Hungarian revisionist rhetoric. Peace 
feelers sounded Bucharest and London on the possibilities of rapprochement. For 
instance, István Bethlen, the Hungarian prime minister in the 1920s, was very uneasy 
about the perpetual misunderstanding with Romania and approached Le Rougetel at the 
British Embassy in Bucharest. The evidence, though very thin, suggests that Bethlen 
offered his influence to put pressure on Teleki, to renounce Hungarian territorial claims 
in Transylvania in favour of a rapprochement between Budapest and Bucharest and 
cooperation against Germany.
 58 Unfortunately, the lack of evidence prevents us from 
deciding whether Bethlen followed his own initiative, or acted with the consent of 
Teleki or Horthy, but using this new evidence to probe the Hungarian-Romanian dispute 
at the outbreak of the war, sheds fresh light on the foreign political thought of Hungary 
and reflects on Budapest`s broader understanding of the situation. Apart from the fact 
that Hungary was constantly associated with `revision`, very influential segments of the 
Hungarian elite clearly did not exclude the renunciation of frontier revision to reach an 
understanding with Bucharest. Evidence of this mostly unknown venture is very scarce. 
Hungarian sources are silent and the reaction of the Foreign Office is also unknown. 
Perhaps the delicacy and secrecy of this contact did not allow written answers and 
discussions, or simply the outbreak of the war diminished the practicability of this 
scheme.
59  
This research has established that attempts were made from very prominent 
Hungarian quarters to project the image of a strong, neutral and pro-British Hungary. 
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58	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23843,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6540/140/37,	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdiaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Rudolf	 ﾠAndorka,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠminister	 ﾠin	 ﾠMadrid,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠprove	 ﾠthat	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠautumn	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1939	 ﾠBethlen	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
actively	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠa	 ﾠrapprochement	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠRomania:	 ﾠA	 ﾠmadridi	 ﾠnagykövetségtől	 ﾠ
Mauthausenig.	 ﾠAndorka	 ﾠRudolf	 ﾠNaplója,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠZs.	 ﾠLőrincz	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1978),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ90-ﾭ‐91,	 ﾠ95-ﾭ‐96.	 ﾠNeither	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmemoir	 ﾠof	 ﾠBethlen,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠbiography	 ﾠof	 ﾠBethlen	 ﾠmentions	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinitiative:	 ﾠBethlen	 ﾠIstván	 ﾠ
emlékirata	 ﾠ1944	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠI.	 ﾠRomsics	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1988);	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠBethlen	 ﾠIstván.	 ﾠ
59	 ﾠBethlen`s	 ﾠinitiative	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠcomparing	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhis	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠviews	 ﾠon	 ﾠTransylvania.	 ﾠ
During	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ1933	 ﾠlecture	 ﾠtour	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindependence	 ﾠof	 ﾠTransylvania.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
initiative	 ﾠseems	 ﾠstrange	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠTrianon	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrichest	 ﾠ
landowners	 ﾠin	 ﾠTransylvania;	 ﾠrumour	 ﾠhad	 ﾠit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠhis	 ﾠrevisionist	 ﾠrhetoric	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcrude	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	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London on the other hand was expecting a consistently pro-Allied policy from 
Budapest, and the contrast between secret pro-Western messages and official pro-
German policy left policy-makers in London disillusioned and confused. The results of 
our investigation have proved that disapproving the revision of the Hungarian-
Romanian frontier in September, according to the decisions of the Foreign Office in 
August, was now an established British viewpoint. Moreover, key policy-makers, such 
as Cadogan and Sargent were already contemplating the reconstruction of the Versailles 
status quo after the war.   
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3.4 Soviet penetration into East Central Europe  
 
On the 17 September the Red Army entered Eastern Poland. Soviet penetration 
significantly affected British attitude towards the territorial status quo of Central 
Europe. We are particularly interested to demonstrate how Soviet expansion into 
Central Europe was received and interpreted in the light of the British guarantees to 
Poland and Romania, and how these events shifted British perceptions towards 
Hungarian revisionism.  
The question of how Soviet aggression against Poland and Romania affected 
British views on the future shape of the region has received minimal attention in the 
historiography. Michael Carley has examined the failure of the Anglo-Soviet 
negotiations before the war, while others, such as Martin Kitchen and Graham Ross 
have analysed Anglo-Soviet relationship during the war.
60 Keith Sword has studied the 
reaction of the Foreign Office to the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland and Victoria 
Child analysed Anglo-Soviet relationship from 1939 to 1942 in the context of the Baltic 
states, but a wider perspective, which goes beyond the analysis of Anglo-Polish and 
Anglo-Soviet relationships, and considers the impact of Soviet aggression on Britain`s 
relationship with other states in the region, such as Hungary, is completely absent in the 
historiography.
61 Hungarian historiography has presented only monocausal explanations 
for Britain`s diminishing interest towards Hungary after the destruction of Poland; and 
Soviet expansion, as one of the key reasons in the shift in British perceptions on the 
frontiers of Hungary has not been explored.
62  
Similarly in fact, the Soviet aggression in 1939, compared to the German, 
received considerably less attention from the Foreign Office, although, as Christopher 
Catherwood has emphasized, Hungary and Romania were more terrified of Bolshevism 
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 ﾠBritish	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than Nazism.
63 In the following, firstly, a brief overview will be given concerning how 
far the Soviet penetration changed Hungarian and Romanian foreign policy. This will be 
followed by an analysis of the radical shift in British strategy after the collapse of 
Poland, and the British reaction to the changes in Hungarian and Romanian foreign 
policy.  
As a result of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland, the Hungarian-Polish 
common frontier was now occupied by the Red Army. The Hungarian elite, terrified by 
Communist propaganda and an immediate Soviet military aggression promptly started 
to construct fortification along the frontier. The fact that the Hungarian-German frontier 
was not strengthened, while the Hungarian-Soviet was now heavily manned and 
fortified, increased British suspicions of a German-Hungarian conspiracy: it was widely 
believed that Hungary would not offer resistance to German penetration.
64  
 The Soviet appearance in the Carpathians arguably weakened the Hungarian 
room for manoeuvre, but at the same time supplied a convenient argument for pressing 
territorial claims in Romania. The threat of a quick Soviet advance towards the Balkans 
and the Romanian oilfields was much overplayed by Budapest, especially to the British 
minister, and the new strategic situation was now used as a justification to claim the 
frontier along the crest of the Carpathians to Hungary. Hungarian control over the 
Eastern Carpathians, argued Teleki, could serve as a bulwark against further Soviet 
penetration into the Balkans which would benefit the West also. This argument was also 
shared by Macartney, who believed that historical precedents clearly proved that this 
frontier could check southward Soviet movements through the strategically crucial 
Focșani-Galati gap (map 3.2).
65 
O`Malley was seemingly strongly influenced by the views of the Hungarian 
elite. From mid-September, echoing their views, he had stressed the strong strategic 
case behind the Hungarian claim to acquire the Eastern crest of the Carpathians.
 66 After 
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 ﾠC.	 ﾠCatherwood,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBalkans	 ﾠin	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the destruction of Poland, the role of the Carpathian boundary in stopping the expansion 
of the Soviet Union towards the Straits recurrently emerged in O`Malley`s thought until 
the Second Vienna Award in August 1940, when this frontier eventually materialised.
67 
Cadogan admitted that the Trianon Hungarian-Romanian frontier was not ideal, but 
dismissed O`Malley`s proposition, due to its radical nature. Consequently, O`Malley 
was only instructed to encourage Hungarian resistance to German and Soviet 
aggression.
68  
Soviet expansion also had a similarly significant impact on Romanian foreign 
policy. Since the Romanian occupation of Bessarabia (modern Moldova) in 1918, 
authority over the province was the subject of Soviet-Romanian dispute. Moscow had 
never recognised the new frontier, which left no doubt of future Soviet intentions.
69 
Armand Calinescu, the Prime Minister of Romania between March and September 
1939, and King Carol followed a cautious pro-Western policy at the outbreak of the 
war.
70 After the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland they sounded out London and 
Reginald Hoare, the British minister, on several occasions over whether the guarantee 
applied against the Soviet Union or Germany only. Hoare encouraged Bucharest to 
resist Germany and Hungary, and his reports clearly fuelled the suspicion of the Foreign 
Office towards Hungary, as he constantly raised the alarm of German-Hungarian 
cooperation.
71 The Foreign Office repeatedly gave evasive answers to Romanian 
enquiries about the guarantee, but as we have seen the guarantee indeed applied against 
Germany and Hungary, but not against the Soviet Union.
72  
The Foreign Office left Hungarian and Romanian worries over the Soviet threat 
unanswered. The immediate British response to the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland 
was of confusion and disbelief. Foreign Office debates also attest remarkable optimism 
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and wishful thinking, as an immediate German-Soviet dispute was anticipated now that 
the buffer-state, Poland, was removed.
73 However, after the conclusion of the German-
Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty (also known as the Second Nazi-Soviet Pact) on 
28 September, the tone of the press and the Foreign Office had shifted, and Germany 
appeared as the sole oppressor of the Polish nation.
74 Most importantly, Halifax and the 
Foreign Office seemed to accept that the Soviet Union was only occupying the frontiers 
set by the Versailles treaty of 1919.
75 The opinion was also expressed that an 
ethnographically just line had been reached, which could possibly form the future post-
war frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union.
76 The early expression of the 
possible acceptance of the Curzon-line, as the future Polish-Soviet frontier places the 
prolonged Anglo-Soviet dispute during the war over the future of Poland in new light. 
Besides, most crucially, it demonstrates that the application of ethnographic criteria in 
the post-war settlement was one of the key principles of British thought. By all 
appearances, Whitehall accepted the Nazi-Soviet demarcation line as the frontier of the 
Soviet Union, on the basis that it ran along the ethnographic dividing line between Poles 
and Belarusians. Fundamentally, this frontier was a result of aggression, but the British 
approval nevertheless indicates that after the outbreak of the war London was still 
thinking along the lines of the reconstruction of Central Europe on the ethnographic 
basis, which potentially had strong implications for the British perceptions on the 
Hungarian-Romanian frontier.  
Regardless of the idea of an ethnographically just Central Europe, the 
disappearance of Poland and the Soviet expansion significantly affected Britain`s 
Balkan and Mediterranean strategy, which had immediate implications for British 
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attitudes towards Hungary. A fresh memorandum of the Chiefs of Staff, written on 18 
September, emphasized the importance of cooperation with Italy in the region and 
anticipated that Germany, lacking a direct connection with Romania, would use 
Hungary to push towards the Ploiesti oil-fields. This memorandum restated the 
conclusions of the earlier decision of September, namely that due to geographical 
impracticability it was impossible to help Hungary and Romania to resist German 
pressure: Budapest and Bucharest were written off in British military strategy.
77 In the 
light of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, for the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, it was now 
considered impracticable to induce Romania and the Balkan states to enter the war on 
the side of the Allies. British strategy, for the third time in the last six months, made a 
U-turn towards the region and Romanian neutrality was again supported.
78 Accordingly, 
French propositions for the immediate opening of a Salonika front were rejected. The 
first line of defence in the Balkans was moved to Northern Greece and Bulgaria, but the 
defence of the Balkans became largely overshadowed by vital Mediterranean interests.
79 
Turkey became increasingly the centre of British attention. Chamberlain, Halifax and 
the Foreign Office unanimously considered Turkey as the key to British Mediterranean 
and imperial strategy.
80 After the British-French-Turkish Tripartite Treaty, signed on 19 
October 1939, Allied military presence in the Balkans became completely dependent on 
Turkish help and agreement.
81 
Although by the autumn of 1939 Hungary and Romania were written off in 
British military planning, diplomatic efforts were made to prevent the region from 
falling under German supremacy. At the outbreak of the war Halifax had already 
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expressed British support for a Balkan neutral bloc of Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria 
and Hungary. Now after the Soviet aggression against Poland, support for this scheme 
was renewed, with the aim of facilitating collective security in the region, including 
both revisionist states, Hungary and Bulgaria. The idea of the bloc came from 
Bucharest, and by supporting its creation, Britain limited its elbow room by accepting 
the Romanian principle that Hungary and Bulgaria would only be allowed to join, if 
territorial claims were renounced.
82 Similarly to the earlier decision	 ﾠto refrain from 
making references to frontier revision, London considered it strategically necessary to 
shelf the question of Romania`s frontiers.
 83 Distinction however has to be immediately 
made between the Romanian and British approaches. While Romania categorically 
refused to discuss frontier revision, the British reluctance to raise the territorial question 
was underpinned only by the strategic interest to create the neutral bloc. The example of 
the Soviet frontier in Poland amply demonstrated that Whitehall contemplated the 
ethnic reconstruction of the region at the post-war settlement, which potentially 
questioned the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.
  
Direct British military support to Hungary and Romania against German and 
Soviet aggression was ruled out, but London was keen to politically support the creation 
of a Balkan neutral bloc. To assist regional cooperation, Hungarian radical claims were 
discouraged. Even though British policy was subordinated to strategic considerations 
during the war, the most significant finding to emerge is that British policy-makers 
agreed to the forceful changes of the status quo. Considering the ethnographic criteria as 
a potentially viable option for redrawing the frontiers of the region had very strong 
implications for the British assessing how or whether to revise Hungary`s future 
frontiers.
84  
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3.5 Walking on very thin ice. Hungary between Germany and Britain at the end of 1939 
 
By the end of 1939 the Anglo-Hungarian relationship was standing at an important 
crossroad. Officially, Budapest was following a friendly policy towards Nazi Germany 
and was trumpeting the need of further territorial gains. Secretly however, Budapest 
was sending signals to London that resisting Germany and preserving the country’s 
independence took precedence over all else. Regardless, London was growing impatient 
towards Hungary`s obscure foreign policy and Hungary`s persistent territorial demands 
annoyed policy-makers in Whitehall, because they hampered British strategy in Central 
Europe and the Balkans. In late 1939, Britain brought forth a new proposal for creating 
a neutral bloc in the region. London was keen to include Hungary in this cooperation, 
but Budapest had to renounce its claims as a prerequisite.  It is intriguing that historians 
paid limited attention to this period. András Bán has failed to disentangle why London 
expressed positive opinions of Horthy, Teleki and other members of the Hungarian 
elite, but treated frontier revision with a measure of reserve.
 85 This part demonstrates 
that Hungary was increasingly losing its significance in British regional policy, which 
inevitably brought a deepening disinterest towards Hungarian territorial claims. On the 
other hand, the amiable tone was maintained on the official level. 
November 1939 witnessed a significant modification in British perceptions of 
Hungary`s position in a neutral bloc. The Cabinet referred to Germany and Hungary as 
potential aggressors against Romania, and as a consequence Hungary`s adhesion to the 
neutral bloc was now ruled out.
86 The conclusion`s remarkable resonance with the 
information sent earlier to Phipps in Paris, which also stated that Hungary was viewed 
as a potential enemy during the Polish campaign, indicates that this notion became 
dominant in the minds of policy-makers after the collapse of Poland. The openly pro-
German tone of the government-controlled Pester Lloyd, the suppression of liberal 
papers, such as the Pesti Napló and Az Est, the Hungarian refusal to grant import 
licenses to Jewish-owned British firms, and most importantly demanding frontier 
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revision in exchange for joining the neutral bloc, were among the reasons for the 
growing British mistrust of Hungary.
87  
Cadogan`s conversation with Barcza in late November reflected this shift in 
British opinion. The meeting went along diplomatic niceties, and ended without much 
substance. Hungary`s peaceful conduct was praised and the well-known argument of the 
British desire to create a just peace was repeated.
88 Sargent`s conversation with Barcza 
in November had followed the same lines of cordiality and evasiveness. Delicate issues, 
such as frontier revision, were avoided and Sargent went so far as to flatter Barcza, 
thanking him for opening London`s eyes about Romanian intrigues.
89 What has to be 
pointed out, is not only the fact that the Foreign Office reduced its communication on 
territorial revision to generalities, but also that Cadogan`s and Sargent`s blandishing 
tone towards Barcza was once again in high contrast to their tone in the Foreign Office. 
This further confirms the argument expressed in chapter 1 that the British tone used 
during conversations with Barcza, and in diplomatic communications in general, cannot 
serve as firm evidence in the analysis of British thought on the Hungarian territorial 
problem.  
Foreign Office minutes reveal a very different picture of British perceptions. On 
the one hand Budapest was praised in diplomatic communications, in order to 
encourage a stiffer resistance towards Germany, but on the other, discussions about the 
neutral bloc demonstrate that Hungary`s claims in Transylvania were seen as an 
obstacle to bring about cooperation in the region against Germany. Moreover, 
Hungarian claims also did not receive the same attention as Bulgaria`s in Southern 
Dobruja. From November, strong pressure was put on Bucharest to give territorial 
concessions to Bulgaria in order to help the creation of a neutral bloc.
90 Compared to 
this, as we have seen, London sounded out Bucharest on the possibilities of territorial 
concession to Hungary, but the firm Romanian refusals brought British proposals on the 
Hungarian-Romanian frontier to an end.
91 Sargent added that promises could not be 
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made to defend Hungary or to influence Hungarian foreign policy, as Britain was 
unable to bribe Hungary by territorial offers.
92  
Besides short-term strategic planning, the Foreign Office was already discussing 
the future shape of the region after the war. Leading figures were debating a yet mostly 
unknown plan by historians. The Foreign Office was on the opinion that after the war 
Germany should be divided and a new state, consisting of South Germany, Austria and 
Hungary would be created. This new state was believed to be an adequate check against 
the penetration of Prussian militarism into the Danubian region and the Balkans.
93 This 
plan was later attributed to Churchill, who brought it forward at the Teheran Conference 
in November 1943, but clearly, this scheme had already been considered much earlier in 
Whitehall.
94 According to Barcza, Hungary in this scheme would be enlarged with the 
adjacent territories populated mostly by Magyars. This was in direct contrast with 
Churchill`s plan in 1943, which considered the adhesion of Hungary to this state in its 
Trianon form. The fact that the Foreign Office in November 1939 believed that 
Hungary should receive the adjoining Magyar territories confirms that the minds of 
British policy-makers at this stage of the war were still set on frontier adjustments based 
on ethnicity (map 3. 3).  
The Hungarian and the Czechoslovak questions became closely connected from 
late 1939 in British thought. British official attitudes towards the Czech émigrés soon 
became a barometer for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. It is evident that until the 
Beneš émigré group received official recognition as a `Committee` in December 1939, 
London was very careful to refer to Czechs and Slovaks, and not Czechoslovaks in 
official communications, to avoid attributing territorial connotations to the problem.
95 
One of the reasons behind the British reluctance to give full recognition to the Czech 
émigrés at the early stage of the war was that Hungary was still not quite viewed as a 
German satellite. The Foreign Office considered it to be crucial not to alienate the 
Hungarians by making references to the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia, which could 
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have potentially been interpreted in Budapest as the renunciation of the First Vienna 
Award.
96  
The problem of the Czechoslovak émigrés in London raised other delicate 
questions, such as the future of Slovakia and whether it would be united with Bohemia-
Moravia after the war. Whitehall`s view of the puppet state of Slovakia attests the lack 
of clear policy. Arthur Henderson, after discussions with Barcza, raised the question of 
British policy towards Slovakia in the House of Commons. `Rab` Butler, the uUnder 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a somewhat dubious answer labelled Slovakia 
as a territory under enemy occupation, refusing to recognise it	 ﾠde jure, but noted that 
Britain was continuing to recognise the Slovak representative in London.
97 The 
remarkable similarity between the subject of the Barcza-Henderson conversation, and 
the topic Henderson raised in the Commons, makes it likely that Henderson`s enquiry 
was for Barcza`s influence, to sound out British intentions on the future of the Vienna 
Award and Slovakia. In late 1939, London apparently kept the door open for different 
alternatives.  
Regardless of the plan to attach an enlarged Hungary to a South German state, 
and the views that Hungary was still not fully on the side of Germany, the Foreign 
Office increasingly believed that Hungarian foreign policy had become completely 
dependent on the question of revision and it was expected that Budapest would decide 
between the Axis and the Allies depending on the extent of their territorial offers.
98 This 
perception eventually led to a shift in British policy in a matter of months, regarding the 
question of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee which received recognition on 29 
December 1939 as a `Committee` representing the Czecho-Slovak nations.
99  
Barcza felt disillusioned by the mistrust of the Foreign Office. Keen to improve 
Hungary`s image in London, he contacted Chamberlain directly in November. He asked 
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Andrian Dingli to convey Budapest`s wish to solve the Hungarian-Romanian dispute 
peacefully.
100 Although Dingli forwarded Chamberlain`s appreciation of Hungary`s 
struggle for independence, compared to his positive attitude before the Munich 
Agreement, Chamberlain seemed less enthusiastic, and Barcza was now unable to 
confer over the Magyar question directly with Chamberlain. Cabinet minutes from the 
end of 1939 also prove that Chamberlain paid less and less attention to Hungarian 
matters.  
Our argument until now has contested András Bán`s and Macartney`s 
viewpoints, who both emphasized that Hungary`s foreign policy at the end of 1939 was 
understood in London.
 One of the key limitations of their explanation is that they did 
not separate the general opinion on Hungary from the judgement about territorial 
claims. Bán also failed to weigh the importance of different official British sources, and 
often interpreted the opinion of junior Foreign Office diplomats as official British 
views.
 101 As before, the official appreciation of Hungarian foreign policy was used to 
encourage Hungarian resistance, and the rigid disapproval of frontier revision persisted 
in the background.  
Official Hungarian visitors to London, such as Richard Quandt, the chairman of 
the Hungarian National Bank, a close ally of Teleki, was warmly welcomed and was 
courted assiduously. When Quandt came to London in October 1939, to negotiate a war 
trade agreement with Britain, the Foreign Office was very interested meeting him in 
order to assure him of Britain`s increasing strength, and to encourage Teleki and Horthy 
to resist German pressure. Quandt`s stay was treated as a unique opportunity to 
negotiate with Hungary, in times when direct contacts were impossible due to the war. 
The Foreign Office and Henry Bruce in the Ministry of Economic Warfare organised 
aircraft factory and air-defence visits for him, with the admitted goal of impressing 
Quandt.
 102 
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Quandt`s visit also enjoyed prominence in the press. The Daily Telegraph 
praised Hungary`s openness for extended trade, and reported that the reason for 
Quandt`s visit was to find alternatives for trading with Germany. In effect, Quandt was 
keen to increase Anglo-Hungarian trade, but presenting his visit in an anti-German 
context terrified policy-makers in Budapest, who were afraid to anger Germany. Hence, 
protests were immediately made to prevent the recurrence of such articles.
 103 Lord 
Perth, the chief advisor on foreign publicity had instructed the press in November to 
write favourably about Hungary, not to give excuses for Germany to intervene.
 104 The 
Foreign Office evidently displayed understanding towards Budapest`s worries, but the 
Hungarian will to court Berlin and the inability to confront Germany had a negative 
effect on the already sceptical views.   
Quandt`s name is similarly very frequent in Barcza`s diaries. Secret negotiations 
were underway between them to deposit large amounts of sterling into banks in London, 
Paris, Canada and the United States for the purpose of a Hungarian émigré 
government.
105 Indeed, Hungary at this time dedicated considerable attention to the 
creation of an émigré government, perhaps as a response to the positive British attitude 
towards the Czecho-Slovak National Committee. John Pelényi mentioned that only 
Teleki, Barcza and Lipót Baranyai, the chief executive of the Hungarian National Bank,  
knew about the plan at this stage, but Barcza`s diaries prove that Quandt also had an 
important role in this scheme.
106  
Genuine respect was not only articulated towards Quandt. The Regent of 
Hungary was a well-known admirer of British naval power and his statesmanship 
enjoyed much appreciation in London.
 107 To encourage Horthy to resist Germany, the 
BBC on 6 December, which was the name-day of the Regent, broadcast Admiral Carr`s 
congratulatory message, with very positive references to Horthy`s acclaimed role as the 
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leader of Hungary.
108 Similarly, in January 1940, the official paper of the BBC, the 
Listener published the very warm speech of Marjorie Harrison, a publicist, about 
Horthy.
109 These were not unique examples of trust in the Regent`s statesmanship, 
which was constant until the spring of 1940, when Hungary granted right of military 
passage to Germany. Halifax and Cadogan also made congenial references to Horthy, 
Teleki and the pro-British views of the Hungarian people.
110 It is clear that London 
attempted to mobilise the pro-British segments of the Hungarian elite, such as Teleki, 
Horthy and Quandt, to encourage them to resist Germany. Elisabeth Barker later 
criticised this British approach, and pointed out that the failure of Britain to prevent 
Hungary`s final accession to the Axis was the result of neglecting the support of the 
similarly pro-British Hungarian middle classes.
111  
This part has demonstrated that officially London encouraged Hungary to resist 
German penetration, and also there were signs that Whitehall genuinely respected the 
Hungarian political elite. However, as the Balkans and Central Europe gradually lost its 
strategic significance for Britain, Whitehall became progressively detached from the 
territorial demands of Hungary. The recognition of the organisation of the 
Czechoslovak émigrés as a `Committee` reflected a considerable shift in British policy, 
indicating that the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia became important for Britain. The 
recognition however still did not determine Czechoslovakia`s future frontiers, which 
effectively left questions unanswered on the viability of the First Vienna Award. The 
influential members of the Foreign Office, such as Cadogan and Sargent, also moved 
another step away from considering frontier revision in favour of Hungary, and the view 
that Hungary tied its future to the realization of revision became widely accepted in 
Whitehall. By the end of 1939 this perception had solidified, which in essence persisted 
until the end of the war. Besides, it was believed that Hungary would not be able to 
resist temptations for further revision, if they were offered by Germany.  
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3.6 The bewilderment of British policy in the maze of Hungarian territorial claims 
 
As we have witnessed, the first months of the war did not see final conclusions on how 
the Hungarian territorial question should be handled after the war. The first months of 
1940 produced various territorial schemes, all attempting to solve the Hungarian-
Romanian dispute. The analysis of plans presented by Gafencu, the Romanian Foreign 
Minister, Carlile Macartney, the British expert on Hungarian history, and Teleki will 
form the centre of this part. We are particularly interested to uncover the official British 
view on these mostly unknown schemes, which were the first major territorial 
propositions during the war.  
As we have noted, Teleki`s policy to pay lip service to Germany on the official 
level, while assurances were given to Britain unofficially, caused dissatisfaction in 
London. The policy of doublespeak continued in 1940. The firm Hungarian declaration 
to refrain from stabbing Romania in the back, if the Soviet Union declared war to regain 
Bessarabia, had a very positive reaction in the Foreign Office.
112 However, a fresh set of 
territorial demands immediately followed this declaration. In January 1940, Teleki 
noted to O`Malley that in order to create strategic frontiers, Hungary would need to 
expand northwards to the crest of the Carpathians and also in the south at the expanse of 
Yugoslavia (map 3.4). Teleki interpreted O`Malley`s positive response, as a generally 
positive British approach towards his proposition, but pointed out that the promise to 
refrain from attacking Romania would not apply if Bucharest voluntarily ceded territory 
to the Soviet Union or Bulgaria, in which case Hungary would step forward with its 
own territorial claims in Transylvania.
 113  
Halifax was clearly satisfied with Hungarian conformity to non-aggression and 
this declaration essentially determined his positive judgement of Hungarian foreign 
policy until the Second Vienna Award, in August 1940. However, as we have argued, 
Hungary in general and Hungarian territorial claims were judged differently. In a 
lengthy personal letter to the British minister in Bucharest, Halifax praised the 
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encouraging Hungarian policy, but noted that the Hungarian condition on `voluntary 
territorial transfer` complicated Britain`s Balkan strategy, as it made bringing about a 
Balkan cooperation very problematic. Halifax and the Foreign Office now ruled out 
trying to persuade Romania to voluntarily cede Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, due to the 
expected Hungarian counterclaims.
114 The last meeting of the Balkan Entente in 
February 1940 confirmed that the transfer of Southern Dobruja had to be postponed, but 
the existence of the issue, unlike the Transylvanian-problem, was officially 
recognised.
115 Halifax praised the Balkan Entente`s declaration for cooperation, but 
failed to recognise that the failure to remove antagonisms in the region played into 
Hitler`s hands. Hungary`s territorial demands once again blocked regional cooperation, 
just as it did earlier in 1939.  
  The Halifax-Barcza meeting in February, which received much prominence in 
the historiography, has to be viewed in the light of these developments.
116 Halifax 
expressed his appreciation that Barcza promised Hungarian resistance against any 
power and that Budapest would not participate in an anti-British German-Soviet 
alliance. Halifax also praised Hungary for refusing to grant right of military passage for 
the Wehrmacht during the Polish campaign and that Hungary declined the German offer 
to occupy the Polish gas-fields in Galicia (map 3.5).
117 The friendly tone of the 
interview however should not be overstated. The Halifax letter to Hoare puts the 
Halifax-Barcza meeting into context. Halifax, abiding by the views expressed to Hoare 
was reluctant to give any assurance to Barcza to treat the Hungarian-Romanian dispute 
fairly and separately at the peace settlement, because of Hungary`s persistency in 
expressing claims in Romania.
118  
  Halifax`s reluctance to make promises on the fair treatment of the Hungarian 
problem at the peace conference was the result of Hungary`s refusal of the Romanian 
proposition to consider frontier adjustment.  In January, a message containing a 
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territorial offer from the most unlikely quarter arrived in Budapest. Gafencu, in order to 
reduce the number of Romania`s enemies, came forward with a proposition to revise the 
Hungarian-Romanian frontier. The proposition offered the transfer of a relatively wide 
(50-100km) strip to Hungary, including the cities of Temesvár [Timișoara], Arad 
[Arad], Nagyvárad [Oradea] and Szatmárnémeti [Satu Mare]	 ﾠ(map 3.6). What is more 
interesting is that new evidence suggests that the Gafencu proposition was influenced 
by British circles. According to Reginald Hoare, Ernst Jäckh `our friend` influenced 
Gafencu, to consider some territorial concessions, to strengthen Romania`s position.
119 
The evidence is too thin to determine whether the Foreign Office or in fact Hoare 
himself was behind this scheme, but it can be established that Jäckh most probably did 
not act in his own capacity.  
The Foreign Office however agreed with the Romanian idea that as part of the 
transfer of territory, the Székely-Magyar population from the South-East corner of 
Transylvania should be transferred to the Temes region, which was now offered to 
Hungary, to solve minority issues between Hungary and Romania once and for all.
120 
This radical scheme applied the ethnic criteria, but combined it with a mass population 
transfer, a notion, which later reoccurred during the Hungarian-Romanian negotiations 
prior to the Second Vienna Award in August 1940. 
On the other hand, Halifax was very reluctant to officially endorse this project, 
but nevertheless raised the question in the Foreign Office, hinting his preference to send 
a positive note to Barcza on the revision of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier after the 
war.
 121 Roger Makins in the Central department praised Hungarian neutrality and 
pointed out that both the elite and the Hungarian people wished for an Allied victory, 
but after a brief discussion the question over whether to send a note was brushed aside 
by Sargent, the head of the Southern department. The compelling observation to emerge 
from this evidence is the disagreement between the Central and Southern departments 
about how to handle Hungarian claims. Sargent made it clear that Britain would abide 
by its promise to Bucharest that unilateral promises on frontier revision would not be 
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 ﾠhead	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 ﾠInstitute	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made to Budapest, and his opinion on Romanian questions, which belonged to his 
department, proved to be the most influential one.
122 The firm stance of Sargent and the 
relative unimportance of the question seemingly disheartened Halifax to raise the 
question again, and then eventually no message was sent to Budapest about frontier 
revision.    
This British-Romanian scheme of frontier adjustment however soon collapsed, 
because László Bárdossy, the Hungarian minister in Bucharest, who later became Prime 
Minister, stressed that the transfer of the Székely districts to Hungary was an 
unconditional Hungarian territorial demand. The refusal estranged the Foreign Office, 
which was unable to understand Hungarian reluctance to consider this territorial offer, 
while for years, frontier revision had been stressed ad nauseam by Budapest. Sargent 
was extremely irritated at the Hungarian designs on the larger part of Transylvania and 
at the Hungarian refusal to accept the Romanian territorial offer, which he believed 
would finally solve the dispute. He summarised British policy towards Hungary with 
intense annoyance: 
How does an encouraging note to Hungary serve our war effort? The answer for 
this is negative, as Hungary is not a free agent and has to adjust her policies to 
her powerful neighbour [Germany]. Hungary renders us no service in the war, it 
is not worthwhile to make sacrifices on her behalf, [...] we recognise that 
Hungary is in the German sphere. [...] No anti-German front is possible, which 
includes Hungary and we cannot guarantee her against Germany.
123 
Views, expressed on a sketch-map hastily drawn in the Foreign Office showing 
Hungary with the Székely districts bluntly questioned Hungarian political sense (map 
3.7). Parallels were drawn between the consequent wedge-shaped geographical form of 
Hungary and the similar geographical form of former Czechoslovakia, which here was 
considered as the main reason for its collapse in March 1939. The Hungarian 
unconditional demand for the Székely districts was considered very dangerous, and 
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Budapest`s policy was denounced, because it was believed that frontier revision was 
placed over good sense.
124   
Due to the outright Hungarian rejection, the transfer of population, as a means to 
solving the Hungarian-Romanian dispute was shelved. Studies on population transfer 
however were appearing from the FRPS. Population transfer was for example one of the 
first questions Macartney examined at the FRPS in early 1940. The Hungarian refusal to 
agree to the transfer of the Székelys to the Temes region is very much reflected in 
Macartney`s views, who had only recently returned from a visit to Hungary. He 
recommended the transfer of population only as a last resort, and only in the form of 
population exchange, with equal numbers to be involved in those transferred on each 
side. Macartney stressed that population exchange between two states would only be 
beneficial if it solved the minority dispute completely. He argued that exchange could 
not be applied to solve the Transylvanian problem, as the ratio of Magyar and 
Romanian minorities in the respective states was 20:1. Arnold Toynbee, the head of the 
FRPS, shared Macartney`s opinion.
125  
After the Hungarians refused the British-Romanian frontier revision proposal in 
January 1940, the Foreign Office had found it useful to send Macartney to Budapest to 
sound out the intentions of the Hungarian elite. Macartney, due to his pro-Hungarian 
views on frontier revision, enjoyed huge popularity in Budapest. The Foreign Office 
also hoped that Macartney`s visit would be interpreted by Budapest as a sign of British 
interest, and would encourage the Hungarian elite to resist Germany. O`Malley also 
expected that Teleki and Horthy would share views with Macartney, which otherwise 
would have been hidden from his eyes.
126  
Brown, in the Southern Department drafted a letter to Toynbee, the direct 
superior of Macartney at the FRPS, and recommended that the historian should visit 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
124	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24985,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ1892/246/37,	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠto	 ﾠHoare,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠBrown,	 ﾠ15	 ﾠ
February	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
125	 ﾠPCAM,	 ﾠMSS.	 ﾠENG.	 ﾠc.	 ﾠ3281,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠdoc.	 ﾠ22,	 ﾠfolios	 ﾠ169-ﾭ‐183,	 ﾠ`Transfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠPopulation`,	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
developed	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠin	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1944	 ﾠby	 ﾠMacartney.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1944,	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠonly	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfrontiers,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠone	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠestablished.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1944,	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐
Romanian	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsidered,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠPCAM,	 ﾠMSS.	 ﾠENG.	 ﾠc.	 ﾠ3281,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ
2,	 ﾠdoc.	 ﾠ23,	 ﾠfolios	 ﾠ184-ﾭ‐196,	 ﾠ`Transfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠMinorities`,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1944.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
126	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/23116,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ18636/17663/21,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ21	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1939.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ136	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Transylvania to collect fresh data, and also suggested picking Macartney as the author 
of the peace handbook about the contested region.
127 Brown`s proposal was side-tracked 
by senior officials, which once again signalled the contrast of opinion between junior 
and senior members. Nichols, in a sense of urgency, immediately contacted Rex Leeper, 
the head of the PID, to prevent the too pro-Hungarian Macartney digging deeper into 
minority issues in Transylvania. Senior officials, such as Nichols and Sargent, clearly 
did not desire Macartney to fish in the troubled waters of Hungarian revisionism, and 
wanted him to stay put in Budapest.
128  
Halifax and O`Malley encouraged Macartney to travel around the Carpathian 
basin. As we have stressed, minor and low priority issues, such as this, were normally 
dealt with personally by the senior officials of the Foreign Office. Halifax`s different, 
occasionally pro-Hungarian, approach was not usually more than a short minute on a 
Foreign Office document, which due to its unimportance was often not followed up by 
him. This is what happened in this instance. Nichols expressed to Leeper that the 
official policy was that the PID would edit the peace handbook, as it had more political 
acumen than Macartney or the other scholars at the RIIA. The sole role of Macartney 
was therefore to collect data for a peace handbook. Moreover, it is evident that already 
at this early stage both the Foreign Office and the PID made efforts to corner out the 
opinion of scholars on post-war planning, and were aiming to make a political decision 
on the peace treaties.
129    
Fully aware of the implication of the pro-Hungarian Macartney`s tour to 
Hungary, Seton-Watson also expressed his opinion on the question of the future of 
Hungary`s frontiers. He noted to the Ministry of Economic Warfare that the Vienna 
Award and the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia violated the ethnographic principle, 
and Ruthenia should be returned to Czechoslovakia after the war. He also stressed that 
there was no justification to revise the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.
130 Seton-Watson`s 
advice attracted no attention, and his opinion was ignored. The elderly professor had 
seemingly lost his influence in Whitehall.  
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On his return from Hungary, Macartney summarised his experiences of his visit 
and expressed his views on Hungarian foreign policy and frontier revision in `Report on 
Hungary`. Previously he had been anxious to encourage a more active British policy 
towards Hungary in the Foreign Office. Therefore, it is not surprising that this 
memorandum drew an assertive picture.
 He admitted that resisting German temptations 
for territorial gains in Transylvania would be exceptionally hard for Budapest, but 
emphasized Teleki`s and Horthy`s firm decision to defend Hungarian independence. 
Implying the benefits of frontier revision to London, he pointed out that Hungary would 
be more content with a reduced acquisition offered by the Western Powers than an 
extensive one from Germany. His suggestive tone however fell on deaf ears, just like 
his attempts to clarify Transylvania’s sentimental value to Hungary. For the Foreign 
Office such justifications for frontier revision had a strong pro-Hungarian overtone, and 
as we will see from the official reaction to Macartney`s memorandum, were not 
welcomed.
131  
Despite this, it would be misleading to use this memorandum, simply as 
evidence for Macartney`s pro-Hungarian opinion. The document doubtlessly advised 
frontier revision, in favour of Hungary, but it rejected radical Hungarian claims. 
Besides, unlike Seton-Watson, Macartney attempted to balance economic, ethnographic, 
geographic, strategic and historical criteria	 ﾠin his recommendations, and also considered 
the perspective of the local population and the possibilities of a regional cooperation.
132  
Moreover, `Report on Hungary` did not focus only on the Transylvanian 
problem. As with his 1937 views,
133 Macartney strongly argued for a union between 
Hungary and Slovakia,	 ﾠas the best economic and geographic option. He painted the 
Hungarian aim of taking over Slovakia through economic pressure in rosy colours, and 
described the union as in the natural economic interest of both countries. He evidently 
preferred to solve the Hungarian-Slovak frontier disputes by drawing mutually 
beneficial economic frontiers, but did not fail to say that on ethnographic grounds, the 
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠsentimental	 ﾠattachment	 ﾠto	 ﾠTransylvania	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleast	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠelement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠadvantage	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Romania`s	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠposition	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠattachment	 ﾠwas	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	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First Vienna Award was after all acceptable. He refrained from expressing a clear 
recommendation for Transylvania, but drew attention to the fact that even moderates, 
such as Teleki and Bethlen, would not be satisfied with a minor frontier adjustment. 
Thus, he judged the so called Hungarian `corridor-plan` (map 3.8) economicly 
impracticable and suggested that the most recent unofficial Hungarian claim, the so 
called `extended corridor-plan`, which seemed to be the lowest common denominator 
between himself and Teleki, was the most viable solution at the moment, taking the 
current Hungarian revisionist uproar into account (map 3.8).
134 This scheme planned to 
transfer everything north of the original `Hungarian-corridor` to Hungary and was 
considered by Macartney as the best solution, balancing both ethnographic and 
economic considerations.      
In `Report on Hungary` Macartney conveyed Teleki`s message to the Foreign 
Office that even if Hungary occupied the whole of Transylvania during the war without 
British consent, the problem would be submitted to the peace conference after the 
war.
135 The Foreign Office found the memorandum useful, but only as a reference for a 
peace handbook, as Macartney`s views were considered too pro-Hungarian. 
Nonetheless, it is arresting that no opinion was expressed over Macartney`s 
recommendations for territorial revision. Both the Foreign Office and the PID requested 
a second opinion on the Hungarian-Romanian problem from the British consuls in 
Kolozsvár [Cluj] and Bucharest, to be able to make a judgement on Macartney`s 
views.
136 Without debating Macartney`s recommendations, the Foreign Office 
concluded that the PID should coordinate the compilation of the final version of the 
peace handbook on the Transylvanian problem. Senior officials agreed that someone of 
the calibre of George Prothero should be commissioned to write the peace handbook on 
Transylvania.
137 The reaction to Macartney`s `Report on Hungary` captures the 
dilemma of the British foreign policy-making elite. The opinion of pro-Versailles 
experts, such as Leeper and Prothero were considered important, which proves that 
Versailles-reflexes were still present. However, the fact that Macartney was sent to 
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 ﾠ371/24429,	 ﾠC	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 ﾠ`Report	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungary`,	 ﾠMarch	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ
135	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	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136	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ898/29,	 ﾠLeeper	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ16	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 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24429,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ1967/1967/21,	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠby	 ﾠNichols	 ﾠand	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠC	 ﾠ
2311/1967/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠHancock,	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠC	 ﾠ4668/1967/21,	 ﾠLeeper	 ﾠto	 ﾠMakins,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠSir	 ﾠ
George	 ﾠW.	 ﾠProthero	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwriter	 ﾠand	 ﾠhistorian.	 ﾠProthero	 ﾠworked	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠadviser	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠ
Office	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠattended	 ﾠthe	 ﾠParis	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠConference	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1919.	 ﾠ	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collect fresh data confims that London contemplated making changes to Versailles, 
which proved to be unstable. This duality will not fully crystallise in the period under 
consideration by this thesis, and it was the freak of British pragmatism that by the time 
it had finally taken its final form in 1942-43, it was already outdated by the emergence 
of the Soviet Union and the United States as the dominating powers of the post-war 
world.   
Macartney`s stay in Budapest had a significant influence on Hungarian 
territorial claims. Macartney later claimed that Teleki, through the influence of an 
English friend - who Antall Czettler believed was Macartney himself - had given up 
demanding the whole of Transylvania and toned down the unofficial declaration that 
Hungary wanted to acquire Transylvania at the end of the war with force.
138 
After Macartney`s visit, a memorandum, compiled by Teleki, finally brought the 
so far unofficial Hungarian claims to Transylvania to the official level. The lengthy 
memorandum, which was sent to several capitals in Europe, rejected the Treaty of 
Trianon and demanded extensive frontier adjustments. The memorandum outlined a 
minimum and a maximum claim. In the maximum claim Teleki aggrandised the 
`extended-corridor` and claimed everything north of the river Maros. This would have 
amounted to about two-thirds of the territory ceded to Romania in 1920 (map 3.9). The 
memorandum backed the territorial claims with historic grounds and strategic 
considerations, emphasizing Transylvania`s Hungarian past and the importance of 
Hungarian control over the Carpathians in order to stop the spreading of Bolshevism. 
The minimum demand also claimed a significantly larger territory which the British 
were willing to consider.
139 As we have seen, only a significantly smaller revision was 
contemplated in London, in January 1940 (map 3.6), not to mention that Teleki seemed 
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 ﾠCzettler,	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠPál	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠkülpolitika,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ46;	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠher	 ﾠSuccessors,	 ﾠ391;	 ﾠ
Macartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ387-ﾭ‐388.	 ﾠUnfortunately,	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠsurvived	 ﾠof	 ﾠMacartney`s	 ﾠ
crucial	 ﾠvisit	 ﾠto	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠknow	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠof	 ﾠMacartney`s	 ﾠconversations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
elite.	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠreported	 ﾠvery	 ﾠvaguely	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhis	 ﾠconversations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠof	 ﾠfrontier-ﾭ‐revision.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠ`the	 ﾠbigger	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠTransylvania`:	 ﾠ
PCAM,	 ﾠMSS.	 ﾠENG.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠ3287,	 ﾠdoc.	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠFor	 ﾠTeleki`s	 ﾠmemorandum,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24427,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ10537/529/21;	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠ
pp.	 ﾠ387-ﾭ‐390;	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ91;	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠkülpolitika	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠ„magyar	 ﾠ
kérdés”`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ75-ﾭ‐76.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠminimum-ﾭ‐plan	 ﾠ(very	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextended-ﾭ‐corridor	 ﾠplan)	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠ
approximately	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠTransylvania,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠapproximately	 ﾠ50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠpopulation,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
maximum-ﾭ‐plan	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐thirds	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠ40	 ﾠprecent	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠ
(this	 ﾠwas	 ﾠTeleki`s	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐thirds	 ﾠplan),	 ﾠCzettler,	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠPál	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠkülpolitika,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ75-ﾭ‐76.	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completely to disregard the fact that the British guarantee to Romania was still in 
operation.  
The reaction at the Foreign Office was predictably reserved and negative, and 
the claims were judged exaggerated and unfounded. 
140 It was argued that the realisation 
of these demands would have significantly altered the regional balance and would have 
strategically shaken Romania. Bruce Lockhart, the director general of the PID, also 
pointed out that the memorandum was biased and used evidence selectively.
141 
Hungarian historiography has failed to clarify the attitudes of the Foreign Office and has 
argued that the claims were acknowledged, but shelved, due to their untimeliness.
142 
However, there is no doubt that the sheer geographical extent of Teleki`s demands 
shocked the Foreign Office, and it became evident in London that British and 
Hungarian concepts on frontier revision were far apart.
143  
Teleki`s memorandum however raised the question of the Czechoslovak-
Hungarian frontier in the Foreign Office. The limited geographical extent and the 
unquestionable Hungarian majority of the First Vienna Award was now contrasted with 
Teleki`s exaggerated claims in Transylvania. Roberts and Ross both noted that a frontier 
similar to the First Vienna Arbitration was acceptable for both Britain and the Czech 
émigrés at the time.
144 Although the future of the Award was still questionable, as 
Sargent and Nichols earlier expressed, its limited nature was now held as an example to 
be followed. This indicated that only a similarly limited revision would be acceptable 
for London in the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, something radically different from 
Teleki`s claims.        
The official British reaction foreshadowed a limited revision and the application 
of ethnographic criteria, as the guiding criteria of the peace treaties. When they 
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 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIV,	 ﾠ551:	 ﾠBartók	 ﾠ(Zagreb)	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24427,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3525/529/21,	 ﾠ
minute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠwas	 ﾠseverely	 ﾠcompromised	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Csáky`s	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐Czech	 ﾠand	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐Allied	 ﾠoutbursts	 ﾠin	 ﾠearly	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠCsáky	 ﾠheavily	 ﾠcriticised	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSikorski-ﾭ‐
Beneš	 ﾠdeclaration	 ﾠof	 ﾠPolish-ﾭ‐Czech	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccused	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠof	 ﾠexploiting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠhis	 ﾠgravest	 ﾠdisillusionment	 ﾠover	 ﾠCsáky`s	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomplained	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠTeleki`s	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnow	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠdiscredited:	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ8	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ
0010.	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 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940,	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 ﾠRoss,	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 ﾠApril	 ﾠ
1940.	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discussed Teleki`s memorandum, Cadogan expressed a rigid viewpoint to Barcza. He 
admitted that due to ethnically mixed areas, the problem could not be solved solely by 
applying the ethnographic principle, but clearly stressed that historic and strategic 
claims, which the Hungarians insisted upon, could only complement the ethnographic 
basis at the post-war settlement.
145 Outwardly, there seems to be an obvious 
contradiction in Cadogan`s thinking, but this resulted more from the different 
interpretation of the ethnographic principle in London and Budapest. While Cadogan 
was thinking along the lines of a limited revision in applying the ethnographic criteria, 
Teleki aimed to create an ethnographic equilibrium in Transylvania, drawing a frontier 
which, according to him would have balanced the number of minorities on each side. As 
this solution required territorial revision on a grand scale London judged it as a 
Hungarian attempt to merge historic and strategic principles with the ethnographic 
bases, in order to gain as much territory as possible.  
The British view of the frontier proposition of January 1940 and of Teleki`s 
memorandum clearly demonstrates that policy-makers in London were indeed thinking 
of drawing an ethnographic frontier between Hungary and Romania. However, the 
application of this principle was tendentiously selective. The evidence suggests that in 
theory this meant the reincorporation of the predominantly Magyar border-districts in 
Romania into Hungary, which would have left more than a million Magyars under the 
rule of Bucharest. Fresh evidence set out here has proved that Britain played a 
significant role in a new attempt to solve the Hungarian-Romanian dispute along these 
lines in January 1940. The Hungarian blunt refusal of this proposal, and Teleki`s 
exaggerated territorial demands, which were just as selective as the British views, made 
clear that any concepts on frontier revision were very different.  
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has determined what affected British perceptions of Hungary`s borders in 
the first six months of the Second World War. In this investigation, the aim was to 
assess whether the British view in 1938, to redraw the frontiers of the region applying 
the ethnographic criteria persisted during the war. We were particularly interested in 
how British views were formulated over the permanent Hungarian-Romanian territorial 
dispute, and what sort of plans were compiled behind closed doors in the early period of 
the war to solve this problem. The historiography has often over-simplified British 
perceptions on Central Europe and Hungary, and conclusions have lacked an analysis 
based on crucial British and Hungarian sources. 
  A certain duality in fact existed in British perceptions of Hungary. Official 
relations remained friendly, but Hungarian territorial claims were discouraged and 
rejected, as they were viewed as threatening the security of the region. The annoyance 
of London was more the result of inflated Hungarian territorial demands and not the 
concept of frontier revision per se. Although different opinions were expressed about 
the future frontiers of Hungary in the Foreign Office, the British foreign policy-making 
elite were united in refusing to make territorial promises for the duration of the war, to 
avoid the repetition of the ill-fated territorial promises of the First World War.  
There is enough evidence to suggest that Britain during the `Phoney War` 
already contemplated the ethnic reconstruction of the region at the post-war settlement. 
The positive reaction of London to the Soviet penetration to the Curzon line, which 
closely followed the ethnographic line between Polish and Ukrainians, proves this 
argument. Later in early 1940, although showing great caution, Britain also played a 
leading role in a proposition to revise the Hungarian-Romanian frontier. The British role 
in this scheme challenges our understanding, which until now has presented a picture of 
rigorous British aloofness from such projects. The plan recommended a limited frontier 
revision on the basis of ethnicity, combined with population transfer, which would have 
transferred a wide strip to Hungary. The Hungarian refusal to consider the January 1940 
plan was the first step on the road towards complete estrangement. Teleki`s counter-
claims in February for the larger part of Transylvania were considered particularly 
untimely, unfounded and exaggerated. It became clear both in London and Budapest 143	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
that policies and demands were far apart. By March 1940 it became evident that the 
decision on future frontiers would be made on political grounds and the opinion of 
scholars would be mostly side-tracked. Sargent and Cadogan declared that they agreed 
with the recommendations of Rex Leeper in the PID on the future boundaries of Central 
Europe and not the views of the scholars of the FRPS. This projected the image of the 
recreation of the Versailles frontiers, with minor amendments to apply some ethnic 
criteria.  144	 ﾠ
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`The Hungarians now informed Mr O`Malley  
That they will give the Germans right of passage 
 if requested to do so. `
1 
(Frank Roberts) 
	 ﾠ
4. A Step too far: The problem of the German `military passage` through 
Hungarian territory and the collapse of British confidence in Hungary 
 
4.1 Introduction 
	 ﾠ
Hungarian historiography has tended to analyse British judgements on the territorial 
aggrandisements of Hungary by only examining the immediate British responses to the 
four stages of territorial revision.
2 Crucial periods, such as the spring of 1940 have 
remained almost completely un-researched, which has resulted in a superficial 
understanding of British policy-making. As a result, key watersheds in the Anglo-
Hungarian relationship, such as the question of German military passage through 
Hungary have been almost entirely over-looked. Historians such as Ignác Romsics, Béni 
L. Balogh and György Réti have argued that Britain condemned the Second Vienna 
Award in August 1940, because it was enforced on Romania by Germany and Italy, and 
as a consequence Hungary was simply viewed as a German puppet in London.
3 The 
official British response indeed suggests this viewpoint. However, prior to the 
arbitration, Hungary was already judged as a German satellite, and the British strongly 
encouraged the Romanians to resist Hungarian territorial demands. Compared to 
London`s fundamentally positive attitude towards the policy of Teleki and Horthy in 
early 1940, this was a radically different British approach. Historiography has failed to 
conclusively interpret the reason for this dramatic shift in British policy, generally 
explaining it through Hungary`s increasing pro-German policy. The evidence presented 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/	 ﾠ24427,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ6321/529/21,	 ﾠ8	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠNamely,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠArbitration	 ﾠ(2	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠRuthenia	 ﾠ(March	 ﾠ
1939),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠArbitration	 ﾠ(30	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠNorthern-ﾭ‐
Yugoslavia	 ﾠ(April	 ﾠ1941).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠkülpolitika	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠ„magyar	 ﾠkérdés”`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ106-ﾭ‐108;	 ﾠL.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠBalogh,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠmásodik	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés`,	 ﾠ
Limes	 ﾠ43	 ﾠ(2001),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ22-ﾭ‐29;	 ﾠBalogh,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar-ﾭ‐román	 ﾠkapcsolatok	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐1940-ﾭ‐ben,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ304-ﾭ‐309;	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠRéti,	 ﾠ
`A	 ﾠmásodik	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés`,	 ﾠKülpolitika	 ﾠ31	 ﾠ(2000),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐2.,	 ﾠ182-ﾭ‐204;	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠRéti,	 ﾠBudapest-ﾭ‐Róma	 ﾠBerlin	 ﾠ
árnyékában,	 ﾠmagyar-ﾭ‐olasz	 ﾠdiplomáciai	 ﾠkapcsolatok	 ﾠ1932-ﾭ‐1940	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1998),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ251-ﾭ‐256.	 ﾠ	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here proves that the Hungarian decision to grant droit de passage to Germany in April 
1940 to enter Romania was responsible for the shift in British perceptions of Hungary.
 4  
Thereafter Budapest was judged as fully being in the German orbit.  
This chapter will juxtapose German, Italian and Hungarian sources with the 
unresearched documents of the Foreign Office. It will present new evidence, which puts 
the Anglo-Hungarian relationship in new light, arguing that the Hungarian decision to 
grant military passage to Germany in April was a critical watershed in the formulation 
of British views of Hungary, and was just as important as the breaking off of diplomatic 
relationship a year later and the declaration of war in December 1941. 
  Firstly, it is necessary to review British policy towards the region in the wake of 
the Battles of Norway and France. It is particularly important to determine the British 
views over the Czech-Slovak National Committee before the `droit`. It is similarly vital 
to review whether London was still contemplating the creation of a neutral bloc 
immediately before Hungary agreed to grant military passage. Comparing these with 
British opinions after the `droit` will demonstrate the impact of the Hungarian decision 
on the image of Hungary in London. Secondly, it seems crucial to put the problem in a 
regional context, which will highlight the effect of the `droit` on British Danubian, 
Balkan and Mediterranean military strategy, and political and economic aims.  
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4.2 British Balkan Policy and Hungary in the last months of the `Phoney War` 
 
The Nazi-Soviet aggression against Poland presented insoluble political and military 
dilemmas for London in Central Europe and the Balkans. Losing Poland as an ally 
crucially weakened British political and military positions in Central Europe and at the 
same time it highlighted the military incapability of Britain to actively support its allies 
in the region.
5 The collapse of Poland and Nazi-Soviet cooperation forced London to 
reconsider its Danubian and Balkan strategy. Central Europe now lost its military and 
strategic significance, and the military strategic emphasis shifted to the Mediterranean 
(map 4.1).
6 In contrast, British political influence in the region was still judged to be 
very strong by London. Memoranda compiled by the Foreign Office about political 
strategy in the region showed unfounded optimism, which was based on the anticipation 
of an imminent German economic and financial collapse and German-Soviet dispute 
over Central Europe.
7 The following discussion considers Britain`s military strategy in 
the Danubian region and the Balkans immediately before the Battle of Norway, and 
points to the contrast between British immediate strategic and long-term political 
interest in the region. The aim is to outline British priorities before Budapest made the 
decision to grant military passage to Germany.  
A fresh memorandum by the CID in March 1940 confirmed the conclusions 
reached in October 1939 that Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia could not be defended. 
It also completely ruled out the possibility of an Allied Balkan front or any successful 
defence of Hungary, Yugoslavia or Romania against German aggression.
 The 
memorandum was promptly accepted by the Cabinet as the base for future Allied 
policy.
8 Compared to the views of October, when the Hungarian-Romanian dispute 
significantly affected British military strategy, this new memorandum indicated a shift 
in British opinion about the role of Hungary and Hungarian revisionism in British 
strategy. This fresh analysis demonstrated complete ambiguity towards territorial 
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disputes, and German encouragements to further Hungarian territorial claims were not 
viewed as a threat to British Balkan strategy any longer.  
Historians, such as MacGregor Knox and Christopher Catherwood have pointed 
to the elusive nature of British strategy and criticised the lack of British initiative in 
Central Europe in 1940. Knox has stressed that the presumption that Italy could be 
forced to cooperate by economic means was no more than wishful thinking, which 
eventually disrupted British strategic planning.
9 Catherwood and Case has also sharply 
criticised Britain for abandoning the region, but expecting Hungary, Romania, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to resist German pressure.
10 Elisabeth Barker has examined 
the impact of British military weakness on the foreign policy of the Balkan states, and 
similarly to Kaiser, she criticised the political commitments undertaken without 
possessing the military means to fulfil them.
11 However, David Gillard has pointed out 
that military limitations did not rule out engagement on the political level, which still 
offered possibilities to counter German influence.
12 Indeed, the evidence tells us that in 
the spring of 1940, although the chances of Hungarian resistance were considered slim 
in London, from a political perspective Budapest still had a significant role in British 
regional policy, and efforts were made in London not to antagonise Hungary 
unnecessarily.  
For example, the problem of whether the Czech émigrés in London and Paris 
should receive political recognition from the Allies had an important Hungarian angle. 
This question increasingly determined the British view of the `Hungarian-question` 
from the outbreak of the war, but the factor that Hungary still did not follow a 
completely pro-German policy seemingly affected British policy towards the Czechs. 
As we have noted, as early as September 1939 Halifax, Kirkpatrick and Cadogan had 
agreed that the liberation of the Czechs was a British war aim.
13 In December the British 
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and French cabinets also reached a joint agreement that Poland and Czechoslovakia 
should be liberated after the war. However, in both instances it had been stressed that 
official recognition should not be given to the Beneš-group, because Beneš was 
personally disliked in Poland and Hungary, and a Czechoslovakia under his leadership 
would alienate Budapest and the Polish émigrés from cooperating with Britain.
14 
Smetana has argued that O`Malley`s strong reservations to Beneš significantly affected 
British opinion.
15 Indeed, the Foreign Office assured O`Malley that Britain wanted to 
avoid any unnecessary irritation of Hungarian sentiments.
16 Both Smetana and Taborsky 
have pointed out that the recognition of the Beneš-group as a `Committee` in December 
1939 was far from an open British commitment to restore Czechoslovakia in its original 
form, but a crude political calculation to prevent Czech-Soviet and Czech-German 
rapprochement.
17 Historians have not stressed, although the evidence clearly 
demonstrate that until Hungary did not fully commit itself on the side of Germany, 
London was keen to remain impartial towards Czech and Hungarian territorial 
questions.   
Indeed, vague official declarations and unofficial discussions in the Foreign 
Office suggest that opinion over the Czechoslovak-Hungarian frontier was still in the 
melting pot in early 1940. For example, Chamberlain on 24 February referred to the 
independence of the Czech nation in the House of Commons, and Halifax, on the 
anniversary of the German occupation of Prague, made a similar public comment, to 
encourage Czech resistance. These remarks seem to be very pro-Czech at first glance, 
but Foreign Office discussions on how these speeches were worded prove the 
contrary.
18 Roberts in the Central department explained that references to `Slovakia` and 
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`Czechoslovakia` were carefully avoided and comments on the independence of the 
Czech nation lacked territorial preciseness, such as promising the reconstruction of 
Czechoslovakia, because this could have been interpreted in Budapest as the British 
renunciation of the First Vienna Award, which Whitehall wanted to avoid.
19  
Hungarian historiography has failed to consider the formulation of the 
Chamberlain and Halifax speeches, and therefore interpreted British policy as pro-
Czech in early 1940. Bán asserted that the Chamberlain and Halifax speeches declared 
the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia as a British war aim.
20 The same study also 
suggested British dishonesty, when assurances were later made to Budapest on the non-
territorial nature of these pro-Czech statements.
 21 The discussions of the Foreign Office 
on how these speeches were drafted however clearly refute Bán`s opinion, and attest 
that in March 1940 the Foreign Office was scrupulously trying to maintain distance 
between pro-Czech and pro-Hungarian declarations.
22  
However, by the spring of 1940 the Foreign Office was gradually getting fed up 
with Hungary`s exaggerated criticism of the British support to Beneš. Bruce Lockhart,	 ﾠ
the liaison officer to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, seemed to have a crucial 
impact on the British recognition of the Czecho-Slovak Committee and that London 
eventually disregarded the Hungarian opinion and moved towards a Czech orientation 
in its Central European policy.
23 As well as the influence of Bruce Lockhart, since the 
spring of 1940 O`Malley`s anti-	 ﾠBeneš susceptibilities were also ignored, and when 
O`Malley made friendly references to Horthy on the future sustainability of the First 
Vienna Award, it caused intense annoyance in the Foreign Office.
24 British opinion 
towards Czechoslovakia and Hungary evidently went through a significant 
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 ﾠémigrés	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
war,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠparticularly:	 ﾠB.	 ﾠLockhart,	 ﾠFriends,	 ﾠFoes,	 ﾠand	 ﾠForeigners	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1957).	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24	 ﾠTNA,	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 ﾠC	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Foreign	 ﾠOffice	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transformation over the spring, but annoyance over Hungarian complaints about an 
increasingly pro-Czech British policy does not seem to explain this dramatic shift. As 
we will see, the underlying reason was the Hungarian decision to grant military passage 
to Germany in April.    
While Hungary still played an important political role in British regional 
planning, the position of Budapest was much weaker in British military strategy. The 
Foreign Office expected a swift German dash towards the Black Sea or the Straits, 
simultaneously with the offensive on the Western Front. The chances of Hungarian 
resistance were intensely debated. Based on a trust in Teleki and Horthy, Roberts and 
Kirkpatrick expected that as long as the Prime Minister and the Regent were in office 
Hungary would not submit to Germany. The radical territorial claims of Teleki in 
Transylvania seemingly had not eroded his reputation, and along with Horthy, Teleki 
was trusted anti-Nazis and was still highly regarded in London	 ﾠfor his determination to 
preserve Hungarian independence. Kirkpatrick was convinced that Horthy and Teleki 
would be able to preserve Hungarian independence and Orchard and Roberts also 
expressed sympathy towards Hungary`s difficult position.
 25 Highlighting the seemingly 
ambivalent and erroneous view of the Foreign Office towards the difficult strategic 
position of Hungary refutes Catherwood`s argument that attempts were made in London 
to drag Hungary into the war. According to Barcza, the Hungarian elite were ready to 
follow Britain if firm promises had been given, but this card was never played by 
London. The Foreign Office turned the cold shoulder to the bids of the British Embassy 
in Budapest who lobbied for political and military support for Hungary.
26	 ﾠO`Malley and 
Barclay, the military attaché in Budapest, after consultations with Teleki reported that 
Hungary would offer resistance if there was an Allied military presence in the Balkans, 
but they forecast	 ﾠonly token Hungarian resistance to a German invasion, if the Allies` 
landing failed to materialise.
27 Archibald Wavell, the British Commander-in-Chief in 
the Middle East believed that an offensive against Germany was possible from the 
direction of South East Europe, hence he supported a British-French landing in the 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24427,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3916/529/21,	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 ﾠ18	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 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠ19	 ﾠMarch	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24427,	 ﾠC	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 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	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 ﾠ9	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠCatherwood,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBalkans	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
World	 ﾠWar	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 ﾠTNA,	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Balkans in the spring of 1940.
28 The reports of O`Malley and Barclay about Hungary`s 
token resistance however noticeably transformed the views of the Foreign Office over 
Hungary. Their arguments were used selectively and the parts commenting on 
Hungary`s willy-nilly resistance were taken very seriously, and the assumption that 
Hungary would only offer `face-saving` resistance essentially determined formulating 
opinion on Hungary in the Foreign Office.  
Our findings suggest that immediately before the Battles of Norway and France, 
British perceptions on the future frontiers of Central Europe were mostly viewed in the 
light of the level of resistance London hoped from the countries of the region against 
Germany. The idea of defending the region against German aggression was dismissed. 
Hungary was still judged as a reluctant ally of Germany, and as long as it remained so, 
it continued to be an important factor in British policy.  
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 ﾠLawlor,	 ﾠChurchill	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠof	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠp.	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 ﾠThe	 ﾠ1940	 ﾠdilemma	 ﾠof	 ﾠBalkan	 ﾠlandings	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 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
thoroughly	 ﾠinvestigated	 ﾠby	 ﾠElisabeth	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 ﾠSheila	 ﾠLawlor,	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 ﾠboth	 ﾠhave	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 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
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 ﾠbetween	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 ﾠBritish	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠin	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 ﾠBalkans,	 ﾠand	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠthe	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 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPolicy	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4. 3 Hungary grants military passage to Germany 
 
The German aggression against the Romanian oil-fields had been the subject of British 
anxieties since the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia and the Foreign Office expected that 
the German army would be using Hungarian territory, as it was the most obvious transit 
route towards Romania. Whether Hungary would offer resistance to a German 
agression, or grant military passage to avoid occupation, was a constant subject of 
Foreign Office discussions in the spring of 1940.
29 As early as September 1939, Csáky 
had indicated to Ciano, the Italian foreign minister that Hungary would not resist a 
peaceful German military passage through its territory to Romania. The first indication 
that Hungary might be willing to grant the passage was reported to London by 
O`Malley in early March 1940. Horthy confessed to him that Hungary would allow the 
passage of the Wehrmacht, if Germany invaded, or offered Transylvania to Hungary for 
cooperation.
 30  This part seeks to remedy the uncertainties surrounding the question of a 
German military passage through Hungarian territory, and based on unresearched 
British archival sources prove that Hungary granted military passage to Germany in the 
spring of 1940. 
Several studies have produced sketchy analyses of this problem, but until now 
no reliable evidence has been brought forward to suggest that Hungary granted military 
passage to Germany in April 1940.
31 Until now, German,	 ﾠItalian, and Hungarian sources 
have provided the largest set of evidence, but all of these are very vague on the subject. 
The question presented a delicate and top secret issue for all parties; therefore the 
problem is absent from official documents. The published diplomatic documents of the 
German Foreign Ministry and the German-Hungarian diplomatic correspondence do not 
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 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠOrchard,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠ19	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ
1940.	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠwas	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠof	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠtroops.	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠit	 ﾠclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠRuthenia	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
resist	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠpressure,	 ﾠor	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWehrmacht	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcrucially	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠview	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠHungary:	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠIII.,	 ﾠ500:	 ﾠ	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939;	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ
0009.	 ﾠ
30	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24427,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3916/529/21,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠBarker,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
towards	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐East	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ63.	 ﾠ
31	 ﾠFocus	 ﾠwas	 ﾠon	 ﾠOctober-ﾭ‐November	 ﾠ1940	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠtroops	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
territory:	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠkülpolitika	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 ﾠa	 ﾠ„magyar	 ﾠkérdés”`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ153-ﾭ‐155;	 ﾠBán,	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Diplomacy	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐41,	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 ﾠ100-ﾭ‐101.	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mention that Berlin asked for a military passage from Budapest in the spring of 1940.
32 
Italian sources are also very obscure on the question. Talamo, the Italian minister in 
Budapest, reported on several occasions in April that Berlin possibly requested a 
military passage through Hungarian territory, but remained silent on whether the 
Hungarians actually granted the passage.
33 The I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, the 
published diplomatic sources of Italian foreign policy reveals nothing about the `droit` 
either. The surviving Hungarian sources are similarly silent. Neither the DIMK, nor the 
diplomatic correspondence between Rome and Budapest mention anything about a 
German request and a Hungarian decision. The minutes of the Hungarian Cabinet 
meetings offer no further evidence on the `droit` either.
34A memorandum handed by 
Lipót Baranyai, the anglophile president of the Hungarian National Bank and a close 
ally of Teleki, directly to Ciano on the 8 April is one of the rare documents clearly 
indicating that the Germans contacted Budapest about a military passage. In a 
questionnaire Baranyai inquired about whether Italy was willing to defend Hungary 
against German aggression. With remarkable honesty he also noted that for the 
judgement of history, a futile, but heroic resistance would be preferable and made it 
clear that the Italian response would be crucial in formulating Hungarian policy. 
Frontier revision appeared in Baranyai`s memorandum as a strategic necessity, which, 
he argued, was also in the strongest interest of Italy. Baranyai insisted that a German 
military transit through Hungary would trigger Soviet countermoves, which could only 
be repelled if Hungary controlled the mountain passes in Eastern Slovakia.
35 
Mussolini`s answer to the Hungarian inquiry, after consultation with Berlin, was abrupt 
and laconic: 
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 ﾠDocuments	 ﾠon	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠ(DGFP),	 ﾠser.	 ﾠD,	 ﾠvols.	 ﾠ7-ﾭ‐12,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠP.	 ﾠR.	 ﾠSweet	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(Washington,	 ﾠ
1954);	 ﾠA	 ﾠWilhelmstrasse	 ﾠés	 ﾠMagyarország,	 ﾠNémet	 ﾠdiplomáciai	 ﾠiratok	 ﾠMagyarországról	 ﾠ1933-ﾭ‐1944,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Gy.	 ﾠJuhász	 ﾠet	 ﾠal	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1968).	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠA	 ﾠPalazzo	 ﾠChigi	 ﾠés	 ﾠMagyarország.	 ﾠ550-ﾭ‐551,	 ﾠ554,	 ﾠ555:	 ﾠTalamo	 ﾠto	 ﾠCiano,	 ﾠ15,	 ﾠ19,	 ﾠ24	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ
34	 ﾠGyula	 ﾠJuhász	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠearly	 ﾠApril,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ`droit`	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠform.	 ﾠIronically,	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠ
meeting	 ﾠheld	 ﾠon	 ﾠApril	 ﾠFools`	 ﾠDay	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 ﾠthat	 ﾠduring	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠin	 ﾠRome,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Brenner	 ﾠPass,	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	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 ﾠon	 ﾠalthough,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsee,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBrenner	 ﾠ
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 ﾠof	 ﾠHitler	 ﾠand	 ﾠMussolini	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 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠ
külpolitikája,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ231-ﾭ‐232;	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 ﾠto:	 ﾠMOL	 ﾠK	 ﾠ27,	 ﾠMinisztertanácsi	 ﾠjegyzőkönyvek,	 ﾠ(1940.	 ﾠ03.	 ﾠ31;	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 ﾠ01;	 ﾠ
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I am Hitler`s ally, and wish to remain so.
36  
Mussolini`s evasive response prompted Budapest to look for alternatives elsewhere. A 
similarly worded memorandum and questionnaire was prepared for the Foreign Office 
by Teleki, which inquired about the British attitude towards Hungarian occupation of 
Transylvania and allowing a German military passage. Even though Teleki was ready to 
refer the question of the Hungarian occupation of Transylvania to the peace conference 
after the war, this memorandum harbours clear evidence of the Hungarian detachment 
from British expectations. The memorandum pointed out that the British response 
would significantly determine the Hungarian decision, but Csáky wrote on the bottom 
of the page that the memorandum was never sent to London.
 37 On the 17 April Teleki 
assured Hitler in a personal letter that in return for German support for Transylvania, 
Hungary would allow the passage of the Wehrmacht to Romania.
38  It can thus be 
suggested that the reason for holding the memorandum back was either the fact that 
British opinion was not considered important any more, or that Budapest made the 
decision to allow the military movements of the Wehrmacht on Hungarian territory 
before the 17 April, or perhaps both.  
The current research has found that British sources, which so far have been 
completely disregarded, present clear and conclusive evidence for a Hungarian decision. 
O`Malley`s diplomatic reports convincingly prove that Hungary eventually granted the 
`droit` in early April, but the exact date of the decision and the actual form of the 
German request is very uncertain. On 9 March O`Malley reported that Teleki`s evasive 
answers for any inquiries about the `droit` assured him that the question was brought up 
by Berlin.
39 Then in April, O`Malley was more precise and gloomily noted that 
Hungary was asked to grant military passage, if such necessity arose, and the 
permission was given by Budapest.
 40  
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 ﾠCiano,	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 ﾠQuoted	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German pressure had already been immense on Hungary since the mid-1930s to 
follow a pro-German foreign policy, to grant economic concessions for the Reich and 
minority rights for the Swabians living in Hungary; hence, Hungary`s compliance in 
April 1940 cannot simply be explained with by reiteration of this argument.  
The Hitler-Mussolini meeting at the Brenner Pass in March 1940 has been 
viewed as a crucial step in the materialization of an active German-Italian military 
alliance in the war, but historians have not recognised its implications for the future of 
Hungary and its connection with the Hungarian decision to allow a German military 
transit through Hungary. Sources about the Brenner meeting are limited and 
ambiguous,
41 therefore uncertainty surrounds them, and particularly the decisions made 
about Hungary.
42 Hungarian historiography has not recognised the consequences of the 
Brenner meetings for Hungary either, and therefore paid only limited attention to the 
meetings. Although historians have noticed that Hungary consequently slipped into the 
German orbit, this was viewed solely as a reflection of Mussolini`s diminishing interest 
in Central Europe. New evidence suggests that a secret deal was struck between the two 
dictators on Hungary. It seems that for a greater influence in Greece and the 
Mediterranean, Mussolini had given up the protection of Hungary, and as a 
consequence Budapest definitively fell into the German sphere of influence.
43 Richard 
Bosworth and Mária Ormos have mentioned that by the spring of 1940 Italy had given 
up the protection of Hungary.
44 However, it has not yet been adequately stressed that 
Hungary, having lost the nominal protection of Italy at the Brenner, was now 
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there	 ﾠis	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcovert	 ﾠinfiltration	 ﾠof	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠ`engineers`,	 ﾠ`teachers`,	 ﾠ`interpreters`	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Hungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalready	 ﾠunder	 ﾠway	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠscale	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspring	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1940:	 ﾠA	 ﾠPalazzo	 ﾠ
Chigi	 ﾠés	 ﾠMagyarország,	 ﾠ571:	 ﾠTalamo	 ﾠto	 ﾠCiano,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠ587:	 ﾠTalamo	 ﾠto	 ﾠCiano,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠMost	 ﾠcrucially,	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠGerman-ﾭ‐Italian	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠare	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sources.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDDI	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDGFP	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠcollections	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmention	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Brenner	 ﾠmeetings,	 ﾠDDI	 ﾠ9.	 ﾠser.	 ﾠIII.	 ﾠvol.;	 ﾠDGFP	 ﾠser.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ9.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠof	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 ﾠBrenner	 ﾠmeetings	 ﾠwas	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 ﾠwar	 ﾠwith	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrance.	 ﾠMussolini	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
consequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠdefinitively	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠto	 ﾠjoin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠinitiated	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
offensive	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠFront,	 ﾠS.	 ﾠCorvaja,	 ﾠHitler	 ﾠand	 ﾠMussolini:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSecret	 ﾠMeetings	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠ
pp.	 ﾠ95-ﾭ‐116.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24427,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ6323/529,	 ﾠ21,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Italian-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠfriendship	 ﾠand	 ﾠItaly`s	 ﾠrole	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvanguard	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠrevisionism	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
overplayed	 ﾠin	 ﾠBudapest,	 ﾠRome	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcounterbalance	 ﾠto	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠpenetration	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Danubian	 ﾠregion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdisappearance	 ﾠof	 ﾠPoland,	 ﾠand	 ﾠItaly`s	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠreliance	 ﾠon	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠ
altered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexplicit.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconclusions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Hitler-ﾭ‐Mussolini	 ﾠconversations	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBrenner	 ﾠPass	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠand	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
culmination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess.	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 ﾠR.	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 ﾠMussolini	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠp.	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 ﾠM.	 ﾠOrmos,	 ﾠMussolini	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1973),	 ﾠp.	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defenceless against forceful German penetration. If Germany were to decide to 
forcefully take the Romanian oil-fields, Hungary was left with the decision to yield or 
be crushed and occupied. The British Cabinet was aware that the status of Hungary in 
the Axis had changed as a result of the Brenner conference. Refering to undisclosed, but 
reliable diplomatic and intelligence information British policy-makers knew that at the 
Brenner Pass Italy had discontinued its support for Hungarian revisionism if the latter 
was against German interests and Mussolini also promised that protests would not be 
made against German troops passing through Hungarian territory.
45 The Foreign Office 
was also aware that Budapest had given an affirmative answer for a German request of 
passage	 ﾠas a result of losing Italian protection at the Brenner. The immediate response 
of Roberts, in the Central department was resigned and negative: 
Nothing we can say further, it will have effect!
46 
The Foreign Office was also convinced that Hungary would receive Eastern 
Slovakia for its services. It needs emphasis that the prospect of further Hungarian 
frontier revision in Easter-Slovakia was instantly viewed in the context of increasing 
Hungarian-German cooperation. Eastern Slovakia was believed to be part of the secret 
Hungarian-German accord against Romania. The senior officials of the Foreign Office, 
Cadogan, Sargent, and Nichols viewed the Hungarian action as a coherent element of a 
tendentiously, and now openly pro-German foreign policy.
 47  
The fact that Budapest after the Brenner conference was directly sounded out by 
Berlin about a military passage is unknown to historians, and connections between the 
two events have not been made. The issue of the `droit` has been recognised by 
historians, but analysis has remained on a theoretical level. András Bán recognised that 
the `droit` presented a dilemma for Hungarian foreign policy, but he failed to fully 
identify its impact on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship.
48 György Réti has also paid 
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 ﾠTNA,	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 ﾠW.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠ97	 ﾠ(40),	 ﾠ19	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠFO/371/24430,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ6327/529/21,	 ﾠCampbell	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠ
Office,	 ﾠ15	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940.	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46	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24427,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ6321/529/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts,	 ﾠ8	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940.	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47	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24430,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ6327/529/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠNichols,	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ
receiving	 ﾠterritory	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreward	 ﾠfor	 ﾠher	 ﾠsubservience	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecurrent	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠsenior	 ﾠofficials.	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠ
labelled	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ`Jackal-ﾭ‐theory	 ﾠ`,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠAward:	 ﾠ
Macartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteen,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ424.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠevident	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstigma	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
senior	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠearlier.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ`droit`	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠa	 ﾠpermanent	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠjudgement	 ﾠof	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠaggrandisements.	 ﾠ
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some attention to the problem, and stressed that the lack of Italian encouragement to 
resist a German request put Hungary in a difficult situation, but his scope of analysis 
was limited to German, Italian and Hungarian sources.
49 Elizabeth Wiskemann claimed 
that the German demand for a passage through Hungary served as a cover for the 
invasion of Denmark and Norway, to direct attention away from Scandinavia. 
Wiskemann unfortunately did not disclose her source, but her surmising was valid, as 
the Hungarian decision occurred simultaneously with the Scandinavian campaign.
50  
Even after the `droit` was granted, Teleki continued his assurances policy to 
London, but these now fell on deaf ears, and `treaty revision and doublespeak` was 
consequently viewed with much suspicion.
51 The `droit` proved to be a critical 
watershed in Anglo-Hungarian relationship. The reason for Hungary`s volte-face was 
mostly blamed on Horthy`s inability to control the German-oriented Hungarian army 
and his disinterest in resisting German demands.
52 Confidence in Teleki and Horthy 
were shaken, and Hungary was now viewed as a German satellite. The Foreign Office 
thereafter lent a deaf ear to the reports of the second secretary in Budapest, who 
anticipated that Teleki and Horthy would firmly resist a German passage.
53 Roberts and 
Orchard at the Central department of the Foreign Office, who earlier had approached the 
difficulties of Hungary with understanding, now expressed their deepest irritation over 
Teleki`s dubious policy. When Teleki sent a message, through the Hungarian-born Lady 
Listowel, to restore confidence, they minuted that further assurances were unnecessary 
to sooth Hungarian anxieties regarding Anglo-Czechoslovak friendship or the future 
Czechoslovak frontiers.
54  
The tone demonstrated that as a result of the `droit` views in the Foreign Office 
about Czechoslovakia and Hungary were transformed; Hungarian complains about pro-
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 ﾠTriumph	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by	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 ﾠToynbee	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 ﾠ(Oxford	 ﾠ1958),	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 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠ`Treaty	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠand	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 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ150-ﾭ‐173.	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52	 ﾠLóránt	 ﾠDombrády	 ﾠand	 ﾠThomas	 ﾠSakmyster	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdemonstrated	 ﾠHorthy`s	 ﾠinability	 ﾠto	 ﾠretain	 ﾠhis	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarmy	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠmingled	 ﾠinto	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠL.	 ﾠDombrády,	 ﾠ
Hadsereg	 ﾠés	 ﾠpolitika	 ﾠMagyarországon	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐1944	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1986);	 ﾠT.	 ﾠL.	 ﾠSakmyster,	 ﾠ`Army	 ﾠOfficers	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Foreign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠInterwar	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐41`,	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠContemporary	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ(1975),	 ﾠpp.	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24429,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ5900/734/21,	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 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ19	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
54	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	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 ﾠSir	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 ﾠ(Rome)	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	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 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠ8	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 ﾠthat	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 ﾠvictory	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 ﾠthe	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 ﾠof	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 ﾠpeace	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠwould	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 ﾠDiaries,	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Czech British policy were consequently ignored, and Whitehall moved towards a 
Czech-orientation. After the Hungarian `droit` British understanding towards the First 
Vienna Award and the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia had also ceased and 
perceptions on Hungarian revisionism radically shifted.
 55 The `droit` became the 
critical element in the British decision to give the Czecho-Slovak National Committee 
recognition as a provisional government in July 1940 and full recognition in 1941. 
Makins, a senior official in the Central department argued that Hungary could now be 
written off. Roberts added that support would be given to nations who were willing to 
fight.
 56 From 1941 the Foreign Office openly questioned the First Vienna Award, even 
though the full recognition still had not contained territorial provisions for the future 
Czechoslovak state.  
So far, we have demonstrated the reaction of the Foreign Office to the 
Hungarian decision to grant military passage to Germany and it has been established 
that the senior members of the Foreign Office viewed the Hungarian decision as a 
watershed in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. The opinion of the Foreign Secretary 
has so far been neglected. Andrew Roberts, the biographer of Halifax, has stressed the 
Foreign Secretary`s fatalistic approach to the German penetration into Central Europe, 
but concentrated very little on Halifax`s opinion about Hungary.
57 Halifax`s memoranda 
on the Balkans and Central Europe in the spring of 1940 indeed exhibited a large 
amount of indifference. Dilks has pointed out that memoranda initialled by Halifax were 
often not written by him, but were compiled in the Foreign Office, following Halifax`s 
guidelines.
 58  Yet, this view-point has to be contested, as the tone of the Foreign Office 
on the question of Hungary in the spring of 1940, and the memoranda initialled by 
Halifax significantly differ. This suggests that the latter were indeed written by either 
Halifax, or his private secretary Oliver Harvey.  
Halifax indeed reacted to the oncoming German-Soviet onslaught of Central 
Europe with aloofness and naivety, and neither his memoirs, nor his official memoranda 
deals with the Hungarian `droit`. In late March, Halifax had dwelt extensively on 
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insignificant issues, such as his belief that the region did not expect a German victory, 
and ungrounded optimism that the loss of British prestige would only be temporary in 
South-Eastern Europe.
59 Markedly, even in late April, Halifax had not completely 
excluded the possibility of an Anglo-Italian rapprochement and the Italian protection of 
Hungary against German aggression. Considering the question of Hungary as an 
unusually high priority in Italian policy, and completely neglecting the implications of 
the Brenner meetings, he expected, or perhaps wished for, a German-Italian quarrel over 
Hungary or other positions in the Balkans. Most strikingly this was posed as one of the 
arguments not to go to war with Italy, if Mussolini attacked Yugoslavia.
60 Another 
memorandum in late April similarly misjudged the Balkan status quo, and Halifax 
proudly declared that the Balkan Bloc, consisting of Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary 
and Bulgaria had been created and declared that British prospects in the Balkans, with 
the backing of the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance, were highly promising.
61   
Halifax had shown a similarly modest concern towards the dangers faced by the 
region at the Balkan Conference of the British ministers in London in April 1940. 
Discussions went along very general lines. Halifax emphasized that the projection of 
British air and naval-strength was essential to maintain hope in the region, but 
expressed British disinterest to actively intervene. He affirmed that assistance to 
Romania was conditional on Italian and Turkish consent, which in reality was a close to 
impossible combination.
62 The conclusions of the meeting highlighted his favourite 
obsession, the subject of Anglo-Italian cooperation extensively. The prospect of 
Hungarian frontier revision was treated with a measure of tact at the conference. British 
support was distinctly articulated for the reincorporation of Southern Dobruja into 
Bulgaria to befriend Sofia, but the Hungarian demands in Transylvania were completely 
ignored. O`Malley`s silence at the conference, and the fact that Hungary was hardly 
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discussed during the entire conference accentuate the diminishing role of Budapest in 
British thought.
63  
Even though the British foreign policy-making elite now seemed to have lost 
faith in Hungary, their reaction to a yet mostly unknown Hungarian proposition, from a 
very different Hungarian quarter, suggests that the lack of trust was only felt towards 
the current Hungarian political elite. Historiography usually suggests that Count Mihály 
Károlyi, the president of Hungary (1918-19), had only taken up a political role in the 
Hungarian anti-fascist emigration in Britain from 1941.
64 New evidence however 
suggests that he was active as early as April 1940. Urievicz, a close friend of Károlyi, 
called on the Foreign Office in late April and requested British approval for Károlyi`s 
plan to offer Ruthenia to the Soviet Union in return for a Soviet guarantee for 
Hungary`s independence. Minutes suggest that Orchard and Robert approached 
Károlyi`s group positively, and were keen to sound out Urievicz on the views of a 
Hungarian political group which opposed both Hitler and the current Hungarian regime. 
However, because of the Nazi-Soviet cooperation the Foreign Office was convinced that 
Moscow would not support such a scheme, therefore Károlyi`s emissary was not 
received.
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4. 4 The military and economic implications of the Hungarian `droit` on Anglo-
Hungarian relationship and British Balkan strategy 
 
Although the Hungarian decision to grant military passage to Germany did not overturn 
British Balkan strategy, it posed serious questions. We have already pointed out that the 
Balkans was considered indefensible, but a smooth and rapid German transit through 
Hungarian territory alarmed British policy-makers. It allowed an easy German access to 
Romanian oil, and potentially troubled Britain`s East Mediterranean positions, 
especially in Turkey.
66 The aim of this part is to determine how far the Hungarian 
`droit` affected British military planning, and how far it forced London to reconsider its 
economic and trade policy towards Hungary, which regardless of the war and strict 
contraband control, had shown surprising lenience towards Budapest.  
    The military implications of the `droit` immediately became the subject of 
intense discussions as the news of the Hungarian decision reached the Foreign Office. 
Evidence clearly indicates that the swift German occupation of South East Europe was 
expected in London	 ﾠas soon as hostilities broke out on the Western Front and the 
Hungarian decision was believed to assist this possibility. Based on intelligence reports 
and the recommendations of Barclay, the British military attaché in Budapest, the 
possibility of Hungarian resistance to the German passage was ruled out.
67 Reports of 
German divisions, stationed along the Hungarian frontier in late April, strengthened the 
belief that the invasion of Hungary and Romania was indeed imminent.
68 Polish sources 
also reported the conclusion of a secret Hungarian-German military alliance against 
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Romania.
69 The Cabinet was also convinced that Mussolini had attempted to persuade 
Teleki to escalate the territorial dispute with Romania, and spark off a conflict, which 
would allow the quick Axis occupation of the Balkans.
70 After the Hitler-Mussolini 
Brenner meetings, Whitehall was expected that Mussolini would enter the war against 
the Allies. Hence, on the 18 April the Cabinet instructed the Chiefs of Staff to consider 
the implications of Italy`s immediate entry into the war.
71  
The question of Hungarian-German military cooperation against Romania was 
also enthusiastically discussed by the British press. The Evening Standard claimed that 
Hungary was raising an army to regain Transylvania, and would allow a German 
military passage in return for territorial rewards.
72 The Hungarian minister, being 
completely unaware of the `droit`, immediately protested against the publication of such 
articles, which, he believed, unduly put Hungary in a negative context.
73 Cadogan was 
convinced that a joint Hungarian-German effort to undermine Romania indeed existed, 
but to maintain cordiality, he had taken steps to prevent the recurrence of such press 
incidents.
74  
The outbreak of the war had witnessed the introduction of certain controlling 
measures on the press, but the Press Department of the Foreign Office was only able to 
enforce a limited `voluntary censorship`. This meant that during weekly, and later daily 
press conferences, the official line on certain sensitive issues was strongly suggested to 
press editors. In the first 6 months of the war Hungarian protests against articles were 
met with genuine sympathy, and steps were taken not to aggravate Hungary`s position 
with negatively toned articles. For instance, a passionate debate on Ruthenia in the 
pages of Free Europe in March 1940 was cut short by the Foreign Office. The paper 
was funded by the British government and it was judged that anti-Hungarian opinion 
could lead to unnecessary disputes between the nations of the region.
75   
The Hungarian `droit` radically transformed the British approach. Roberts was 
particularly annoyed with the report that Budapest would not consider British press 
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representations,
76 and emphasized that as long as there was no Hungarian reciprocity, 
and the tone of the Hungarian press was pro-German, an occasional rebuke against 
Hungary was necessary.
77  
Despite the growing antagonism felt towards Hungary, the official relationship 
remained cordial, mostly for economic reasons. Even though O`Malley recommended 
lenience towards Hungary, he also believed that the Hungarian decisions would have 
the gravest consequences for Anglo-Hungarian trade.
78 He immediately proposed the 
reduction of war material export to Hungary and suggested a carefully worded warning. 
Despite this, he advised that the friendly tone towards Budapest should not be changed, 
to avoid antagonising Hungary completely.
79  
Indeed, before the `droit`, Hugh Dalton, who was Minister of Economic Warfare 
in 1940, was convinced that Hungary could be encouraged to resist if supplementary 
export and import quotas were granted, as Hungary was in desperate need of raw 
materials. Now, reflecting on Hungary`s decision to cooperate with the Wehrmacht, he 
completely reversed his views and proposed the suspension of all war material exports 
and the refusal of granting further import quotas.
80 Halifax and the Foreign Office 
unanimously agreed to a more rigid set of criteria, which did not allow special 
considerations for countries in special circumstances if it involved giving economic 
advantage to Germany. The Foreign Office agreed that contraband-control should be 
kept tight and the excessive export of war material to Hungary should be prohibited, 
because it was believed that strengthening the Hungarian Army would eventually 
strengthen the Wehrmacht, which after the probable occupation of Hungary would 
disarm the Hungarians.
81  
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Despite the fact that the `droit` acutely affected Anglo-Hungarian trade, there is 
evidence for cross-currents in British commercial policy. The top secret scheme, to 
import Bofors air-defence guns and ammunition, manufactured in Hungary under 
Swedish licence, for the defence of Portugal and Britain seemed to have a very crucial 
role in the decision to maintain friendly relations with Hungary.
82 Although Halifax 
showed little enthusiasm towards German penetration into the Danubian states, he was 
very interested in acquiring arms from Hungary. He believed that putting political and 
economic restrictions on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship would cause resentment in 
Hungary, which could endanger the Bofors scheme.
83 As a consequence of these 
economic interests O`Malley was instructed that in response to the `droit` no official 
démarche should be issued, and Budapest should only be warned of the `droit``s 
inconsistency with Hungarian neutrality in a personal letter addressed to Csáky.
84  
A joint meeting of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare in 
late May raised the question of Hungary`s status in British policy, now that the country 
voluntarily granted military passage to Germany and examined the political, legal and 
moral implications of strict British raw material and contraband control on neutrals. The 
question was asked whether non-belligerents, such as Hungary, should be harmed with 
contraband and trade restrictions, and if yes, to what extent. On the grounds that the 
`droit` had not actually occured and that Hungary had made considerable attempts to 
stay neutral, the meeting recommended that Hungary should still not be considered as 
territory under enemy occupation and correct Anglo-Hungarian relations ought to be 
maintained.
85 
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4. 5 “Our fate is being decided now between Namur and Sedan”
86 The Anglo-
Hungarian relationship in the first weeks of the Battle of France  
 
The decisive moment on the Western Front came on 10 May, when Germany launched 
a major offensive against the Allies. György Barcza in London, and the Hungarian elite 
in Budapest, anxiously waited for the outcome of the battle, praying for an Allied 
victory. The aim here is to determine whether the outbreak of hostilities on the Western 
Front brought change into the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, and in what direction the 
war pushed the crippled image of Hungary in London. Particular attention will be 
placed on British expectations from Hungary in the grave hours of the Battle of France, 
and how far the consequences of the Hungarian `droit` affected these calculations.  
  Immediately before the Battle of France O`Malley had sounded out Teleki on 
Hungary`s attitude towards the war and Germany. The intense conversation highlighted 
the distance between Hungarian and British perceptions on the limits between 
acceptable cooperation and open collaboration between Budapest and Berlin. Frustrated 
over the lack of information Teleki was providing about Hungary`s future attitude, 
O`Malley indicated that a Hungarian `droit` could have grave consequences for the 
Anglo-Hungarian relationship and could result in reducing British raw material export 
to Hungary. A seemingly very enervated Teleki claimed that this would definitely push 
Hungary into the arms of Germany.
87 The reason for Teleki`s frustration, apart from 
being indignant about the lack of British support, can indeed be the fact that a positive 
answer to a German transit had already been given.   
Barcza`s diaries also partly explain Teleki`s attitude. Barcza perceived that 
Teleki and Horthy had arrived at the conclusion that during the life and death struggle 
on the Western Front, Transylvania should be occupied regardless of Western or 
German disapproval.
88 Ablonczy has also pointed out that Teleki, guided by the vision 
of Hungary`s messianic mission in the Carpathian basin, believed that integral revision 
would guarantee the security of Hungary against anyone.
89 British policy-makers were 
unable to accept that the purpose of frontier revision was to build a geographically and 
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militarily strong Hungary and to achieve it Teleki was prepared to collaborate with 
Germany until the limit of physical German occupation.
90   
The Teleki-O`Malley meeting on 11 May resonates with this notion. Teleki, 
once again showed considerable annoyance towards O`Malley and blamed British lack 
of support for agreeing to allow a German passage, if asked. Teleki was particularly 
harsh, declaring that the current situation on the Western front was the result of the 
failure of the West to check Hitler when it was still possible, and to address the 
territorial problems of Central Europe. He also indicated that he would not accept 
territory from either Britain or Germany, and hinted that Hungary wished to take 
matters into its own hands.
91 The Hungarian anger and self-pity over Trianon, which 
earlier was rigorously projected towards Britain in an attempt to gather sympathy, now 
in the dilemma of collaboration or occupation, turned into violent irritation at Britain. 
The argument that Hungary would not defend Romania, by refusing military passage to 
Germany, appeared during this meeting for the first time, and concurrently served as a 
justification for action towards London. The fact that the concept only appeared about a 
month after the actual Hungarian decision occured questions its genuiness. Whether 
Teleki used this argument as a pretext cannot be decided conclusively, but nevertheless 
it failed to deceive O`Malley and the Foreign Office, who considered the Hungarian 
argument very artificial.  
Teleki, although irritated at British passivity, continued the policy of reassurance 
towards London. He sent Béla Randvánszky to London, with the message that Hungary 
would protest at a German military passage, but the regime and Horthy would stay in 
place to prevent the appointment of a Quisling government and any Gleichschaltung of 
the country.
92 As we have noted, earlier in 1939 during the Polish crisis, Barcza did not 
sympathise with Teleki`s policy to conduct diplomacy through unprofessional agents. 
The droit-crisis however completely changed his approach and Barcza viewed these 
emissaries more positively, particularly because it provided a channel to bypass the 
progressively pro-German Csáky.  
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Regardless of the efforts of Teleki, these reassurances had failed to influence 
Western perceptions, as Hungarian promises were intentionally left vague to avoid 
angering Berlin with a pro-British policy.
93 Ambiguous promises were unable to 
outweigh the official pro-German rethoric of Budapest and the violent anti-Western 
invectives of Csáky.
94 Britain expected a more concrete Hungarian foreign policy, and 
as Hungarian promises never categorically reassured London on the British primary 
criteria of armed resistance to Germany, they were bound to fail. These kind of 
diplomatic balancing acts were acceptable for London during the Czech crises of 1938, 
but since the outbreak of war it caused displeasure. István Bibó, the Hungarian political 
theorist, who as early as the 1930s called Hungarian revisionism the major obstacle to 
regional rapproachment, also pointed out later that Hungarian historical arguments for 
frontier revision did not influence British perceptions and were considered as naive and 
extreme in London.
95  
A hitherto unknown interlude confirms Bibó`s sobering analysis, and provides 
further evidence as to why Teleki`s assurance-policy failed to convince British policy-
makers. As a sign of understanding and rapport, Teleki was cordially asked in April to 
renew his membership at the Royal Geographical Society. Ironically his membership 
had been suspended when Austria-Hungary declared war on Great Britain in 1914. 
Barcza bitterly descibed his and London`s disappointment over Teleki`s refusal, who 
asked to delay his renewal due to the difficult international situation. According to 
Barcza, this was taken in London as a clear and definite sign of German orientation, as 
it was believed that due to the fear of German repraisals even this minor issue could not 
be considered by Teleki independently. The conclusion was drawn that even Teleki had 
lost his ability and will to fight for independence.
96   
Although Teleki felt let down by Britain, we have demonsrated that he did not 
want to antagonise London completely, and made attempts to save whatever was left of 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
93	 ﾠN.	 ﾠDreiszinger,	 ﾠ`Bridges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWest,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHorthy	 ﾠregime`s	 ﾠreassurance	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1941`,	 ﾠWar	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Society	 ﾠ	 ﾠ29	 ﾠ(1989),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐23.	 ﾠ
94	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ8	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠa	 ﾠsharp	 ﾠrant	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAllies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠa	 ﾠCzech-ﾭ‐Polish	 ﾠ
confederation	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsurprised,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
publication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspeech	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpress.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand	 ﾠwas	 ﾠunaware	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspeech	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠ
resentment	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice:	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK66	 ﾠ1940-ﾭ‐I.-ﾭ‐5.	 ﾠ436.csomó,	 ﾠ86/biz.,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Csáky,	 ﾠ8	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ
95	 ﾠBibó	 ﾠIstván	 ﾠÖsszegyűjtött	 ﾠMunkái	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠI.	 ﾠKemény	 ﾠés	 ﾠM.	 ﾠSárközi	 ﾠ(Bern,	 ﾠ1984),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ1210.	 ﾠ
96	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0010,	 ﾠ12,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ168	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
British sympathy.
97 Csáky on the other hand now followed an openly pro-German 
foreign policy. The fact that Csáky had failed to inform his minister in London about 
the `droit` testifies to his German-orientation, and that British approval mattered less 
and less for him. Barcza`s diaries reveal his anger and astonishment when he was 
informed of the `droit` by Sargent, and not Budapest, during their meeting on 14 May.
98 
Diplomatic dispatches conceal the conflict between Barcza and Csáky, but Barcza`s 
diaries did not hide his bitter disappointment in Csáky`s increasing German orientation.  
During 1940, hopelessness and irritation over the lack of information and instruction 
from Budapest is a common feature of the Barcza diaries. While Barcza`s isolation tells 
us much about Budapest`s disregard of London as a point of reference, furthermore it 
also indicates Barcza`s marginal position in London, as a representative of Hungary. As 
we have pointed out, the Foreign Office had information about the `droit` through 
O`Malley since March, and although Barcza was in regular contact with Sargent and 
Cadogan, they failed to question the Hungarian minister on this crucial question for 
more than month.  
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4. 6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to determine whether it could be proved that Hungary granted 
military passage to Germany in April 1940. Historiography so far has been unable to 
prove that such a decision was made in Budapest, and the issue remained theoretical in 
historical analyses. The failure to conclusively answer the question was partly due to the 
fact that a German military passage through Hungarian territory did not materialise until 
the autumn of 1940, therefore the problem was overlooked. It has been demonstrated 
here that British sources prove beyond question that a positive Hungarian answer was 
given to the German request in early April. 
Returning to the question about how far the Hungarian decision	 ﾠinfluenced 
British views on the Hungarian territorial question and the image of Hungary in 
London, it is clear that the decision had pivotal implications for the Anglo-Hungarian 
relationship.  Although the effects of the `droit` had not fully developed until 1941, it is 
evident that the `droit` had a particularly negative reception in London, and crucially 
affected perceptions of Hungary. The future of the First Vienna Award, and Hungarian 
authority over Ruthenia was now openly questioned in the Foreign Office, and similarly 
reserved opinions were articulated towards the question of the Hungarian-Romanian 
territorial dispute. The change of tone evidently suggests that confidence was shaken in 
the Hungarian elite. The British approach towards Hungary`s renewed claims in 
Romania in the summer of 1940, and the official opinion about the Second Vienna 
Award largely reflected this perception.   
Henceworth, London disregarded Hungarian concerns about the recreation of 
Czechoslovakia after the war, and more openly supported the cause of the  Czech 
émigrés. Besides, London discontinued its leniency in controlling contra-band  imports 
to Hungary. One of the more significant findings to emerge from the analysis of the 
`droit` is that the evidence presented here on the actual occurance of the Hungarian 
decision clearly explains the radical contrast between the positive British opinion of 
Hungary in early 1940 and the condemnation of the Second Vienna Award in August 
1940. This, until now, has only been explained by the vague and generalizing argument 
that Hungary followed an increasingly pro-German policy.  170	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`[…] we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes  
which take place during the war,  
unless they take place with the free consent  
and good will of the parties concerned.`
1 
(Churchill) 
 
5. Contemplating Alternatives: Britain and Hungary between rapprochement and 
conflict in the summer of 1940 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Only a few days after initiating an attack on the Western front, the German army broke 
through the gap in the Allied front, close to Sedan, and were rolling towards the English 
Channel at breakneck speed. Reaching the coast a few days later they had trapped about 
half a million Allied troops, including the British Expeditionary Forces (B.E.F.).
2 
Although the Allies managed to evacuate more than 300,000 British and French soldiers 
to England between the 26 May and 4 June 1940, the defeat seemed embarrassingly 
total.
3   
These dramatic developments increased the anxieties of Central European 
governments, which were forced to adjust their policy according to the changed 
circumstances. Most crucially, the Allied defeat had shaken belief in the ultimate British 
victory. On 21 May Teleki asked János Pelényi, the Hungarian minister in Washington, 
to send back the $5 million, originally intended for establishing a Hungarian émigré 
government in America.
4 A few days later, the Romanian cabinet declared an 
adjustment of its policy towards Germany and renounced the British guarantee.
5 As a 
result of the Allied defeat on the Western front not only Central European, but British 
political and military strategy also underwent a major revision. The immediate priority 
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 ﾠ(New	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 ﾠSecret	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was to prepare for the invasion of the British Isles, and as a result British continental 
priorities were downgraded. A large and growing body of historical literature has 
investigated this shift in British strategy, but the position of the Danubian region and the 
Balkans in this new situation have received limited attention. Historians have 
recognised that Central Europe and the Balkans retained only a very limited strategic 
importance in the context of British Mediterranean and Middle Eastern strategy, but so 
far historians provided limited evidence, particularly if we are looking at London`s 
relationship with countries far away from the `Middle Sea`.
6 Although several studies 
have recognised the devastating effect of the Allied collapse on Britain`s relationship 
with the region, the problem of how British policy shifted, as a consequence of the fall 
of France, has received very little attention in British historiography.
7  
Evidence suggests that although countries such as Hungary and Romania lost 
their strategically important position in British planning, June and July witnessed 
crucial decisions in British post-war planning, and the attitude of Budapest and 
Bucharest in this period critically affected the ways London contemplated the 
reconstruction of the region after the war. Hungarian historiography has also paid little 
attention to the summer months of 1940 in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. Although 
offering a comprehensive picture of the latter, András Bán`s analysis needs clarification. 
He raised the crucial question of how the evolution of the Anglo-Czech and Anglo-
Romanian relationships influenced British views on Hungary, but by using limited 
sources, he was unable to elucidate the correlations.
8 Ignác Romsics` analysis of the 
`image of Hungary` in the summer of 1940 also reached limited conclusion due to the 
same reasons.
9 Gábor Bátonyi, Tibor Frank, and Miklós Lojkó have analysed Anglo-
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 ﾠGreene	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 ﾠ(London,	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 ﾠBritish	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 ﾠalso:	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 ﾠVital	 ﾠCrossroads;	 ﾠPlayfair	 ﾠet	 ﾠal,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMediterranean	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠEast,	 ﾠvol.	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7	 ﾠThe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsummer	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1940	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 ﾠvery	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 ﾠstrategy	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 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpolicy:	 ﾠButler,	 ﾠGrand	 ﾠStrategy;	 ﾠWoodward,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
Foreign	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	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 ﾠstudy	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 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	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 ﾠanalysis	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Greek-ﾭ‐Turkish	 ﾠfocus:	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 ﾠand	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 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠof	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Hungarian relations in a broader time-frame and crucially recognised that judging 
Hungarian policy worked in a regional framework in British thought.
10 The new sources 
examined here will complement our understanding of how Britain judged the Hungarian 
territorial claims and will show that the views on Hungary were ambiguous and 
inconclusive in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophes of the summer of 1940.   
We are seeking also to go beyond investigating British policy towards the region 
solely through the prism of diplomatic correspondence and the simple analysis of 
official policy. The political correspondence of the Foreign Office provides the general 
framework of the analysis, but we will pursue un-researched evidence in the files of the 
PID and the FRPS, responsible for propaganda and post-war planning at this stage of 
the war. As we have noted, most of the Hungarian archival materials covering Anglo-
Hungarian relationship in 1940-41 were destroyed during the war. This has largely 
hampered the analysis, especially in determining to what extent Budapest relied on 
British official opinion in formulating its foreign policy in mid-1940. Some of the 
crucial aspects of Hungarian foreign policy can however be reconstructed from the 
diaries of György Barcza, which therefore will form an important part of our inquiry. 
Romanian sources have recently been thoroughly examined by Béni L. Balogh, but for 
the most part he concentrated on Romanian-Hungarian and Romanian-German 
relations; therefore looking at British sources for Romania will also be crucial.
11  
This chapter will also address largely unexplored questions, such as propaganda 
towards Hungary and Romania in mid-1940.
12 The evidence suggests that London was 
very active in this sphere, perhaps as propaganda remained the sole method to influence 
the region. The analysis of this field in the context of British views on the ongoing 
Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute in the summer of 1940 will bring us closer to 
answer one of the key question of this study: why were the two countries viewed 
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 ﾠG.	 ﾠBátonyi,	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 ﾠEurope,	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differently in London, if both were viewed as Axis satellites?
 13 Answering this question 
will also help understanding British disapproval of the Second Vienna Award, which 
was a German-Italian arbitration of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute on 30 
August 1940.   
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5. 2 The implications of the Allied collapse on the Western front on British Central 
European policy 
 
I. 
The collapse of France, and Italy`s entry into the war was the worst possible 
combination for British Balkan and Mediterranean strategy.
14 As early as 1936, the 
Chiefs of Staff had warned of the difficulties of waging simultaneous wars against 
Germany on the continent, Italy in the Mediterranean and Japan in the Far East. The 
`Three Power Enemy` threat presented an impossible financial and strategic burden for 
Britain. The problem sparked intense debate between the Treasury, the Foreign Office 
and the Armed Services, leading to the conclusion that Italian non-belligerence was 
essential for keeping imperial communications open in the Mediterranean.
15 A 
memorandum, prepared by the Chiefs of Staff at the outbreak of the war further 
emphasized the importance of Italian neutrality in British Mediterranean strategy, 
pointing out that the attitude of Italy would also crucially influence the attitude of 
Turkey and Balkan countries towards Britain.
16  
After Italy declared war on Britain and France on 10 June 1940, a fresh Chiefs 
of Staff report recommended the complete reverse of British Balkan policy. It noted that 
the earlier aim to keep the war away from the region, by creating a Balkan neutral bloc, 
consisting of Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary, should now finally be 
abandoned. This loss of interest was twofold. The memorandum stressed that the only 
way to limit the implication of the catastrophes of Norway and the Western front was to 
extend the war to the Balkans, which at the same time would relieve the strain and 
pressure on Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, and the British Isles.
 17 The document stressed that 
the German-Italian occupation of the region suddenly became a British interest, as it 
could potentially cause communicational and economic disruptions for the Axis. The 
report was briefly discussed by the Cabinet on 13 June, where Halifax proposed that 
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Yugoslavia and Greece should immediately be induced to intervene actively on the side 
of the Allies. His recommendation was accepted without discussion, but further 
decisions on the Balkans were postponed until the situation in France and in the 
Mediterranean clarified. The Cabinet nevertheless agreed that immediate action should 
be taken to organise acts of sabotage to destroy stocks, harvest and disrupt 
communication in order to disturb the shipping of supplies from the region to 
Germany.
18 Apart from this occasion, the Cabinet paid very little attention to the 
Balkans and focus unsurprisingly was centred on the dramatic situation of the Western 
front.
19  
The apparent lack of Cabinet attention on South East Europe in June and July 
supports the viewpoint of Gabriel Gorodetsky and Valerie Cromwell, who have both 
argued that due to Churchill`s and Halifax`s lack of interest, policy was mainly 
conducted by the Foreign Office towards South Eastern Europe.
20 However, their 
argument fails to deal with the crucial questions of how far the Foreign Office and its 
senior officials followed the general guidelines of Halifax, and to what extent they 
attempted to go against Cabinet instructions, which will be examined here. We have 
argued that Hungarian questions were normally dealt with by the Foreign Office, due to 
Chamberlain`s, Churchill`s and Halifax`s lack of interest; this argument will be put to 
the test here. A circular telegram instructed British representatives in the region 
according to 13 June decisions of the Cabinet. Apart from emphasizing that the present 
chaotic situation should also be exploited to organise acts of sabotage, it stressed that 
causing friction between Germany and the Soviet Union was now paramount.
21  
The change in British policy was radical. Countries, which only a few months 
before had been promised economic and military aid, now became the subject of 
discussions about subversive actions. Preparations for sabotage commenced 
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immediately in the D section of MI6, which later became the foundation of the Special 
Operations Executive (S.O.E.). Keith Jeffrey`s recent monograph of MI6 has 
demonstrated that between 1939 and 1941 British intelligence activities in Hungary 
were very limited.
22 Basil Davidson, an intelligence officer, was sent to Hungary in late 
1939	 ﾠwith the vague instruction to `promote resistance`. He reported that Hungarians 
were hard to bribe and were reluctant to destroy their stocks and property for the Allied 
cause.
23 For instance, his preparations to blow up bridges on the Danube was halted by 
O`Malley, who forced him to throw the explosives into the Danube.
24 Later, in 1943-44, 
during the Anglo-Hungarian secret negotiations, the same problem became the 
cornerstone of Hungary`s possible surrender to the Allies.
25 Miklós Kállay, the 
Hungarian prime minister at the time, expressed his particular annoyance regarding the 
British request that Hungary should show its pro-Allied inclination by organising acts of 
sabotage.
26 
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The circular telegram, informing the British representatives in the region about the shift 
in Balkan policy, and crucially of a changed policy towards the Soviet Union, had 
critical implications for British policy towards the small nations of Central Europe. 
British policy towards the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940 encapsulates the 
controversies of British policy towards Central Europe and Hungary. Over the summer 
of 1940 Britain aimed to prevent a close German-Soviet cooperation and was making 
efforts to avoid estranging Moscow. This policy was not a new phenomenon. Although 
Chamberlain, Churchill and Halifax were very suspicious towards the USSR, Moscow 
was viewed as the smaller evil in the region, and since the Nazi-Soviet Pact, a German-
Soviet conflict was expected over controlling Central Europe and the Balkans in 
particular. Sir Stafford Cripps, a staunch advocate of the Soviet Union was appointed as 
ambassador in Moscow in May 1940 with the intention of facilitating an understanding 
between London and the Soviet regime. He was allowed greater latitude than that of a 
regular ambassador and was given the instruction to approach Anglo-Soviet relationship 
from the general standpoint of European equilibrium.
27 Cripps recommended that for 
cooperation against Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union should be granted greater 
influence in the Balkans and the Baltic. His recommendations were received with 
scepticism in the Foreign Office,
 28 but Churchill and Halifax disagreed with the Foreign 
Office and assured Moscow that Britain might accept Soviet annexations in Poland, 
Romania and the Baltic for a closer cooperation.
29  
The Soviet ultimatum to Bucharest on 26 June, which demanded the return of 
Bessarabia, along with Northern Bukovina, prompted perplexity in the Cabinet. Halifax 
expressed his hope that the Soviet step would lead to conflict between the two 
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dictators.
30 Similarly to the British reaction to the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland 
in September 1939, any suggestions of sending a warning to Moscow were ruled out 
and London adopted a reserved attitude on the question, in effect de facto recognising 
this frontier change.
31 Moreover, Churchill, in a personal letter to Stalin, suggested the 
continuation of negotiations between London and Moscow, a move, which suggested 
that London might turn a blind eye towards Soviet territorial expansion in Romania.
32  
  
It also seems useful to briefly juxtapose the British reaction to the Soviet 
aggression against Bessarabia with that against the Baltic States, as they contrast 
considerably. Although covertly, Britain had harboured and aided the transport of 
volunteers to Finland, to fight the Soviet Union in the `Winter War`. More crucially, the 
British Cabinet and the Foreign Office expressed their sharp disapproval of the Soviet 
penetration into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the summer of 1940. Moscow`s 
control over the Baltic was viewed as a sign of Soviet naval penetration, in possible 
cooperation with Germany, towards the North Sea.
33 This comparison demonstrates that 
naval threats triggered fierce protests in London, even though the protection of the 
Baltic States was impossible at the time. On the other hand, as long as the Soviet Union 
was satisfied with Bessarabia in the Balkans, and did not go beyond its original demand, 
escalating the relationship with Moscow with a warning was ruled out.  
On the other hand it is crucial to point out that compared to the British 
sympathies towards the ethnographic frontier between Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union, created by the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland in 1939, the Soviet takeover 
of Bessarabia could not be justified ethnographically.
34 The Soviet occupation re-
established the historical frontier between Romania and the `Russian Empire`. The fact 
that Whitehall supported the alteration of frontiers in Bessarabia, which could not be 
justified ethnically, refutes our earlier hypothesis, which, using the example of the 
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positive British opinion of the ethnographic frontier of the Soviet Union in occupied 
Poland claimed that London contemplated redrawing of the future regional frontiers on 
an ethnographic basis. The problem has very important Hungarian implications. The 
Soviet aggression reinvigorated Hungarian territorial claims in Romania. Budapest, 
similarly to Moscow, attempted to re-establish the historic frontier between Hungary 
and Romania along the crest of the Carpathians, which was not supported by London. 
The next section will analyse the renewed Hungarian territorial claims on Romania in 
July in greater depth; therefore here we will limit our attention to establishing whether 
there was a Hungarian angle in the British policy over Bessarabia.  
  One of the reasons for the reserved British attitude towards the Soviet 
aggression against Romania was the supposition that if London told Bucharest to yield 
to Soviet demands, it would prompt Budapest to immediately come forward with their 
set of territorial claims. We have noted that Hungarian territorial claims were viewed as 
German tools to dismember Romania, which was seen as the first step of German 
penetration towards the Straits in Whitehall. The British will to avoid this scenario 
seems to contradict our earlier argument, which suggested that extending the war to the 
Balkans became the new British strategy after the collapse of France. Looking at the 
formulation of British policy on this particular question demonstrates one of the crucial 
problems surrounding the analysis of British foreign policy. The separate analysis of 
these two seemingly contradictory policies would lead to inaccurate assumptions. This 
realization points to the pitfalls of looking at British policy towards a country in 
isolation and highlights the necessity of analysing the bigger picture of British regional 
policy. The contradiction of aiming to bring the war to the Balkans, while making 
efforts to prevent the disintegration of Romania can be used to highlight that 
formulating policy was at an intermediate stage.      
This stage of discussions brought unusual propositions forward. Orme Sargent in 
the Southern department suggested a radically different approach to Hungarian 
revisionism. For strategic consideration, he proposed that Britain should support 
Hungarian territorial claims in Romania and Yugoslavia, because Hungarian expansion 
could potentially set the region alight, because both Belgrade and Bucharest pledge 180	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
active military help to each other in the event of Hungarian aggression.
35 Supporting 
Hungarian territorial claims for immediate strategic interest was a new approach. 
However, it has to be stressed that Sargent only proposed supporting Hungarian 
territorial claims to gain strategic advantages for Britain; the primary strategic aim was 
to cause trouble for the Axis. His proposition was unanimously rejected by the Foreign 
Office due to the fact that Sir Ronald Campbell, the British minister to Belgrade, 
reported that the Yugoslavs were also going out of their way to accommodate the 
Axis.
36  
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III. 
 
In July British policy towards the region was evidently in the process of transformation. 
Hungary and Romania now entirely disappeared from memoranda discussing British 
Balkan strategy, which demonstrate that they lost all strategic significance after the 
French defeat. Since strategic interests did not play any prominence, it will be crucial to 
identify what set of criteria were used in the consequent judgement of Hungary and 
Romania.  
Looking at the Czechoslovak angle of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship after 
the collapse of France provides some answers to this question. Hungarian 
historiography has failed to recognise that until the `droit` the Czech émigré question in 
London had a Hungarian angle, and London was reluctant to decide between Prague and 
Budapest.
37 In early July however, at the recommendation of Halifax, the Cabinet 
decided to recognise the Czecho-Slovak National Committee as the provisional 
government of the Czecho-Slovak peoples.
38 The reasons for the decision were both 
strategic and political. As a result of the defeat of France and Hungary`s openly pro-
German policy, Halifax stressed that the opinions of Paris and Budapest could now be 
ignored.
39 Concerns were also expressed that German successes might turn the Czechs 
and Slovaks towards Berlin, and in desperate need for allies Britain felt it essential to 
officially recognise the Czecho-Slovak National Committee.
40 Despite the recognition, 
London still explicitly refused to commit to the future frontiers of the Czecho-Slovak 
state, but compared to late 1939, this now did not have any Hungarian dimension.
41 
The recognition of the Czech émigrés brought the disagreement between the 
Foreign Office and O`Malley to the surface, which eventually clarified where London 
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 ﾠBán,	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 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ105.	 ﾠ	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38	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/42,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ7646/2/12,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠRecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCzecho-ﾭ‐Slovak	 ﾠNational	 ﾠCommittee`,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠJuly	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1940;	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠBrugel,	 ﾠ‘The	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCzechoslovak	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon’,	 ﾠJournal	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 ﾠCzechoslovak	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠStudies,	 ﾠ1983/2.,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐15;	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 ﾠpp.	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 ﾠimportant	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stood on the question of frontier revision. Earlier in February Sargent had noted his 
dissatisfaction over O`Malley`s pro-Hungarian inclination and minuted that `[…] the 
Hungarians have an eloquent advocate in the person of His Majesty`s representative`.
42 
Later in July Sargent was particularly annoyed over O`Malley`s recommendation to 
reverse British policy on Hungarian territorial claims, and to support the Carpathian 
frontier.
43 Due to O`Malley`s pro-Hungarian views on frontier revision, and perhaps to 
avoid unnecessary protests, the Foreign Office deliberately failed to inform him that the 
Czech émigrés would receive recognition. O`Malley, on receiving the news felt let 
down and deprived of any opportunities to sooth Hungarian anxieties or to influence 
Hungarian foreign policy.
44 One of the most significant results to emerge from the spat 
between the Foreign Office and O`Malley was that during the ensuing discussion, the 
Foreign Office categorically asserted that the Hungarian decision to grant military 
passage to Germany in April crucially influenced the decision to recognise the Czecho-
Slovak Committee as a provisional government.
45 The recognition had not immediately 
brought discussions forward about the future of the First Vienna Award and Ruthenia 
between Whitehall and Beneš, but as we will see, it had a crucial impact on the future of 
Hungary`s territorial gains in Czechoslovakia.  
The Czech question also brought discussions forward on the issue of the 
Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute. Opinions demonstrated that apart from singling 
out the Czech view point, the Foreign Office also drifted towards favouring the 
Romanian opinion as a result of the Hungarian `droit`. In the Central department Frank 
Roberts now stressed that: 
Nothing can be hoped from Hungary in this war, but […] Romania […] might 
change government, so we are supporting them.
46  
The fact that Romania renounced the British guarantee on 1 July, and officially declared 
that in the future it would exclusively follow Axis policy, makes Roberts` remark 
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 ﾠregion.	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exceptionally curious. Sir Reginald Hoare, the British minister in Bucharest felt 
disgusted at the Romanian volte face and recommended radically rethinking British 
policy towards Bucharest. His anxiety fell on deaf ears in London.
47 The most 
influential members of the Foreign Office - Halifax, Cadogan, Sargent, Roberts and 
Nichols - were all convinced that even though Romania should now be considered as 
territory under enemy control, this could not be officially declared for a number of 
reasons. Hoare was instructed that due to British investments in the Romanian oil 
industry and Danubian shipping, the relationship had to be officially maintained.
48  
What is also significant to add is that the Foreign Office drew distinctions 
between the behaviour of the Hungarian and Romanian nations. The assumption that the 
Romanian nation was more sympathetic towards the Allied cause became one of the key 
elements in the formulation of British policy over the Hungarian-Romanian territorial 
question after Romania turned its back on Britain. As Roberts` comment shows, the 
Foreign Office was convinced that the Romanian people had genuine pro-Western 
feelings, and expected them to overthrow their pro-Axis government.  
This notion crucially separated the orientation of the Romanian people from the 
mistakes of the current pro-German Romanian government, which resulted in giving a 
blind eye to the renunciation of the British guarantee. Besides, based on the reports of 
Hugh Seton-Watson, who at this time worked at the British legation in Bucharest, 
London put exceptionally high hopes on the ability of Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the 
National Peasant Party (PNŢ), and earlier Prime Minister of Romania (1928-1933), to 
resist German and Hungarian territorial claims.
49 On the other hand London ignored 
supporting the democratic Hungarian opposition, and neglected the pro-British 
persuasion of the Hungarian middle classes.
50 The question inevitably arises, why the 
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Romania	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1940	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 ﾠpurchase,	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 ﾠon	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 ﾠDanube,	 ﾠin	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 ﾠto	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transporting	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠoil.	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 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	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 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy.	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 ﾠneeds	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pro-British segments of the Hungarian elite and the Hungarian masses were considered 
less `revolutionary` than the Romanian? The answer seems to lie in the contrast between 
the diplomatic reports coming from Belgrade, Bucharest and Budapest. Outlining the 
attitude of Central European nations towards Britain had always been the key element 
of British diplomatic reports. Before the French defeat, representatives of Britain 
unanimously reported the strong belief of Central European nations in the ultimate 
victory of Britain. After the French surrender, O`Malley recounted the disillusionment 
of the Hungarian public in British strength.
51 On the other hand, Hoare reported a 
continuous disposition towards Britain among the Romanian public throughout 1940.
52  
There is a more speculative answer, which draws upon deep-seated perceptions 
and prejudices of British policy-makers. It uses the assumption that the long established 
British perceptions viewed Hungary, the Hungarian elite and the Hungarian political 
and social system negatively. Sylvia Stevenson, an English journalist, who travelled 
through Northern Hungary and Ruthenia on horseback in 1938, recounted that the 
English perceived the Hungarian elite as feudal, autarchic and harsh on their peasants 
and minorities.
53 The Magyarization of the late dualist era, the undemocratic character 
and backwardness of the Hungarian society, the lack of land reform was indeed held 
against Budapest in the Foreign Office when the question of the reconstruction of 
Central Europe was discussed.
54 These questions were also raised by historians, such as 
Macartney and Seton-Watson, who, although having very different views on the 
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these	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWest,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠTibor	 ﾠEckhardt,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠas	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠruling	 ﾠ
elite	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠunacceptable	 ﾠextent,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠruled	 ﾠout	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠEckhardt`s	 ﾠviews	 ﾠon	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠviewed	 ﾠas	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠradical.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ`Danube	 ﾠValley	 ﾠQuestion`	 ﾠwas	 ﾠignored	 ﾠand	 ﾠshelved	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠand	 ﾠRex	 ﾠLeeper,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhead	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPID:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ898/217,	 ﾠBruce	 ﾠLockhart	 ﾠto	 ﾠLeeper,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ
1940.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ`Magyarország	 ﾠvilágháborús	 ﾠrészvétele	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠszemszögből`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ64.	 ﾠLondon,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsympathetic	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠCount	 ﾠMihály	 ﾠKárolyi,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprime	 ﾠminister	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
1919,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠlived	 ﾠin	 ﾠexile	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠless	 ﾠradical	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠrevision,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
1940	 ﾠwas	 ﾠstill	 ﾠreluctant	 ﾠto	 ﾠlead	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐fascist	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠemigration	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
prominent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
51	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/42,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ8209/529/21,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ7	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
52	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24984,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ3820/195/37;	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6681/392/37,	 ﾠ
Hoare	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ
53	 ﾠStevenson,	 ﾠRide	 ﾠto	 ﾠBattle	 ﾠ,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
54	 ﾠThis	 ﾠview	 ﾠwas	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠas	 ﾠearly	 ﾠas	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21571,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ
12378/2319/12,	 ﾠStevenson,	 ﾠSub-ﾭ‐Carpathian	 ﾠRussia,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠSpeaight	 ﾠ9	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ
1938;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠMallet,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠ17	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1938;	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/21573,	 ﾠ
C13549/2319/12,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠMallet,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1938.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ185	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
question of frontier revision, agreed that after the war Hungary would need to undergo 
extensive democratization.
55  
The perception that the Hungarian people was less enthusiastic towards the 
Allied cause, and the Hungarian opposition less powerful to overthrow the government 
than the Romanian, became recurrent when Whitehall formulated an opinion about the 
Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute in July, and became the basis of the 
condemnation of the Second Vienna Award later in August.   
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55	 ﾠPCAM,	 ﾠMSS.	 ﾠEng.	 ﾠc.	 ﾠ3287,	 ﾠDoc	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠMacartney:	 ﾠReport	 ﾠon	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠ(fols	 ﾠ3-ﾭ‐125),	 ﾠ4-ﾭ‐5,	 ﾠ12;	 ﾠR.	 ﾠ
W.	 ﾠSeton	 ﾠWatson,	 ﾠ‘The	 ﾠEra	 ﾠof	 ﾠReform	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary’,	 ﾠSlavonic	 ﾠand	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠReview	 ﾠ(American	 ﾠSeries)	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠ(1943),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ145-ﾭ‐166.	 ﾠ186	 ﾠ
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5. 3 Hungarian territorial claims (July-August 1940) 
 
I. 
 
Since the outbreak of the war, Hungary had been keen to bring the question of 
Transylvania to a head. The suddenness of the Allied collapse convinced Teleki that the 
war was approaching its end and he was desperately looking for an opportunity to 
recover Transylvania.
56 Based on the experiences of the chaotic climax of the First 
World War, when the Romanian occupation of Transylvania was accepted by Britain 
and France as a fait accompli, Teleki was now eager to regain the province before the 
end of the war.
57 He was certain that London would be preoccupied with more 
important questions at the future peace conference and would simply acknowledge the 
reincorporation of Transylvania into Hungary. Moreover, both Teleki and Csáky 
assumed that London would not raise its voice against the Hungarian occupation, due to 
Romania`s volte face.
58 Barcza, who earlier was convinced of Britain`s ultimate victory, 
was now also shaken in his views as a consequence of the swift German victory. He 
made the surprising remark in his diary that Transylvania had to be occupied 
immediately, even considering the threat of disruption of diplomatic relations with 
London.
59  
At the end of 1939 Hungary had promised not to stab Romania in the back, if it 
had to defend itself against the Soviet Union. On the other hand Barcza was instructed 
to forewarn London that Hungary would not tolerate discrimination, and the free 
surrender of Romanian territory to the Soviet Union would encourage Hungary to 
demand Transylvania.
60 When Romania handed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to 
the Soviet Union on 28 June, Budapest immediately presented its claims, and ordered 
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56	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSoviet	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠBessarabia	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠsent	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠquestionnaires	 ﾠto	 ﾠMussolini	 ﾠsounding	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
Italy`s	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠaction	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠRomania.	 ﾠMussolini	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠoccasions	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpatience:	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
Palazzo	 ﾠChigi	 ﾠés	 ﾠMagyarország,	 ﾠ615:	 ﾠTalamo	 ﾠto	 ﾠCiano,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠ633:	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠto	 ﾠMussolini,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ
1940;	 ﾠ672:	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠto	 ﾠMussolini	 ﾠ3	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠRéti,	 ﾠ`Teleki	 ﾠPál	 ﾠ1940	 ﾠaugusztus	 ﾠ3-ﾭ‐i	 ﾠlevele	 ﾠés	 ﾠ
emlékeztetője	 ﾠBenito	 ﾠMussolininek`,	 ﾠSzázadok	 ﾠ231	 ﾠ(1999),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ828-ﾭ‐841.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
57	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠMagyarorszag	 ﾠkülpolitikája,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ234-ﾭ‐235;	 ﾠAblonczy,	 ﾠPál	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ93,	 ﾠ106-ﾭ‐107,	 ﾠ169.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
58	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠV,	 ﾠ189:	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
59	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠJuly,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0010;	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠto	 ﾠBarcza`s	 ﾠmemoirs,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
discussed	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsceptically:	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiplomataemlékeim,	 ﾠ	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ393-ﾭ‐394.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
60	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteenth,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ405.	 ﾠ187	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
full mobilization.
61 In the past, Berlin had vetoed any Hungarian actions in 
Transylvania. Now, Otto von Ermansdorff, the German minister in Budapest, although 
assuring that Hungarian territorial claims were supported, warned against escalating the 
situation.
62  
The Foreign Office judged that due to the German-Italian veto on Hungarian 
action, the problem would not escalate into an open conflict. Hence, London showed 
limited interest towards the problem in the first half of July. On the day of the Soviet 
occupation of Bessarabia, O`Malley advised that allowing Hungary to declare war on 
Romania would serve British interests, as it would lead to the Hungarian occupation of 
the crest of the Carpathians, which could check Soviet expansion towards the Straits.
63 
Halifax dismissed this proposition on the basis that Germany had already declared that a 
Hungarian occupation would not be allowed.
64 
 What is instantly apparent from the diplomatic reports coming from Bucharest 
is that the Transylvanian question was the least of British worries among the plethora of 
problems Romania presented. London`s paramount concern was the fate of British 
investments in Romanian shipment and oil companies and the treatment of British 
subjects in the country, now that Romania was on the verge of adhering to the Axis.
65 
These predicaments were all rooted in the U-turn of Romanian foreign policy, and 
Hungarian territorial claims in Transylvania, either supported or discouraged by 
London, seemed to have no effect on these questions. However, it would be a mistake to 
interpret the initial British disinterest towards the Hungarian claims as British 
detachment from the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, as the later German attention in 
August sparked intense British interest.  It will be crucial to identify why London 
became suddenly interested in the question and whether this had any implications for 
British perceptions of the post-war reconstruction of the region and the redrawing of the 
Hungarian-Romanian frontier in particular.  
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61	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠMagyarorszag	 ﾠkülpolitikája,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ234-ﾭ‐235;	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠV,	 ﾠ135:	 ﾠCsáky`s	 ﾠcircular	 ﾠtelegram	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠlegations,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrenewed	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreiteration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠTeleki`s	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠmemorandum,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐thirds	 ﾠof	 ﾠTransylvania:	 ﾠBalogh,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar-ﾭ‐román	 ﾠ
kapcsolatok,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ63.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
62	 ﾠA	 ﾠWilhelmstrasse	 ﾠés	 ﾠMagyarország,	 ﾠ329:	 ﾠErmansdorff	 ﾠto	 ﾠRibbentrop,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠ332:	 ﾠErmansdorff	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠRibbentrop,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ
63	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6667/246/37,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
64	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6733/5/67,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
65	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24988,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6681/392/37,	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠ7	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
It deserves to be highlighted too that in July British opinion of the Transylvanian 
problem was mainly formulated in diplomatic reports from Bucharest. As noted, 
O`Malley`s judgement on the question was not trusted, as he was viewed to be under 
the influence of the Hungarian elite. The recommendations of Hoare on the other hand 
constantly reappeared during discussions in the Foreign Office. Regarding the 
Hungarian-Romanian quarrel, Hoare projected the image of a tolerant Romania, which 
in the previous 20 years was following a patient minority policy. On the other hand he 
described Hungary as a country which had been refusing every sensible compromise by 
insisting on highly inflated territorial demands.
 66  
It is clear that the superabundance of Hungarian and Romanian propaganda 
material, which attempted to influence policy-makers in London on the Transylvanian 
problem, largely missed their target.
 67 Interestingly enough, out of the vast number of 
pamphlets and other materials, only Marcu Beza`s study on Bessarabia and 
Transylvania was used as a reference point by Foreign Office officials during July and 
August 1940.
68 Beza`s pamphlet attempted to refute the Hungarian historic claims to the 
province by arguing for the Daco-Roman continuity theory, which emphasized that 
Romanians were the direct descendants of Dacia from the Roman times, and indeed had 
been living in Transylvania before the Magyars arrived.
69 Beza also emphasized 
Transylvania`s Romanian cultural and ethnographic character based on the fact that the 
majority of the peasant population were Romanian. 
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66	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6871/195/37,	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ31	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
67	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠand	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠpropaganda	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1940s	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Transylvanian	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠby	 ﾠCase:	 ﾠBetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTransylvania	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ
40-ﾭ‐49.	 ﾠ
68	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24984,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6731/195/37,	 ﾠMarcu	 ﾠBeza,	 ﾠBessarabia	 ﾠand	 ﾠTransylvania.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠExplanation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
Maps	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1940).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
69	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠDaco-ﾭ‐Roman	 ﾠcontinuity	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠby	 ﾠhistorians.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠ
perspective,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠL.	 ﾠBoia,	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠand	 ﾠMyth	 ﾠin	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠConsciousness	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2001),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ47,	 ﾠ113-ﾭ‐114.	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠview,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠI.	 ﾠBóna,	 ﾠ`From	 ﾠDacia	 ﾠto	 ﾠTransylvania:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠ
Migrations	 ﾠ(271–895)	 ﾠand	 ﾠThe	 ﾠHungarian–Slav	 ﾠPeriod	 ﾠ(895–1172)`	 ﾠin	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠTransylvania,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ
Bóna	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1994),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ62–177.	 ﾠ189	 ﾠ
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II. 
 
British opinion worked within these limitations, until Germany decided to intervene in 
the dispute. In mid-July a Hungarian,	 ﾠand later a Romanian delegation was invited to 
Germany for discussions. The German diplomatic intervention suggested that the 
dispute would eventually lead to German dictated frontier change between Hungary and 
Romania. Britain paid attention to the question in order to limit the advantages Berlin 
hoped to gain by solving the quarrel. London predicted that a German involvement 
would end in a frontier revision in favour of Hungary, which was viewed as a threat to 
Romania.
70  
In the Foreign Office very few had questioned that Romania should be 
encouraged to resist Hungarian claims. Austin Haigh, the liaison officer between the 
News and Central departments recommended that now that Romania was lost, Britain 
should gain credit in Hungary by supporting their claims.
71 Haigh`s proposition was 
swept aside and it was firmly expressed that Britain had no interest in playing second 
fiddle to Germany as a mediator.
72 The Foreign Office viewed the question more as a 
minority problem than a territorial one, and adopted Hoare`s recommendations that the 
transfer of Magyars from Romania and Romanians from Hungary would put an end to 
the dispute.
 73 The Romanian declaration that ceding Romanians to Hungary would not 
be accepted resonated with British preferences for solving territorial disputes with 
minority transfers.Consequently, discussion about transferring territory to Hungary 
worked in the context of minority transfer which was considered in order to 
accommodate the substantially larger number of Magyars, who might be transferred in 
the process. Robin Hankey, the first secretary of the British legation in Bucharest, 
suggested that Romania would agree to the cession of territories west of the Arad-
Máramarossziget [Sighet] line to Hungary (map 5.1a, 5.1b), if this could involve 
transferring the entire Magyar minority of Romania to this area. The Foreign Office had 
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70	 ﾠBudapest,	 ﾠas	 ﾠalways,	 ﾠleft	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠvague	 ﾠform.	 ﾠTherefore	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
judge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠTeleki`s	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Hungary`s	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠclaims,	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠin	 ﾠFebruary,	 ﾠformed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfresh	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠclaims.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
71	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24984,	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already proposed a similar solution in January 1940, which, as we have seen, was 
rejected by Budapest. Nichols claimed that the Arad-Máramarossziget [Sighet] frontier 
would still be an acceptable compromise for London, but pointed out that the 
Hungarians, as in January, would not be satisfied with such a small territorial gain.
74  
As we have noted, Macartney had studied the question of population transfer in 
the FRPS from early 1940. Contrary to the Foreign Office opinion he recommended that 
only equal number of minorities should be involved in a population exchange.
75 The 
historian, J. D. Mabbott had also examined the question of population transfer in the 
FRPS in May 1940. He suggested that the Hungarian-Slovak frontier should be drawn 
in a way to balance the number of minorities on each side, which would allow a 
possible exchange of population. The question of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier was 
more complex, and here Mabbott recommended three alternatives (map 5.2). The first 
possibility was to transfer the district lying adjacent to Hungary, because here Magyars 
comprised of over 80 percent of the population. As a second option Mabbott 
recommended the transfer of a wider strip of territory to Hungary along the existing 
frontier. This was very similar to the January 1940 recommendation of the Foreign 
Office. Interestingly, the third recommendation suggested a frontier very similar to the 
Second Vienna Award line, drawn by Hitler later at the end of August 1940.
76   
As Keyserling have pointed out, there is no evidence that these memoranda 
reached the Foreign Office in mid-1940, and Whitehall formulated its opinions on 
Hungary`s territorial claims on Romania in the summer of 1940 on very different 
criteria.
77 As the discussion reached the top of the Foreign Office hierarchy, the opinion 
became more negative towards Hungary. Sargent, known for his anti-Hungarian rants, 
stressed that Hungary could serve no British purpose in the war. Besides, Halifax, 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
74	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24984,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6871/195/37,	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠby	 ﾠE.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠRose	 ﾠand	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 ﾠPCAM,	 ﾠMSS.	 ﾠENG.	 ﾠc.	 ﾠ3281,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠdoc.	 ﾠ22,	 ﾠfolios	 ﾠ169-ﾭ‐183,	 ﾠTransfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠPopulation,	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ
Keyserling,	 ﾠ`Arnold	 ﾠToynbee`s	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠResearch	 ﾠand	 ﾠPress	 ﾠService`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ546.	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 ﾠSEW	 ﾠ13/1,	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠMabbott,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠTransfer	 ﾠof	 ﾠMinorities`,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠMabbott	 ﾠalso	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Austrian	 ﾠfrontier,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠunchanged.	 ﾠSince	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 ﾠ
Anschluss,	 ﾠWhitehall	 ﾠdedicated	 ﾠminimal	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfrontier,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠBerlin	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠit	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
March	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpresumed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontest	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ1942	 ﾠwitnessed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappearance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠmemoranda	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFRPS	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠAustria.	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 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrestoration	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Austrian	 ﾠindependence	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠretention	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Austrian	 ﾠfrontier:	 ﾠPCAM,	 ﾠMSS.	 ﾠENG.	 ﾠ
C.	 ﾠ3286,	 ﾠdoc.	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠ`Austria	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐East	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠQuestion	 ﾠ(British	 ﾠattitude)`,	 ﾠ20	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 ﾠ1942;	 ﾠ
doc.	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠ`Frontiers	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustria	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary`,	 ﾠ17	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 ﾠ1943.	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 ﾠPress	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 ﾠ546.	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Sargent and Cadogan all emphasized that Romania should be encouraged to resist 
Hungarian territorial claims, as they were convinced that it could stimulate Romania to 
return to the Allied camp.
78 Accordingly, Hoare was instructed to encourage Bucharest 
to resist Hungarian claims.
79 As always, Cadogan hit a completely different tone with 
Barcza during their conversations on the 16 July. He thanked Barcza for the sincere 
attitude of the Hungarians, and noted his devastating opinion of Romania after it openly 
started following the policy of the Axis.
80 In fact Cadogan wanted to maintain friendly 
relations with Hungary and said what Barcza wanted to hear. This disingenuousness 
eventually fuelled the Hungarian perception that the Romanian volte face had morally 
elevated Hungary in British eyes. The minutes of the Foreign Office clearly demonstrate 
that such a shift did not occur and the notion that the Romanian nation was more likely 
to turn against the present pro-German regime than the Hungarian continued to 
determine British thought. 
The comparison of the British reaction to Hungarian and Bulgarian claims in 
Romania over the summer of 1940 puts Hungarian revisionism in a regional context and 
illustrate the differences of how London contemplated solving different territorial 
disputes in the region and answers questions such as why different territorial claims 
were viewed differently in London. Sofia`s claims on Southern Dobruja (map 5.3) had a 
distinctively different reception in London, compared to the ones presented by 
Budapest, due to Bulgaria`s strategically important position. The Southern Dobruja 
dispute was the only regional territorial dispute during the Second World War which the 
Foreign Office actively encouraged to be solved on a revisionist basis.
  
The U-turn of Romania brought the German threat closer to the Straits. Bulgaria 
had not yet followed an openly pro-German policy, therefore supporting its claims for 
Southern Dobruja served the strategic aim of keeping a foothold in the Balkans.
 81 The 
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 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/	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 ﾠR	 ﾠ6897/246/37,	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 ﾠby	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940;	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 ﾠby	 ﾠHalifax,	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/	 ﾠ24985,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6897/246/37,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠHoare,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	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80	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0010.	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81	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSouthern	 ﾠDobruja	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠgap	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠBalkan	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Mediterranean	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠStoyan	 ﾠRachev`s	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAnglo-ﾭ‐Bulgarian	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
war	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠdetail,	 ﾠand	 ﾠElisabeth	 ﾠBarker	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠrestrained	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion:	 ﾠS.	 ﾠRatchev,	 ﾠ
Anglo-ﾭ‐Bulgarian	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠDuring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(1939-ﾭ‐1944)	 ﾠ(Sofia,	 ﾠ1981),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ28-ﾭ‐29,	 ﾠ36;	 ﾠBarker,	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐East	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ57-ﾭ‐58.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠBulgaria`s	 ﾠstruggle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠneutrality	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
Britain,	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSoviet	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠV.	 ﾠDimitrov,	 ﾠ`Bulgarian	 ﾠNeutrality:	 ﾠDomestic	 ﾠand	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radical change in Romanian policy also crucially shifted British attitudes towards a 
closer cooperation with Bulgaria. Halifax informed George Rendel, the British minister 
in Bulgaria, that due to the drastic alteration of Romania`s attitude towards the Allies 
Bulgaria`s immediate interests in Southern Dobruja were now fully supported.
82 Halifax 
and the Foreign Office articulated that it was desirable to solve this question before 
Germany awarded the region to Bulgaria, in order to gain credit in Sofia for the Allied 
cause.
83 In contrast, Hungarian demands in Transylvania were not supported, as it 
lacked strategic implications for Britain.  
Halifax also began to feel that British support for Bulgaria offered even more 
strategic potential. Based on the notion of the long outdated Balkan neutral bloc, he 
drafted a scheme which outlined the cooperation of Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
in order to check German penetration towards the Straits. The project was relying on too 
many `ifs`, notably, the moral and material support of the Soviet Union and the 
participation of Romania, which was already Germany`s ally.
84 We could quickly 
disregard the project as an example of Halifax`s self-deception and wishful thinking, if 
it had not had a crucial Hungarian angle. Halifax firmly believed that the Transylvanian 
movement, which was forming under the leadership of Iuliu Maniu`s Nationalist Party, 
could successfully resist Hungarian territorial demands, if it received British support. 
Consequently, argued Halifax, this would allow Romania to return to the Allied camp.
85  
The strategic implication of Southern Dobruja was evidently the primary 
concern of Whitehall and the ethnographic and minority angles were hardly mentioned. 
The fact that Bulgaria`s claim was ethnically justifiable, while the Hungarian was not, 
certainly legitimized British official support, but the evidence demonstrates that this 
was not the decisive criterion.
 86 Comparison on this basis demonstrates the reasons 
behind British discouragement of Hungarian designs on Transylvania. We have 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	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 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠKnatchbull-ﾭ‐Hugessen,	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 ﾠWe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	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 ﾠmuch	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠto	 ﾠManiu`s	 ﾠmovement.	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Vienna	 ﾠAward	 ﾠLondon	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 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930	 ﾠRomanian	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 ﾠthe	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 ﾠhad	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 ﾠ37	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 ﾠ20	 ﾠpercent	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 ﾠS.	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 ﾠLa	 ﾠPopulation	 ﾠde	 ﾠla	 ﾠDobroudja	 ﾠ
(Bucarest:	 ﾠInstitut	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠde	 ﾠStatistique	 ﾠ1939),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ146-ﾭ‐147.	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established that the British disapproval had a complex background, and the primary 
reason was not London`s preoccupation with the Battle of Britain, as Hungarian 
historiography has suggested.
87   
Events followed each other in rapid succession and by the time the quarreling 
parties were forced by Berlin to the negotiating table at Turnu Severin, it was too late 
for London to influence the events or to actively support Romania in any form. 
Outwardly, Cadogan assured Barcza that London would accept any peaceful solution, 
reached by the equal consent of Budapest and Bucharest, but in the background, 
Bucharest was encouraged to resist Hungarian claims.
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III. 
 
British wartime propaganda towards Hungary and Romania gives a different 
perspective of British policy towards the region. Propaganda broadcasts to Hungary and 
Romania had started immediately after at the outbreak of the war.
89 The comparison of 
the aims, tools and arguments of the Hungarian and Romanian broadcasts in July and 
August reflects London`s actual aims and priorities over the Transylvania dispute. We 
will see they are in direct contrast with officially articulated British opinion, especially 
concerning Hungary.  
Paradoxically, a new and increasing campaign was initiated in the summer of 
1940, at the time when British influence was seemingly decreasing in the region. The 
broadcast service of the BBC towards Central Europe and the Balkans is an intriguingly 
under-researched area.
90 The sudden increase of British propaganda activity towards 
Hungary and Romania in itself contests the commonly accepted historiographical view-
point that Britain withdrew from the region and detached itself from the maze of 
regional territorial and minority questions. The initiative of a comprehensive 
propaganda campaign towards Hungary came from Elisabeth Barker and Sir Ralph 
Murray.
91 Influenced by the reports of the British writer, Vernon Duckworth Barker, 
who in the 1920s and 30s had spent several years in Hungary, Barker and Murray were 
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 ﾠA.	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 ﾠThe	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 ﾠKingdom,	 ﾠvol.	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 ﾠp.	 ﾠ176.	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 ﾠcomprised	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠnews	 ﾠbulletins,	 ﾠbroadcasting	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtalks	 ﾠto	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠclandestine	 ﾠradio	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠRadio	 ﾠPetőfi,	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠbroadcasting	 ﾠin	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ1942.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠarticulated	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠvulgar	 ﾠ
voice	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHorthy	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠSee:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ898/58,	 ﾠ59;	 ﾠE.	 ﾠHaraszti-ﾭ‐Taylor,	 ﾠ`In	 ﾠMemoriam	 ﾠof	 ﾠGeorges	 ﾠ
Buday	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPWE`s	 ﾠClandestine	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠPetőfi	 ﾠRadio`	 ﾠin	 ﾠScribble,	 ﾠscribble,	 ﾠscribble	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠ
essays,	 ﾠdocuments,	 ﾠreviews	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠreflections	 ﾠon	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠE.	 ﾠHaraszti-ﾭ‐Taylor	 ﾠ
(Nottingham,	 ﾠ2001),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ123-ﾭ‐130.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠÁgnes	 ﾠBeretzky	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpropaganda	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBBC	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠservice.	 ﾠShe	 ﾠ
focused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtalks	 ﾠof	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠoverlooked	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠquestions,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
London	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpropaganda	 ﾠtalks	 ﾠcould	 ﾠturn	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAllies:	 ﾠBeretzky,	 ﾠ‘C.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney.	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
Devoted	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrustrated	 ﾠFriend	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ237-ﾭ‐246.	 ﾠ
91	 ﾠElisabeth	 ﾠBarker	 ﾠwho	 ﾠlater	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠhistorian	 ﾠof	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
news	 ﾠeditor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOverseas	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBBC.	 ﾠRalph	 ﾠMurray	 ﾠwas	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwriting	 ﾠ
propaganda	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠoccupied	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠin	 ﾠElectra	 ﾠHouse,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940	 ﾠ
became	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpropaganda	 ﾠarm	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSOE.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBBC`s	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠService,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠ	 ﾠM.	 ﾠBalfour,	 ﾠPropaganda	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐1945:	 ﾠOrganisations,	 ﾠPolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠPublics	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ88-ﾭ‐
92;	 ﾠGarnett,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecret	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠPWE,	 ﾠ1939–46,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ11,	 ﾠ156-ﾭ‐157.	 ﾠ	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convinced that Hungary could be influenced towards the Allied cause.
92 They 
articulated a distinctively different view from the Foreign Office in connection with 
what policy should be followed towards Hungary. Due to Murray`s close working 
relationship with Ivone Kirkpatrick, an influential member of the Foreign Office and the 
director of the Foreign Division of the Ministry of Information, a scheme for a new 
Hungarian `talk service` was set up in June 1940. These Hungarian talks were 
broadcasts by Macartney. Macartney`s weekly talks commenced on 7 July 1940. 
Because the BBC believed that Macartney carried influence in Hungary, initially he was 
free to compile the scripts. During the summer of 1940, there was no particular pressure 
on Macartney to voice an either pro or anti-Hungarian tone. In July and August 
Macartney markedly avoided commenting on the Hungarian-Romanian dispute but, 
hitting a pro-Hungarian tone, conveyed British understanding towards the difficult 
situation of Hungary and put special attention on convincing his listeners that 
collaboration with Nazi Germany would lead to losing Hungarian wealth and 
independence.
93  
For some time, these Hungarian talks went along with little supervision from the 
Foreign Office. The Foreign Office on the other hand had taken every opportunity to 
influence the content of the Hungarian, and particularly the Romanian news bulletins.
94 
The Southern department asserted that the `threat of another Vienna Award` had to be 
used to induce Romania to resist.
95 The Ministry of Information also attempted to 
influence the BBC to encourage Romanians in its bulletins to resist Hungarian territorial 
claims.
96 Consequently, in the Romanian news, negative analogues were made between 
the earlier revisionist gains of Hungary and the current Hungarian-Romanian quarrel, 
and Romanians were encouraged to cling to their territorial integrity.  
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92	 ﾠBBC-ﾭ‐WAC,	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠContributors	 ﾠTalks,	 ﾠfile	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠBarker	 ﾠto	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠBarker	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Toynbee,	 ﾠ31	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠE2/	 ﾠ356,	 ﾠMurray	 ﾠto	 ﾠKirkpatrick,	 ﾠ27	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreports	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Duckworth-ﾭ‐Barker	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠBBC	 ﾠWAC,	 ﾠE/1	 ﾠ863,	 ﾠE/2	 ﾠ356.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
93	 ﾠBBC	 ﾠWAC,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠTalk	 ﾠScripts,	 ﾠC.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠHitler`s	 ﾠPamphlets	 ﾠand	 ﾠSalzburg	 ﾠPromises,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ
1940;	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBattle	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠ15	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠNazi	 ﾠPropaganda	 ﾠStrategy,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ
94	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠconfuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBBC`s	 ﾠregular	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠand	 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠnews	 ﾠbulletins	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
talks,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠones	 ﾠbroadcasted	 ﾠby	 ﾠMacartney.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24984,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7402/246/37,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoss,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠ	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24985,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ
6897/246/37,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24985,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6897/246/37,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠHaigh,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ196	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 London`s pro-Romanian propaganda however had no influence on the events 
that followed. Direct negotiations in mid-August between Budapest and Bucharest at 
Turnu Severin had failed, due to the incompatibility of Hungarian and Romanian 
theoretical approaches to the problem and the large gap between what the Hungarians 
wanted and the Romanians were willing to offer.
97   
The British press reaction to the Transylvanian question was mixed. The Daily 
Telegraph on 8 August examined the issue solely from a Romanian perspective.
98 The 
Times on the other questioned the sincerity of Romanian minority policy and blamed the 
escalating dispute on the short-sightedness of Bucharest in failing to solve its minority 
and territorial problems.
99 Whitehall was however very sensitive towards any 
speculations about frontier change and the press coverage of the Turnu Severin 
negotiations. The Foreign Office reaction to one article, published in The Times on 28 
August, demonstrates the sentiments and mind-sets of policy-makers. Geoffrey 
Dawson, the editor of The Times, and the most prominent members of the Foreign 
Office were engaged	 ﾠin a prolonged quarrel in late August. The article emphasized that 
due to the disproportionate number of minorities in Transylvania, a substantially large 
portion of territory would have to be transferred to Hungary, to accommodate the 
Magyar minority of Romania.
100 Sargent found the article so mischievous that he hastily 
proposed that Halifax should immediately `meet the case` in a personal letter to 
Dawson.
101 Halifax hastily sent the letter the very next day which pointed out that 
Britain opposed Hungarian claims, and wanted to strengthen the pro-British Romanian 
opposition, which could eventually form the nucleus of a Romanian national revival.
102 
Dawson was not hesitant sending a reply. On the 30
th in a sharply-toned letter he stood 
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97	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠinto	 ﾠunnecessary	 ﾠdetails,	 ﾠat	 ﾠTurnu	 ﾠSeverin	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠdemanded	 ﾠapproximately	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐
thirds	 ﾠof	 ﾠTransylvania,	 ﾠand	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠonly	 ﾠafter	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠterritory.	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠ
however	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ1/4	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠand	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinsistent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠagreement.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTurnu	 ﾠSeverin	 ﾠconference,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠBalogh,	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
magyar-ﾭ‐román	 ﾠkapcsolatok	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐1940-ﾭ‐ben,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ232-ﾭ‐270.	 ﾠ
98	 ﾠ`Roumania`,	 ﾠDaily	 ﾠTelegraph,	 ﾠ8	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
99	 ﾠ`Minority	 ﾠgrievances	 ﾠof	 ﾠRoumania`,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ
0010.	 ﾠ
100	 ﾠ`Hungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠRumania`	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ
101	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24988,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7405/246/37,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠSargent,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	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102	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24988,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7405/246/37,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠDawson,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ197	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by the arguments of the article and educated the Foreign Office on the advisability of 
frontier revision in order to create stability.
103  
Most strikingly, Barcza`s diaries reveal that William Goode, the unofficial 
advisor of the Hungarian Legation, and Barcza himself were behind the revisionist 
articles of The Times. During the course of August they had had several long 
conversation with Aubrey Leo Kennedy, the `foreign leader writer` of The Times, and 
for hours had tried to convince him to voice a Hungarian perspective in the paper which, 
so far, they believed had voiced only the Romanian.
104 The article which caused the 
nuisance on the 28
th appeared following one of these meetings.
105 This intermezzo 
demonstrates that the quality press, and particularly The Times, often represented a 
cross-current to official foreign policy, and indeed made every effort to maintain its 
own freedom. The example also highlights the ease of conducting covert propaganda on 
the pages of British papers, taking advantage of the relative lack of specialist knowledge 
regarding complex Central European issues.    
We have set out to determine the British reaction towards Hungarian territorial 
claims in Romania after the dramatic defeat of the Allies in the West. We aimed to 
review the over-simplified historiographical view-point that Britain, due to other vital 
interests and the Battle of Britain, showed passivity towards Central Europe and the 
Balkans. Arguably, Britain was more reactive than proactive in the region, but new 
evidence has proved that London was still very keen to limit German penetration into 
the region. As other examples have already shown, since the outbreak of the war, 
territorial disputes in the region worked in the context of grand strategy, and the 
Hungarian –Romanian dispute in July-August was no exception. Most intriguingly 
however, a large scale propaganda campaign towards Hungary and Romania was also 
initiated in these months, which challenges our understanding of British policy towards 
the region and suggests a much more receptive and concerned Britain than has usually 
been understood by historians. Since the German interest in the Transylvanian question 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24988,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7405/246/37,	 ﾠDawson	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠalso	 ﾠseems	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠthat	 ﾠDawson	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlife-ﾭ‐long	 ﾠfriend	 ﾠand	 ﾠdining	 ﾠcompanion	 ﾠof	 ﾠLord	 ﾠHalifax.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠspat	 ﾠgives	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinsight	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠalso.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdiaries	 ﾠof	 ﾠGeoffrey	 ﾠDawson	 ﾠunfortunately	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠanything	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠinfluences	 ﾠon	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTimes:	 ﾠMSS.	 ﾠDawson,	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbiography	 ﾠof	 ﾠDawson	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimilarly	 ﾠsilent	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
Hungary:	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠWrench,	 ﾠGeoffrey	 ﾠDawson	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1955).	 ﾠ
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 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0010.	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 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ28	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0010.	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in July 1940, London expected a Vienna-style arbitration. Sketch maps were drawn up 
in the Foreign Office which outlined the British propositions for the frontier between 
Hungary and Romania, and recommended a limited adjustment. As there was a huge 
gap between these and the Hungarian demands, London made no attempt to persuade 
Budapest to accept these.  
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5. 4 British reaction to the Second Vienna Award 
 
When negotiations at Turnu Severin ended without a result, London expected that war 
between Hungary and Romania was only a matter of time.
106 However, as a conflict in 
the region would have threatened Germany`s food and oil supplies, Hitler decided to 
solve the dispute with a German-Italian arbitration. He personally drew the new frontier 
between Hungary and Romania, based on the recommendations of the German 
ministers in Budapest and Bucharest.
107 The decision, which became known as the 
Second Vienna Award, was announced on 30 August. Hungary reincorporated 43 104 
km
2, approximately 42 percent of its former territories lost to Romania after the First 
World War (map 5.4).
108 The 1930 Romanian census had registered a 47 percent 
relative Romanian majority. According to both the 1910 and 1941 Hungarian censuses 
there was a 51 percent absolute Magyar majority and 1 million Romanians in the 
territory ceded by the award.
109  
The new frontier did not satisfy either side. The Romanians were shocked at the 
extent of territory transferred to Hungary, and some of the Hungarian claims were also 
ignored. Far from settling matters, the award exacerbated the Hungarian-Romanian 
relationship. It did not solve the nationality problem, as the transferred territory 
contained one million Romanians, and 400,000 Hungarians were left in South-
Transylvania under Romanian rule.
110 The territorial problem also remained unsolved, 
as now both countries became revisionist and made various attempts to overturn the 
award in the next five years.  
Compared to the view of historiography, which so far has analysed British 
opinion solely through the prism of British immediate reaction,	 ﾠthe evidence presented 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/	 ﾠ24985,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7056/246/37,	 ﾠLe	 ﾠRougetel	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠBalogh,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar-ﾭ‐román	 ﾠkapcsolatok	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐1940-ﾭ‐ben,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠRéti,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠmásodik	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ1-ﾭ‐2.,	 ﾠ182-ﾭ‐204;	 ﾠZ.	 ﾠSzász,	 ﾠ‘A	 ﾠmásodik	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntés’,	 ﾠEgyüttélés	 ﾠ16	 ﾠ
(2000),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ79-ﾭ‐84;	 ﾠRéti,	 ﾠOlasz	 ﾠdiplomáciai	 ﾠdokumatumok	 ﾠa	 ﾠmásodik	 ﾠbécsi	 ﾠdöntésről;	 ﾠBalogh,	 ﾠ`A	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠdöntés`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ61-ﾭ‐88.	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 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcensus	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠethnographic	 ﾠconditions	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccurately.	 ﾠ
Macartney,	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠof	 ﾠcensuses	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠboth	 ﾠby	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠand	 ﾠBucharest,	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠlay	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠstatistics:	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠHer	 ﾠSuccessors,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ286,	 ﾠ313,	 ﾠ341.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠK.	 ﾠHitchins,	 ﾠRumania	 ﾠ1866-ﾭ‐1947	 ﾠ(Oxford,	 ﾠ1994),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ486;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠBalogh,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠAward	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Romanian	 ﾠrelations,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ335-ﾭ‐356.	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here demonstrates a more complex and subtle explanation of decision-making, which 
was the result of a combination of decisions made in various governmental bodies.
111 
David Reynolds has pointed out that British foreign policy-making was a delicate 
balance of rationality, order and effectiveness between different governmental 
departments, while Hungarian historians evidently dedicated significance only to 
official communications.
112 Indeed, opinions, expressed by policy-makers behind the 
scenes, were very different from official declarations, particularly with regards to the 
Second Vienna Award.  
Hungarian historians have been keen to point out Churchill`s criticism of 
Trianon in his speech in response to the Second Vienna Award on 5 September.
113 
Churchill declared that the Vienna decision was unacceptable to Britain because it was 
forced on Romania:  
I have never been happy about the way in which Hungary was treated after the 
last war. We have not at any time adopted, since this war broke out, the line that 
nothing could be changed in the territorial structure of various countries. On the 
other hand, we do not propose to recognise any territorial changes which take 
place during the war, unless they take place with the free consent and good will 
of the parties concerned.
114 
Officially declaring that the status quo could be reassessed was certainly a big leap in 
British policy, but overstating Churchill`s speech and presenting it as the credo of a 
`new wave` of British foreign policy is too simple and a deeper analysis is necessary of 
how British opinion was formulated over the Second Vienna Award.  
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
111	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbrit	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 ﾠkérdés”`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ107-ﾭ‐108;	 ﾠ	 ﾠBán,	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 ﾠDiplomacy,	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 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ106-ﾭ‐107.	 ﾠ
112	 ﾠReynolds,	 ﾠBritannia	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 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠkülpolitika	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠ„magyar	 ﾠkérdés”`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ107;	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠBritish-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠDiplomacy,	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠ
p.	 ﾠ106.	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 ﾠHansard	 ﾠ(Commons),	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ365,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ40-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠChurchill,	 ﾠ05	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
opinion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠof	 ﾠLords:	 ﾠHansard	 ﾠ(Lords),	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ117,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ366-ﾭ‐367,	 ﾠViscount	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ
1940.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠresponse,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠWar	 ﾠand	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠAims	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠNations:	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
1939-ﾭ‐December	 ﾠ31	 ﾠ1942,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠLouise	 ﾠW.	 ﾠHolborn	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ1943),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ190-ﾭ‐191.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCraiova	 ﾠconference,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠon	 ﾠ5	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSouthern	 ﾠDobruja	 ﾠ
question,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠChurchill	 ﾠand	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠspeech	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠ
welcomed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCraiova	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreached	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequal	 ﾠconsent	 ﾠof	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠand	 ﾠBulgaria,	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠAxis	 ﾠpressure.	 ﾠ	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  The first direct consequence of the Vienna decision was that Lord Londonderry, 
in protest at the Axis pressure on Romania, resigned from the presidency of the Anglo-
Hungarian Society.
115 Alongside these official manifestations of British disapproval, the 
conversations between the Foreign Office and the Hungarian and Romanian ministers 
also highlight British criticism, and most crucially illustrate the difference in the 
perception towards Hungary and Romania. Sargent received Barcza on the day of the 
award and pointed out that Britain could not accept Hungarian claims, as Hungary was 
under the influence of Berlin and the Hungarian press was ever more violent against the 
Allies. Sargent, referring to the Hungarian decision to grant military passage to 
Germany earlier in April, also suggested that Britain could not support a country which 
had lost its will for self-defence.
116  
Halifax had very different conversations with Viorel Tilea, the Romanian 
minister. As a result of the Vienna decision and Romania`s pledge to follow Axis 
policy, Tilea, who was judged to be too pro-British by Bucharest, was recalled from his 
post. Tilea decided to stay in London in a personal capacity, and evidently had a strong 
influence on formulating British opinion over the Vienna Award. In early September, 
amidst the gravest hours of the Battle of Britain, although not Romanian minister 
anymore, he managed to meet Halifax on several occasions. On the 2 September 
meeting with Halifax and Sargent, he explained the demographic and economic 
implications of the transfer of Northern Transylvania to Hungary from the Romanian 
perspective, using the 1937-38 Romanian Annual Statistical Bulletin, which claimed 
less than 1 200,000 Magyars in Romania, although in fact there were more than 1 
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠAnglo-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠSociety	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrole.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
William	 ﾠGoode,	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠintervened	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠLord	 ﾠLondonderry	 ﾠmade	 ﾠa	 ﾠsymbolic	 ﾠresignation.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠLondonderry`s	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠplan,	 ﾠall	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠresign	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
membership.	 ﾠGoode`s	 ﾠmediation	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠembarrassment	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvice-ﾭ‐president	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠand	 ﾠactive	 ﾠminister	 ﾠin	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
forced	 ﾠto	 ﾠresign:	 ﾠHIA,	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiaries,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠBox	 ﾠ0010.	 ﾠIan	 ﾠKersaw`s	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠLord	 ﾠ
Londonderry	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreveal	 ﾠanything	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠepisode:	 ﾠI.	 ﾠKershaw,	 ﾠMaking	 ﾠFriends	 ﾠwith	 ﾠHitler:	 ﾠLord	 ﾠ
Londonderry	 ﾠand	 ﾠBritain's	 ﾠRoad	 ﾠto	 ﾠWar	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠ	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 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ66,	 ﾠ443.	 ﾠcs.	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠI-ﾭ‐5.,	 ﾠ233,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ31	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠhistoriography	 ﾠtends	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmisinterpret	 ﾠBarcza`s	 ﾠmeetings	 ﾠwith	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠand	 ﾠCadogan.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠillustrative	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ
Romsics	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSargent`s	 ﾠdeclaration	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ`just	 ﾠsettlement`	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
meeting	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠfrontier	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ`just	 ﾠsettlement`	 ﾠwas	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
undeclared	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠwar	 ﾠaim	 ﾠby	 ﾠ1940	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠrather	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠ`just	 ﾠsettlement`	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfor	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ
only.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠcomplaint	 ﾠabout	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠto	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠ
opinion.	 ﾠSee:	 ﾠ	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠkülpolitika	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠ„magyar	 ﾠkérdés”`,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ107.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ202	 ﾠ
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600,000.
117 He pointed out that the transfer of one million Romanians to Hungary was 
everything he protested against, and it would have grave consequences for the region`s 
stability.
118 It is crucial to note that the only source of up-to-date information London 
received in wartime was diplomatic and intelligence reports and personal accounts, all 
of which provided very limited data about territorial and minority questions. The supply 
of newspapers was also very limited; therefore the specialised information of Tilea, a 
representative of a country which used to be the close friend of Britain must have 
carried some weight in the formulation of official opinion. The fact that diplomatic 
reports from Bucharest also provided limited information about the consequences of the 
award adds further significance to the information Tilea provided.
119  
From Budapest, O`Malley observed the situation very differently. Although he 
seemingly disagreed with the level of German influence in Hungary, he reported that the 
new frontier would indeed serve the stability of the region.
120 Although this opinion was 
left without a response, later discussions prove that Whitehall viewed the problem from 
a different perspective and O`Malley`s opinion was ignored. September had witnessed a 
shift in the Southern department`s attention and interest, which confirms that the data 
supplied by Tilea made a significant impression on British perceptions. London now 
became extremely interested in the demographic implications of the award, and the 
statistics provided by Tilea about the number of Romanians transferred to Hungary 
were analysed to great extent.
121 
  We have already noted that as a consequence of Hungarian territorial gains a 
legend started to spring up in Britain. The Jackal-theory, as Macartney labelled it 
became particularly strong after the Second Vienna Award and exaggerated the extent 
of the territory annexed by Hungary. According to this, Romania had been punished by 
Germany	 ﾠfor her pro-Allied policy, with the transfer of two-thirds of Transylvania to 
Hungary.
122 As we have noted, the Second Vienna Award transferred only 42 percent of 
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 ﾠMemoires	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 ﾠVirgil	 ﾠTilea,	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 ﾠI.	 ﾠTilea	 ﾠ(London,	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 ﾠp.	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	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 ﾠR	 ﾠ7379/246/37,	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7521/246/37,	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	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31	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24428,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ9096/529/21,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24984,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7685/195/37,	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠto	 ﾠHoare,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	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31	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠOctober	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Transylvania to Hungary. The notion that Hungary snatched Ruthenia like a jackal 
when Hitler marched into Prague had emerged much earlier, but the Vienna decision 
strengthened this theory. Halifax and other senior officials in Whitehall were indeed 
convinced that Hungary received two-thirds of Transylvania, and the BBC evening 
news-talk also mentioned the two-thirds theory to the British public.
123 It is difficult to 
identify the source of this misconception. Most probably it was not a result of deliberate 
misrepresentation, but possibly due to the fact that the Hungarians demanded two-thirds 
of Transylvania originally, and were awarded two-thirds of this demand (map 5.4).
124 
The `	 ﾠtwo-thirds theory` proved to be very persistent and even some of the English 
language historiography notes the transfer of two-thirds of Transylvania to Hungary.
125  
  The Second Vienna Award brought disagreement between the Central and the 
Southern department to the surface. As we have seen, Sargent in the Southern 
department viewed the award as the mutilation of the Romanian nation. On the other 
hand, policy-makers in the Central department would have been satisfied with the new 
frontier if it had removed antagonisms. The tone of the minutes suggests that the new 
frontier, if combined with extensive minority transfers, would have been an acceptable 
solution for Makins and Roberts; both of them stressed that the award should not 
necessarily be reversed,
126 and they were convinced that there were possibilities for an 
Anglo-Hungarian rapprochement on the basis of this frontier.
127 The change of attitude 
in the Central department was surprisingly influenced by Macartney, who, in early 
September analysed the policy of Hungary and Romania in a long memorandum 
directed to the Foreign Office.
128 He argued that the new frontier was `economicly and 
geographically bad`, but stressed that it would be a mistake to nullify it later, only 
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 ﾠHansard	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 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ117,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ366-ﾭ‐367,	 ﾠViscount	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ05	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠBBC-ﾭ‐WAC,	 ﾠT	 ﾠ624,	 ﾠRadio	 ﾠ
Talks	 ﾠScripts,	 ﾠG.	 ﾠF.	 ﾠA.	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 ﾠnews-ﾭ‐talk,	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 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠR.	 ﾠHoare	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 ﾠthe	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 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐thirds	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 ﾠTNA,	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 ﾠover	 ﾠRomania,	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 ﾠ‘Transylvania	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 ﾠForeign	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24984,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7685/195/37,	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 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠoffice,	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 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	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28	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠthought	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthoroughly	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Matthew	 ﾠFrank.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠFrank`s	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠillustrates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠwas	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
solution	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠneglected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠMagyar	 ﾠminorities:	 ﾠM.	 ﾠFrank,	 ﾠExpelling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Germans:	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠOpinion	 ﾠand	 ﾠPost-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠPopulation	 ﾠTransfer	 ﾠin	 ﾠContext	 ﾠ(Oxford,	 ﾠ2008).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
127	 ﾠTNA,	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 ﾠ7406/246/37,	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 ﾠ6	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 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠR	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 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠ`Attitude	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 ﾠHungary	 ﾠand	 ﾠRoumania`,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
September	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because it was dictated by Hitler. Macartney pointed out that the dividing line was 
slightly biased towards Hungary, but it could be used as a basis for a more justifiable 
solution. Hungary – he argued – was friendly towards Germany only owing to the 
question of frontier revision, and the overwhelming majority of the nation hated and 
feared Germany. The Central department eventually took the advice of Macartney and 
recommended that Britain should remain uncommitted to either Romania or Hungary 
regarding the territorial question.
129 The impact of Macartney`s opinion is surprising, 
because earlier, especially after his visit to Hungary in early 1940 his recommendations 
for a more positive British policy towards Hungary failed to have an effect.  
Besides, Macartney`s memorandum also influenced the decision over the new 
line of propaganda towards Hungary and Romania after the award. A meeting of 
representatives of the BBC, the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office on 9 
September discussed the points Macartney raised. They decided that neither Hungary 
nor Romania should be distinguished or favoured and the priority of British propaganda 
should be to convince both that the award only benefited Nazi Germany. They made the 
decision that Hungary should not be criticised, especially in Hungarian news bulletins 
and broadcasts, as it would alienate pro-British Hungarians.  
However, a closer examination of the list of decision-makers at this meeting put 
things into different perspective. It is immediately apparent that both the Foreign Office 
and the BBC were represented by younger and lower rank officials, who, as we have 
seen earlier, often advocated a more revisionist policy. Dixon and Randal from the 
Foreign Office had supported a more positive British policy towards Hungary and 
Bulgaria earlier; while Henry James Bruce, the head of the Hungarian section of the 
Ministry of Information was a well-known friend of Hungary. Also, Elisabeth Barker, 
the overseas news editor of the BBC, also present at the meeting, was actually the 
person who supported the setting up of the Hungarian broadcasts of Macartney back in 
early 1940.
130 The absence of senior members, such as Sargent and Kirkpatrick, the 
prominent figures responsible for Central Europe and propaganda, made the 
permanency of this new policy questionable. Lower rank officials were allowed to make 
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decisions on secondary issues, such as Hungary and Romania, which later were 
reviewed by senior figures. Nevertheless, this example resonates with Reynolds` 
concept that British foreign political decisions in the war period were largely the result 
of quick, random reactions rather than considered verdicts on comprehensive 
evaluation.
131   
The question of whether R. W. Seton-Watson should broadcast to Romania on 
the BBC, immediately confirms that senior members like Sargent and Nichols 
approached the question with different mind-sets. The question emerged, as it was 
believed that Seton-Watson, who had a great reputation in Romania, could encourage 
Romanians to resist further demands from Germany and Hungary. Nichols warned that 
the name of Seton-Watson was explosive in the region, especially among Hungarians, 
therefore insisted on toning down the provocative script proposed by Seton-Watson, and 
suggested that radical parts on the Munich Agreement and Hungary should be 
omitted.
132 Sargent made the final decision and cut only the inciteful parts about 
Munich, but retained the Hungarian ones in the script. The message in the name of 
Seton-Watson was eventually read out in the Romanian broadcasts on 5 September, but 
not with his voice. Hitting a markedly anti-Hungarian tone, the broadcast declared that 
Hungary wished to restore the 1918 oppressive rule of the Magyars in the Carpathian 
basin, and the First Vienna Award and now the `Second` were the first steps in that 
process.
133  
Finally, mention has to be made of the Hungarian response to the British 
reaction to the Second Vienna Award, as it demonstrates a shift in Hungarian foreign 
policy. The news of the award sparked a wave of euphoria across Hungary. Teleki 
officially praised Hitler and Mussolini as the allies of Hungary and for helping to regain 
a part of Transylvania, but inside he felt deeply concerned about the price Hungary 
would have to pay to Germany in return for the support.
134 Moreover, Teleki openly 
declared to O`Malley that a closer cooperation with Germany was inevitable, primarily 
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because further territorial gains could only be achieved through friendship with the 
Axis. He also stressed that Hungary`s future depended on its successful rearmament, for 
which it needed German arms and raw material, which Britain was unable to provide.
135   
Our aim has been to demonstrate that official British disapproval of the Second 
Vienna Award was only one dimension of British perceptions of the Hungarian-
Romanian territorial question. We have seen the contrast between official declarations 
and thoughts articulated in internal discussions, which once again point to the 
limitations of analysing the relationship of two countries solely from the perspective of 
diplomatic communications. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that the Transylvanian 
problem even after the Second Vienna Award had a crucial propaganda angle, which 
occupied a key place in British regional policy. On the other hand, interpreting the 
evident impartiality of propaganda towards Hungary and Romania as the key basis for 
solving their territorial dispute after the war would be misleading. Senior officials at 
Whitehall, such as Sargent, demonstrated a markedly anti-Hungarian opinion, which he 
derived from Hungary`s pro-German policy in the past. This dichotomy was noticeable 
since the Munich crisis and Sargent`s key position in decision-making predicted that at 
the post-war settlement the Hungarian-Romanian frontier would be redrawn taking the 
Trianon frontier into account and not the Second Vienna Award. The positive opinion 
of the Central department, which was not responsible for Romania, seems to be less 
influential on the question of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier.      
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5. 5 Conclusion 
 
We have investigated the impact of the Allied defeat in France on the Anglo-Hungarian 
relationship during the summer months of 1940. We have put particular attention on 
disentangling whether the position of South East Europe, and Hungary in particular, 
changed in British strategy as a consequence of the British-French collapse on the 
continent. We have also examined the British view of the Hungarian-Romanian 
territorial dispute, which in July and August had reached a new phase, and the criteria 
which governed London`s approach to the Second Vienna Award. We have aimed to 
determine how far these dramatic events influenced British perceptions about the future 
shape of the region and notably Hungary.  
  This chapter has also challenged the widely accepted view of historians that 
London was not interested in the complicated territorial and minority questions of the 
region, as it was fully absorbed in fighting for its own survival. The new evidence 
presented here has vividly demonstrated that, regardless of the fact that the region lost 
its strategic importance and that Britain was entangled in defending the British Isles, in 
the sphere of propaganda Britain was more active than ever before towards the region. 
Crucially, a comparison of the aims and tools of the British propaganda campaigns 
towards Hungary and Romania has answered one of the key questions of our study: why 
Hungary was viewed more negatively than Romania, and was it only because of 
Hungary`s persistent territorial ambitions? Our findings clearly suggest that historical 
perceptions about Hungary persisted in the Foreign Office. As at the end of the Great 
War, and during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-39, Hungary was viewed as a feudal 
and socially backward country, which treated its minorities harshly. Most importantly 
London viewed the rule of the Hungarian elite as so absolute that no support was 
contemplated to democratic movements in 1940. In comparison, the Romanian will for 
resistance against Germany was believed to be more genuine and potent; therefore 
London stood by Bucharest, its traditional ally, even though Romania turned its back on 
Britain momentarily. These notions had crucially affected the views of key policy-
makers regarding the future form of Hungary, and it seemed that the Romanian and 
Czechoslovak arguments would take precedent at the post-war determination of 
Hungary`s frontiers. 208	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The traditional method of writing the relationship of two countries solely 
through the prism of diplomatic correspondence has been contested here. The analysis 
of the opinion of governmental bodies and other institutions, such as the PID, the FRPS, 
or the BBC for instance, has highlighted the complexity of British foreign policy-
making process and how views and influences were evaluated by decision-makers, 
especially for second-tier countries like Hungary. The relevance of this method is 
clearly supported by the current findings of this study, as the specialised subject of the 
Hungarian territorial question was viewed differently at the various spheres and stages 
of policy-making. On the other hand, the `traditional method` is still beneficial, for 
considering the Hungarian question in a regional context. The juxtaposition of British 
official opinion on the questions of Soviet-occupied Poland, Bessarabia, or Southern 
Dobruja with the Hungarian claims in Transylvania has validated our hypothesis that 
London viewed territorial disputes in the region from the perspective of its own 
strategic interests.  
  Although, the official reaction to the Second Vienna Award significantly 
differed from opinion expressed during internal Foreign Office discussions, British 
policy largely worked within the limitations of past perceptions, current strategic 
interests and vague ideas about post-war Europe. The summer of 1940 did not provide 
final answers to these complex problems; final conclusions had not yet been reached on 
the future frontiers of Hungary.  
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`Nothing can be hoped, I fear, from Hungary until the military tide begins to turn 
and until this happens, this Legation can hope to achieve little more than  
to keep alive friendship with Britain […] and stimulate the belief in the possibility of 
 British victory. There are some signs that this belief is growing.`
1 
(O`Malley) 
 
6. Passing the Zenith …reaching the Nadir: Anglo-Hungarian Relationship from 
late 1940 to the declaration of war 
 
6.1 Introduction 
	 ﾠ
There has been a historiographical consensus that following the Second Vienna Award, 
and Hungary`s adhesion to the Tripartite Pact in November 1940, the image of Hungary 
in London was damaged beyond repair, and the Anglo-Hungarian relationship were 
heading towards final disruption.
2 British official declarations undoubtedly suggested 
this viewpoint. These conclusions however stemmed from analysing only a small 
amount of the diplomatic correspondence between London and Budapest. The 
perceptions of influential British policy-makers, discussions on Hungary in the Foreign 
Office, what priorities Britain actually followed, and how decisions were made on 
Hungary from late 1940 to late 1941 – these have not been analysed. Considerable 
research has been done on the plans made by the FRPS on post-war Central Europe and 
the Balkans, but the views of this essentially academic body have not been juxtaposed 
with the opinion of policy-makers on the post-war world.
3 It has also not been stressed 
enough by historians that the post-war planning entered an advanced and accelerated 
phase in late 1940. At the same time, British strategic interests, propaganda policy, the 
aim of creating a more stable Central Europe, and the ideal to construct a just world 
clashed and pulled British policy in different directions. It will be crucial to analyse the 
interactions of these factors and to demonstrate the differences between their aims 
regarding Central Europe, Hungary and Hungary`s frontiers. Here we are interested in 
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demonstrating how far strategic interests in the war affected post-war planning both on 
the official and academic level, and to what extent decision-makers clung to their idea 
of creating a just and stable Central Europe. As the previous chapter has noted, British 
propaganda towards Hungary and Romania was particularly active from the second half 
of 1940, and was fundamentally independent from Whitehall. It will be crucial to 
analyse the relationship between British official policy towards these countries and 
British propaganda after the Second Vienna Award, and it will be analysed what 
priorities and criteria British propaganda followed and how far it served official British 
policy towards these countries.  
The lack of Hungarian sources has presented a compelling problem in the 
analysis of the relationship after late 1940, and therefore some very crucial questions, 
such as how the territorial problem was viewed by London, cannot be answered by 
analysing Hungarian sources alone. Research was further encumbered by the 
circumstance that for the 1 January – 31 May 1941 period Barcza`s diaries are not 
available.
4 Crucially however, O`Malley`s diplomatic reports have survived, and will be 
the focus of our attention here.  To surmount the problem of the lack of evidence, 
Anglo-Czechoslovak, Anglo-Romanian and Anglo-Yugoslav relations will also be 
analysed, since the British view about the fate of these states had crucial Hungarian 
implications.  
Another under-researched angle of British policy towards the region is how far 
the dynamics of Anglo-Soviet relations influenced British wartime policy there as well 
as post-war planning.
5 The Soviet Union was an increasingly formidable factor in the 
region, and after the fall of France, although with much suspicion, Whitehall was in the 
process of rethinking its policy towards Moscow for the strategic reason to defeat Nazi 
Germany. As we have stressed, this policy had a critical impact on British attitude 
towards the frontiers of Central Europe after the Soviet Union occupied Bessarabia. 
How this policy developed from late 1940, and how the Anglo-Soviet alliance after the 
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German invasion of the Soviet Union affected British policy towards the region and 
Hungary will also be our focus here.     
The current chapter covers the crucial turning points in Anglo-Hungarian 
relations: Hungary`s adherence to the Tripartite Pact, the breaking of diplomatic 
relations and the declaration of war. It asks how far these crises affected British views 
over the future geographical shape of Hungary. Firstly, we will be examining the aims 
of British peace planning. Secondly, we will be demonstrating the benefits of 
integrating the analysis of British Central European, Balkan and Mediterranean strategy 
for the study of Anglo-Hungarian relations; this will be followed by the examination of 
the impact of Czechoslovak-Polish fraternization on Anglo-Hungarian relations in 
1940-41. Finally the exceptionally positive opinion of the Central department on 
Hungary will be put to the test in the context of the crucial question: who made British 
policy on Hungary in 1941?   
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6.2 British post-war planning accelerated 
 
In Britain, planning the peace started as soon as war broke out in 1939. Preparation was 
conducted on multiple levels from the outset. The FRPS was set up in Oxford out of 
highly qualified academic experts to provide scholarly background information. 
Simultaneously, the PID was in the process of compiling peace handbooks and was 
responsible for conducting political propaganda towards Central Europe and the 
Balkans. Naturally, the Foreign Office was also discussing future plans over the first 
year of the war, but as we have seen, until the collapse of France these remained in a 
superficial form.   
Although during the first year of war planning went on slowly, it was clear that 
compared to the post-First World War settlements, a completely new approach would 
be taken. Nationalism as a legitimate organizing factor in Central Europe and the 
Balkans was repudiated, and planners hoped to create stability by scanning the past for 
clues to a better future. The post-war planning of the FRPS has received some coverage 
in historiography, but its role have been often overstated in peace-planning.
6 The 
activities of the PID in 1940-41 have so far mostly been neglected by historians, and we 
also know very little of the opinion of key Foreign Office officials in this period about 
Hungary`s post-war frontiers.
7 Our aim is to highlight the limitation of viewing the 
post-war planning of these different governmental agencies in isolation and to 
demonstrate that British war strategy, propaganda and peace aims were directly 
affecting each other and therefore their analysis should be synthesised.  
In the second half of 1940, senior politicians and Foreign Office officials, such 
as Halifax, Duff Cooper, Cadogan, Kirkpatrick and Aston-Gwatkin were making plans 
for the coordination of the works of these different agencies, in order to increase the 
efficiency of post-war planning. In the autumn of 1940, the War Aims Committee was 
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 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ542-ﾭ‐545;	 ﾠIdem,	 ﾠ
`The	 ﾠRehabilitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustro-ﾭ‐Hungarian	 ﾠEmpire`,	 ﾠpp.	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 ﾠV.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠRothwell	 ﾠhas	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 ﾠthat	 ﾠChurchill	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 ﾠstrong	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 ﾠto	 ﾠpeace-ﾭ‐planning	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 ﾠonly	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 ﾠwar	 ﾠstrategy:	 ﾠRothwell,	 ﾠWar	 ﾠAims	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	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 ﾠp.	 ﾠ65.	 ﾠChurchill`s	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approach	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 ﾠan	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 ﾠW.	 ﾠS.	 ﾠChurchill,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ6:	 ﾠ
Triumph	 ﾠand	 ﾠTragedy	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2005),	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ210;	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 ﾠChurchill,	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ214	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
set up to oversee British peace planning. Our research suggests that since the autumn of 
1940 contacts between the Foreign Office, the FRPS, the PID and the War Aims 
Committee became more regular, which suggests a more organised and developed 
policy-making system than usually depicted by historians.  
By late 1940, the Foreign Office and FRPS officials had all reached the same 
conclusions regarding the future of Central and South Eastern Europe. They were 
convinced that the future pointed towards the creation of a number of multinational 
confederations, which would provide opportunities for economic cooperation, and 
common defence against Germany and Russia.
8 The FRPS compiled two memoranda 
on British war aims. These documents addressed questions such as reconstruction, 
security, welfare, and the political and economic problems of Europe from the general, 
and rather idealistic, perspectives of creating a world system based on cooperation, 
justice and free trade. The memoranda neglected Central European territorial questions, 
but stressed that a new territorial settlement had to be based on ethnographic justice.
9 
Halifax and Duff Cooper recommended that the newly created War Aims Committee 
should coordinate official policy and the scholarly research of the FRPS, and they 
proposed that the two FRPS memoranda should be the basis of planning.
10 An extended 
and updated version was written later on over the summer of 1941 which covered some 
of the critical territorial questions of Central Europe. It declared that the absolute 
sovereignty of the `lesser state` was outdated, and recommended that the triangular zone 
between the Baltic, the Aegean and the Adriatic be organised into confederations. The 
document recommended the renunciation of the First Vienna Award on the basis that it 
was an Axis arbitration, and proposed the cantonization of Transylvania.
11 This 
memorandum proved to be the prologue to the final version of the FRPS 
recommendations for Central European confederations, which in 1942 was submitted to 
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 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠfederalism,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠV.	 ﾠMastny,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠHistorical	 ﾠExperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Federalism	 ﾠin	 ﾠEast	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope`,	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠPolitics	 ﾠand	 ﾠSocieties	 ﾠ53	 ﾠ(1999),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ64-ﾭ‐96.	 ﾠGábor	 ﾠ
Bátonyi	 ﾠhas	 ﾠreviewed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠfederalism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠperiod:	 ﾠG.	 ﾠBátonyi,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠ
dunai	 ﾠkonföderáció	 ﾠgondolata	 ﾠa	 ﾠkét	 ﾠvilágháború	 ﾠközötti	 ﾠMagyarországon`,	 ﾠAlföld	 ﾠ98	 ﾠ(1985),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ35-ﾭ‐43.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ800/321,	 ﾠWar	 ﾠAims	 ﾠCommittee,	 ﾠ`Proposed	 ﾠTerms	 ﾠof	 ﾠReference`,	 ﾠ`A`	 ﾠand	 ﾠ`B`,	 ﾠ(n.	 ﾠd.,	 ﾠ[early-ﾭ‐
1941?]).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ800/321,	 ﾠDuff	 ﾠCooper	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠWar	 ﾠAims	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
coordinated	 ﾠby	 ﾠSir	 ﾠGeorge	 ﾠCrystal,	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupervision	 ﾠof	 ﾠClement	 ﾠAttlee.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠSEW	 ﾠ12/3/1,	 ﾠ`Policy	 ﾠand	 ﾠPropaganda`,	 ﾠunsigned,	 ﾠ(n.	 ﾠd.	 ﾠ[early	 ﾠ1941?]).	 ﾠIt	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 ﾠFRPS	 ﾠresearch,	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the Foreign Office, and in 1943 endorsed by the Cabinet as the official British war aim 
in the region.
12  
György Barcza also reported the increasing interest of the Foreign Office 
towards the future of Europe. He recorded that despite declaring the untimeliness of 
territorial questions, the Foreign Office was making secret decisions. Referring to a 
`reliable source`, which most probably was William Goode, the primary aim of the 
Foreign Office was to create a United Europe, comprising nationally homogeneous 
states with ethnographic frontiers. Most crucially, reported Barcza, Czechoslovak and 
Polish interest would be the priorities, and countries like Hungary, which were 
indirectly helping the Axis cause, would be left with strict ethnic frontiers.
13 The view 
of the Foreign Office resembles that of the FRPS, but evidently had moved away from 
the idealized image of a new Europe, adjusting it to British strategic interest in the 
regions. What this meant for Hungary`s frontiers and the future of its recent territorial 
acquisition is difficult to decide at this intermediate stage. It however suggested that 
territorial gains would be curtailed at the peace conference. It is also clear that the 
British strategic aim was to create stability in the region. Fundamentally, Whitehall 
viewed Central European territorial disputes as minority problems, and judged that 
ethnographic frontiers without large numbers of minorities on either side of the border 
would serve stability.
14  
In the first part of 1941 Whitehall was tightening its grip on post-war planning. 
In an attempt to raise its efficiency, and to ensure a more direct governmental control, 
the activities of the FRPS were reviewed by Ashton-Gwatkin, the Assistant Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
15 Similarly to Duff Cooper, he recommended the 
amalgamation of the War Aims Committee and the FRPS, to ensure that balanced 
decisions were made both politically and scientifically. For the same reasons, he also 
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 ﾠAndrás	 ﾠBán	 ﾠpublihed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	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 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungarian:	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠPax	 ﾠBritannica.	 ﾠThe	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 ﾠ
version	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthoroughly	 ﾠanalysed	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlater	 ﾠstage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchapter.	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13	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ64,	 ﾠ1941,	 ﾠ2.	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 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1941;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠBarcza`s	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠreport	 ﾠto	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 ﾠ63,	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15.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1941-ﾭ‐2/1,	 ﾠI	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 ﾠ5952/1941,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	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 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1941.	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14	 ﾠThis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠresonates	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearlier	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 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	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 ﾠAston-ﾭ‐Gwatkin	 ﾠpromoted	 ﾠradical	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritain`s	 ﾠoverseas	 ﾠrelations,	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later	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 ﾠfor	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠso	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 ﾠForeign	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suggested that post-war planning should be separated from the propaganda activities of 
the PID.
16  
Robert Cole has stressed that during Chamberlain`s premiership British 
propaganda was hopelessly inadequate and inefficient. Propaganda activity in the first 
year of the war towards Central Europe was described by Cole as `a leap in the dark`, 
noting that propagandist were clueless about the region and conducted the wrong kind 
of propaganda.
17 The propaganda policy towards Central Europe was set out by Halifax 
at the outbreak of the war, and did not change significantly until 1941. The new line 
stressed the ethical, moral and material supremacy of the Allies and presented Britain as 
the champion of smaller and weaker peoples.
18 Also, there were tailored first lines of 
propaganda for each individual country. Interestingly, towards Hungary the British 
desire for the extension of Anglo-Hungarian trade was stressed. This was a dicey point, 
as one of the pillars of British strategy against Germany was the tight maintenance of 
the economic blockade, which hit the economic position of neutrals particularly hard, 
and forced them to trade even more with Germany. What is also important to stress is 
that Britain at this point left the door open for a future Anglo-Soviet alliance and for this 
reason refrained from anti-Communist propaganda. This was a crucial deficiency, as 
Hungary was terrified of Bolshevism, and even though was scared also of German 
supremacy, saw Germany as the only European power stepping up against 
Bolshevism.
19 As a result, propaganda only reassured the already converted pro-British, 
the others were left in doubt and fear of Germany and the Soviet. 
Elizabeth Wiskemann, the distinguished historian of Central Europe, who at the 
time was responsible for propaganda towards Czechoslovakia, also pointed out that both 
the PID and the BBC was confused in their propaganda policy towards Hungary. She 
complained about the difficulties of conducting propaganda, due to the weakness of the 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ898/29,	 ﾠAshton-ﾭ‐Gwatkin,	 ﾠ`Report	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFRPS	 ﾠof	 ﾠChatham	 ﾠHouse`,	 ﾠ10	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	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Garnett,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSecret	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠPWE,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ11,	 ﾠ182.	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17	 ﾠR.	 ﾠCole,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠOther	 ﾠ`Phoney	 ﾠWar:	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPropaganda	 ﾠin	 ﾠNeutral	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠSeptember-ﾭ‐December	 ﾠ1939`,	 ﾠ
Journal	 ﾠof	 ﾠContemporary	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠ	 ﾠ91	 ﾠ(1987),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ455-ﾭ‐479	 ﾠ(p.	 ﾠ457).	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	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 ﾠLord	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ`Propaganda	 ﾠPolicy`,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1939.	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 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠand	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinstructed	 ﾠto	 ﾠassure	 ﾠBudapest	 ﾠand	 ﾠBucharest	 ﾠthat	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 ﾠSovietisation	 ﾠof	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Central	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠinterest.	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	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 ﾠmessages	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failed	 ﾠto	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian,	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠelite	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 ﾠthat	 ﾠBritain,	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 ﾠreturn	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠready	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠa	 ﾠSoviet	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 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	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 ﾠCentral	 ﾠEurope:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ
371/24902,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7463/4156/67,	 ﾠCadogan`s	 ﾠcircular	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 ﾠn.	 ﾠd.	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 ﾠSeptember	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 ﾠto	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pro-British middle classes, the unapproachability of the peasantry and the strength of 
German propaganda.
20 Gábor Bátonyi has also pointed out that a BBC directive on 
Hungary stressed that due to the weakness of the pro-British elements among the 
Hungarian elite, it was difficult to conduct propaganda in Hungary.
21 Seton-Watson 
suggested the same to Rex Leeper, the head of the PID, and made attempts to convince 
him that propaganda was futile towards Hungary. He stressed that nothing could be 
expected from the Hungarians, and warned that Budapest would make every effort to 
overturn the post-war confederations.
22  
Macartney`s Hungarian broadcasts in the BBC also served propaganda purposes, 
but have to be distinguished from propaganda designed by official agencies, such as the 
PID. It is not the aim of this study to analyse Macartney`s broadcasts; it only seeks to 
use them to demonstrate the contrasts and controversies in British propaganda and post-
war policy.
23 Macartney`s broadcasts, as we have noted, had started in mid-1940 as the 
personal venture of a handful of people, such as Ralph Murray, Elisabeth Barker and 
Macartney himself. The talks received tacit official approval in mid-1940, but 
Macartney`s critical but friendly voice towards Hungary complicated the propaganda 
schemes of the PID from late 1940, and also official policy after April 1941. Although 
Macartney hit a critical tone about Hungary`s subservience towards Germany, he 
designed the broadcasts to encourage the pro-British segments of Hungarian society. He 
projected an image of British strength, and conveyed the message that Britain would not 
necessarily dismantle Hungary at the peace conference.
24 Macartney`s broadcasts were 
often criticised. Vansittart and the Czech émigrés complained that they were too 
friendly, and demanded the removal of the `Hungarian nest` from the BBC.
25 On 
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 ﾠTNA,	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 ﾠWiskemann,	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 ﾠto	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠWiskemann	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Hungary`s	 ﾠpersistence	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 ﾠdemanding	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 ﾠrevision:	 ﾠ	 ﾠE.	 ﾠWiskemann,	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 ﾠ(London,	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠA.	 ﾠMacartney,	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠAxis`,	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠPower`,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠso	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠ“Függetlenség”`,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26624,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3949/2240/21,	 ﾠVansittart	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ218	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Kirkpatrick`s inquiry, Frank Roberts at the Central department however defended 
Macartney`s broadcasts as being very useful to keep Hungary away from Germany.
26  
In late 1940, the Labour Party also published its views on the future of Europe. 
In the inter-war period Labour was a strong advocate of the League of Nations and 
minority protection, as the mean of solving territorial disputes.
27 From late 1940, the 
criteria of Labour changed. Hugh Dalton proclaimed that the post-war world had to be 
based on freedom and equality.
28 A short pamphlet stressed that the wrongdoings done 
to the Czechoslovaks and Polish would have to be remedied, but apart from this short 
reference it focused mainly on the German problem, and the questions of the new world 
system.
29 Judged from the pamphlet`s vagueness on territorial questions, the utilization 
of the word `Czechoslovaks`, instead of `Czechs` and `Slovaks`, seemed to be 
unintentional and most probably had no connotation on the territorial shape of future 
Czechoslovakia.
30 With the progression of the war this policy steadily eroded and the 
arguments for the transfer of Germans and the creation of multinational confederations 
also became more popular in the Labour Party.
31     
At the end of 1940, British post-war planning was in the stage of transformation. 
Until then, comprehensive schemes were drawn up only by the scholars of the FRPS, 
but there were signs that the government was aiming for more coordinated peace 
planning, considering political, strategic and ethnographic criteria for a future peace. In 
the meantime, propaganda was largely unsupervised and uncoordinated with these 
efforts, and often went opposite to British policy.    
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6. 3 The Priorities of British strategy in the Balkans in late 1940 
 
British policy-makers contemplated an equal role for Hungary in post-war Europe. This 
perception did not change throughout 1941, regardless of the fact that Hungary actively 
participated in the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia. It is crucial to examine how far British 
strategic priorities shifted in the region after the Second Vienna Award, to fully 
understand why Britain eventually broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary in April 
1941 and declared war in December.   
Due to Italy`s entry into the war, and the fall of France, British Mediterranean 
and Middle Eastern positions became very vulnerable. In order to maintain a line of 
communications with the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, it was crucial to ensure the 
security and cooperation of Greece and Turkey. Several studies have stressed that 
Greece, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia, were solely viewed by Churchill 
from the perspective of their strategic usefulness to the British war effort.
32 Initially, the 
priority of arm supplies was given to Turkey, as the Chiefs of Staff were expecting a 
German attack towards Iraq through Bulgaria and Turkey. After the threat of the 
invasion of Britain eased, and the British army achieved successes against the Italians in 
Northern Africa, Churchill decided against the advice of the military and moved larger 
British land forces into Greece.
33 Historians have argued that the decision was a military 
gamble, which did not defend Greece, but with British military presence in the Balkans, 
provoked a German attack.
34 The Cabinet however stressed that the decision served 
long term political purposes, such as raising the confidence of the Balkan states in 
British power.
35  
When the Italians invaded Greece in late October, apart from meagre military 
aid London was only able to support Ioannis Metaxas, the Greek Prime Minister, 
diplomatically and morally.
36 London made desperate attempts to localise the conflict. 
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Since Bulgarian aspirations for Southern Dobruja were satisfied, London expected that 
Sofia would step forward with claims on Western Thrace, the other province Bulgaria 
had lost after the First World War (map 6. 1). After Italy declared war on Greece 
Bulgaria was under immense British pressure to shelve its claims in Greece. Rendel, the 
British minister in Sofia was instructed to threaten the Bulgarians with the loss of 
Southern Dobruja and a punitive peace, if Bulgaria attempted to grab Western Thrace.
37 
The new British opinion on Southern Dobruja proves that although its reincorporation 
into Bulgaria was supported earlier on ethnographic grounds, London would not have 
hesitated to reconsider its support for strategic purposes.  
   Halifax was eager to find a more peaceful solution. Heartened by the euphoria of 
the successes of the British army in Libya against the Italians in late 1940, he rekindled 
his favourite obsession, the cooperation of the Balkan states against Germany. He was 
convinced that Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish cooperation could check German 
penetration into Bulgaria and Greece.
38 As winter faded into spring it became clear that 
a German invasion of Greece would be inevitable. In late February the Germans put 
across a treaty of non-aggression between Bulgaria and Turkey, which ruled out a 
unified Balkan front and guaranteed the safe passage of the Wehrmacht into Bulgaria. 
The invasion of Greece was only a matter of time.  
Another angle needing consideration is the Soviet. Late 1940 witnessed a critical 
shift in British perception towards Moscow which, as we will see, had important 
implications for British perceptions about the future of Central Europe. Since the fall of 
France, to prevent the southward penetration of the Axis, London was contemplating 
radically rethinking its relationship with Moscow. Halifax was very suspicious of Soviet 
intentions in the Balkans, but was convinced that the primary enemy was not Moscow 
but Germany because it was much stronger and more efficient. Therefore, to check 
Germany, he speculated on a closer cooperation with Moscow, even at the expense of 
acknowledging Soviet expansion across greater parts of Europe.
39 Stafford Cripps, the 
British ambassador in Moscow, also suggested that the only chance of retaining British 
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influence in the region was to make extensive territorial concessions to the Soviets.
40 
After some hesitation Halifax gave his approval for approaching Stalin with the offer of 
a Soviet sphere of influence.
41 The Soviet leader however reacted with less enthusiasm, 
as he still hoped that cooperation with Germany was possible.
42 The British offer 
therefore received no response from Moscow. Elisabeth Barker has argued that the 
British offer raised Molotov`s bargaining position with Hitler. The Soviets consequently 
raised their price with Germany, which Hitler was not ready to accept, instead deciding 
to attack the Soviet Union. Eventually, the British, although rather unexpectedly, had 
succeeded `embroiling` the Nazis and the Soviets.
43  
As we have demonstrated, analysing British Mediterranean, Balkan and Central 
European strategy and post-war planning as one, provides a wider and yet unconsidered 
context. This helps clarifying how strategic necessities formulated British perceptions 
on the post-war shape of Europe. Reviewing the Anglo-Hungarian relationship from 
this viewpoint helps us decide whether policy-makers saw the mutilation of Hungary, 
and the strict ethnographic frontiers provisioned for Hungary in the confederation plans, 
as an ethnically just solution, or perhaps as a strategic decision, made to support British 
allies in the region. Here we have only drafted the benefits of this perspective, in order 
to highlight its usefulness for the analysis of British policy. A detailed analysis of how 
post-war planning affected British war strategy, or vice versa, would usefully form the 
subject of future studies.    
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6. 4 Hungary turns its attention southwards 
 
The position of Yugoslavia in British strategy requires a separate analysis from overall 
British Balkans strategy for the obvious reason that it had an important Hungarian 
angle. In late 1940 Yugoslavia was a weak outpost in the British Balkan and 
Mediterranean strategy. Prince Paul was keen to follow a pro-British policy, but his 
position was hampered by internal quarrels with the Croats and other minorities, and the 
proximity of hostile and expansionist powers, Germany and Italy.
44 Based on the 
experiences of the First World War, the Serbs were viewed as great and heroic soldiers 
by the British.
45 By 1918 Britain had embraced the idea of Yugoslavism, and the 
positive attitude formed in this period proved remarkably enduring in the inter-war 
years.
46 British and French investments played a crucial role in the modernization of 
certain sectors of Yugoslav industry, particularly the mining of non-ferrous metals. 
Until 1939 however Yugoslavia played a pro-German policy, mainly to counter the 
Italian threat, but by 1940 German political and economic pressure was openly 
threatening Yugoslav independence.  
In the second half of 1940, British policy towards Yugoslavia and Hungary was 
very much akin. London encouraged both countries to resist the Axis, but could not 
provide the means of doing so. After the French defeat, just like O`Malley from 
Budapest, Campbell in Belgrade reported the collapse of Yugoslav confidence in 
ultimate British victory, due to London`s inability to provide adequate support. 
Yugoslavia was indeed in a tricky political and economic position. Campbell reported 
that the Serb elite was keen to resist Germany and was eager to maintain their 
traditional friendship with Britain, but could only hope to avoid an Axis occupation by 
either sacrificing British economic interests to Germany and Italy, or receiving 
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substantial British military support.
 47 As we have noted, active British military aid to 
Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia was impossible after the Polish defeat; therefore 
London, although keen to induce Belgrade to resist, could only rely on the relentless 
will for independence and sacrificial resistance of Yugoslavia.
48  
  Campbell reported the correct relationship between Hungary and Yugoslavia 
during the summer of 1940, and the question of frontier revision was entirely absent 
from his report in the first part of the year.
49 In the inter-war years there had been some 
half-hearted propositions on either side to revise the frontier, in an attempt to facilitate 
closer cooperation, but these came to nought. During the Czech crisis of 1938, and until 
as late as 1941, Budapest was keen to attain Yugoslav neutrality towards Hungary`s 
aspirations for Czechoslovak and Romanian territories, and therefore Hungarian claims 
in Yugoslavia were shelved. Belgrade in turn reacted very cautiously to the Hungarian-
Romanian territorial dispute and the Second Vienna Award. Campbell was convinced 
that Belgrade would not fulfil any of its treaty obligations to the Balkan Entente or 
Romania, if the dispute over Transylvania escalated into open conflict.
50 Indeed, Eugene 
Boia`s thorough study of Romanian archival material has proved that Belgrade was 
keen to find an excuse to free itself from any commitment to Bucharest, giving unclear 
and evasive answers to the Hungarian and Romanian ministers when they asked about 
the Yugoslav attitude.
 51  
However, immediately after the Second Vienna Award, Budapest raised the 
question of revision of the Yugoslav border. After a conversation with Csáky or Teleki, 
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47	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7164/415/92,	 ﾠCampbell	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7069/89/92,	 ﾠCampbell	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠItaly	 ﾠwere	 ﾠvery	 ﾠkeen	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠconcessions	 ﾠand	 ﾠshares	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠTrepča	 ﾠmines.	 ﾠ
48	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠmade	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠto	 ﾠPrince	 ﾠPaul.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecommendation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠKing	 ﾠ
George	 ﾠsent	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠletters,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpraised	 ﾠPrince	 ﾠPaul`s	 ﾠsteadfastness	 ﾠand	 ﾠassured	 ﾠhim	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠposition:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/25033,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ6629/415/92,	 ﾠletter	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠHis	 ﾠ
Majesty	 ﾠto	 ﾠPrince	 ﾠPaul,	 ﾠ3	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/25034,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ8249/415/92,	 ﾠletter	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠHis	 ﾠMajesty	 ﾠto	 ﾠPrince	 ﾠ
Paul,	 ﾠ15	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠHoptner,	 ﾠYugoslavia	 ﾠin	 ﾠCrisis,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ144-ﾭ‐145;	 ﾠL.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠModisett,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠFour-ﾭ‐Cornered	 ﾠ
Triangle:	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠand	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠYugoslavia	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠ(unpublished	 ﾠPh.D.	 ﾠthesis,	 ﾠ
Georgetown	 ﾠUniversity,	 ﾠ1981),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ80-ﾭ‐81.	 ﾠ	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49	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7069/89/92,	 ﾠCampbell	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ
50	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7069/89/92,	 ﾠCampbell	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ13	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠ
Entente	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1938,	 ﾠYugoslavia	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbound	 ﾠto	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBalkan	 ﾠEntente,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠaimed	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
maintaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠquo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠvolte	 ﾠface	 ﾠin	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
alliance	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠdead.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠE.	 ﾠBoia,	 ﾠRomania's	 ﾠDiplomatic	 ﾠRelations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠYugoslavia	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInterwar	 ﾠPeriod:	 ﾠ1919-ﾭ‐1941	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ
1993),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ276-ﾭ‐278.	 ﾠ224	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O`Malley reported limited Hungarian demads. O`Malley noted that claims were not 
expressed for Croatia, but Budapest only aimed to regain the Drava-triangle for strategic 
reasons (map 6. 2).
52 London showed complete disinterest towards this question and 
was concerned with more important strategic issues, such as the question of German 
military passage through Hungary and Yugoslavia. By signing the Second Vienna 
Award, Budapest agreed to allow the passage of the Wehrmacht to Romania.
53  
As we have seen, the prospect of Hungarian acquiescence to a German military 
passage had deeply alarmed London in April. Budapest agreed to allow a free passage, 
but the `droit` had not actually happened then. Compared to this, now in October, a 
German military mission passed through Hungarian territory and arrived in Bucharest 
on 11 October to set up air-defences around the Ploiești oil-fields and to instruct the 
Romanian army.
54 London protested, but Hungarian acquiescence did not disturb the 
Foreign Office to the same extent as the `droit` of April.
 55  
O`Malley however reported that Hungarian sympathies towards Britain were 
diminishing rapidly. He warned Horthy that after the war Hungary would be judged by 
how far it attempted to maintain its independence and to what extent it resisted German 
pressure. He noted with disappointment that Horthy expressed his deep affection 
towards Britain, but did not hide his plan of recovering the rest of Transylvania at the 
earliest possible moment. Horthy also insisted on territorial claims on Yugoslavia, 
although described them as `not very extensive`. Horthy also intimated that Hungary 
would be soon pressed to join the Tripartite Pact and explained that he would not 
attempt to resist such a request. O`Malley strongly recommended the redirection of 
Hungarian policy and threatened that the openly pro-German attitude would result in a 
sharp deterioration of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. With much irritation, he 
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52	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ9096/529/21,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDrava	 ﾠtriangle	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
strategic	 ﾠbridgehead	 ﾠfor	 ﾠYugoslavia	 ﾠnorth	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDanube	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDrava	 ﾠrivers.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
district	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinhabited	 ﾠby	 ﾠMagyars	 ﾠand	 ﾠCroats,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠcomprising	 ﾠequally	 ﾠ50-ﾭ‐50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulation.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ
53	 ﾠBarker,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐East	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ65.	 ﾠ
54	 ﾠHitchins,	 ﾠRumania,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ436-ﾭ‐455.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGermans	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
civilian	 ﾠclothes	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtourist	 ﾠtransit	 ﾠvisas.	 ﾠ	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55	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ15.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1940-ﾭ‐2/31,	 ﾠI.	 ﾠtétel,	 ﾠ262/pol.	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠCsáky,	 ﾠ7	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMacartney	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠdefended	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠto	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠin	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
solution,	 ﾠsaving	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠoccupation:	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠFifteen,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ440-ﾭ‐441.	 ﾠGy.	 ﾠJuhász	 ﾠwrote	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠand	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠ
base:	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠkülpolitikája,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ239.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdemonstrate,	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1941	 ﾠ
Hungary	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ`only`	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorridor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWehrmacht.	 ﾠ	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reported that Horthy, just like the whole Hungarian elite, was deaf to any kind of 
warnings. He concluded with disappointment that his mission now only had 
representational purposes until the tide might begin to turn.
56  
Romania received even stronger warnings for turning the country into a German 
base. Halifax criticised Romania in unusually harsh language and threatened Florescu, 
the Romanian chargé d'affaires, that nations failing to resist would have a very dark 
future after the British victory.
57 As we have seen, Romania was encouraged by the 
Foreign Office to resist Hungarian territorial demands, and Whitehall was convinced 
that the Romanian nation would eventually rise against the pro-German regime. The 
question inevitably arises why British perceptions shifted so dramatically towards 
Romania in a matter of weeks, and whether this change triggered any shift in views on 
the post-war Hungarian-Romanian frontier. The question essentially has two 
dimensions. Firstly, Maniu, the last best hope of London, although managing to 
organise mass protests against the Vienna Award, was unable to grab power and steer 
Romania back to the Allied camp.
58 Also, Antonescu, the Conducător (leader) of the 
new Romania, arrested British nationals in the country and accused them of espionage, 
which infuriated British policy-makers.
59 Most crucially however, Romania provided 
military bases for the Wehrmacht and airfields for the Luftwaffe. For these reasons 
London broke off diplomatic relations with Bucharest in January 1941. 
We can immediately jump to the hasty conclusion that as a consequence of the 
German military occupation of Romania, London viewed the Romanian political elite as 
corrupt, ungrateful and dubious, and as a result British attitudes towards Hungary 
radically changed and Hungarian revisionsm was viewed more favourably. Halifax 
explained to O`Malley that Hungary`s amicable attitude towards British subjects, 
especially compared to Romania`s and the correct treatment of Polish refugees and 
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56	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ11020/529/21,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠ23	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24428,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ
11325/529/21,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠO`Malley`s	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠtriggered	 ﾠintense	 ﾠmind-ﾭ‐
searching	 ﾠin	 ﾠBudapest,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsee,	 ﾠit	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠin	 ﾠanger	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠTeleki,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠredirection	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ
57	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7925/392/37,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠHoare,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
58	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ8156/246/37,	 ﾠHoare	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940;	 ﾠD.	 ﾠDeletant,	 ﾠHitler's	 ﾠForgotten	 ﾠ
Ally:	 ﾠIon	 ﾠAntonescu	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠRegime,	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠ1940-ﾭ‐1944	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2006),	 ﾠpp.48–51.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
59	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ7746/392/37,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠHoare,	 ﾠ29	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠ	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prisoners of war would be held in Hungary`s favour in the future.
60 Consequently, the 
Foreign Office made a clear distinction between Teleki`s `reluctant cooperation` and 
Antonescu`s `voluntary subservience`, but regardless of this Roberts` minute proves 
beyond doubt that the Foreign Office essentially viewed Hungary an Axis satellite, and 
were already contemplating reversing the territorial changes of 1938-40.
61   
  Since the fall of France British contacts with Budapest and Bucharest were 
reduced anyway to a minimum, due to fear of German espionage. Therefore, it is 
difficult to form a clear picture on how the breaking of diplomatic relations with 
Bucharest affected British opinion towards the post-war future of these countries. 
Moreover, the lack of extant Hungarian archival material further hampers research. 
Also, during the course of 1940 and 1941 the confidential papers of the British Legation 
in Budapest were destroyed on numerous occasions due to the fear of a German 
occupation of Hungary. For the reasons above, it is profitable to move from analysing 
the Anglo-Hungarian relationship to concentrating on how the Anglo-Czechoslovak and 
the Anglo-Polish relationship affected Hungary`s post-war position in British thought. 
After all, Czechoslovak-Polish fraternization had crucial implications for Hungary`s 
post-war role and shape.  
The Czechoslovak-Polish relationship in the inter-war period had been burdened 
with a dispute over Teschen, a small, but industrialised district in Silesia (map 6. 3).
62 
Władysław Sikorski, the head of the	 ﾠPolish government-in-exile approached Beneš, 
with the aim of burying the hatchet and forming a closer cooperation after the war. 
Initially, Beneš was reluctant to cooperate with Poland, and only agreed to engage in 
talks, lest his government be marginalised by the Foreign Office.
 63 Anita Prażmowska 
has pointed out that the Teschen dispute became one of the major issues of contention 
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60	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠ12482/12482/21,	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠ2	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠPolish	 ﾠ
prisoners	 ﾠof	 ﾠwar	 ﾠin	 ﾠHungary,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠL.	 ﾠAntal,	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠR.	 ﾠNowak	 ﾠand	 ﾠT.	 ﾠOlszański,	 ﾠBarátok	 ﾠa	 ﾠbajban:	 ﾠlengyel	 ﾠ
menekültek	 ﾠMagyarországon,	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐1945	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1985).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
61	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26603,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ387/123/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts,	 ﾠ14	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠRomsics	 ﾠwrongly	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠRomania`s	 ﾠvolte	 ﾠface	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbreaking	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiplomatic	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠBucharest,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠ
Vienna	 ﾠAward	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrecognised	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠterritorial	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠin	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
London:	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`A	 ﾠbrit	 ﾠkülpolitika	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠ„magyar	 ﾠkérdés”`,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ108-ﾭ‐109.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠIn	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ1940	 ﾠBeneš	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠkeen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠZaolzie	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTeschen	 ﾠterritory,	 ﾠoccupied	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Poland	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchaotic	 ﾠaftermath	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMunich	 ﾠConference,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregained	 ﾠby	 ﾠCzechoslovakia:	 ﾠOrzoff,	 ﾠ
Battle	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCastle,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ199.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠP.	 ﾠS.	 ﾠWandycz,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoland	 ﾠ(Cambridge,	 ﾠ1980),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ245–246.	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during these conversations,
64 but in mid-September, Bruce Lockhart, the British 
minister to the Czecho-Slovak National Committee, reported that the parties agreed that 
territorial disputes would not encumber future cooperation. 
Historians have failed to identify the implications of this newly found 
Czechoslovak-Polish accord for Hungarian territorial aspirations. Most crucially, Beneš 
and Sikorski addressed not only Teschen, but other territorial questions such as 
Slovakia. Sikorski agreed that Poland would refrain from intervening in Slovak internal 
affairs, and would stop flirting with the idea of a Polish-Hungarian influence over 
Slovakia.
65 This declaration questioned the viability of Hungarian acquisitions in 
Czechoslovakia, which had been achieved with Polish encouragement	 ﾠin 1938-39.  
The Magyar question and the future of the First Vienna Award rarely formed the 
subject of the Beneš-Lockhart discussions. Lockhart reported that Beneš was careful 
avoiding the question of Ruthenia, but Lockhart was convinced that the Czechs would 
eventually demand the province to create a corridor with the Soviet Union after the war 
(map 6. 4). On the question of the First Vienna Award, Beneš seemed to have an even 
more ambiguous viewpoint, which becomes interesting in the light of future 
developments. He told Lockhart that he did not want a large Magyar minority in the 
new Czechoslovakia, but suggested that the reincorporation of Kassa [Košice] would be 
demanded (map 6. 4). This declaration seemed very precise and straight forward in a 
1940 context. It suggested that Beneš was contemplating only minor rectifications to the 
Vienna frontier, in order for it to follow the ethnographic line between Magyars and 
Slovaks even closer. In the light of the expulsion of Sudeten-Germans and some of the 
Magyars from Czechoslovakia after the war, Beneš`s opinion however resonates very 
differently and suggest that in the autumn of 1940 Beneš was already contemplating the 
expulsion of Magyars from Slovakia. Lockhart supported Beneš` views of creating 
ethnographic frontiers and recommended to the Foreign Office that backing a 
Czechoslovak-Polish confederation on this basis could form the nucleus of Central 
European confederations.
66  
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 ﾠPrażmowska,	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoland	 ﾠ1939-ﾭ‐1943:	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Beneš was mostly fixated on German issues, and since the Czechoslovak 
Committee was recognised by Britain as a provisional government in July 1940, he was 
aiming to exert British agreement for the repudiation of Munich and the transfer of the 
Sudeten-Germans to Germany. Even though the First Vienna Award and Ruthenia was 
a secondary problem for both Beneš and Lockhart, the Czech view on the Sudeten-
question had crucial implications for Beneš` real aims regarding the future of the First 
Vienna Award and the Magyar minorities, and predicted that Beneš wanted to regain 
Southern Slovakia and Ruthenia and transfer the Magyars.
 67   
Regardless of these Czech-Polish declarations, British policy-makers were still 
reluctant to make references to Czechoslovakia`s future geographical form.
68 These 
developments however essentially changed British perceptions towards the First Vienna 
Award. In late December Barcza formally questioned one of Beneš` speeches, in which 
Beneš had claimed that Britain did not recognise the Munich Agreement and the First 
Vienna Award anymore. Cadogan made it clear that because London recognised the 
Czechoslovak Committee as a provisional government, Whitehall was now viewing the 
question of the First Vienna Award according to the declarations made after the Second 
Vienna Award on 5 September, which had declared that Britain would not recognise 
changes to the status quo made without the free consent of the parties involved. He 
added that Britain had no responsibility for the First Vienna Award, as it was made 
without British consent.
69  Although Britain was careful not to recognise the pre-
Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia officially, the First Vienna Award and Hungarian 
authority over Ruthenia was openly questioned by key policy-makers.
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 ﾠCrises	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 ﾠSince	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠleft	 ﾠwing	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpoliticians	 ﾠand	 ﾠintellectuals,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠPál	 ﾠIgnotus,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
journalist	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠassistant	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠIntelligence	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBBC,	 ﾠBéla	 ﾠ
Iványi,	 ﾠhistorian,	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠMikes,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeditor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ8	 ﾠÓrai	 ﾠÚjság,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠBeneš	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠin	 ﾠLondon	 ﾠabout	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Czechoslovak	 ﾠrapprochement.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠcontacts	 ﾠwere	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
initial	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠHungarians	 ﾠwere	 ﾠevidently	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠAward	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠoccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠRuthenia	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreversed.	 ﾠWhitehall	 ﾠwas	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Hungarian-ﾭ‐Czechoslovak	 ﾠfraternizations,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠits	 ﾠaims	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclarified	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreluctant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	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Although the cooperation of Czechoslovakia and Poland was viewed with 
sympathy, Britain was more concerned with the Southern part of the Balkans for 
strategic reasons. Hence, when Hungary, Romania and Slovakia joined the Tripartite 
Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan in late November, it did not gather much attention in 
London. András Bán emphasized that Hungary`s adherence to the Tripartite Pact was a 
watershed in Anglo-Hungarian relations, and consequently caused the loss of British 
confidence in Hungary.
71 Later developments clarify that Hungary`s adherence was 
long expected and did not have any impact on the British opinion of Hungary and 
Hungarian revisionism. 
  From Budapest O`Malley did everything to convince the Foreign Office that 
Hungary`s adherence to the Tripartite Pact did not change Hungary`s aim to maintain 
friendly relations with Britain. Regardless of Horthy`s earlier declaration that Hungary 
had to follow Germany to gain further territories, he regarded the step as `window 
dressing`, and reported that Teleki was still keen to maintain Hungarian independence 
and cordial relationship with Britain. Taking O`Malley`s advice, Whitehall adopted a 
conciliatory attitude. Cadogan assured Barcza that Britain understood the step. When 
Barcza then complained that Hungary had joined the Axis due to the lack of British 
support for revision, Cadogan even declared that if the occasion presented itself the 
matter might be re-considered by London. This message was intended to be conciliatory 
and promising at the same time. It vaguely hinted that Britain might take a positive 
attitude towards Hungary`s territorial acquisitions if Budapest changed its pro-German 
policy. Cadogan however noted with regret that Hungary had finally committed itself on 
the Axis side, and added dispassionately that Hungary signed the pact simultaneously 
with two states who were not masters of their own will.
72 In contrast to the official 
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 ﾠFor	 ﾠBarcza`s	 ﾠreport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeeting,	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 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	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 ﾠ1940,	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 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠCadogan`s	 ﾠreport,	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/24426,	 ﾠC	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 ﾠCadogan,	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29	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 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠCadogan	 ﾠwas	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlenient	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent.	 ﾠCsáky	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠanxious	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
announce	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠjoined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPact	 ﾠas	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregion,	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 ﾠmade	 ﾠit	 ﾠprimus	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 ﾠ
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 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠallies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAxis.	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠjoined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPact	 ﾠon	 ﾠ20	 ﾠNovember,	 ﾠRomania	 ﾠon	 ﾠ23	 ﾠ
November	 ﾠand	 ﾠSlovakia	 ﾠon	 ﾠ24	 ﾠNovember.	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reassurance, Barcza in his diaries recounted British distrust towards Hungary and now 
complained frustratedly that he was seen as the representative of an enemy country.
73  
In essence, Halifax, Strang, Roberts and Makins fully approved O`Malley`s 
recommendations that policy towards Hungary should not be changed, but 
recommended that the tone of propaganda should be stiffened towards Budapest.
74 The 
Foreign Office instructed O`Malley along these lines and pointed out that the legation 
had to stay at all costs, as it provided unique opportunities to collect German 
intelligence data. Moreover, the Foreign Office expressed in early December that 
maintaining diplomatic representations in Hungary would help associate Hungary with 
the formulating Czechoslovak-Polish confederation.
75 This benevolent approach 
towards Hungary received a slap in the face the very next day, when Csáky, on 3 
December, told the Polish Legation in Budapest that Hungary was withdrawing its 
recognition. Although O`Malley stressed that the severing of diplomatic relations with 
Poland was necessary to compensate for Hungary`s friendly policy towards Yugoslavia 
in the eyes of Germany, Halifax was dispassionate and noted with irritation that 
Hungary`s betrayal of its only friend in the region would affect relations in the present 
and future also.
76      
Hungary`s disloyalty to Poland indeed had a crucial effect on British views of 
the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement, initiated by Budapest in the autumn of 1940. 
Although the Hungarian initiative to make friends with Belgrade demonstrated that 
Budapest was anxious to find a way out of the German pincer, O`Malley`s reports prove 
that London viewed the Hungarian-Yugoslav fraternization and the Treaty of Eternal 
Friendship, signed between the two countries on 12 December, with great suspicion.
77 
Budapest in fact intended to use the new-found friendship with Yugoslavia to open a 
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 ﾠTNA,	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 ﾠ12482/12482/21,	 ﾠO`Malley	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 ﾠHalifax,	 ﾠ21	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1940;	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 ﾠMakins	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	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 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠ2	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 ﾠ1940.	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 ﾠ
the	 ﾠTripartite	 ﾠPact	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 ﾠBarcza	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠhis	 ﾠresignation.	 ﾠHorthy	 ﾠallegedly	 ﾠ
begged	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠstayed	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠpost.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsecretive	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
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 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠrevealed	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdiaries.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠknow	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠCadogan`s	 ﾠ
report	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠconversation	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ13	 ﾠDecember:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠC	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 ﾠto	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 ﾠand	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 ﾠ
only	 ﾠcame	 ﾠup	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 ﾠthis	 ﾠstory	 ﾠto	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 ﾠLondon.	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 ﾠPoland	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 ﾠvivid	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 ﾠ`give	 ﾠand	 ﾠtake`	 ﾠdiplomacy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
77	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/8,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ8902/1232/92,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax,	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window to Britain, and made efforts to project the treaty as part of an anti-German 
policy.
78 The treaty declared that all future disputes would be dealt with peacefully. This 
formula was a compromise, which for the moment satisfied both Budapest and 
Belgrade. Budapest interpreted it as a way of dealing with Hungarian territorial claims 
at a future date, while Belgrade was satisfied that direct references to frontier revision 
were left out of the treaty. Macartney however was extremely critical of the Hungarian 
policy of presenting the treaty to London as an anti-German accord. He proved that the 
treaty was signed with the agreement, and possibly on the initiative of Hitler, to bring 
Yugoslavia closer to the Axis. He therefore condemned Budapest for misguiding 
London, which he eventually believed to be the main reason for British disillusionment 
with Hungary, leading eventually to the breaking of diplomatic relations in April 
1941.
79  
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6. 5 A radical change in the tone of the Central Department 
 
From 1941, Ivone Kirkpatrick, the head of the Central department which dealt with 
Hungarian questions, left the diplomatic service to take over the control of the European 
Services at the BBC. He was succeeded by Roger Makins. Frank Roberts, the second 
secretary in 1940, was also promoted to first secretary, effectively becoming the deputy-
head of the department.
80 They had already articulated pro-Hungarian opinion earlier; 
therefore their promotion projected a change of attitude towards Hungarian matters in 
1941.  
Hungarian historiography has shown considerable confusion about British 
policy towards Hungary in the winter of 1940-41. The most serious weakness of András 
Bán`s and Ignác Romsics` analyses is that they understood the British foreign policy-
making process as a series of meticulous debates, which balanced every possible 
scenario, in order	 ﾠto achieve the best decisions. They interpreted official British foreign 
policy as a series of decisions made with the consensus of the Cabinet, the Foreign 
Secretary and the Foreign Office. In effect, as we have already pointed out, the policy-
making process was largely the uncoordinated interaction of governmental departments 
and influential officials. Decisions, particularly on secondary issues such as Hungary, 
were often made hastily, based on limited information. Hungarian historiography 
consequently reached questionable conclusions. Bán argued that Cadogan`s irritation at 
the Second Vienna Award proved that British attitudes towards Hungarian territorial 
aspirations remained negative. On the other hand, he stressed that the positive opinion 
of Roger Makins on the same questions meant that the image of Hungary had improved 
in London by early 1941. Although both Bán and Romsics indicated that there was a 
difference of opinion between Makins and Cadogan, they did not weigh the influence of 
policy-makers.
81  
We need to stress that Makins` views cannot be interpreted as the articulation of 
British official policy. Makins as the head of the Central department directed the 
everyday conduct of policy-making towards Hungary and made recommendations to his 
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 ﾠand	 ﾠConsular	 ﾠYearbook	 ﾠfor	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 ﾠ(Harrison	 ﾠ
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 ﾠLondon	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 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ14-ﾭ‐15.	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 ﾠ
81	 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ118-ﾭ‐119;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠRomsics,	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direct superior, Cadogan, on what policy to follow towards Budapest. Analysing the 
recommendations of the heads of the departments, Cadogan then made independent 
decisions, or represented the Foreign Office`s viewpoint (and his own) at the Cabinet or 
at special committee discussions on crucial foreign political matters. Hungarian 
historians have not analysed the minutes of internal discussions of the Central 
department, and therefore they have overlooked whether Makins` pro-Hungarian views, 
or Robert`s evident annoyance at Beneš, shifted official British policy towards Hungary 
and the frontier questions. Here therefore we will focus on comparing the 
recommendations of the Central department with the officially adopted foreign policy 
towards Hungary.  
As we have stressed, after joining the Tripartite Pact in November 1940, 
Budapest made efforts to articulate its continued sympathy towards Britain. The 
Hungarian-Yugoslav treaty had failed to move British feelings, and therefore Teleki 
wrote to Macartney, asking him to convey a message to London. The Hungarians 
inquired about British opinion about Hungary`s role in post-war Central Europe.
82 
Nichols, anxious to avoid opening the frontier question, immediately recommended that 
Macartney should be seen as soon as possible `[…] otherwise he might get on the wrong 
line.`
83 It is evident that although Macartney was allowed to broadcast to Hungary, 
compared to the Munich crisis, he did not carry influence in the Foreign Office. 
Seemingly, the Foreign Office viewed Macartney as a mouthpiece of Hungarian 
revisionist demands. 
Perhaps due to the same Hungarian influence, O`Malley recommended that to 
the well-known 5 September declaration about Britain rejecting any territorial changes 
during the war, it should be added that London was striving for a just and sensible 
solution which would be based on how far countries attempted to preserve their 
sovereignty.
84 Strang immediately recognised that this would be interpreted by 
Budapest as a British approval of its double-dealing tactics between Germany and 
Britain. Strang, Cadogan and Eden, the new Foreign Secretary agreed that promising 
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 ﾠOffice,	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 ﾠNichols,	 ﾠ2	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territory to Hungary was not advisable, as it would have no effect on its subservience 
towards Germany.
85  
Reflecting on Macartney, Roberts too made an interesting remark, which puts 
the handling of frontier questions in the Foreign Office into a new perspective. 
Commenting on the Transylvanian problem, he noted that the question belonged to the 
Southern department, which dealt with Romanian questions, and redirected all 
discussion to them. This demonstrates that although the Central department viewed 
Hungary positively, it did have limited authority over the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, 
which still belonged to the Southern department. Here, the anti-Hungarian views of 
Sargent guaranteed a pro-Romanian British opinion on the Transylvania question.  
Bán and Romsics have dedicated much attention to the conversations of Barcza 
and Eden on 6 February 1941. During the meeting Eden expressed his disapproval of 
Hungarian foreign policy and explained that Britain so far had showed patience towards 
the Hungarian decision to allow the passage of German troops, turned a blind eye to 
Hungary`s adherence to the Axis and to the violently pro-German tone of the Hungarian 
press and radio. Yet, Eden warned Barcza that at the peace conference British attitudes 
would be influenced by the degree and manner in which Hungary had endeavoured to 
withstand Axis pressure and maintain a genuinely neutral attitude. Bán and Romsics 
interpreted Eden`s words as the manifestation of his anti-Hungarian views, which they 
believed determined British foreign policy towards Hungary in early 1941.
86 The 
documents of the Central department however reveal that these mild warnings did not 
reflect Eden`s views at all, as he was simply using the guidelines drafted and compiled 
by the Central department for him.
87 Eden`s post-meeting report reveals that he did 
indeed stick to these guidelines, which tells us much about the influence of the Central 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26603,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ387/123/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠStrang,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1941;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠCadogan,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠ
January	 ﾠ1941;	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠEden	 ﾠ18	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1941;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠR.	 ﾠR.	 ﾠJames,	 ﾠAnthony	 ﾠEden	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1987);	 ﾠD.	 ﾠ
R.	 ﾠThorpe,	 ﾠEden:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠLife	 ﾠand	 ﾠTimes	 ﾠof	 ﾠAnthony	 ﾠEden	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠEarl	 ﾠof	 ﾠAvon,	 ﾠ1897-ﾭ‐1977	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2004).	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 ﾠBán,	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐British	 ﾠDiplomacy	 ﾠ1938-ﾭ‐41,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ120-ﾭ‐121;	 ﾠRomsics,	 ﾠ`A	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 ﾠkülpolitika	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 ﾠpp.	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 ﾠAnthony	 ﾠEden	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Foreign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠabout	 ﾠHungary:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	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 ﾠD.	 ﾠCarlton,	 ﾠAntony	 ﾠEden	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ1981);	 ﾠA.	 ﾠC.	 ﾠJohnson,	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Anthony	 ﾠEden:	 ﾠA	 ﾠbiography	 ﾠ(London,	 ﾠ2010).	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Secretary:	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department, and Eden`s lack of knowledge of Hungarian questions. Eden made one 
personal comment to Barcza, which was not in the Foreign Office guideline, which 
indicated his perception of Hungarian territorial expansion. Reflecting on the question 
of Hungary`s recent aggrandisement he remarked:  
I thought the Hungarian Government and people should bear in mind the 
distinction between the German attitude and our own. A German domination of 
Europe meant the complete subjection of all peoples, Hungarians included. […] 
The Hungarian Minister appeared to agree […] that […] it was better for any 
nation to be free in a small area than slave in a large area.
 88   
This was a veiled criticism of the Hungarian policy of `cooperation for territory`, and 
his personal declaration of disapproval of an extensively enlarged Hungary.  
Yet, although disapproval of Hungarian policy was articulated outwardly, the 
internal discussion of the Foreign Office shows a very different picture. Analysing the 
Central department`s reaction to the Eden-Barcza meeting and the reception of 
Hungarian propositions in early 1941 attests that Eden`s harsh words towards Barcza 
were only intended to direct, rather than to warn or threaten. During the course of the 
first three months of 1941 the senior officials of the Central department, Makins and 
Roberts, articulated a very lenient and friendly tone towards Hungary, which suggested 
that they were contemplating an equal position for Hungary in post-war Europe. 
Moreover, the tone occasionally suggested that Roberts and Makins were toying with 
the idea of basing British post-war Central European stategy on a strong and 
geographically bigger Hungary. Reacting to Barcza`s and O`Malley`s request for a 
vague encouragement on rightful Hungarian territorial aspirations, Roberts noted that 
Britain could not applaud the recent territorial changes, but might approve them, if 
Hungary would openly follow the Allied cause.
89 Makins went a step further. He 
believed that a friendly reference to Hungary`s territorial acquisitions might be possible 
in the near future, as although Hungary was exposed to the highest German pressure in 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
88	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26603,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ1228/123/21,	 ﾠEden	 ﾠto	 ﾠO`Malley,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
89	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26603,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ1228/123/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts,	 ﾠ17	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ236	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
the region, she was still able to maintain a significant level of independence, and 
showed national unity.
90  
Although in the background the Central department seemed to demonstrate 
unusual lenience towards Hungary, on the official level Budapest received repeated 
solemn warnings. O`Malley, on 26 January gave a strongly worded aide-memoire to 
Horthy, which described the possible course of Anglo-Hungarian relations. The 
document attempted to appeal to Hungary`s revisionist agenda. It questioned Hungary`s 
recent territorial gains by declaring that states, which decided to be allies of Germany, 
were unlikely to be aggrandized to the extent of the victims of Nazi aggression. Hitting 
a threatening tone, the memorandum advanced that England would not feel sympathy 
`[…] for those proven unready when circumstances demanded it to hazard their own 
lives in the service of truth and freedom.`
91 Horthy assured O`Malley that he would 
resign if the Germans went too far in threatening Hungarian independence, and would 
appoint an émigré government, which would be represented by István Bethlen in 
London and Tibor Eckhart in Washington.
92 Makins and Roberts reacted very positively 
towards the possible formulation of a Hungarian government-in-exile; they evidently 
respected Bethlen and Eckhart, and were eager to facilitate their journey to Britain.
93  
Yet, Makins and Roberts were not without an opposition in the Foreign Office; 
the earlier difference between the Central and Southern departments as to how to deal 
with Hungarian revisionism escalated. The Southern department and Orme Sargent in 
particular, who had articulated his antipathy of Hungary on numerous occasions, was 
startled that London still maintained contacts with a country which allowed the passage 
of Nazis towards the Mediterranean.
94 Robert Vansittart also recommended that 
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 ﾠp.	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 ﾠUndeclared	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠ1940-ﾭ‐1941,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠW.	 ﾠI.	 ﾠEverett	 ﾠ
Gleason	 ﾠand	 ﾠS.	 ﾠLanger	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ1953),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ396-ﾭ‐398.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠO`Malley	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 ﾠ7	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 ﾠof	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 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	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diplomatic relations with Hungary should be immediately severed, as the Hungarian 
elite were completely on the side of Nazi Germany and the country was under enemy 
control.
95 These opinions were immediately side-lined. Roberts defended Hungary and 
praised the pro-British sentiments of Horthy, Teleki and Bethlen, explaining that 
Hungary was only a corridor for Germany, not like Romania which had become a 
German base.
96 Failing to exert influence on the Central department, Vansittart 
attempted to influence the views of the British public. In the Sunday Times he published 
a violent and very derogatory rant against the Axis satellites, threatening them with no 
sympathy this time.
97 Despite the official criticism, the Central department remained 
very friendly towards Hungary until the invasion of Yugoslavia, because compared to 
Romania Hungary was not the base of the Wehrmacht.
98   
Roberts` and Makins` suspicion towards Beneš, could also be one of the reasons 
for the more friendly tone towards Hungary.
99 Beneš` protest at a Hungarian-Polish 
declaration for a common Hungarian-Polish frontier was viewed with suspicion in the 
Central department. An unidentifiable Hungarian officer and Dembinski, a general of 
the Polish Home Army commandeered by Sikorski, called for the Hungarian occupation 
of further Slovak territories, to strengthen the common frontier between Hungary and 
Poland.
100 Roberts and Makins instructed the European Service of the BBC to ban 
propaganda about Ruthenia, the province which was connecting Hungary and Poland, 
and rejected the Czech excitement, stressing that the Hungarian-Polish declaration was 
indeed encouraged as it promoted Hungarian-Polish friendship.
101  
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26603,	 ﾠR	 ﾠ1101/80/37,	 ﾠVansittart	 ﾠto	 ﾠEden,	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠ	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96	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26603,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ1494/123/21,	 ﾠminutes	 ﾠby	 ﾠMakins	 ﾠand	 ﾠRoberts,	 ﾠ21	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠ
recounted	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠTeleki	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 ﾠof	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 ﾠin	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 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ1940,	 ﾠTeleki	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtrusted	 ﾠanymore	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
mention	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠWhitehall	 ﾠin	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 ﾠHIA,	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 ﾠ18	 ﾠ
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 ﾠthe	 ﾠconflict	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 ﾠBruce	 ﾠLockhart	 ﾠand	 ﾠFrank	 ﾠRoberts	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 ﾠCzech	 ﾠ
questions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠRoberts`	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcovert	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 ﾠof	 ﾠBeneš	 ﾠin	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 ﾠSmetana,	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Shadow	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 ﾠpp.	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6. 6 The nadir of their fortunes 
 
By February the level of German transport through Hungary had reached an alarming 
level, but it still had not affected the positive tone towards Hungary. O`Malley protested 
against the transhipping of 20 German divisions, and Cadogan also explained to Barcza 
that if Budapest decided to quarter the Wehrmacht, like Romania, it would be treated as 
an enemy.
102 It seemed that opening Hungary to the Wehrmacht would not alarm 
London, as long as Hungary was only a `corridor` and not a base, like Romania.
103 In 
late February, when Hungary went another step further in contingencies towards 
Germany, the Central department finally reached the end of its tether. When O`Malley 
reported that German troops were quartered around the Hungarian city of Kolozsvár 
[Cluj] in Transylvania, the attitude towards Hungary completely changed. Roberts 
remarked with frustration: `It seems that Hungary now is not simply a corridor, as it 
used to be, but a base.`
104 
Teleki and László Bárdossy the new Hungarian Foreign Minister, justified the 
Hungarian acquiescence, explaining that Romania explicitly asked Budapest to allow 
the passage of German troops.
105 Roberts refuted such justifications and quoted article 2 
of the Hague Convention (1907) which declared that allowing the transportation of 
ammunition and troops through neutral territory was forbidden by international law.
 106    
Despite this change of attitude towards Hungary, it is evident that at this point 
the Foreign Office did not contemplate severing diplomatic relations. Drafting the 
answer for a parliamentary question clearly demonstrates this attitude. William 
Wedgwood Benn, a Labour M.P., proposed the question whether Britain contemplated 
withdrawing its legation from Budapest. Drafting the answer, Makins stressed that 
O`Malley had to be kept at his post, because breaking off relations might give the 
impression of an unfriendly Britain towards other neutrals, such as Spain and Portugal, 
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 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠEden,	 ﾠ26	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1941;	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ15.	 ﾠcs.,	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 ﾠI.	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 ﾠOn	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 ﾠthat	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠbase,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ`only`	 ﾠa	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠcorridor,	 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠresisted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠto	 ﾠblock	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠbalances	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠstressed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠmove	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalienate	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐
British	 ﾠHungarians:	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 ﾠC	 ﾠ461/392/21,	 ﾠRoberts	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 ﾠ(Treasury),	 ﾠ21	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ
1941.	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which London was very keen to avoid. It also might fuel public demands for military 
action, argued Makins, for which Britain was still unprepared.
107 It is immediately 
apparent that the pro-British feelings of the Hungarian elite and nation were not used 
anymore as a justification for keeping the legation open. The amicable tone turned more 
neutral towards Hungary.
108 
Teleki bitterly complained to Barcza about the British lack of understanding. He 
was furious that Britain expected Hungary to defend its territory with arms for British 
imperial interests, and explained to Barcza that London should not be surprised that 
after giving no support, Hungary was looking for help from other quarters for its 
righteous claims.
109 In early March Teleki felt it necessary to further explain his actions 
to London. He declared that the priority of Hungary in the current war was to preserve 
its armed forces and national wealth, as it was surrounded by enemies.
110 Bán claims 
that Barcza only received this letter in late March. We have found no evidence that the 
Foreign Office ever saw this report, although Barcza probably used it during his next 
meeting with Eden in late March. No report has survived of this meeting in the 
documents of the Foreign Office, and Eden also did not mention it in his memoirs.
111 
The meeting however was a crucial one, and the only report we have is Barcza`s. Eden 
warned that if Hungary served as a base for German military operations against one of 
Britain`s allies, London would break off diplomatic relations with Budapest. On the 
other hand, if Hungary joined the German campaign, Britain would have no other 
option but declare war on Hungary and bomb German military formations and supply 
lines in Hungary.
112 Previously it has been understood that Hungary became a base of 
the Wehrmacht only directly before the Yugoslav campaign in April 1941. British 
intelligence reports however demonstrated that German military preparations in 
Hungary were well under-way before the Yugoslav coup. In March, the British military 
attaché reported a high level of German military presence along the Hungarian-
Yugoslav frontier and noted that the Luftwaffe was using Hungarian airfields at will. He 
complained that the Hungarian Defence Ministry was using all kinds of excuses to 
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 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiplomataemlékeim,	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ485;	 ﾠibid	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ300.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ240	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
cover the operation, and predicted that this was the first step in the complete occupation 
of the country.
 113  
A coup d'état, led by General Dušan Simović, overthrew the Yugoslav 
government after Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact.
114 Simović declared loyalty to 
the Axis, but Hitler nevertheless decided to invade Yugoslavia along with the planed 
invasion of Greece. Hitler offered the Hungarians the possibility to fulfil their 
revisionist aims, and suggested that Horthy determine the line of Hungarian 
annexation.
115 The Hungarian Crown Council, after prolonged discussions and 
hesitation, decided that Hungary would only participate in the campaign after 
Yugoslavia broke up as a country.
116 The Hungarian decision to participate in the 
invasion of Yugoslavia can be described as the interplay of Horthy`s enthusiasm to 
revitalise First World War German-Hungarian armed comradeship, the interference of 
the Hungarian military in politics, the marginalization of the pro-British segments of the 
Hungarian political elite, and the unquenchable will to reincorporate lost territories; all 
was coupled with Teleki`s fatigue, depression and eventual suicide.
117  
As we have noted, the Hungarian sources for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship 
in March and early April	 ﾠare very scarce. The British reaction to Hungary`s slippery 
slope from the sudden gleam of hope for revision to opening the country to the 
Wehrmacht can however be reconstructed from the diplomatic dispatches of O`Malley, 
which have not been used by historians. These reports attest that the Hungarian tone 
towards London also radically changed after early April as a result of the decision to 
accept Hitler`s offer to reincorporate some of the territories lost to Yugoslavia at 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
113	 ﾠMOL,	 ﾠK	 ﾠ63,	 ﾠ15.	 ﾠcs.,	 ﾠ1941-ﾭ‐2/7,	 ﾠI.	 ﾠtétel,	 ﾠ4144/1941,	 ﾠBarclay	 ﾠ(M.A.	 ﾠBudapest)	 ﾠto	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice,	 ﾠ25	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ
1941.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
114	 ﾠFor	 ﾠBritain`s	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYugoslav	 ﾠcoup	 ﾠd'état,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠS.	 ﾠOnslow,	 ﾠ`Britain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBelgrade	 ﾠCoup	 ﾠof	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ
March	 ﾠ1941	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 ﾠInterwar	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 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ260-ﾭ‐267.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdecades,	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠ
historiography	 ﾠintensely	 ﾠdebated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠand	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠTeleki`s	 ﾠsuicide.	 ﾠAmong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠBarcza`s	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 ﾠattacked	 ﾠby	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Trianon.
118 Horthy and Bárdossy were abrupt and now showed complete indifference 
towards British opinion. During a conversation with Horthy on 3 April and with 
Bárdossy on the next day O`Malley warned that Hungarian participation in the war 
against Yugoslavia might result in war between Britain and Hungary. According to 
O`Malley, both Horthy and Bárdossy completely disregarded British threats on the 
grounds of Britain`s notorious lack of attention towards Hungarian problems and on 
German-Hungarian traditional friendship.
119 Grasping at straws, O`Malley reported on 5 
April that there might be an improvement in Hungarian attitude, as Bethlen was 
attempting to restrain Horthy and the Hungarian military, but O`Malley`s hope 
collapsed very soon.
 120 The next day, which proved to be the last day of his mission, as 
London broke diplomatic relations with Budapest on 7 April, he reported in 
disillusionment that Horthy had completely betrayed his promise to appoint an émigré 
government and resist German pressure. Moreover, Bethlen also sent a message to him, 
explaining that he would not leave for England, contrary to what he had promised if the 
Germans occupied Hungary.
121 
  Cadogan informed Barcza on 6 April that since the Wehrmacht had attacked 
Yugoslavia from Hungarian territory, British diplomatic representation would be 
withdrawn the next day.
122 Now that Hungary had committed itself to the Axis the 
opinion of the Central department became more critical. As we have noted, in 
connection with the question of the Czech émigrés in London, the Central department 
had voiced a very friendly tone towards Hungary; now this argument was turned 
around. Roberts noted that Britain had to stand by the Czechs, who were ready to 
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 ﾠYugoslavia,	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gain,	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 ﾠRomanian	 ﾠBánát	 ﾠand	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 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠBánát	 ﾠand	 ﾠBaranya	 ﾠ(map	 ﾠ6.	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 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠDuring	 ﾠhis	 ﾠwar	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠtrial	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠBárdossy	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ1	 ﾠApril	 ﾠhad	 ﾠpromised	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠreincorporate	 ﾠterritories	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Hungarian	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠwent	 ﾠto	 ﾠEngland	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠfunctioning	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernment-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐exile:	 ﾠJuhász,	 ﾠ
Brit-ﾭ‐magyar	 ﾠtitkos	 ﾠtárgyalások	 ﾠ1943-ﾭ‐ban,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ23;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠP.	 ﾠPritz,	 ﾠBárdossy	 ﾠLászló	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ2001);	 ﾠ
Idem,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠWar	 ﾠCrimes	 ﾠTrial	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠPrime	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠLászló	 ﾠBárdossy	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork,	 ﾠ2005).	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠ
remained	 ﾠsilent	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠreports	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpromise,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmade	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26603,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3363/123/31,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠEden,	 ﾠ5	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1941.	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121	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26602,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3462/80/21,	 ﾠO`Malley	 ﾠto	 ﾠEden,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
122	 ﾠDIMK	 ﾠV,	 ﾠ703,	 ﾠBarcza	 ﾠto	 ﾠBárdossy,	 ﾠ6	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1941.	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fight.
123 During their last meeting, Eden asked Barcza to convey his deepest 
disappointment towards the Hungarian government. He said that attacking a country, 
with which Budapest only recently signed a pact of eternal friendship, would always be 
to the shame of Hungary, and Britain would remember this at the peace conference. He 
also noted that Britain would never negotiate with those currently ruling Hungary.
124 
 
 
 
 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
123	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26602,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ3392/80/21,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts,	 ﾠ7	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ1941.	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124	 ﾠGyörgy	 ﾠBarcza,	 ﾠDiplomataemlékeim.	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ500.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠour	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠ`Free	 ﾠHungary`	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain	 ﾠand	 ﾠAmerica	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠ
organizations	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠactive	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1941,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠhad	 ﾠno	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
formulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
organizations	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠof	 ﾠWhitehall	 ﾠabout	 ﾠHungarian-ﾭ‐Czechoslovak	 ﾠfraternization	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1940.	 ﾠEden	 ﾠproclaimed	 ﾠin	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1941	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠémigré	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠenjoyed	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠ
recognition,	 ﾠor	 ﾠsupport,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠaims	 ﾠwere	 ﾠunclear,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsupported	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
majority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠnation	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠsuspected	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcovertly	 ﾠ
represented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠgovernment:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ434/9,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ9383/7460/62,	 ﾠEden	 ﾠto	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠ
(Washington),	 ﾠ4	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠan	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐depth	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHungarian	 ﾠémigré	 ﾠ
movements	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1941,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26642,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ13505/13505/21,	 ﾠMacartney,	 ﾠ`The	 ﾠMagyars	 ﾠAbroad`,	 ﾠ
November	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso:	 ﾠN.	 ﾠDreisziger,	 ﾠ`Az	 ﾠatlanti	 ﾠdemokraciák	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠ'Szabad	 ﾠMagyarországért'	 ﾠ
mozgalmak	 ﾠa	 ﾠII.	 ﾠvilágháború	 ﾠalatt`	 ﾠin	 ﾠMagyarország	 ﾠés	 ﾠa	 ﾠnagyhatalmak	 ﾠa	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠszázadban,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠby	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ
Romsics	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ1995),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ149-ﾭ‐62.	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6. 7 The end of Anglo-Hungarian relationship 
 
The period between Britain breaking off relations with Hungary and declaring war in 
December 1941 has received little attention from historians. This short span of time 
however provides crucial implications for British post-war policy. Although official 
contacts ceased, the question of Hungary was still intensely debated in the Foreign 
Office.  
Roberts and Makins, although supporting breaking off relations with Hungary, 
had not changed their views about Hungary`s future position in the region. They fully 
agreed with O`Malley`s recommendation of considering Bethlen as the future leader, 
and regardless of past events, Makins was still convinced that Hungary could form the 
basis of British policy in the region.
125 Hungary`s declaration of war on the Soviet 
Union received very little attention in Whitehall. The question whether Britain should 
declare war on Hungary came up in July in the House of Commons, but not in the 
context of Hungary`s operations in the Soviet Union.
126 John Parker, a Labour M. P., 
inquired why the British government showed leniency in their propaganda towards 
Quislings, such as Horthy and Antonescu, and whether it was time to declare war on 
them.
127 Roberts, drafting the answer, pointed out that British policy should not demean 
itself by becoming personal in its propaganda, and pointed out that Britain could still 
count on the loyalty of some Hungarians.
128 Consequently, an evasive answer was given 
in the Commons, pointing out that Britain had already expressed its policy by breaking 
off relations.
129 
It is crucial to address why Hungary retained its positive image in the Central 
department even after relations were broken, and whether this positive opinion was 
reflected in perceptions towards the territorial questions. Due to the fact that since the 
Second Vienna Award, the Hungarian problem had largely lost its Romanian angle, 
Hungarian questions were now mostly dealt within the Central department. During the 
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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26602,	 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠand	 ﾠMakins,	 ﾠ1	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
126	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠwar	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSoviet	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ26	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠHungary`s	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠoperations	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the	 ﾠSoviet	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1941,	 ﾠsee:	 ﾠP.	 ﾠGosztonyi,	 ﾠA	 ﾠmagyar	 ﾠhonvédség	 ﾠa	 ﾠmásodik	 ﾠvilágháborúban	 ﾠ(Budapest,	 ﾠ
1992),	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ43-ﾭ‐58.	 ﾠ
127	 ﾠHansard	 ﾠ(Commons),	 ﾠvol.	 ﾠ373,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ149,	 ﾠParker	 ﾠto	 ﾠEden,	 ﾠ9	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1941.	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ371/26620,	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 ﾠminute	 ﾠby	 ﾠRoberts,	 ﾠ8	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1941.	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 ﾠ(Commons),	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 ﾠJuly	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summer months of 1940, O`Malley`s recommendations were side-lined by Sargent, but 
in 1941 Roberts and Makins trusted his propositions, which were often adopted as 
official policy without much debate in the Central department. O`Malley was critical of 
Hungarian foreign policy, but continuously reported that the pro-British part of the elite 
and the Hungarian nation were gaining strength and increasingly believed in ultimate 
British victory. These factors explain why the Hungarian people continued to be trusted, 
even when confidence was lost in the Hungarian elite after it decided to participate in 
the invasion of Yugoslavia.   
The question then inevitably arises why diplomatic relations were broken off 
and war declared later in 1941 if the department which was dealing with Hungarian 
questions had such a positive opinion about Hungary? This question directs the 
attention to one of the key questions surrounding the British foreign policy-making 
process, and more crucially to the question: who made British foreign policy? The 
example of Hungary attests that even the head of the Central department, Roger Makins, 
or its senior official, Frank Roberts was unable to exert much influence on strategic 
decision-making. Their opinions on Hungary were overruled by Cadogan and Eden, 
who were more senior, and carried more influence in the decision-making process.
130 
With the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, and as the result of the Anglo-Soviet 
military alliance (12 July 1941), British opinion on Central Europe became more and 
more conditioned by the external factor of Soviet opinion and interest.  
Even before the Anglo-Soviet military accord was signed, Moscow had put 
indirect pressure on British policy in Central Europe. In early July, the Soviet Union 
recognised the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia, and the judicial continuation of 
the Czecho-Slovak National Committee and inter-war Czechoslovakia.
131 After the 
Anglo-Soviet treaty, London was forced to give similar recognition. On 18 July the 
Committee was recognised by London as `enjoying a judicial position identical with 
that of the Allied […] governments`, but Whitehall still upheld its reservation on the 
questions of judicial continuity and full territorial restoration.
132 By the end of the 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
130	 ﾠBarker,	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠin	 ﾠSouth	 ﾠEast	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ245.	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/43,	 ﾠC	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 ﾠLockhart	 ﾠto	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 ﾠTNA,	 ﾠFO	 ﾠ417/43,	 ﾠC	 ﾠ7680/7140/12,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠRecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCzecho-ﾭ‐Slovak	 ﾠNational	 ﾠCommittee,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ
1941.	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 ﾠdeclaration	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdesigned	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 ﾠSoviet	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	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 ﾠnothing	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 ﾠthe	 ﾠCzechs.	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and	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 ﾠFirst	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 ﾠwould	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summer Britain and the Soviet Union formed a unified front on post-war policy. 
Moscow signed the Atlantic Charter, which defined Allied war aims. The Charter stated 
the aim of the war: no territorial aggrandizement, no territorial changes made against the 
wishes of the people, and restoration of self-government. The Atlantic Charter 
questioned all territorial changes occurring since January 1938, among them all of 
Hungary`s territorial acquisitions.    
By the autumn of 1941 Moscow requested the British to demonstrate more fully 
their commitment to the alliance with the Soviet Union and Molotov demanded a 
British declaration of war on Hungary, Romania and Finland. Churchill and Eden in 
order not to compromise British post-war positions in these countries were able to resist 
this demand until the end of the year.
133 In December, Moscow however pressed the 
claims with intense vigour. With the Wehrmacht at the gates of Moscow, London was 
concerned that Stalin might be tempted to sign a separate peace with Hitler, and 
declared war to ensure continued Soviet participation. On 3 December an ultimatum 
was sent to Budapest that unless the Hungarian army ceased hostilities against the 
Soviet Union, the ally of Britain, in two days, war would be declared between Britain 
and Hungary.
134 Budapest did not respond, hence, although reluctantly, London 
declared war on Hungary on 5 December 1941.  
The problem of declaring war on the small Axis-satellites symbolises the closing 
chapter of unravelled British decision-making on Central Europe and the Balkans. The 
reluctance of Churchill, Eden and the Central department to declare war proves that on 
the altar of the Anglo-Soviet alliance certain sacrifices had to be made. Makins 
frustratingly noted that the Hungarians would now throw everything behind the Axis, as 
they could see no hope from the West, and as a consequence the war might even be 
prolonged.
135 Strang`s comments described the British situation with great accuracy: 
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The trouble about having allies is that one has to take some account of their 
wishes, especially if they have a large share of the fighting.
136 
December 1941 also clarified that post-war planning would be subdued to the 
requirements of Anglo-Soviet alliance. This had a decisive effect on British policy 
towards Central European territorial questions. During Eden`s discussion with Soviet 
leaders in December 1941 it became clear that Moscow would demand a dominant role 
in the region. Stalin and Molotov insisted on the immediate de jure recognition of the 
June 1941 frontiers of the Soviet Union, which would have meant the British 
recognition of Soviet aggression against Poland, Romania, Finland and the Baltic states. 
Eden was reluctant to give such assurances of his own accord, and returned to 
London.
137 As a consequence of the experiences of the Moscow discussion, the Foreign 
Office immediately requested the FRPS to prepare memoranda on the territorial 
disputes and questions of the region.
138 A comprehensive memorandum, dealing with 
the territorial, economic and political problems of the European region wedged between 
Germany and the Soviet Union, was submitted to the Foreign Office in September 
1942.
139 The process of post-war planning went along with remarkable sluggishness in 
1940 and 1941, and the impetus to deal with the territorial questions of Central Europe 
came as a reaction to the strong Soviet interests and territorial demands in the region.
140    
The document, now in front of the Foreign Office, recommended the 
reorganization of the region, and redrawing its frontiers applying a combination of 
ethnographic, economic and strategic principles, with the close appreciation of Soviet 
interests. It recommended the creation of two confederations, the first based on the 
Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation, the other on the Yugoslav-Greek, with the explicit 
aim to attach other countries to these. It stressed that frontiers between the members had 
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 ﾠ(8),	 ﾠMr	 ﾠEden`s	 ﾠvisit	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 ﾠMoscow,	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 ﾠJanuary	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1942;	 ﾠD.	 ﾠHall,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠchanging	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 ﾠof	 ﾠBritish	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠPolicy:	 ﾠEden’s	 ﾠVisit	 ﾠto	 ﾠMoscow	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1941,	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ[accessed	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 ﾠJune	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 ﾠSeptember	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 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠin	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to be mainly ethnographic.
141 Additionally, based on the failure of inter-war minority 
protection, it recommended the exchange, or transfer of national minorities, to remove 
sources of antagonism between member states.
142 Hungary would have belonged to the 
Northern confederation, within strict ethnographic frontiers, which meant that it would 
have been able to retain only a fraction of the First Vienna Award, if anything. The 
document dealt with the Transylvanian problem in a separate section, recognising its 
difficulties. It essentially offered three solutions: creating an independent state, serving 
as a buffer between the two confederations; cantonization and attachment to one of the 
confederations; or dividing it between Hungary and Romania, and transferring a 50-
100km wide strip to Hungary in the process.
143  
From 1942 onwards, it became clear for British policy-makers that the 
confederations would become the subject of friction with Moscow. Molotov articulated 
an increasing distaste towards the plans, convinced that they were directed against the 
Soviet Union. He also raised explicit objections against attaching Hungary and Austria 
to any of the confederations.
144 By this time, Soviet policy seemed to determine British 
plans to an ever greater extent. Responding to Soviet opinion, a memorandum on 
Hungary, prepared by Roberts for the Teheran Conference stressed that the alteration of 
Hungary`s Trianon frontier with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia was not a British 
interest.
145 At the Teheran Conference, Churchill`s plan to open the European Second 
Front in the Balkans, and not in France, was rejected by the Soviets and Americans, 
which technically put an end to British confederation plans, and it became certain that 
Central Europe would be occupied by the Soviet Union. Churchill, keen to retain a 
position for Britain in the region, travelled to Moscow with Eden in October 1944, and 
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠfrontiers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconfederations,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
German-ﾭ‐Polish,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠconsiderations,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
strengthening	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconfederations.	 ﾠ	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 ﾠmemorandum	 ﾠattests,	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecognised	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agreed with Stalin to divide the countries of the region into spheres of influence.	 ﾠThe so 
called	 ﾠ`Percentages Agreement` determined the percentage of Soviet and British 
influence in the countries of the region, and divided Hungary 80-20 in favour of the 
Soviets.
146 Romsics has interpreted the agreement as a well-calculated British move to 
forestall Soviet dominance, while Kolko has pointed out the cynicism with which the 
future of the region was dealt with.
147 The meeting actually was the last attempt at 
checking Soviet supremacy in the region, which eventually resulted in British 
humiliation. All of the British and American proposals regarding the political and 
geographic shape of the region were rejected by the Soviets at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1947 and the region soon fell under the Soviet yoke.
148 Britain was only 
able to maintain a fragile influence in Greece.  
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 ﾠPolitics	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 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠForeign	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 ﾠYork,	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6. 8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the Anglo-Hungarian relationship after the Second Vienna 
Award, with special focus on how Hungary`s adherence to the Tripartite Pact, the 
breaking of diplomatic relations and finally how the declaration of war influenced 
British perceptions about the future geographical shape of Hungary. We have kept a 
close attention on British official perception of post-war Central Europe, which was 
compared to the academic viewpoints of the FRPS and British propaganda policy.  
We have found that both the planning in the Foreign Office and in the FRPS 
arrived at same conclusions; supporting the creation of multi-national confederation in 
the region between Germany and the Soviet Union, from Finland in the north, to Greece 
in the south. The confederations would have been organised on the principle of `justice`, 
which projected a peace treaty without victors or defeated. One of the most important 
aims of the confederation were to remove antagonisms between the states of Central 
Europe and the Balkans, which peace-planners were hoping to achieve by drawing 
ethnographic frontiers, and transferring national minorities. The confederation plans had 
not been finalised until the autumn of 1942, therefore it is difficult to accurately tell 
what frontiers were planned for Hungary at the end of 1941. The memoranda of the 
FRPS, the initial discussions of the War Aims Committee, the propaganda activities of 
the PID and the internal discussions in the Foreign Office all suggested that Hungary’s 
recent territorial acquisitions would be curtailed at the peace conference.   
 This chapter has also demonstrated that the analysis of British foreign policy 
towards Central Europe has to leave its geographical limitations, and broaden its context 
by considering other angles, such as the Balkans, the Soviet Union and even the 
Mediterranean, as all these regions were connected in British grand strategy. British 
peace-planning was only accelerated in late 1941 as a reaction to increasing Soviet 
interests and claims. It was rather unfortunate, or perhaps symptomatic of the 
sluggishness of British foreign policy-making process that by the time the Cabinet made 
the decision to endorse the confederation plan scheme in 1943 as official policy, it was 
already outdated due to Soviet disapproval.   250	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It has been further demonstrated that the Anglo-Hungarian relationship also has 
to step out of its geographic limitations, and other aspects, such as the Czechoslovak, 
Polish, Romanian and Yugoslavian have to be considered. An examination of the papers 
of the Czechoslovak-Polish confederation proves that policy-makers in London always 
favoured nations which were ready to make sacrifices and actively resist Germany. 
Regardless of the sympathy of the Central department, a future Hungary could only 
exist in this context. Although this did not limit Hungary`s role in the future Europe, it 
certainly limited its geographical extent. Keeping territorial gains in late 1941 seemed to 
be very remote. Eventually at the Paris Peace Conference, the frontiers of Hungary were 
determined by Moscow, and were readjusted to Trianon.  
The positive opinion of the Central department about Hungary has been 
contrasted to the view of key policy-makers. Eden and Cadogan did not share the 
sympathetic views of the Foreign Office, and were convinced of Hungary`s 
fundamentally pro-German orientation. The views of the Central department were 
therefore ignored and Eden and Cadogan condemned Hungary for following an 
increasingly pro-German policy. Allowing the passage of 20 German divisions to 
Romania and Bulgaria in October 1940, adhering to the Axis in November and finally 
Hungary`s participation in the attack on Yugoslavia were all viewed to be the 
culmination of Hungary`s pro-German policy, which had been gradually unfolding 
since the Munich crisis.    
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7. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has focused on the official British-Hungarian relationship and official British 
views about Hungary`s territorial aggrandisements between 1938 and 1941. The 
primary aim has been to demonstrate the impact of Hungary`s territorial claims on 
British policy towards Hungary and Central Europe and the criteria by which Britain 
judged Hungary`s territorial gains and revisionism.   
The study has not been a rewriting of Anglo-Hungarian relations, but a more 
concentrated analysis of how the territorial question affected British official opinion and 
bilateral relations. As revisionism was the central theme of inter-war Hungarian foreign 
policy, it crucially influenced all aspects of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship; hence 
reviewing British official opinions and bilateral relations from this perspective has 
offered a more complicated image than previous historical approaches. The thesis is not 
a typical diplomatic case study. It has asked a different set of questions from those 
normally posed in conventional diplomatic narratives and viewed the problem from a 
broader theoretical perspective. Diplomatic developments have provided the framework 
for an analysis of the formulation of British attitudes towards Hungary, but the 
argument has taken a different tack by examining the way in which thinking unfolded in 
Whitehall. This approach has vividly illuminated that perceptions and prejudices were 
just as important in formulating policy towards Hungary as the interpretation and 
analysis of current international developments.  
Moreover, we have provided a wider geographical perspective for the analysis of 
the Anglo-Hungarian relationship and have shown that the Hungarian territorial 
question had strong implications for British Central European and Balkan strategy. This 
broader perspective gives a clearer image of London`s relationship with 
Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, confirming that exactly because Hungary 
had contested the territorial status quo of these countries, their relationship with London 
cannot be entirely understood without considering the British attitude towards the 
`Hungarian question`.  
Many historians have addressed the immediate British reaction to the Hungarian 
and other territorial changes in the region. However, the dynamics and evolution of 253	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British opinion and London`s long term view about the post-war shape of Central 
Europe and Hungary has received little attention. Hence, the analysis has been directed 
towards demonstrating whether British policy-makers considered the territorial gains of 
Hungary as sustainable and viable. We have aimed at identifying the British criteria in 
judging the territorial changes of Hungary and for redrawing Hungary`s post-war 
frontiers. It has also been questioned whether the concept of `national self-
determination`, the original aim of the Versailles peace settlement, was still considered 
by Whitehall as a viable solution for reconstructing the region after the Second World 
War, or whether more forceful solutions, such as creating ethnographic frontiers by 
population transfers or redrawing frontiers on the basis of economic considerations or 
historical precedence, were contemplated as workable alternatives.  
We have also sought to dispel some of the deeply held beliefs of the 
historiography about British views between 1938 and 1941. The image of Hungary as a 
German satellite is very much overstated in the historiography. The danger of this view-
point is that it suggests that Whitehall condemned Hungarian territorial gains and 
automatically supported Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia and the restoration 
of the Versailles status quo after the war. 
This research has proved that the Anglo-Hungarian relationship was conditioned 
by the international situation, the current military and economic strength of Britain and 
Hungary`s geographical position, and not primarily by the conduct and direction of 
Hungarian foreign policy or Hungarian territorial gains and further demands. For these 
reasons, the question of frontier revision was underpinned and treated by British policy-
makers with a measure of tact, unaccompanied by any firm commitment. Promises were 
guided by strategic necessity rather than long term political or other considerations. This 
was in spite of the fact that Hungary was condemned for following a pro-German 
policy; in the background policy-makers planned a fair treatment for Hungary after the 
war, which would have involved limited frontier revision.  
Historians have suggested that after the Anschluss London had written Hungary 
off as a German satellite.
1 In fact British opinion was more complex. In the aftermath of 
the Anschluss, the Cabinet showed limited interest towards the fate of Hungary. 
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Certainly, Hungary`s openly pro-German policy was received with deep dissatisfaction 
by Orme Sargent, the head of the Southern department of the Foreign Office. Newly 
presented evidence suggests that Hungarian policy in 1938 brought deep-seated Foreign 
Office suspicion to the surface from the era of the Great War, which essentially 
determined British opinion about Hungarian revisionism. Sargent, who was the key 
figure determining British policy towards Hungary at the time, connected Hungary`s 
military alliance with Germany in the Great War with current developments; and his 
minutes were full of antagonistic comments about Hungary`s social backwardness and 
the past ill-treatment of nationalities. Whether Sargent`s opinions were very persuasive 
in the Foreign Office or whether he simply brought these prejudices to the surfaces we 
cannot decide conclusively, but these arguments became recurrent in Whitehall until 
1941. Consequently, the Foreign Office was deeply suspicious about Hungarian 
territorial claims. On the other hand, the official tone towards Budapest did not reflect 
this strong dislike, becasuse Hungary was still not fully on the side of Germany. This 
duality of opinion persisted throughout the period up to 1941, hence the analysis of 
official opinion and British perceptions have been separated.  
  The Czechoslovak crisis in the autumn of 1938 brought Central European 
territorial and minority conflicts to the international forefront. Chamberlain had taken 
the diplomatic lead to solve the Sudeten question. It has been the consensus of 
historians that Chamberlain had been completely disinterested in the Magyar question 
of Czechoslovakia, and was only reacting to Hitler`s demands. Barcza`s diaries and 
unresearched British official documents have shown that Chamberlain was more open 
towards moderate Hungarian claims than was previously understood by historians. 
Scholars have not emphasied that the fact that the Magyar demands were raised by 
Hitler crucially affected British attitudes toward Hungary. For the reason that Hitler 
connected his demands for the Sudetenland with Hungarian territorial claims, 
Chamberlain viewed the latter as a German pretext for destabilising the status quo of the 
region, and therefore viewed it with suspicion. This notion essentially persisted in 
London throughout the period and was understandably connected with Hungary`s 
continuous pro-German official rethoric. András Bán mentioned that recommendations 
were made in the Foreign Office about the revision of Hungary`s frontiers before 255	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Munich, but he did not fully explore the aims and background of this proposition.
2 Our 
findings have demonstrated that the British delegation arrived in Munich with very clear 
views on the question. Chamberlain was ready to recommend the transfer of a small 
number of towns and villages to Hungary, which were mainly inhabited by Magyars. 
This recommendation displays the marks of both Chamberlain`s and the Foreign 
Office`s opinion. The aim to create ethnographic frontiers originated from Chamberlain, 
who was convinced that the application of these criteria would bring long sought 
stability to the region. Limited revision and the cession of as few non-Magyars to 
Hungary as possible was recommended by Sargent and Nichols, due to the harsh past 
treatment of nationalities in Hungary. These notions largely determined British views 
on Hungarian revisionism at this time, which became the underlying reason for 
recommending only a very limited frontier revision in favour of Hungary. However, due 
to Hitler`s disinterest towards settling the Magyar claims at Munich, the British did not 
raise the question either.  
After Munich, both Chamberlain and the Foreign Office accepted Germany`s 
leading role in determining the territorial status quo of Central Europe. This however 
was not simply due to German pressure. New evidence presented here has proved that at 
the end of 1938 ethnographic frontiers in the region would have also been Whitehall`s 
preferred criteria in reconstructing the status quo of Central Europe. For this reason, 
London welcomed the First Vienna Award, which was felt to follow the ethnographic 
line between Hungarians and Slovaks.  
Historians have not perceived that Hungary`s adherence to the Anti-Comintern 
pact in January 1939 seriously undermined Hungary`s image in London, because it was 
viewed as a gratitude to Germany for the First Vienna Award.
3 The First Vienna Award, 
Hungary`s first revisionist gain, immediately brought the underlying differences 
between British and Hungarian perceptions to light. In order to regain its lost territories, 
which was considered as the basis for Hungary`s revival, Teleki was ready to flirt with 
Germany to the verge of open collaboration. Teleki expected London to understand this 
policy, and when faced with British disapproval and lack of support, he turned to Berlin 
for assistance in his revisionist aims. London expected clear and open Hungarian 
resistance, and was not satisfied with Hungary`s lukewarm assurances. Nevertheless, 
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London was still eager to maintain cordial relations with Budapest, as long as Hungary 
showed signs of possible resistance. Hence, the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia in 
March 1939 was acknowledged as a fait accompli and marked a notably different 
British reception compared to the German aggression against Bohemia-Moravia.   
As a military conflict with Germany seemed more and more inevitable after the 
destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, the ideal of creating ethnographic justice and balance 
soon became the victim of strategic interests. The Hungarian-Romanian discord after 
the Hungarian occupation of Ruthenia was viewed from the perspective of its strategic 
implications, namely that economicly and strategically Romania was more valuable. 
Hungary`s persistent claims in Romania, as with the Czechoslovak crisis, were viewed 
by Chamberlain and the Foreign Office as occuring through German encouragement, 
and even though there were more than 1 600,000 Magyars in Romania, the revision of 
the Hungarian-Romanian frontier was discouraged.  
Nonetheless, British strategy in the region was in the process of transformation 
and Whitehall contemplated the creation of an anti-German regional bloc. The new 
evidence brought forward by this thesis suggests that Teleki`s anti-Nazi policies 
convinced London that Hungary had a place in this combination. Even though Romania 
was guaranteed by Britain, through Hungary`s insistence the door was left open for 
future frontier change. Crucially, this became one of the underpinning reasons for 
guaranteeing only the independence and not the territorial integrity of Romania. The 
consulted archival material also revealed (previously unknown to historians) that in the 
spring of 1939 under specific circumstances, Britain considered guaranteeing and 
helping Hungary if war broke out. It is an intriguing new development in the study of 
British policy toward Central Europe and in our understanding of British opinion of 
Hungary. However, it has to be stressed that the shift in British opinion was 
underpinned by the strategic interest of encircling Germany. Hungarian territorial 
claims complicated this policy by creating antagonism in the region, therefore they were 
swept under the carpet.  
The outbreak of the war put British opinion about Hungarian revisionism in a 
whole new context. British attitudes towards the frontiers of Hungary essentially 
worked in two dimensions: war strategy and post-war planning. For some time, these 
worked alongside each other, following very different aims. The British foreign policy-
making elite were united in refusing to make territorial promises for the duration of the 257	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
war, to avoid the repetition of the ill-fated territorial commitments of the Great War. 
This became one of the reasons for discouraging Hungarian claims during the war. 
Hungary`s dubious foreign policy during the first months of the war also disheartened 
British hopes of any accord with Hungary and made London reluctant to consider 
Hungarian demands. For example, the Hungarian refusal to grant military passage for 
the Wehrmacht during the German-Polish war, and the cordial treatment of Polish 
refugees by Hungary had a positive reception in London. On the other hand Budapest`s 
refusal to declare neutrality, and the proclamation of `armed neutrality` was viewed as a 
definite sign of a German-Hungarian military cooperation against Romania. However, 
as earlier, the amicable tone was maintained outwardly. For these reasons, until the end 
of 1939	 ﾠthe contrast between the friendly official attitude and the discouragement of 
frontier revision persisted.  
Then again, in the last days of 1939, Hungary was sending positive signals to the 
West. Budapest declared it would stay neutral if a Soviet-Romanian war broke out over 
Bessarabia. This marked a significant shift in the British attitude. Possibly as a reaction 
to this positive change in Hungary`s policy, although showing great caution, in early 
1940 London attempted to mediate between Budapest and Bucharest. A proposition was 
put forward about a small modification of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier, which 
would have been combined with the transfer of the entire Magyar minority in Romania 
to Hungary. The British role in this scheme has so far been unknown to historians, and 
challenges our understanding of the British `no territorial commitment` policy over the 
war. The Foreign Office opinion was drawn up by Sargent and Cadogan, who were 
disgusted by Hungary`s refusal to consider this territorial offer, which indeed was the 
first step on the road towards complete estrangement between London and Budapest. 
The Foreign Office was unable to understand all the fuss about revisionism over the last 
two decades in the light of the Hungarian refusal to consider the January 1940 offer. At 
this point the Foreign Office`s and Halifax`s opinion markedly differed. Even after the 
fiasco of this proposition, completely unaware of the realities of the time and the region, 
Halifax became a staunch advocate of the creation of a neutral bloc consisting of 
Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, in order to keep these countries out of the 
German sphere.     258	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This was the point when Teleki put forward his counter-claims in February 1940 
for two-thirds of Transylvania, which finally let the cat out of the bag and made it clear 
that British and Hungarian policies and perceptions about Hungary`s future frontiers 
were a huge distance apart. Teleki`s claim of two-thirds of Transylvania was considered 
particularly untimely, unfounded and greatly exaggerated by London, even though 
Teleki viewed it as a generous compromise.  
Although post-war planning had started as soon as war broke out, until late 1940 
the process was in its infancy. Nonetheless, it was clear from the outset that the FRPS 
academics, mandated to work on post-war planning, were contemplating the future 
territorial status quo of Central Europe on the principle of drawing frontiers running 
along ethnographic lines, as it was considered the only solution to achieve stability. The 
implications of this for Hungary`s future frontiers were very unclear at this early stage 
because from early 1940 the Foreign Office aimed to assume a tighter control over 
peace plans. This transformation coincided with receiving Teleki`s counterclaims. Due 
to these, Sargent and Cadogan declared in March 1940 that after the war a political 
decision would be made about Hungary`s frontiers and in this context the level of 
Hungary`s resistance to German pressure would be carefully weighed. However, as 
early as the spring of 1940 it was clear that the scholarly opinion of the FRPS would be 
mostly side-tracked. The intervention of Sargent and Cadogan ensured that Teleki`s 
proposal would be completely dismissed and the Versailles frontiers would be restored, 
with only minor rectifications based on ethnicity.   
Since the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia in March 1939, Whitehall`s primary 
strategic aim in the region was to prevent Germany from controlling the Romanian oil-
fields. Hungarian territorial claims for Transylvania were seen as a German Trojan 
horse, and became one of the underlying reasons for the discouragement of wider 
Hungarian claims in Romania. From the outbreak of war London expected that Hungary 
in return for support from Germany for its demands in Transylvania, would attack 
Romania in cooperation with Germany, or as a least worst scenario, would allow the 
free passage of the Wehrmacht through its territory. London was unaware that during 
the German-Polish war, István Csáky had already promised free passage to Germany for 
supporting Hungarian aspirations for Transylvania. Historians have been aware that 
allowing a military passage had been the Gordian knot for Teleki, who was keen to 259	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preserve Hungarian independence, but so far the issue remained theoretical in the 
historiography. 
British official sources have now shown that Berlin requested a passage in 
March, and the request was granted by Budapest in early April. The Hungarian 
compliance changes our understanding of Hungarian foreign policy and suggests that 
contrary to the previous historiography, Teleki lost faith in the possibility of an ultimate 
Allied victory even before the collapse of France and seemingly made a final decision to 
side with Germany in return for territorial gains. It is clear that the Hungarian decision 
had pivotal implications for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. Hungary`s action had a 
particularly negative reception in London, and crucially affected perceptions of 
Hungarian revisionism. As a result, the future of the First Vienna Award, and 
Hungarian authority over Ruthenia, was now openly questioned by key policy-makers, 
and similarly reserved opinions were articulated towards the question of the Hungarian-
Romanian territorial dispute. The change of tone evidently suggests that confidence was 
shaken in the Hungarian elite. It has also been demonstrated that the British approach 
towards Hungary`s renewed claims in Romania in the summer of 1940, and the 
judgement of the Second Vienna Award, largely reflected this perception. The 
Hungarian `droit` also crucially determined British views about the future status quo of 
the region. Henceforth, London viewed the Czecho-Slovak émigrés more positively, 
and disregarded Hungarian concerns about the recreation of Czechoslovakia after the 
war. One of the most significant findings to emerge is that the Hungarian `droit` clearly 
explains the radical contrast between the positive British opinion of Hungary in early 
1940 and the condemnation of the Second Vienna Arbitration in August 1940. This, 
until now, has only been explained by historians with the vague argument that Hungary 
followed a more and more pro-German policy.  
  This thesis has also challenged the widely held belief that after the Allied defeat 
on the Western Front London was not interested in Central Europe and its complicated 
territorial and minority questions, because Britain was fully absorbed in fighting for its 
own survival. The new evidence has vividly demonstrated that, regardless of the fact 
that the region lost its strategic importance, in the sphere of propaganda Britain was 
more active than ever before towards the region. In July 1940 Romania turned its back 
on Britain and openly sided with Germany. Crucially, a comparison of the aims and 260	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tools of the British propaganda campaigns towards Hungary and Romania in an era 
when both countries were viewed as German satellites has answered one of the key 
questions of our study: why was Hungary viewed more negatively than Romania, and 
was it only because of Hungary`s persistent territorial ambitions? It is clear that 
historical perceptions guided the viewpoints of the Foreign Office about Hungary, but 
this was not the only reason for favouring Romania. As at the end of the Great War, and 
during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-39, Hungary was usually viewed as a feudal and 
socially backward country, which traditionally cooperated with Germany and treated its 
minorities harshly. In comparison, the will of the Romanian nation for independence, 
and the chances of Romanian resistance against Germany were believed to be more 
genuine and potent; therefore London stood by Bucharest, even though Romania turned 
its back on Britain after the French defeat. These notions had crucially affected the 
views of key policy-makers regarding the future geographical form of Hungary, and it 
seemed that the Romanian and Czechoslovak arguments would take precedence at the 
post-war determination of Hungary`s frontiers. 
For all these reasons, the Second Vienna Award was officially rejected by 
London. Although, the official reaction to the Second Vienna Award significantly 
differed from opinion expressed during internal Foreign Office discussions (which 
surprisingly viewed the award as a potential basis for redrawing the Hungarian-
Romanian frontier), the perception of key policy-makers largely worked within the 
limitations of past perceptions about Hungary, current strategic interests and vague 
ideas about post-war Europe.  
By late 1940, discussion in the Foreign Office about post-war Central Europe, 
and scholarly analysis in the FRPS reached the same conclusions. In order to remove 
antagonisms between the states of the region, to provide stability and to increase the 
chance of future regional cooperation against Germany, the creation of multi-national 
confederations were recommended. The confederations would be organised on the 
principle of `ethnographic justice`, which peace-planners were hoping to achieve by 
drawing ethnographic frontiers and transferring national minorities. The confederation 
plans were not finalised until the autumn of 1942, therefore it is difficult to accurately 
tell what frontiers were planned for Hungary at the end of 1940 and in 1941. The FRPS 
memoranda, the initial discussions of the War Aims Committee, the propaganda 261	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activities of the PID and the internal discussions in the Foreign Office - all suggested 
that most of Hungary’s recent territorial acquisitions would be reversed at the peace 
conference.   
 Britain broke its diplomatic relationship with Bucharest in January 1941 
because the country became the base of the German army. As a result, opinions about 
Romania seriously deteriorated in London, and faith in the Western sympathy of the 
Romanian nation had also been shaken. Consequently, British perceptions towards 
Hungary were transformed radically. One of the other reasons for the change in the 
British attitude was that Hungary was transferred from the Southern to the Central 
department, in which the senior officials,	 ﾠFrank Roberts and Roger Makins, in 
comparison to Sargent`s anti-Hungarian tone, displayed warm friendship and 
understanding towards Hungary. They turned a blind eye towards the pro-German tone 
of the Hungarian press, the passage of the German army to Romania through Hungarian 
territory, and argued that compared to the political machination of the Czechs in 
London and the unreliability of Romanians, the Hungarians had genuine pro-British 
feelings. The paradox of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship is that in spite of the Central 
department`s positive opinion, London broke off diplomatic relations with Hungary in 
April 1941 and declared war later in December. Analysing this problem more closely 
has answered one of the key questions of this research: who made foreign policy 
towards Hungary in Whitehall? We have shown that in questions of war and peace the 
opinion of Foreign Office officials counted for very little. The Cabinet and the new 
foreign secretary Anthony Eden made decisions on their own judgement and on the 
recommendations of Cadogan, the effective head of the Foreign Office; the views of 
Roberts and Makins were side-lined. Even though the Central department was firmly 
against severing diplomatic relations and declaring war, Eden and Cadogan followed 
British strategic aims, which dictated supporting anyone fighting Hitler.  
This result also shows why British opinion fluctuated so dramatically towards 
Hungary throughout these years. András Bán suggested that the occasional positive 
signals from Budapest about Hungary`s pro-British feelings had a crucial impact on 
London. It is however evident that these shifts occurred due to the nature of the British 
foreign policy-making process. During times of international crisis, policy was made at 
the highest level of hierarchy. Amid the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938-39 policy-making 262	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was governed by Chamberlain and Halifax. Again, in April 1941, when the Axis 
overran Yugoslavia and Greece, decisions about Hungary were made by Eden and 
Cadogan, who viewed Hungary`s adherence to the Axis in November 1940 and 
Hungary`s participation in the attack on Yugoslavia as the culmination of Hungary`s 
tendentiously pro-German policy. In the period between these two crises, the everyday 
conduct of policy towards Hungary was largely made by the Foreign Office, where 
policy-making was divided between a larger number of senior officials, who often made 
decisions without consulting each other.  
The traditional method of writing the relationship of two countries solely 
through the prism of diplomatic correspondence has been contested here. Analysing the 
opinion of governmental bodies and other agencies, such as the PID, the FRPS, or the 
BBC for instance, has highlighted the complexity of the British foreign policy-making 
process and how views and influences were evaluated by decision-makers, especially 
for second-tier countries like Hungary. It is clear that the specialised subject of 
Hungary`s territorial question was viewed differently at the various spheres and stages 
of policy-making. Also, the juxtaposition of British official opinion on the questions of 
Soviet-occupied Poland, Bessarabia or Southern Dobruja with the Hungarian claims in 
Transylvania has provided a comparative regional perspective and validated the 
hypothesis that London viewed territorial disputes in the region from the perspective of 
its own strategic interests.  
This research has therefore demonstrated that both the analysis of the Anglo-
Hungarian relationship and British foreign policy towards Central Europe has to leave 
its geographical limitations, the context broadened by considering other angles such as 
the Czechoslovak, Romanian, Balkan and Soviet and even the Mediterranean, as all 
these regions were linked in British strategy. The Hungarian `droit` and the strategic 
need to find allies on the continent shifted British attitudes: the Czechoslovak émigrés 
were viewed with more sympathy. However, after 1941, the Soviet Union had a 
massive impact on British post-war planning. British peace-planning was only 
accelerated in late 1941, in reaction to increasing Soviet interests and territorial claims.  
A number of lines are set out for future historical inquiry. Little has been written 
about the impact of Hungarian revisionism on the relationship between Hungary and its 263	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neighbours. Due to the destruction of archival materials during the war some of these 
questions are problematic to analyse. The generally well-informed British sources can 
possibly remedy this lacuna. Equally, this study provides a valuable perspective for 
historians researching London`s relationship with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania 
and Yugoslavia. It therefore appears increasingly desirable to bring the historians of 
regional states together, in order to better synthesize British policy towards Central 
Europe and the Balkans.   
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8, Appendices 
8. 1. Maps: 
 
Map 1.1: The stages of the aggrandizement of Hungary (1938-1941)	 ﾠ[the map is the a modified 
version of: Köztes-Európa térképtár,ed. by Pándi et al, map 224] 
	 ﾠ
Map 1.2: The ethnic map of Hungary (circa 1880) [source: `The ethnic map of Hungary, 1880`, - See 
more at: http://www.hunsor.se/trianon/treatyoftrianon1920.html (accessed: 1 November 2013)] 265	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Map 1.3: The territorial consequences of the Treaty of Trianon [the map is the modified version of: 
Köztes-Európa térképtár, ed. by Pándi et al, map 322] 
 
 
Map 2.1: The Little Entente [source: I. Deak, `The Versailles System and Central Europe`, The English 
Historical Review 490 (2006), p. 338] 266	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Map 2.2: The strategic implications of a German-Hungarian military cooperation  
against Czechoslovakia (1938) [the map is the modified version of: `The map of Czechoslovakia 1938`, 
- See more at: <http://althistory.wikia.com/wiki/File:Map_of_Czechoslovakia_1938.png> (accessed: 1 
Octiber 2013)] 
 
 
 
Map 2.3: The recommendation of the Foreign Office on the Hungarian-Czechoslovak frontier  
[red shaded areas] (September 1938) [the map is the modified version of: Köztes-Európa térképtár, ed. 
by Pándi et al, map 198] 
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Map 2.4: The alternative recommendation of the Foreign Office (September 1938), compared to the 
First Vienna Award (2 November 1938) [the settlements marked with the circles represent the towns 
and cities of figure 2.1] [the map is the modified version of: `The physical map of Slovakia`, - See more 
at: <http://www.ezilon.com/maps/europe/slovakia-physical-maps.html> (accessed: 1 July 2013)] 
The `80 percent recommendation` 
	 ﾠ The First Vienna Award 
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Map 2.5: The strategic railway connection between Czechoslovakia and Romania (1938)	 ﾠ[the map is 
the modified version of: Köztes-Európa térképtár, ed. by Pándi et al, map 198] 
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Map 2.6: The districts of Ruthenia inhabited by Magyars (marked by the red line)  
(Note that the Vienna Award closely followed the ethnographic line and ceded these territories to 
Hungary on 2 November 1938) [source: `Ruthenia, First Vienna Award`, - See more at: 
<http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=233880> (accessed: 1 November 2013)] 
 
 
	 ﾠ
Map 2.7: The First Vienna Award (2 November 1938) [source: `Az elsõ bécsi döntéssel visszacsatolt 
területek`, in A XX. század krónikája, ed. by I. Karádi et al (Budapest, 1994), p. 533.] 
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Map 2.8: Romanian demands in Ruthenia in March 1939	 ﾠ[the map is the modified version of: 
`Ruthenia`, - See more at: <http://www.euratlas.net/history/hisatlas/balkan_states/199445RU.html> 
(accessed: 12 November 2013)] 
(red area – initial Romanian demand; yellow area – last Romanian demand; blue line – Rahó-
Kőrösmező railway line) 
 
 
Map 2.9: The Slovak territory occupied by Hungary in the mini-war (blue shaded area, April 1939) 
[source: `Atlas of Slovakia`, - See more at: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Atlas_of_Slovakia 
(accessed 15 July 2012)] 
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Map 2.10: The Corridor plans in Transylvania (1939) [the map is the modified version of: `Magyarok 
Erdélyben`- See more at: <http://nagymagyarorszag.network.hu/kepek/klubkepek/magyarok_erdelyben> 
(accessed: 4 January 2013)] 
 
Map 3.1: The Kassa-Velejte railway line (TNA, FO 925/20115) 
     
Trianon frontier of Hungary 
(1920) 
The First Vienna Award 
frontier (1938) 
The Kassa-Velejte Railwayline 271	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Map 3.2: The Hungarian strategic claim of the East-Carpathians (late 1939) 
[the map is the modified version of: `The map of Romania`,- See more at:  <http://www.world-
geographics.com/maps/europe/map-of-romania/> (accessed: 12 April 2013)] 
Hungarian frontier 
(September 1939) 
Hungarian claim for the 
Eastern-Carpathians 
The strategically crucial	 ﾠ
Focșani-Galati gap  
 
 
Map 3.3: The frontiers of the November 1939 Foreign Office secret plan 
Churchill`s proposition at the Teheran Conference (November 1943) [the map is a modified version 
of: Köztes-Európa térképtár, ed. by Pándi et al, map 232c] 272	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Map 3.4: Teleki`s concept for revision in January 1940 [the map is the modified version of: 
`Magyarország térképe 1939`, - See more at: <http://hungary-maps.myhunet.com/en/View-Map/Hungary-
map-1939/mo1939/> (accessed 7 June 2012)] 
 
Map 3.5: The German offer of the Polish gas-fields to Hungary (September 1939) 
[the map is the modified version of: Köztes-Európa térképtár, ed. by Pándi et al, map 205] 
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Map 3.6: The British-Romanian proposition for revision (January 1940) [the map is the modified 
version of: `East Central and Southeast Europe nationality map`, - See more at: 
<http://www.mappery.com/East-Central-and-Southeast-Europe-Nationality-Map> (accessed: 11 
September 2012)] 
 
 
Map 3.7: Foreign Office sketch-map of the anticipated Hungarian claims in Romania 274	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 (January 1940) (TNA, FO 371/24985, R 1892/246/37) 
 
  Map 3.8: The `extended corridor-plan` in Transylvania (February 1940)	 ﾠ[the map is the modified 
version of: `Magyarok Erdélyben`- See more at:  <http://nagymagyarorszag.network.hu/kepek/klubkepek 
/magyarok _erdelyben> (accessed: 4 January 2013)]   
 
Map 3.9: Teleki`s official territorial claims (February 1940) [the map is the modified version of: 
`Magyarok Erdélyben` - See more at: 
<http://nagymagyarorszag.network.hu/kepek/klubkepek/magyarok_erdelyben> (accessed: 4 January 
2013)] 
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Map 4.1: British and Italian positions in the Mediterranean (spring 1940) 
Malta, etc. – British posessions, Tripoli, etc. – Italian posessions 
 [source: `Allied Maritime Responsibilities`, - See more at: <http://www.naval-
history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed.htm> (accessed: 3 May 2013)] 
 
 
 
Map 4.2: The presumable route of the German military passage through Hungary 
(Spring 1940) [Note that the route crosses Yugoslav territory.] 
[the map is the modified version of: `Germany’s borders before World War Two` in 
Collier`s World Atlas and Gazeetteer, ed. by P. F. Collier et al (London, 1940), p. 34]  
Hungary	 ﾠ276	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
 
Map 5.1a: The Arad-Sigeth line (TNA, FO 371/ 24984, R 6731/195/37) 
 
Map 5.1b: The Arad-Sigeth line (TNA, FO 371/ 24984, R 6871/195/37) 
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Map 5.2: Mabbott`s recommendations for the Hungarian-Romanian frontier (May 1940) (SEW 
13/1)  
 
 
Map 5.3: Bulgarian territorial claims for Southern Dobruja (1940) 
[the map is the modified version of: `Dobruja`, - See more at: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dobruja> 
(accessed: 9 November 2012)] 
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(the Bulgarian claim in 1940) 
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Map 5.4: The Second Vienna Award (30 August 1940) compared to Hungary`s original 
demands  
[the map is the modified version of: `Evolutia administrativ-teritoriala a Romaniei de la Cuza 
pana azi` - See more at: <http://surupaceanu.ro/2011/06/evolutia-administrativ-teritoriala-a-
romaniei-de-la-cuza-pana-azi/#sthash.9OPAq2KQ.dpuf> (accessed: 4 August 2012)] 
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Map 6.1: Bulgaria`s territorial changes 
Bulgaria in the interwar period 
Bulgarian territorial claims: Thrace and South-Dobruja 
 [the map is the modified version of: Köztes-Európa térképtár, ed. by Pándi et al, map 325] 
 
 
 
 
Map 6.2: Hungarian claim for the Drava triangle [the map is the modified version of: `Map of 
Yugoslavia 1939`, - See more at: <http://maps.nationmaster.com/country/yu/1> (accessed: 11 October 
2012)] 280	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Map 6.3: The Teschen dispute between Czechoslovakia and Poland [the map is the modified version 
of: `Czechoslovakia 1938`, - See more at: <http://movelands.com/czechoslovakia/> (accessed: 21 August 
2013)] 
 
 
 
Map 6.4: Ruthenia, as a corridor between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union 
[the map is the modified version of: Köztes-Európa térképtár, ed. by Pándi et al, map 198] 281	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Map 6.5: The Hungarian occupation of Northern parts of Yugoslavia (April 1941) 
[the map is the modified version of: Köztes-Európa térképtár,ed. by Pándi et al, map 211] 
 
 
 
Map 6.6: The German plan for a Swabian buffer state (1941) 
[the map is the modified version of: Köztes-Európa térképtár,ed. by Pándi et al, map 224] 282	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 ﾠ Central Department (1938) 
Head of Department   William Strang 
Superintending Under-
Secretary  Orme Sargent 
Senior official  C. W.Baxter 
Senior official  W. I. Mallet 
   F. K. Roberts 
   R. E. Barkley 
   W. G. Lawford 
   P. F. Hancock 
Responsibility: Belgium, 
Danzig, Germany, Poland, 
Europe general  	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
 
Table: 1.1: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1938) 
 
 
 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ  
 
Table: 1.2: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1938) 
	 ﾠ
Southern Department (1938)
Head of Department  E.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠIngram
Superintending Under-Secretary O.	 ﾠSargent
Senior official P.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠNichols
A.	 ﾠN.	 ﾠN.	 ﾠNoble
C.	 ﾠBramwell
G.	 ﾠL.	 ﾠMcDermott
A.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠRoss
Responsibility: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, Romania, etc.283	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Central Department 
(1939) 
Head of Department   William	 ﾠStrang	 ﾠ
Superintending Under-Secretary  Orme	 ﾠSargent	 ﾠ
Senior official  I.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠKirkpatrick	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ R.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠMakins	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ F.	 ﾠK.	 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ R.	 ﾠL.	 ﾠSpeaight	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ R.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠBarclay	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ R.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠSelby	 ﾠ
Responsibility: Belgium, Danzig, Germany, Poland, 
Europe general  	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
 
Table: 1.3: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1939) 
 
 
 
 
Table: 1.4: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1939) 
	 ﾠ
Southern Department (1939)
Head of Department  E.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠIngram
Superintending Under-Secretary O.	 ﾠSargent
Senior official P.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠNichols
A.	 ﾠN.	 ﾠN.	 ﾠNoble
J.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠCoulson
C.	 ﾠH.	 ﾠS.	 ﾠBarclay
F.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠBrown
Responsibility: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, Romania, etc.284	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Central Department 
(1940) 
Head of Department   I.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠKirkpatrick	 ﾠ
Superintending Under-
Secretary  William	 ﾠStrang	 ﾠ
Senior official  R.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠMakins	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ F.	 ﾠK.	 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ A.	 ﾠF.	 ﾠOrchard	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ G.	 ﾠP.	 ﾠYoung	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ R.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠBarclay	 ﾠ
Responsibility: Germany, 
Poland, Hungary, France, 
Europe general, etc.  	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
 
Table: 1.5: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1940) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 1.6: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1940) 
 
 
Southern Department (1940)
Head of Department  P.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠNichols
Superintending Under-Secretary O.	 ﾠSargent
Senior official A.	 ﾠN.	 ﾠN.	 ﾠNoble
R.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠBowker
P.	 ﾠBroad
C.	 ﾠA.	 ﾠE.	 ﾠSuckhburg
F.	 ﾠD.	 ﾠW.	 ﾠBrown
Responsibility: Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.285	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Central Department (1941) 
Head of Department  R.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠMakins	 ﾠ
Superintending Under-Secretary  William	 ﾠStrang	 ﾠ
Senior official  F.	 ﾠK.	 ﾠRoberts	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ G.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠWarr	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ J.	 ﾠG.	 ﾠWard	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ M.S.	 ﾠWilliams	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ J.	 ﾠY.	 ﾠMackenzie	 ﾠ
Responsibility: Germany, Poland, Hungary, France, Europe general, etc. 
 
Table: 1.7: The Central department of the Foreign Office (1941) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: 1.8: The Southern department of the Foreign Office (1941) 
 
 
 
Southern Department (1941)
Head of Department  P.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠB.	 ﾠNichols
Superintending Under-Secretary O.	 ﾠSargent
Senior official R.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠBowker
P.	 ﾠJ.	 ﾠDixon
E.	 ﾠM.	 ﾠRose
E.	 ﾠR.	 ﾠWarner
Responsibility: Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.286	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠethnic	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠHungary	 ﾠ(1910)	 ﾠ
(without	 ﾠCroatia)	 ﾠ
Magyars	 ﾠ 54%	 ﾠ
Germans	 ﾠ 10.5%	 ﾠ
Romanians	 ﾠ 16%	 ﾠ
Slovaks	 ﾠ 10.5%	 ﾠ
Serbs	 ﾠ 2.5%	 ﾠ
Ruthenians	 ﾠ 2.5%	 ﾠ
Others	 ﾠ 4%	 ﾠ
 
Table 1.9: The ethnic structure of Hungary (1910)  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. 1: List of diplomatic representatives in selected countries (1938-41)  
 
Country	 ﾠ(Location	 ﾠof	 ﾠEmbassy/Mission): British	 ﾠRepresentative: Representative	 ﾠin	 ﾠBritain:
Bulgaria	 ﾠ(Sophia) George	 ﾠRendel Nicolas	 ﾠMomtchiloff
France	 ﾠ(Paris) Sir	 ﾠEric	 ﾠPhipps,	 ﾠSir	 ﾠRonald	 ﾠH.Campbell	 ﾠ(from	 ﾠ1/11/39) Charles	 ﾠCorbin
Hungary	 ﾠ(Budapest) Sir	 ﾠGeoffrey	 ﾠKnox,	 ﾠOwen	 ﾠO’Malley	 ﾠ(from	 ﾠ11/04/39) György	 ﾠBarcza
Italy	 ﾠ(Rome) Lord	 ﾠPerth,	 ﾠSir	 ﾠPercy	 ﾠLoraine	 ﾠ(from	 ﾠ1/9/39) Giuseppe	 ﾠBastianini
Poland	 ﾠ(Government	 ﾠin	 ﾠExile,	 ﾠAngers) Sir	 ﾠHoward	 ﾠKennard Count	 ﾠEdward	 ﾠRaczynski
Romania	 ﾠ(Bucharest) Sir	 ﾠReginald	 ﾠHoare Viorel	 ﾠVirgil	 ﾠTilea
U.S.A.	 ﾠ(Washington) Lord	 ﾠLothian,	 ﾠLord	 ﾠHalifax	 ﾠ(from	 ﾠ30/11/40) Joseph	 ﾠKennedy
U.S.S.R.	 ﾠ(Moscow) Sir	 ﾠWilliam	 ﾠSeeds,	 ﾠSir	 ﾠStafford	 ﾠCripps	 ﾠ(30/5/40) Ivan	 ﾠMaisky
Yugoslavia	 ﾠ(Belgrade) Sir	 ﾠR.H.	 ﾠCampbell,	 ﾠRonald	 ﾠI.	 ﾠCampbell	 ﾠ(from	 ﾠ13/12/39) Ivan	 ﾠSoubbotich287	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
 
Table 2.1: The recommendation of the Foreign Office of the cities and towns to be 
transferred to Hungary (September 1938) 
	 ﾠ  288	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9. Glossary: 
  
Cordon Sanitaire – “sanitary cordon”; after the Great War it originally denoted a barrier 
(consisting of the Baltic States, Poland and Romania) implemented to stop the spread of 
Communism.  
De facto - In international law, it means “in practice, but not officially established.” It is 
commonly used in contrast to de jure. 
De jure - “concerning law”. 
Démarche – a formal and often strongly worded diplomatic representation of the 
official position, on a specific subject from one government to another. 
Diktat - A diktat is a statute or harsh settlement imposed upon a defeated party or 
country by the victor(s). 
Droit de passage - right of military passage. 
Fait accompli – “an accomplished fact” 
Gleichschaltung – “the forced exploitation, or standardization of political and social 
institutions under an authoritarian regime” 
Per se – “as such, or as a matter of law” 
Primus inter pares – “first among equals” 
Volte face – “a dramatic change in mood or tone” 
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